German Diplomatic Relations 1871-1945: The Wilhelmstrasse
And the Formulation
Of Foreign Policy

By William Young

The continuity issue has been a theme in German historiography for half a century. Historians have examined the foreign policy of Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany that led to two world wars.

Dr. William Young examines the continuity of German Foreign Office influence in the formulation of foreign policy under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck (1862-1890), Kaiser William II (1888-1918), the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), and Adolf Hitler (1933-1945). He stresses the role and influence of strong German leaders in the making of policy and the conduct of foreign relations.

German Diplomatic Relations 1871-1945 will be of value to individuals interested in the history of Germany, Modern Europe, and International Relations.

• Language: English
• Publisher: iUniverse
• Release date: Sep 4, 2006
• ISBN: 9780595850723

William Young

William Young can fly helicopters and airplanes, drive automobiles, steer boats, rollerblade, water ski, snowboard, and ride a bicycle. His career as a newspaper reporter spanned more than a decade at five different newspapers. He has also worked as a golf caddy, flipped burgers at a fast food chain, stocked grocery store shelves, sold ski equipment, worked at a funeral home, unloaded trucks for a department store and worked as a uniformed security guard. He lives in a small post-industrial town along the Schuylkill River in Pennsylvania with his wife and three children.

Book preview

German Diplomatic

Relations 1871-1945

The Wilhelmstrasse

and the Formulation

of Foreign Policy

William Young

iUniverse, Inc.

New York Lincoln Shanghai

German Diplomatic Relations 1871-1945

The Wilhelmstrasse and the Formulation of Foreign Policy

Copyright © 2006 by William Young

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Contents

Abbreviations

Preface

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

About the Author

End Notes

For Great Friends,

Mark Massen

and

Martin Skotzke

Abbreviations 

(Used in the Footnotes)

Preface 

The continuity issue has been a theme in German historiography for half a century. Historians have examined the foreign policy and war aims of Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany. This study will examine the continuity, if any, of German Foreign Office influence in the formulation of foreign policy under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck (1862-90), Emperor William II (1888-1918), the Weimar Republic (1919-33), and Adolf Hitler (1933-45). The main purpose of this work is to examine the validity of the defense argument made at the International Military Tribunal, and later, the American Military Tribunal, held at Nuremberg in the late 1940s that members of the Foreign Office had little, if any, influence on decision-making in the realm of foreign policy. The military tribunals held key representatives from the German Foreign Office as defendants against charges of conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, the actual waging of wars, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This work concentrates on the first charge, that of conspiracy. The International Military Tribunal found former German Foreign Ministers Constantin von Neurath (1932-38) and Joachim von Ribbentrop (1938-45) both guilty of conspiracy in spite of pleas of innocence due to their minimal influence over Hitler’s foreign policy: Ribbentrop argued that Hitler was actually his own Foreign Minister and he only carried out orders as a technical specialist. Other members of the Foreign Office, including the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs,¹ Ernst von Weizsäcker, were also found guilty of this charge after lengthy trials by the American Military Tribunal.

Since its creation in 1870, the German Foreign Office has had a history of strict obedience to the head of German affairs, whether it be Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who was also Prussian Foreign Minister, or Emperor William II, carrying out, not formulating foreign policy. The parliamentary cabinets of the Weimar Republic controlled foreign policy after the First World War. But, the Wilhelmstrasse gained some influence in the formulation of foreign policy when Gustav Stresemann served as Foreign Minister from 1923 to 1929. Stresemann, who served for a short time as Chancellor (1923), became a focal point in European politics because of Germany’s postwar situation, as well as the combined German civilian and military leaders quest to revise the Treaty of Versailles. Under the autocratic rule of Adolf Hitler, as Ribbentrop argued at Nuremberg, the Foreign Office was again forced into its traditional subservient role as a mere technical apparatus which carried out foreign policy decisions, but did not formulate them.

