Hitler Versus Stalin: The Eastern Front, 1943–1944: Kursk to Bagration

By Nik Cornish

The third volume in Nik Cornishs photographic history of the Second World War on the Eastern Front records in vivid visual detail the sequence of Red Army offensives that pushed the Wehrmacht back across Russia after the failure of Operation Citadel, the German attack at Kursk. Previously unpublished images show the epic scale of the build-up to the Kursk battle and the enormous cost in terms of lives and material of the battle itself. They also show that the military initiative was now firmly in Soviet hands, for the balance of power on the Eastern Front had shifted and the Germans were on the defensive and in retreat. Subsequent chapters chronicle the hard-fought and bloody German withdrawal across western Russia and the Ukraine, recording the Red Armys liberation of occupied Soviet territory, the recovery of key cities like Orel, Kharkov and Kiev, the raising of the siege of Leningrad and the advance to the borders of the Baltic states. Not only do the photographs track the sequence of events on the ground, they also show the equipment and weapons used by both sides, the living conditions experienced by the troops, the actions of the Soviet partisans, the fight against the Finns in the north, the massive logistical organization behind the front lines, and the devastation the war left in its wake.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Mar 30, 2017
• ISBN: 9781473861725

Nik Cornish

Nik Cornish is a former head teacher whose passionate interest in the world wars on the Eastern Front and in Russias military history in particular has led to a series of important books on the subject including Images of Kursk, Stalingrad: Victory on the Volga, Berlin: Victory in Europe, Partisan Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1944, The Russian Revolution: World War to Civil War 1917-1921, Hitler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1941-1942 Barbarossa to Moscow, Hitler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1942-1943 Stalingrad to Kharkov and Hitler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1943-1944 Kursk to Bagration.

Book preview

Introduction

For the Axis the summer of 1942 and a second winter in the depths of the USSR had proved a mix of success and disaster. Army Group South’s (AGS) advance on a front stretching from Voronezh to Grozny in the Caucasus, with Stalingrad roughly in the centre, had marked the deepest penetration made by the invaders. But it was an unsustainable situation and, as more and more troops were sucked into the Stalingrad street battle, the Sixth Army’s vulnerable flanks proved its undoing. When Stavka (the Soviet High Command) launched the several phases of the winter offensive Germany’s most powerful force, for such Sixth Army was, was within a week trapped in and around the city it had failed to capture. The gradual reduction of what was known to the Germans as the Stalingrad Kessel (cauldron) lasted roughly ten weeks from late November to early February. The failure of a relief expedition, commanded by General Erich Manstein, combined with the Kessel ’s stubborn defence allowed the greater part of the Axis forces in the Caucasus to retire to a defensible line along the Mius and Donets rivers, west of Rostov on Don. Heavily reinforced, the Soviets struck once more capturing Belgorod and Kharkov in a bid to reach the Dnieper River crossings and complete the destruction of AGS. However, Manstein, also reinforced particularly with armoured units, hit back and restored the line east of Kharkov and Belgorod. A plan involving a combined operation involving Army Group Centre (AGC) and AGS to recapture Kursk was frustrated by a firm Soviet defence coupled with a spring thaw that effectively brought operations to an end.

To the north in the Arctic, where Finns and Germans fought the elements as well as the Red Army, the situation had changed but little from the autumn of 1941. The failure of the Soviets to raise the siege of Leningrad and the Germans’ inability to break through the city’s defences extended the population’s suffering into 1943.

Despite the Red Army’s dramatic achievements in the south they had failed badly in their attempt to crush the Rzhev Salient, a position that Stalin characterized as a ‘pistol’ pointed at Moscow. Operation Mars, the elimination of the Rzhev Salient, had cost the Red Army vast numbers of men and masses of materiel. When German Ninth Army withdrew, with few casualties, from Rzhev it provided a welcome source of veteran combat troops for use in the upcoming summer offensive.

Replacing men, guns and armour was a much easier task for the Soviets. Now much of their military industrial plant was back in production and Lend-Lease support flowed steadily towards the front via the Iran–Caucasus route and the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok.

Furthermore, the Red Army’s leadership had learnt from its success and failures during earlier campaigns. Therefore, as the Axis forces, now mainly German, in the USSR were less able to mount a broad front summer offensive the Soviets were growing stronger and more capable and were certainly better able to conduct powerful operations. The campaigning season of 1943 was set to be an interesting time for both sides.

German POWS cross the frozen waters of the Volga River at the beginning of their march into the depths of the USSR. Following the collapse of Sixth Army, AGS found it difficult to replace men and equipment.

The failure of Manstein’s counterattack, codenamed Operation Winter Storm, to relieve Sixth Army bought time for the Axis forces in the Caucasus to escape from their exposed positions.

In the far north the fighting had ground to a halt during the autumn of 1941. The relatively small-scale actions in this area were limited because of the harsh environment and primitive infrastructure.

The acute shortage of men forced Germany to acknowledge the enlistment of anti-communist troops in formations such as the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). More a propaganda success than a military one, the ROA was a resource that was never exploited to the extent that it could have been. Here the colours of the ROA are displayed in Smolensk during the spring of 1943.

