With the Courage of Desperation: Germany's Defence of the Southern Sector of the Eastern Front 1944-45

By Rolf Hinze

In his historical series Hinze provides the only comprehensive account of events on the central and southern portions of the German Eastern Front during the years of German retreat. This volume covers events on the southern portion of the Eastern Front from July 1944, in the aftermath of the cataclysmic defeat of Heeresgruppe Mitte, through the Soviet drive to victory.

Events covered include the retrograde fighting of 4th Panzer-Armee, the situation on the flanks of Heeresgruppe Nordukraine, operations around Lemberg, and the settling of positions along the line of the Vistula river. The Soviet drive through Rumania against Heeresgruppe Südukraine is described, leading to the fall of Bucharest before the panorama moves into the Hungarian Puszta. The German attempts to stem the Soviet drive on Budapest, the Gran bridgehead and the last great German offensive of the war, Operation 'Spring Awakening' are all recounted, as is the steady and now inevitable final withdrawal and defeat of the remaining Axis forces as the Soviets penetrate into Austria. The fall of both Budapest and Vienna are related, before Hinze completes his study with the final battles in Austria and the area north of the Danube.

Hinze's accounts are indispensable to any study of the decline and collapse of the German Eastern Front, and are published by Helion across three volumes - the great retreats across the Ukraine to the borders of Hungary and Rumania, and the evacuation of the Crimean Peninsula (Crucible of Combat), the fate of Heeresgruppen Nordukraine, Sudukraine and Sud-/ Ostmark in 1945 (this volume) and the battles of Heeresgruppe Nordukraine/A/Mitte ('To the Bitter End'). There are no other detailed but comprehensive accounts in which the various individual narratives, unit histories and studies of individual battles may find their place in relation to the big picture. Hinze's maps, alone, would justify his works, for most of the unit histories, narratives and studies of individual battles lack maps illustrating their place in the larger geography of the war. The study is complemented by orders of battle, the aforementioned maps (over 80 of them), plus photographs. Publication of With the Courage of Desperation completes Hinze's trilogy, and represents a keystone to our understanding of the Soviet-German War 1941-45.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: May 19, 2013
• ISBN: 9781909982505

Rolf Hinze

Rolf Hinze specializes in World War II history.

Book preview

Introduction

It may seem presumptuous to think that, more than forty years after the end of the Second World War, there are still enough interested readers to justify historical explanation of the events. Each period of history, however, deserves sufficient study for judging both its domestic and international significance.

In addition, the history of the Second World War initially rested in the hands of authors belonging to the victorious powers who had access to material unavailable to German authors. What frequently amounted to nearly ten years of captivity as prisoners of war left a shortage of German authors who were in a position to research the historical events.

The result was, for the most part, a one-sided presentation shaped by the staged trials in the Soviet Union and the victor’s Nuremberg war–crimes trial, where the only violations of the Hague Laws of Land Warfare and other international standards investigated were those committed by leaders and the military of Germany. Offenses by others were ignored. The Western Powers specified in the ‘Bonn Agreements’ that there would be no investigation of war-crimes by members of their forces. The same immunity was, likewise, extended to the still respected Red Army.

Even a superficial glance reveals incontrovertibly that millions of people would still live today if the victorious powers of the Second World War had, themselves, even approached the discipline with which the German Army respected the Hague Laws of Land Warfare. That holds equally true both for the treatment of the citizens of East Prussia and for the mass-carpet-bombing attacks against the civilian population of the greater German state.

The subsequent research is also of interest to the youth who find the victors’ presentation of history unjust and judgmental and who deserve the facts. The former members of the ‘Feldgrau’, the German soldiers, deserve recognition of how they fought on to the last day of the war, bearing immense burdens, as disciplined fighting men of the German Army.

Obviously, members of the younger, or most recent, generations, face purely human limitations, at least for those who wish to fully experience the thoughts and emotions of those who were actually there. It is hardly possible to fully know the feelings of those who fought in the battle of Cannae, or during the time of the battles between Athens and Sparta, or in the Seven Years’ War, with cut and thrust weapons or firearms, in ordered formations. Thereby every soldier had to realize that if he failed or delayed in his blow, thrust or shot, that he, himself, would fall victim to the enemy’s weapons. The soldiers of these epochs, too, had to overcome the drive for their own survival in order to take part in such battles.

Soldiers in the First and Second World Wars met the same requirements. To rise from the protection of the trenches and charge over open terrain in the face of expected casualties from enemy fire put life at risk and demanded prior subjugation of the drive for self-preservation.

In the Second World War soldiers often took part in attacks that involved assault-by-storm. This, along with physical exhaustion resulting from marching and lack of sleep resulted in a certain indifference to such reflections and obstacles, indeed, to taking them for-granted.

Discipline, comradeship and personal honour formed the backbone for conduct. In addition it was necessary to prevent the Red Army from penetrating into central Europe, and, thus, into Reichs territory. During the period of their occupation of the Soviet Union, the troops had ample opportunity to study conditions under Communism. They had also seen the conduct of the Red Army when it recaptured territory in Rumania, Poland and Hungary. They wished to spare the German homeland such rape and murder, even though there was no longer the slightest prospect of victory, even as the German cause became hopeless and the enemy demanded unconditional surrender, thereby barring any negotiations.

Thus all that was left for the soldiers in the bloody fighting at the end of 1944/start of 1945 was the bare hope of survival, if only as one of the wounded. The only other alternative was as a prisoner of war to the Red Army. Experience had shown that capture by the Red Army generally resulted in a grim form of death by freezing, stabbing, beating, starvation or the like. Death in the German lines offered a preferable fate. Nevertheless, one must remember that every soldier wanted to survive. This desire for survival was subordinated to the higher common interest of shielding the homeland from the grasp of the Red Army. That was despite the ever-increasing material and manpower superiority of the Soviet forces, which caused even greater German losses, yet increasing the divergence in relative strengths.

Since the hostile powers showed no regard for the civilian population, (whether coming from east or west), it seemed to everyone that there was no choice but to fight on, in hopes of averting something even worse. Accordingly the fighting troops did their duty in protecting the naked homeland right up to the day of final surrender, whereupon they then entered captivity with dubious chances for personal survival.

1

Fighting Retreat of Heeresgruppe Nordukraine

¹

Describing a defined portion of the great military confrontation between Germany and the USSR requires an initial decision as to the starting date. A time of absolute cessation of combat for a definite interval would be suitable as the starting point of such a narrative. That, however, presents difficulties during a period of incessant fighting.

Heeresgruppe Süd had, in the meanwhile, been divided into Heeresgruppe Süd – Ukraine and Heeresgruppe Nord-Ukraine. In the former’s sector, the Soviets paused upon reaching the Dnjestr, in part because they needed to bring up supplies, incorporate personnel replacements and reorganize their forces. Most important, however, was their need to develop means to supply a continued advance. Accordingly, the months of June and July 1944 were marked primarily by a variety of local operations with limited objectives such as straightening the front or gaining a more favorable line of defense. The Soviets repeatedly sought to build bridgeheads on the west bank of the Dnjestr.

The left sector of Heeresgruppe Süd, from the Dnjestr via Targul – Frumos to the Carpathian Mountains exhibited a certain calm, probably for the same reasons. Here the Soviets had lost heavily in armour and manpower, which they had to make good, whilst the difficult supply routes first had to be restored to service (railroads, roads).

In the sector of the former left wing of Heeresgruppe Süd, now the sector of Heeresgruppe Nord-Ukraine, the breakout of the German forces from the Hube – Kessel had led to a certain quieting of the front, first with attacks still continuing in the Kolomea area on the one hand, and also north of the location of the breakout, at Bucasz, owing to the previous Soviet intention of forming an additional pincer around the Hube – Kessel.

Heeresgruppe Nord-Ukraine’s command extended south of Brest. After the capture of Tarnopol, the Soviets had, in this entire sector, as a result of the Hube – Kessel, essentially turned to the southwest with their Schwerpunkt in the area between Schepetowka and Sarny. On 1 February Brody fell to the Soviets, as did Luck, on 12 March. Initially the Soviets did not seem to consider this area as very significant, especially since the area to its north, extending to the relatively impassable Pripjet region, was generally under partisan control. Therefore the German forces – initially only police forces – were not concerned with a delaying action, instead organizing for defense in a great salient around Kowel.

However, this area became tactically significant to the Soviets because of the good transport connections to Kowel. All Soviet planning demonstrated that the Soviets prized a serviceable rail line in the rear area for supplying their forces along with effective roads. Kowel was significant as a rail hub, with a single-track line from Korosten via Sarny to Kowel and a double-tracked line from Rowno to Kowel. A double-tracked line ran from Kowel northwest to Brest Litowsk. This direction first became significant to the Soviets after their successes against Heeresgruppe Mitte. The Soviet command had not initially planned that far ahead. In addition, a double-tracked line extended toward Cholm and Lublin, thus on toward the Weichsel [Vistula], in the direction of further Soviet operational plans. Another railroad line extended south from Kowel via Wlodzimierz to Lemberg [Lvov, Lviv], thereby to the Carpathians. This rail line, too, appeared to be of interest for future Soviet operations, for an advance to the Carpathians would yield the opportunity to sever the entire right wing of Heeresgruppe Nord -Ukraine from its rear communications. Such an operation would enable the Soviets to employ their favored tactic of successively encircling cut-off German forces, as they had already just demonstrated in the preceding months on the right wing of the German Eastern Front. The breakout from the Hube – Kessel had, however, eliminated the prerequisites for such operations.

Map 1    The Eastern Front before the Soviet Summer Offensive, 1944.

Map 2    The Eastern Front before the Soviet Summer Offensive, 1944.

Map 3    Fighting around Kowel in March and April, 1944.

The Soviet Operation Bagration, the great offensive against the central German front (Heeresgruppe Mitte) opened later. Without the opportunity to examine Soviet sources it is impossible to tell whether the Soviets already had plans for an advance from Kowel toward Brest, which was a transport hub with supply lines to the German 2nd and 9th Armeen, or whether, as the German command later believed, they had already planned, or dreamed of, a thrust north from Brest. It seems improbable that such considerations could already have played a role at that time, in March of 1944. The later deception-maneuvers of bringing trains to Kowel by night and bringing them back empty by day, which gave the Germans the impression of great troop movements, could only have played a role at the start of June 1944.

Whatever further plans the Soviets may have had, Kowel was important as a rail hub. In the event, during March the Soviets gradually felt their way closer to Kowel against the police units of SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach. Over time they increased pressure, which required reinforcements on the German side, eventually leading to replacement of the police units with Heeres troops.

BATTLE FOR KOWEL

On 16 March forces of the right wing of the 13th Armee Korps were fighting enemy forces advancing to the north and west in defense of the area in and around the vicinity south of Kremienniez. The 340th Infanterie Division had to defend itself against enemy cavalry forces which had some armoured support, whereby the Soviets gained ground west of Luck [Luzk], 54 kilometers southeast of Kowel. In this sector the Soviets continued their attack to the west, eventually cutting the railroad lines leading west and southwest from Kowel approximately six kilometers west and southwest of Kowel, respectively. That immediately forced the Generalgouvernement [German government of that part of Poland not directly annexed to the Reich] to dispatch the 5th SS-Panzer Division ‘Wiking’, which was being reconstituted, along the railroad from the west to Kowel to clear the supply route of enemy forces.

Evaluation of reconnaissance revealed that the Soviets now planned to advance concentrically with the objective of encircling the Kowel railroad hub. North of Kozin the Soviets took Pelcza and Demidowka, forcing the Kowel defense back to the outer ring of the defense and, finally, penetrating into the western and southern portions of the city. With the help of an armoured train, the 5th SS-Panzer Division ‘Wiking’, failed in an attempt to force its way through to Kowel.

German counterattacks succeeded in several sectors, such as the recapture of Kozin by Korpsabteilung C, which knocked out several Soviet AFVs southwest of Dubno. West of Kozin, Division Generalgouvernement repulsed enemy attacks at Prespa on its northern wing. It was, finally, possible to prevent further enemy advances into the southern part of Kowel.

In the meantime, supreme command shifted Heeresgruppen boundaries, assigning the Kowel sector to Heeresgruppe Mitte. That made it easier to bring forces of that Heeresgruppe into Kowel. Thus the 131st Infanterie Division was pulled out of the Lutschessa sector (Witebsk area) and arrived in the combat sector by expedited rail via Luboml.

RELIEF OF KOWEL

On 21 March this division and the 5th SS-Panzer Division ‘Wiking’ moved out from the Maciejow area and the area south of the railroad toward Kowel, advancing to a point 12 kilometers west of Kowel. This thrust, however, suffered from constant Soviet attacks on its flanks. It was possible to knock out a number of Soviet AFVs, but the enemy attacks delayed the advance of the 131st Infanterie Division.

On 26 March all but extremely limited remnants of the enemy forces that had broken into the southern portion of Kowel were destroyed. Similar success was denied in the northern part of the city. With armoured support, the Soviets then attacked what had now been designated the ‘Fester Platz’ Kowel sector from the south, southeast, and northeast.