German armour was manufactured to higher standards than its Soviet opponents. However, productivity was lower and the qualitative difference was insuffiient to offset the lack of numbers. Baldly put, the Red Army could lose more tanks than the Germans and still maintain the momentum of its offensives.

Chapter 1

Kursk, the Northern Flank

For the Germans the westward facing bulge in the line that centred on the city of Kursk was unfinished business, left over from their counteroffensive of February–March 1943. On 13 March, within days of the recapture of Kharkov and Belgorod, Hitler listed the tasks for his men on the Eastern Front. Of these the main priority was the destruction of the Kursk Bulge. This was to be accomplished by a simple, two-thrust pincer movement; one attack from AGC; one from the southern flank by AGS. Later that month the Führer considered operations south of Kharkov to reconquer the industrial region of the Donets River. However, in mid-April those participating in the Kursk offensive, codenamed Operation Citadel, were informed that they should be prepared to attack at six days’ notice sometime after 28 April. This was what Hitler termed ‘the first offensive of the year’.

With the die cast, AGS’ Fourth Panzer Army and AGC’s Ninth Army were to spearhead Operation Citadel and began to receive powerful reinforcements. However, a combination of continuing bad weather and technical problems with the new tank, the Panzer V Panther, led to the offensive being postponed several times. But, every day that Hitler vacillated and factors beyond his control intervened gifted the Soviets more time to prepare their defences. For much as the German leadership was not entirely united behind the Führer in support of the summer offensive, Stalin’s generals and marshals were less doubtful of success.

Having lost the offensive momentum following Manstein’s counterattacks, Stavka was eager to regain the initiative. Therefore, Stalin consulted his senior officers for their assessment of the strategic situation with reports to be ready by mid-April. The conclusion reached resulted in the decision to ‘concentrate our forces in the Kursk area, to bleed the enemy forces here in a defensive operation, and then to switch to the offensive and achieve their full destruction’, as described in a Stavka memorandum.

The German northern pincer would be commanded by General Walter Model, the well-respected defender of the Rzhev Salient. Model’s Ninth Army would deploy six panzer divisions: 2nd, 4th, 9th, 12th, 18th and 20th alongside 10th Panzer Grenadier Division and 14 infantry divisions. The 2nd, 9th and 20th Panzer divisions and 6th Infantry Division would spearhead the attack. After the postponements and false alarms of May and June information from newly captured German POWs was sufficiently convincing for Zhukov to order the artillery to fire a pre-emptive barrage to upset enemy assembly and artillery positions.

Although the damage inflicted was minimal, it did wrong-foot the attackers, causing a delay of over 2 hours. However, an attack on Luftwaffe bases on both flanks of the bulge achieved very little. Then, at 0430hr, on 5 July the German artillery opened fire followed 60 minutes later by the ground attack.

A feint by XXIII Army Corps at the junction of Thirteenth and Forty-Eighth armies at the eastern end of the bulge pushed 1.5km into the first defence line where it was held by counterattacks, 3km short of the road junction of Maloarkhangelsk. But the main attack by XXXXVII and XXXXI Panzer corps with strong air support advanced 5km in the direction of Ponyri railway station. Rokossovsky’s Central Front, facing these attacks, fought back deploying armour and mobile obstacle detachments while simultaneously falling back on the line of ridges outside of Ponyri. By sunset Ninth Army had pushed into the first defence line to a depth of 8km across a front of 15km. One German noted, ‘We’re getting there! Not easily, and the battle has been bloody and costly. But we are getting there.’ However, ‘Nowhere has the enemy been taken by surprise. Nowhere has he been soft. He had clearly been expecting the attack . . .’ That night Rokossovsky’s armoured reserve, Second Tank Army, began to move forward in preparation to counterattack. Model’s panzer units counted some 20 per cent of tanks and assault guns lost from the 300 committed.

The Soviet counterattack was to be met by 2nd and 9th panzer divisions supported by the Tigers of 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. From 6 July upwards of 1,000 tanks would be locked in a huge battle that swung to and fro along the Ponyri ridge line, Hill 274 and the fortified villages of Olkhovatka and Samodurovka.

Renewing the attack towards Maloarkhangelsk, 18th Panzer Division and its accompanying 86th and 292nd infantry divisions were stopped short of Ponyri by well-entrenched infantry and cleverly sited anti-tank guns. Described thus by a German observer, ‘The Russian infantrymen allowed the tanks to rumble past their well-camouflaged fox holes and then came out to deal with the German grenadiers in their wake. Thus the battle continued to rage on in sectors that the forward tank commanders believed already won . . . and the tanks and assault guns were out of fuel.’ Such holding actions by the Soviet riflemen bought time for their armour which had been experiencing great difficulty moving forward through the maze of their own defences. This slow movement resulted in less effective, piecemeal attacks.

Such was the pressure that 140th Rifle Division from Seventieth Army on the Soviet left flank was sent in support. As dusk fell concealed Soviet infantrymen and engineers scuttled about the battlefield sowing mines, killing the members of tank recovery and repair crews and generally creating havoc. On 7 July the Red Air Force finally gained control of the air over the bulge’s northern flank. Now the Shturmovik not the Stuka would pulverize enemy armour as it ground