Because Kowel was now in the Heeresgruppe Mitte sector, it was possible to bring up the 5th Panzer Division along the road from Brest southeast to Kowel. The 5th Jäger Division drove forward along the Brest – Kowel rail line, gaining nine kilometers, to a point just before the Turski canal. Both divisions, belonging to the 56th Panzer Korps, advanced further along the Brest – Kowel road, as did the 211th Infanterie Division. In hard fighting, an attack group of the 42nd Armee Korps advanced north of the railroad line to a position five kilometers west of Kowel. Within the ‘Fester Platz’ fighting continued on 29 March against enemy forces penetrating the south and southeast portions of the city.

On 30 March an armoured element of the 5th SS-Panzer Division ‘Wiking’, with a battalion of the 131st Infanterie Division, broke through to Kowel, briefly restoring contact with the forces encircled there. Heavy enemy attacks from north and south, with remarkably heavy artillery support, promptly severed this contact. All the while the Soviets tightened their ring of encirclement around the ‘Fester Platz’ and bombed the city from the air, causing notable losses.

In the – blocked – supply corridor to Kowel, German forces held a strong point three kilometers west of the city against heavy enemy attacks. Nevertheless, the Skijäger Brigade took another locality five kilometers west of Kowel. On the other hand, on 2 April the Soviets enlarged their penetration from the east into the ‘Fester Platz’ to a breadth of 2.5 kilometers and deepened it to the railroad station grounds.

That caused the 2nd Armee to attack from west to east on 4 April with the 8th Armee Korps and 56th Panzer Korps to reestablish contact with the ‘Fester Platz’. After hard fighting the attack group of the 131st Infanterie Division reached the edge of the woods seven kilometers west of the city. With the 4th Panzer Division the 56th Panzer Korps attacked to the east, regardless of heavy enemy counterattacks with armoured support, reaching a position just west of the Brest – Kowel railroad line. The 5th Panzer Division captured a locality 10 – 12 kilometers east of Smidyn. Elements of the 5th Jäger Division took Wyzwa Nowa and a place eight kilometers south of the city, until contact was restored with the encircled forces of the ‘Fester Platz’ on 5 April. This success was largely due to the 4th Panzer Division. Advancing with an attack group to the east, after heavy house-to-house fighting, it captured a locality on the Brest – Kowel road six kilometers north of Kowel. In conjunction with the 2nd assault troop of the division, it then turned south and broke through southeast along the Brest – Kowel railroad line to Kowel. Directly after the supply route was opened to ‘Fester Platz’ Kowel removal of the wounded from the city was initiated.

Map 4    Situation of Heeresgruppe Nordukraine before the start of the Soviet Summer Offensive on 12 July 1944.

On 6 April the 131st Infanterie Division attacked from east to west, restoring contact with its own strong point at the railroad crossing directly northwest of Kowel. The 4th Panzer Division and 5th Panzer Division ran into heavy enemy resistance in their attack from the area five kilometers northwest of Kowel to the east and northeast. In the meantime resupply of the ‘Fester Platz’ and the removal of wounded proceeded at full steam.

RESTORATION OF A CONTINUOUS LINE OF DEFENSE WITH CONTACT WITH THE 2ND ARMEE OF HEERESGRUPPE MITTE

On 8 April Gruppe ‘Gille’ cleared the western portion of the city from enemy forces. The next day’s mission was to narrow the gap between Heeresgruppe Nord-Ukraine and Heeresgruppe Mitte by advancing Ski-Jäger-Brigade 1. On 17 April the left wing of the 214th Infanterie Division established contact with the southern wing of Heeresgruppe Mitte at Ruda (nine kilometers northwest of Owadno), linking up with Kampfgruppe ‘Lippert’, advancing from Mosur to the southeast. Forces of the ‘Fester Platz’ (Gruppe ‘Gille’) then extended the area of the fortress by advancing to the southwest and south, also capturing the hotly contested railroad strong point west of Kowel. Enemy attacks against the Brest – Kowel road foundered on the defense of the 4th and 5th Panzer Divisionen. These divisions counterattacked and cleaned up a local penetration at the railroad line, knocking out several enemy AFVs.

The German forced an enemy cavalry group that had been cut off in the wooded area east of the Bug, out of Mosur in a generally northward direction before it, thereby taking hundreds of wounded prisoners as well as numerous support vehicles.

The 214th and 72nd Infanterie Divisionen, which had been committed southwest and south of Kowel, cleaned up the area south of Kowel in the ensuing days. On 27 April, in converging attacks, elements of the 131st Infanterie Division encircled strong enemy forces directly south of the Lublin – Kowel railroad line. The situation then temporarily calmed down in this sector.

2

Defensive Combat and Fighting Retreats of the 4th Panzerarmee

GERMAN EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION

The German estimate of Soviet intentions in the Kowel area was, apparently, erroneous. Despite massive superiority in artillery, air and armour, the Soviet command evidently was not ready to assume the risks needed to carry out the plan that Hitler suspected, namely, to advance north from the Kowel area, thereby cutting the entire German central front off from its rear area. Soviet reinforcement of forces in this area had, however, occasioned concern about other intentions, namely an advance to the west. The fear was that this would give the Soviets a broad base of operations on terrain favorable to armour, using Kowel as a supply base. A westward advance would be supported by highroads, in part paved, in this area that were left over from the time when this was Polish territory, as well as double-tracked rail lines both from the east and to the west. The tactics corresponded in detail with those repeatedly employed by the Soviets at this point in the war: repeated encirclement of the desired area, as with their encirclement of Kowel.

This fighting necessarily involved the 8th Armee Korps to the north and the 42nd Armee Korps to the south. The thrusts of the two Soviet pincers had to strike these two adjoining Korps.

8th Armee Korps

The significance of the sector of the 8th Armee Korps between the right wing of the 2nd Armee of Heeresgruppe Mitte and the 56th Panzer Korps of Heeresgruppe Nord-Ukraine had not yet received the recognition it would later get. At the end of June, observations disclosed zealous construction activity: bridge building, construction of corduroy-roads over treacherous terrain, all this with, at times, extravagantly wasteful use of penal-labor. German forces repeatedly sent assault troops to blow up the bridges or attempted to damage them with artillery fire. This seemed only to spur the efforts of the Soviet pioneer battalions to immediately repair the damage. From a distance German observers reported sawing of wood and nailing, the usual preparations for planned crossing of impassable terrain with streams.

The advance of the Soviet pincer-arm north of Kowel also determined the fate of the 8th Armee Korps, which had to maintain contact with the 2nd Armee of Heeresgruppe Mitte, and, later, was intended to cover the southern flank of ‘Festung Brest’ while, on the right, contact was lost with the 56th Panzer Korps. The 8th Armee Korps thereby successfully formed a diagonally positioned front, ending up with its front facing an entirely new direction, to the south, with supplies coming from the north. Since the 4th Panzer Armee of Heeresgruppe Nord-Ukraine could no longer supply the 8th Armee Korps and that Korps could no longer support the actions of its former Heeresgruppe, the Heeresgruppe attached the 8th Armee Korps to Heeresgruppe Mitte.

Henceforth the 8th Armee Korps was given the mission of covering the new wing of the Heeresgruppe Mitte front to the south, taking over the line of defense that was, necessarily, extending itself toward the west.

The Soviets took advantage of this gap in the front to advance onward to the west and, finally, to the northwest toward Warsaw [Warschau].¹

BATTLES OF THE 56TH PANZER KORPS IN THE KOWEL AREA

Preparations

On 14 June 1944 the Soviets in this sector suddenly ended their reticence with a heavy artillery preparation and subsequent infantry attacks. They attacked the hotly contested Kowel – Huszyn road, the left boundary of the 131st Infanterie Division. They also attacked the 26th Infanterie Division. Further observations indicated brisk patrol and assault troop activity throughout the entire Korps sector. Troop movements identified behind the enemy main line of resistance provided further evidence of enemy aggressive intentions. This was given additional support by statements of a line-crosser that the Soviets were crossing the streams with weapons and gas masks, and that, in their political speeches, the Politruks [political officers] were saying that the newly-begun invasion of Western Europe would draw German forces from the Eastern Front.

The Soviets started with planned artillery fire on selected targets. Guide – parties were evident in the enemy MLR [main-line-of-resistance]. Thereupon the 5th Panzer Division moved to the Maciejow area, while the 4th Panzer Division was still tied up in a major anti-partisan operation in the area south of Cholm. Aerial reconnaissance not only reported troops marching on the roads behind the enemy MLR, but also conspicuously heavy rail traffic, consisting primarily of empty trains heading eastward during the day. From this Hitler drew erroneous conclusions regarding Soviet intentions. As noted above, he concluded that the Soviets planned an advance to the north via Brest to the Baltic Sea [Ostsee], thereby cutting off the entire Heeresgruppen Mitte and Nord from their rear areas. These conclusions, however, were contradicted by results of the troops’ own reconnaissance of the enemy, particularly that of the 9th Armee and the 3rd Panzer Armee.

In any case, the forces in the Kowel area organized for defense, mining the terrain between the first and second trench lines. They then set up all weapons for defense against ground-attack aircraft, erected road blocks at the Panzer interception line and reconnoitered the roads for movement from the assembly areas to the Panzer defense lines.

Observations, particularly regarding intense enemy aerial reconnaissance, revealed where the Soviets were building Schwerpunkte. This again led to shifting of sector boundaries. The 214th Infanterie Division boundaries were shifted to the south, as with the 253rd Infanterie Division, to which was attached the 1st Ski-Jäger Division. The 131st Infanterie Division reported particularly heavy enemy movements with an unusually large percentage of lorries with guns and limbers in tow. On 19 June in their sector an enemy assault troop captured two German listening posts, giving rise to the conclusion that the Soviets could discover German intentions in this manner.

In response to the concentration of Soviet artillery German forces adopted a new way of manning their trenches. During the day 1/3 of the manpower was in the first trench, 2/3 in the second, with the proportions reversed during the night. Accordingly, the artillery established its observation posts in depth. Assault troops appeared on the right wing of the 253rd Infanterie Division and the 1st Ski-Jäger Division. Artillery observed Soviet artillery firing by map references, which indicated major reinforcement of Soviet artillery.

In the Kowel area the Soviets achieved small lodgements within the foremost German lines, using assault troops, infantry weapons and artillery support, as well as smoke screens. The 26th Infanterie Division came under a regular attack. After half an hour of drumfire-preparation by all heavy weapons on the German MLR and command posts, particularly 1.5 kilometers east of Szajno, in intense fighting the Soviets attained penetrations in company strength. These were cleaned up by counterattacks, which left numerous enemy dead.

Attack on Kowel

In apparent coordination with the Soviet attack against the central sector of the Eastern Front, Soviet pressure, initially with heavy artillery fire, mounted on the sector adjoining to the south on both sides of the road to Blaznik. The Soviets attacked the 1st Ski-Jäger Division sector in battalion strength. Simultaneously partisans systematically blocked railroads and bridges, with about 1,200 demolitions in the 2nd Armee area, 700 of which caused blockages. The long awaited Soviet offensive, however, did not open on 21 June. Action was initially limited to reconnaissance probes in company, battalion and, finally, in regimental strength.

While the 26th Infanterie Division and 342nd Infanterie Division merely reported active traffic in the section facing them, the 1st Ski-Jäger Division reported massive heavy weapons fire and enemy aerial reconnaissance. A German assault troop, committed in front of the 253rd Infanterie Division, made it to the enemy trenches, but then had to fall back. In the meantime, troop-commanders took part in a map-game involving all divisions of the 56th Panzer Korps, which rehearsed various potential combat situations. Tension increased as, save for ongoing enemy aerial reconnaissance, all divisions suddenly reported a disturbing calm on the battlefield – as was usual before the storm.

The opening of the Soviet offensive in the Heeresgruppe Mitte sector finally affected the Kowel sector, as German armoured formations, such as schwere Panzerabteilung 505, were hastily withdrawn for entrainment in the Maciejow area, offset by assignment of the 2nd Kompanie, Panzer-Jäger Abteilung 655.

After 22 June the Soviets again showed lively march movements, patrol and assault troop activity and sound of engines, which evidenced withdrawal or introduction of new troops and weapons. For the first time utilization was observed of the railroad from Horodyszcze to a point two kilometers from the MLR. The German forces strengthened their positions and prepared for a hard defensive battle. They extended the employment of their artillery batteries to include possible anti-tank fire. The Soviets evidenced apparent intentions of attack in this sector – simultaneous with the offensive against the 3rd Panzer Armee [located on the northern wing of Heeresgruppe Mitte]. That initially supported Hitler’s foresight regarding Soviet intentions.

Soviet preparations for attack continued. In the 131st Infanterie Division sector they strengthened their ground and air-reconnaissance, removed mines from a path in front of the sector of the 26th Infanterie Division sector, which indicated, at the very least, preparation for assault troop operations. Guide- commandos reappeared. Vehicle traffic between Klusk and Tahaczyn mounted, as also on the Woronna – Lubitow road in front of the 342nd Infanterie Division sector.

Previously the pincer attack on Kowel seemed to be a tactical preliminary for an enemy offensive. The new observations suggested another possibility, namely, a shift of the southern point of attack roughly to the area of the 131st Infanterie Division – southern 342nd Infanterie Division sector. Following the withdrawal of the 5th Panzer Division and schwere Panzer Abteilung 505 this sector was held by the 342nd Infanterie Division with SS-Panzer Regiment 5 (less the 1st Abteilung). ²

On 29 June an enemy captive balloon made its first appearance at Huszyn before the northern Korps sector, confirming the German observation that the Soviets were here conducting organized reconnaissance under skilled direction, suggesting preparations for a major operation. That conclusion was further supported by the strong concentration of enemy batteries before Kowel.

Positional and Defensive Fighting around Kowel from 30 June to 7 July

The goals pursued by the Soviets with their operations in the Kowel area appeared, in relation to events in the Heeresgruppe Mitte sector, to be aimed initially at preventing withdrawal of forces for transfer to the Heeresgruppe Mitte combat area to the north. The Soviets employed assault troops, at times in company strength, and also attacks on a larger scale with corresponding artillery preparation. These operations, however, bogged down at the time, in suddenly aroused defense.

Reconnaissance reported that large numbers of motorized vehicles and armour were arriving in the Brody – Rowno area, as well as concentration of new multiple-rocket launchers in the Kowel area. The transformation of Kowel from a ‘Fester Platz’ to an open city offered the potential for preparation of planned maneuvers. The initial focus was on removal of supply dumps from Kowel. Results of aerial reconnaissance indicated replacement of Soviet forces with new troops, along with construction of an advanced airfield northeast of Kolodezno and the landing of Soviet fighters and twin-engine aircraft.

An enemy radio conversation intercepted on July 3, along with captured maps, showed that the Soviets planned to isolate the area of the German penetration at Kowel or, at least, its eastern point, along with a breakthrough in depth. Accordingly several attacks in battalion strength ensued in pincer-fashion against the frontal salient east of Kowel. After several attacks had been repulsed in bloody combat, the elements that had broken in being wiped out, the Soviets fell back to their jump-off positions. Active enemy aerial reconnaissance and the sound of tracked motor-vehicles, along with lively movement, particularly facing the 26th Infanterie Division and the 1st Ski-JägerDivision confirmed that the period of calm had ended. Considering the overall situation of Heeresgruppe Mitte and the weakening of the sector resulting from withdrawal of troops, the German command planned to pull its forces back by stages into the Büffel [buffalo] – Position. This retreat, in part under code names ‘Erdbeere’ [strawberry] and ‘Märchenbuch’ [fairytale book] was planned in three phases, resulting in the evacuation of the Kowel salient.

For this new sector, the 56th Panzer Korps planned a final organization of only three divisions (1st Ski-Jäger Division, 342nd Infanterie Division and 26th Infanterie Division, with attached elements), after the 4th Panzer Division and 5th Panzer Division had been shifted to other Heeresgruppe Mitte sectors.

During the night of 4-5 July the first phase of Operation ‘Erdbeere’ commenced with the evacuation of the Kowel salient and adjoining positions of the 26th Infanterie Division. The Soviets certainly should have utilized this moment for immediate pursuit, since, as prisoner statements showed, the intended evacuation of Kowel was known to them. However, contact with the enemy was broken without their knowledge or interference. At about 0345 hours the usual harassing fire still pounded the old MLR and center of the city, even though the city of Kowel had been evacuated, all military installations and bridges blown, and the rear-guards in blocking positions by about 0320 hours.

The Soviets advanced in two directions, first against the shortened lines in the north and northeast, where a critical situation developed as the result of overhasty falling-back of the rear-guards of the neighbour adjoining to the left from their positions. Elements of the 342nd Infanterie Division initially had to fight to clear the trenches in order to hold the rear. The second thrust via Werbka endangered positions on the high ground southeast of Dubowa. After the disruption of a bridging attempt over the Turja, the Soviets employed ferries to build a bridgehead. This dangerous flanking thrust was, however, repulsed.

Again and again the Soviets launched their assaults that day in order to gain ground toward the blown highroad bridges and attain the west bank of the Turja on a broad front. All attacks bogged down in extremely bitter defensive combat – artillery firing direct. As darkness fell the second phase of the withdrawal commenced, which the Soviets attempted to utilize for pursuit. The 342nd Infanterie Division alone repulsed 17 well-planned attacks.

In the sector of the 26th Infanterie Division the withdrawal had the code name ‘Schneewittchen’ [Snow White]. In the early hours of the morning, the Soviets attempted to interfere, forcing back the right wing of the securing forces, thereby trying to attack the withdrawal movement on both flanks. Contact between the 342nd Infanterie Division and the 26th Infanterie Division, however, was restored by noon. For the first time Soviet armour now appeared, a portion having been quartered in Dubowa.

The Soviets then turned to the center of the Korps front. Making skillful use of the terrain, they crossed the Turja River under cover of fire from heavy weapons and attacked from the covered terrain of the outpost area with Schwerpunkt on both wings of the 131st Infanterie Division. Part of the west bank of the Turja was regained in hand-to-hand combat, but not on the left wing. The Soviets dug in the outpost area and received reinforcements throughout the day. In the meanwhile they developed crossings over the river.

SECOND STAGE OF THE WITHDRAWAL

Even though the second phase of Operation ‘Erdbeere’ went without Soviet interference as far as the withdrawal of the 342nd Infanterie Division, the 6 July attack showed planning, with Schwerpunkt in the northern portion of the Korps sector. In the evening hours attack followed attack, in wooded terrain where lack of observation complicated defense.

In the 342nd Infanterie Division sector the Soviets attacked the rear-guards southwest of Czerkassy along the railroad with support from ground-attack aircraft. The attack, however, failed. They industriously pushed forward reinforcements via Kol. Lubliniec to Dolhonosy in the favorable assembly area of the Czerkassy woods. They built a bridge at Morowiecz. The German rear-guards were forced back before the Soviet pressure. The Soviets were unable to make full use of their artillery during the German retreat because they first had to displace forward.

On 6 July the Soviet offensive extended to other sectors, initially on the ‘Ilse’ Position. In isolated cases counterattacks restored the situation. Schwerpunkte, however, developed in the 26th Infanterie Division sector, attack following attack, with support from armour and ground-attack aircraft. Newly arrived Soviet artillery engaged the German artillery positions. While, in the north, local penetrations were promptly eliminated, ongoing thrusts by massed enemy forces endangered the right wing for a time, forcing back the front at Krasnobudy and in the woods and the high ground southwest of Now. Koszary, exposing the left flank of the 342nd Infanterie Division. Counterattacks by the 26th Infanterie Division, with support of SS-Panzer Regiment 5 restored the situation in that sector in the evening, regaining the MLR.

Beginning of the Soviet Offensive

On 7 and 8 July, after a concentrated artillery preparation, the Soviets finally launched their long-prepared assault on the MLR. The 342nd Infanterie Division repulsed all attacks, with heavy losses to the enemy, with the result that the Soviets pulled the attacking division out of the fighting on the first day, apparently due to its heavy losses. Schwerpunkte also became evident in the center of the Korps front in the 131st Infanterie Division sector. Enemy penetrations in company and battalion strength in the MLR west of Ruzyn were eliminated by hasty counterattacks. A new level of cooperation was seen between the various arms: infantry, artillery and ground-attack aircraft, following the pattern of the recent action against the 3rd Panzer Armee and 9th Armee on the central front.

Defense in the ‘Büffel’ Position (8 to 17 July, 1944)

Heavy commitment of ground-attack aircraft and repeated armoured thrusts against the 342nd Infanterie Division and 26th Infanterie Division with very distinct building of a Schwerpunkt should have achieved the breakthrough. The Soviets planned to accomplish this in a variety of ways. In the Dolsk – Targowiszcze area, as well as the Parybudy – Smidyn areas they launched infantry attacks with accompanying armour on both sides of the Kowel – Maciejow highroad, thrusting forward recklessly into the depth of the positions with armoured wedges. They thrust into the withdrawal movements of the 253rd Infanterie Division northwest of Rastow, thereby revealing the general direction of their planned advance. The wooded terrain before the southern wing of the division – after it had occupied its new MLR – provided the Soviets with a favorable opportunity to assemble for the attack.

On 8 July the Soviets renewed their attack on the MLR with strong artillery support and concentrated ground-attack aircraft – primarily concentrating on the artillery positions and supply traffic – in order to ruthlessly force the breakthrough with division strength forces. After concentrating fire on a narrow area, the Soviets achieved a deep penetration into the positions northeast of Dolsk, as far as the woods one kilometer east of Sosnowka. The immediate counterattack launched from south to west achieved only local successes. The Soviets received constant reinforcements and held on bitterly in the eastern portion of the area of penetration. As a result of the unfavorable terrain, a gap which was in fact sealed off, remained, significantly affecting employment of forces in the coming days.

Nevertheless, on 8 July the 342nd Infanterie Division knocked out 88 Soviet AFVs with artillery or in close-combat, and shot down three aircraft. Enemy bombs and strafing hit the division command post. Despite all this, the division held like iron. On the next day, after the Germans had cleaned up the Soviet penetrations in the central sector of the 26th Infanterie Division (Paryduby – Kruyhell) the Soviets turned against the new positions and, above all, against the Smidyn bridgehead, which the IIIrd Abteilung, SS-Panzerregiment ‘Germania’ held until midday with the 1st Kompanie, SS-Panzer Regiment 5.

With a hitherto unknown expenditure of forces the Soviets attempted to break through at any price. They sent in massed armoured attacks along the highroad and railroad, again with ground-attack aircraft supporting, 40 to 50 aircraft at a time, which supported the armoured spearheads in the breakthrough by bombing the Maciejow railroad crossing and Buda [Ruda] transportation hubs. Individual AFVs advanced along the rail line up to eight kilometers into the terrain to the rear. SS-Panzer Regiment 5 and artillery knocked out a total of 84 AFVs, thereby destroying most of the armour that had broken through. The breakthrough finally failed. The German infantry had allowed itself to be rolled over and then beat back the waves of the Soviet attack left far behind by their armour. The subsequent attack in the evening also failed, despite a drumfire artillery preparation that lasted an hour and a half. In this attack against the right wing the Soviet armour only advanced singly. The enemy artillery laid down smoke between the armour and infantry, significantly reducing the effectiveness of their own armour. One gun of Artillerie Regiment 26 shot down an airplane with a lucky hit by a combination fused round [nose and base fused].

The Soviet losses, which cannot be estimated, must have been considerable. That is the probable reason why the reckless attack failed. Such losses in men and materiel made it necessary to regroup. The manner in which the Soviets conducted combat and their commitment of massed troops, along with the obvious traffic to the rear support the presumption regarding Soviet losses.

The German command desired to eliminate the only enemy achievements of the previous days’ attack, the penetration at Dolsk. An effective Stuka bombing attack supported the operation. The northern attack group cleared the Soviets from the old MLR as far as where the road crossed a stream 2.5 kilometers south of Point 194.4. To the south, however, the Soviets delivered a counterattack with armoured support and thwarted the German attack.

In the 342nd Infanterie Division sector the Soviet attacks from the north and south let up. In an attack west of Targowiszcze the Soviet armour was conspicuously reticent – likely the result of the recent losses in armour. On the next day the attack was directed against the lines of the 26th Infanterie Division on both sides of the highroad and against the western portion of Smidyn. This attack bogged down before it reached the first trenches, except for temporary penetrations at Parybudy and Point 220.8. The Soviets again switched out forces before the lines of the 342nd Infanterie Division. The 5th SS-Panzer Division ‘Wiking’, which had been reconstituted in the Generalgouvernement after breaking out of the Tscherkassy Kessel, reinforced the German forces. It prepared for a thrust against the Dolsk penetration. The division, however, had to abandon its plans due to employment at another point. By midnight of 14 – 15 July the 342nd Infanterie Division had cleaned up the penetration at Dolsk.

Renewed identification of enemy troop concentrations warned of further attacks. The command, therefore, determined to set aside reserves. The 1st Kompanie of Pnazer-Jäger Abteilulng 655, II nd Bataillon of Grenadier-Regiment 453 of the 253rd Infanterie Division and 2nd Batterie Sturmgeschütz [assault gun] Brigade 600 formed a Korps Kampfgruppe. A second Kampfgruppe consisted of the II nd Bataillon, Ski-Jäger Regiment 2 and the 2nd Batterie, Sturmgeschütz Brigade 270. Both were concentrated behind the presumed Soviet Schwerpunkt, the center and southern wing of the 342nd Infanterie Division. The Korps organized its defense on both sides of Rude [Ruda], with Grenadier Regiment 464 to the rear in the ‘Tiger’- position.

Map 5    56th Panzerkorps, Development of the Situation between 18 and 22 July 1944.

The Schwerpunkt of the Soviet advance was on Dolsk and Gargowiszcze. The Soviet attack started from west of Milanowicze to the Parybudy area. Enemy advances in company and battalion strengths failed, as did an afternoon attack east of Smidyn against the northern wing of the division.

Soviet Offensive, 18 to 30 July, 1944 and Retreat to the ‘Tiger’ Position

On 18 July the Soviets opened up a drumfire bombardment lasting one and one-half hours from artillery positions echeloned in depth, and then launched their offensive in the early hours of the morning with 14 rifle divisions and strong armoured support between Dolsk and Smidyn. The attack was supported by incessant ground-attack aircraft strikes against the MLR and to the rear. Particularly hard hit were the left wing of the 342nd Infanterie Division and the right wing of the 26th Infanterie Division, where the Soviets achieved deep penetrations in their first assault. Before noon the fighting was already in the positions protecting the artillery. The artillery finally ran out of ammunition, since Soviet ground-attack aircraft had disrupted ammunition supply. Therefore the defense in the artillery position had to be an infantry defense. The right wing of the 342nd Infanterie Division, essentially held, while the center and northern wing of the division were forced back, in part to the west as far as Komarow, and in part into a Przewaly – Oserby blocking front, without adequate assurance of being able to effectively withstand the enemy attack.

The 342nd Infanterie Division fell back to the ‘Tiger’ – Position. The entire Korps had to conduct a hasty withdrawal. Heavy losses in personnel and materiel were especially debilitating, particularly for the 26th Infanterie Division. During the evening, at Czarnoplesy, the Soviets attained a deep penetration to Byk. The 26th Infanterie Division was entirely out of radio contact since the start of the attack. The situation of the left wing of the Korps was confused. Radio contact there was intermittent. The Korps found itself unable to guarantee that it could hold the ‘Tiger’- position.

The Korps designated two lines of resistance for a staged withdrawal to the Bug River. However, the Soviets forced their way through the ‘Tiger’- Position and also the first line of resistance. The second line of resistance also failed before the hotly pursuing enemy. By evening of 19 July the position of the northern wing before the Bug also proved untenable. By noon of 19 July enemy armour was in Luboml, exposing both flanks of the 253rd Infanterie Division. It also threatened the deep northern flank of the 342nd Infanterie Division, which was thereby forced to again fall back. The 1st Bataillon of the Ski-Jäger Division conducted a fighting retreat to the Bug. The troops were so exhausted during the previous day’s fighting that there was no longer any possibility of improving the defenses of the Bug-Position. The regiment that was securing the position had not been provided with any significant reinforcements. Therefore defense of this position, which the higher levels of command considered vital, was left to the fighting forces of the Korps, with no possibility of adequately manning the Bug-Position.

As if that wasn’t bad enough, the fighting troops’ defense was primarily based on infantry weapons, because the heavy weapons (artillery and heavy mortars) had been reduced to mere remnants, especially in the 26th Infanterie Division. Personnel had also been seriously diminished. The 342nd Infanterie Division was down to about 10 percent of its combat strength. In addition, enemy ground-attack aircraft maintained a constant attack throughout the day.

The shallow bed of the Bug, with numerous fords and bridges, did not constitute a significant barrier, especially for an enemy who kept his massed forces hard on the heels of the retreating troops. The retreating troops had to limit themselves to sealing off the bridgeheads and preventing their operational extension. The German command judged that the Soviets had forced back the German forces by use of ‘Masse Mensch’ [human masses, a ‘human steamroller’].

On 20 July, in the 1st Ski-Jäger Division sector, the Soviets achieved a penetration southwest of Kladniow to the Skryniczyn area. A German counterattack failed, so the Soviets were able to hold their bridgehead.

As a result of the shift of the MLR to the west, the focus of the Soviet crossing attempts was near Husynne, on the forward-thrusting ridge in the Bug’s meander northwest of Husynne. In dense concentrations, with artillery and multiple-rocket launcher support, the Soviets attempted to force a crossing from Wysock, at the bridge. Repeated attacks, in varying strength, reached their high point at 1040 hours as the Soviets broke through to the Turka – Miskowie line. The 342nd Infanterie Division cleaned up this penetration with counterattacks from north and south, also sealing off a small penetration on the left division boundary.

Loss of the Bug Line

By noon it became evident that the Bug-Position was no longer tenable in the sectors of the 253rd Infanterie Division and 26th Infanterie Division. At 1000 hours six enemy AFVs with mounted infantry were on the west bank of the Bug south of Opalin. Infantry and armour moved out of the Hniszow area to the west and southwest. A counterattack from the southwest with Grenadier Regiment 454 [254th Infanterie Division] gained ground, while, in the 26th Infanterie Division sector it was impossible to hold against the enemy.

In the evening, enemy spearheads from Siedlizscze reached the railroad line and also achieved a penetration from Zabuscze to Stulno, in the 5th Jäger Division sector, and against the deep flank of the 26th Infanterie Division to the west and southwest. At the same time the Soviets brought up motorized reinforcements.

The Korps attempted to master the enemy situation with appropriate shifts of troops. Sturmgeschütz Brigade 600 moved with six Sturmgeschütze into the northern sector, Feldersatz Bataillon 253 [belonging to the 253rd Infanterie Division] went to the 342nd Infanterie Division to the south, although this last was urgently needed at Dorohusk Wolka.

On 20 June the Bug-Position could no longer be held. The open northern flank needed to be screened, but there were no forces available. The bridgeheads and penetrations provided natural jumping-off positions for the incessantly driven enemy attacks which were supported by armour and ground-attack aircraft. The ground gained in depth by the Soviets corresponded to the declining powers of resistance of the German forces. On the right wing of the Korps, too, in the sector of the 1st Ski-Jäger Division, the Soviets attained success south of Bubienka, still without armour, but the penetration was six kilometers wide.

The 342nd Infanterie Division held its defensive position like an island. In fact, the Soviets threatened the position on the Bug less from the east, than on the flank, and less from the south and far more from the north, so that it became a matter of building a screening front. The Soviets knew the situation and therefore shifted the Schwerpunkt of their attack to the left wing of the Korps, where opportunity beckoned to transform penetrations into breakthroughs. Soviet armoured spearheads advanced from Bytyn – Uhrush – Siedliszcze and Hniszow, with column after column, followed by infantry.

German forces continued to dwindle. The 26th Infanterie Division had to cover 12 kilometers of front with all of 300 men and three light field howitzers. Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 600, which had been intended as reinforcement, did not arrive in time. Nothing else stood in the way of further breakthrough by the enemy armoured spearheads. The Soviets forced the Kampfgruppe of Grenadier Regiment 77 [26th Infanterie Division] to the northwest, where, in later events, it was out of the Korps sector. The Kampfgruppe to the south fell back, fighting, to the west. Further Soviet advance now threatened the Brest-Litowsk – Cholm highroad and Cholm, itself. After the 26th Infanterie Division had practically ceased to exist, a gap of about 20 kilometers yawned in the Korps front. There was no hope of reestablishing contact on the left. The Soviet masses flowed, unhindered, into the empty space.

Soviet Advance to Cholm and Lublin

Since the entire Korps was now in danger, the Korps had a company of ‘Nashörner’ [Sd. Kfz.164, Self-propelled 8.8 cm Pak 43/I L/71 anti-tank gun on a Panzerkampfwagon IV chassis, employed with schweren Heeres Panzerjägerabteilungen] secure the highroad intersection northwest of Cholm and ordered the 253rd Infanterie Division to halt its counterattack and, instead, to reinforce the Brzezno strong point by itself, securing the retreat route and thereby, simultaneously take over further protection of Cholm. The 1st Ski-Jäger Division, attached to the 42nd Armee Korps, received the mission of maintaining contact with the neighbour on the right along the Cholm – Horodlo road, and of holding a blocking line there.

The Korps formed ‘Sperrverband [blocking unit] Damisch’, a Kampfgruppe of mixed artillery, Nashörner and escorting infantry with a binding mission of securing the Wieprz river crossings from Leszna to Krasnystaw against crossing attempts by enemy armour, and to blow up the bridges if necessary. This, however, could be no more than an interim solution.

During the night of 21/22 July the Soviets took Cholm by a coup de main. The commander of the 253rd Infanterie Division barely escaped, abandoning his radio vehicle.

On 22 July, in the afternoon, alarming news arrived of Soviet armour before the eastern edge of Lublin. It was still unclear where the Soviets had crossed the Wieprz. Remnants of the 26th Infanterie Division, one company strong, with three guns, crossed the Wieprz at Leczna and joined up with Kampfgruppe Damisch. At least 25 enemy AFVs were knocked out during the defensive fighting. Now, however, there was a completely vacant area between the highroad and the sector adjoining on the left, into which enemy forces could be expected to branch off and move at any time. If they crossed the highroad, they would endanger the deep flank of the Korps and, thereby, the Armee. If the enemy was before Lublin he was already to the rear.

The troops awaited the arrival of the 17th Panzerdivision, which was on the march to Zamoswz, and was supposed to prevent further penetration of the northern front by a possible aggressive advance. Ahead of the division marched gepanzerte [armoured] Kampfgruppe Brux to fight clear the Cholm – Lublin highroad.

The block at Lublin forced re-routing of supply and resulted in a shortage of fuel. Fuel tanks of prime-movers towing anti-tank guns and of other vehicles were drained to provide fuel for the Sturmgeschütze. In addition, a Korps ammunition train was derailed. Somehow the troops would have to find a way to deal with this.

Kampfgruppe Brux received the mission of advancing north from Rejowiec. First they would have to fight their way to the highroad, cross it, and then, block it against enemy armour and motorized elements. Thereupon, the enemy forces that were backing up at the roadblock swung out to the sides, thereby again exerting pressure on the 253rd Infanterie Division front. Its right wing fell back to the south and established itself firmly on the high ground directly northeast of Rejowiec. The action of this Kampfgruppe strengthened the left wing of the Korps. In addition it blocked the highroad and thereby delayed supplies for the enemy forces that were starting to advance on Lublin and in the rear of the Korps. The Korps, however, was then fighting with its front facing both east and west. The Kommandant of ‘Fester Platz Lublin’ had all of 150 Landeschützen [territorial defense troops, consisting primarily of older men] and three Nashörner for his defensive force. He urgently sought help over the still functioning telephone lines. Inside the city there was street-fighting with enemy armour and infantry that had penetrated and been joined by Polish partisans. In the streets of Lublin the Nashörner knocked out 14 enemy AFVs on 23 July.

In the meantime, the enemy drove forward with armour and artillery toward Trawniki and Peleszyn. As ordered, the 17th Panzer Division was to cover the northern flank in the Piaski area in order to further support the northern wing by keeping open the area around Krasnystaw. The division recaptured both Trawniki and Pelszyn, thereby enabling the further withdrawal of the remainder of the Korps, which was suffering from logistical problems. Among its other problems, due to fuel shortages, Gruppe Brux could only keep three out of five ‘Tiger’ Panzers in action. All other vehicles’ tanks had to be drained to provide fuel for prime-movers, radio vehicles and Sturmgeschütze. The Armee granted permission, in that respect, to destroy vehicles.

Near Trawniki, where the Soviet columns were held up, strong enemy forces reached the west bank of the Wieprz. The 17th Panzer Division repulsed these in heavy fighting. Eventful combat developed in the Piaski Luterske area at the Cholm – Lublin highroad. In an attack from the south and southeast the Panzeraurfklärungsabteilung [armoured reconnaissance battalion] of the 17th Panzer Division and Panzergrenadier Regiment 40 [17th Panzer Division] forced an enemy column back that was advancing from Piaski toward Krasnystaw. Late in the afternoon of 24 July they recaptured Piaski and held it against all further enemy attacks. The 17th Panzer Division was then to advance against Lublin while screening Trawniki and establish contact with the garrison of the ‘Fester Platz’. The Armee considered it vital to hold this place in order to protect its northern flank.

Events took over. The 17th Panzer Division had to drop its mission of covering the northern flank and the Armee southeast of Lublin in order to undertake a new mission southwest of Lublin. The garrison of Lublin, 150 men and three Sturmgeschütze, was forced back toward Wilkolaz by superior enemy cavalry forces. On 24 July the Soviets also arrived in Wilkolaz, thereby preventing relief of Lublin and also preventing German forces from securing at the Wieprz and blocking the road at Piaski.

Fuel again ran short. There were 9,000 liters in Krasnik. Aircraft dropped 600 liters of fuel 50 kilometers from Krasnik. The quantity available, however, was insufficient to prevent further draining of tanks and destruction of many vehicles in order to keep the armour mobile.

JOINT DEFENSE OF THE 56TH PANZER KORPS AND 42ND ARMEE KORPS

The 56th Panzer Korps and the 42nd Armee Korps now had to coordinate their withdrawals, the 42nd Armee Korps with Zamosz as its point of departure. In order to understand the developing situation of the 42nd Armee Korps and 13th Armee Korps we must look back at the previous action of these Korps.

42nd Armee Korps

Just as the 8th Armee Korps bore the blow from the northern Soviet pincer around Kowel, the 42nd Armee Korps received the thrust from the southern arm of the pincers. The Soviets had, again, employed their customary pincers operation independent of their frontal advance against Kowel. The 42nd Armee Korps became involved in the fighting on 12 July, initially with preliminary Soviet reconnaissance probes on 12 and 13 July. A rolling preparatory aerial attack followed, then heavy artillery fire and attacks with numerous AFVs in support, initially against the 291st Infanterie Division on the right wing and the left wing of the 340th Infanterie Division. Against the 291st Infanterie Division the Soviets broke deeply into the planned withdrawal to the Prinz-Eugen Position (3rd line). The 291st Infanterie Division was unable to mop up these penetrations with its own forces. Grenadier Regiment 694 (340th Infanterie Division), under Oberstleutnant Muschner, checked the attack against the left flank of the 340th Infanterie Division. Elements of the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisionen launched a counterattack on 13 and 14 July in order to mop up the area of the penetration at the 291st Infanterie Division and to restore contact on the open left wing of the 340th Infanterie Division, with simultaneous assignment to regain the Prinz-Eugen Position. This attack did not attain its objectives.

With ongoing support from the air, strong Soviet infantry and armoured forces continued to advance to the west. Attacks in the deep, open flank of the 340th Infanterie Division sought to collapse the division MLR. All of these attacks were thwarted by hastily assembled last reserves of the Division at the low ground along the Lipa River. On 14 July