An examination of the history of the Foreign Office reveals the continuity of the ministry’s function as an organization designed to carry out the instructions of German leaders. Bismarck, William II, and Hitler all practiced, to varying degrees, their desire to be their own Foreign Minister. In Bismarck’s case, as the Imperial Chancellor and Prussian Foreign Minister, he had absolute control of foreign policy. He appointed civil servants and diplomats, who carried out his instructions without question, to key positions in the Foreign Office. In 1890, Emperor William II dismissed the Iron Chancellor and initially replaced him with men who knew little of world affairs so that he, himself, could greatly influence the direction of German foreign policy. Eventually William II appointed the diplomat Bernhard von Bülow as Foreign Secretary (1897-1900), and later as Imperial Chancellor and Prussian Foreign Minister (1900-9), to carry out his Weltpolitik. Although influenced by the military, especially Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, William II took foreign policy initiatives on his own, sometimes contrary to the advice of Bülow and Friedrich von Holstein, who held much influence inside the Foreign Office, as well as a long succession of foreign secretaries. The Emperor strongly disliked professional diplomats. Ridding himself of foreign affairs experts, the Emperor approached the First World War under the military leadership’s influence with little expert diplomatic advice, since the Imperial Chancellor and Prussian Foreign Minister, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, knew little of foreign affairs, and Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow took a back seat in the Emperor’s circle of influential advisers.

Coming to power in 1933, Hitler kept Neurath, a conservative elite, as Foreign Minister while he consolidated his control over Germany. The Foreign Office, traditionally consisting primarily of aristocrats, under Neurath shared common aims, to a certain degree, with Hitler. They both wanted Germany to be rid of the Versailles restrictions and regain its status as a Great Power. For a while both the Chancellor and Foreign Minister worked together, especially since Hitler valued the need of maintaining German respectability in the diplomatic world. Hitler, however, had an additional agenda, eastward expansionism, and thus sought ultimate control over German foreign policy. The Führer, who greatly disliked professional diplomats, employed the ambitious and loyal champagne dealer, Ribbentrop, who knew little of world affairs beyond his travels, as a personal diplomat to not only challenge the authority of the Foreign Office, but to carry out his foreign policy initiatives. Neurath and the Foreign Office opposed Hitler’s meddling in diplomatic affairs, but found the situation impossible. They swiftly lost the influence in the formulation of foreign policy that the ministry had acquired during the Weimar Republic. In early 1938, Hitler became his own Foreign Minister, dismissing Neurath, and replacing him with Ribbentrop as the token head of the Foreign Office. Thus, under the autocratic rule of Hitler, the Foreign Office came full circle and clearly resumed its traditional position as an agency meant to carry out the instructions of the German leadership with strict obedience as during the times of Bismarck and William II.

If the above thesis proves true, then the defense arguments of Ribbentrop and other diplomats at the Nuremberg trials had a ring of truth to them. Ribbentrop, although officially Reich Foreign Minister, professed that he had little influence in the formulation of foreign policy. He, in fear of his life during the Nuremberg proceedings, argued that Hitler, acting as his own Foreign Minister, and Hermann Göring were the conspirators planning wars of aggression.² Ernst von Weizsäcker, Ribbentrop’s Foreign Secretary, insisted that the Foreign Office had no influence on policy.³ Could these statements be mere arguments made by men in the shadow of the gallows? Bradley Smith has shown that the Allies were out to try and convict the much disliked Ribbentrop months before the end of the war. Evidence, no matter how circumstantial, pointing toward Ribbentrop’s involvement in a Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of aggression was gathered during the course of the war.⁴ Norman Rich has pointed out that these documents, in their abundance, were overwhelming to any defense that Ribbentrop could manage.⁵ These same documents that convicted the Foreign Minister, as Allied logic would have it, implicated other leading members of the Foreign Office and were used to try individual diplomats, who survived the war, at Nuremberg. Ribbentrop realized his own predicament. He wrote in his uncompleted memoirs, Adolf Hitler is dead, and others must therefore be found responsible.⁶ On 5 October 1946, shortly before his execution, Ribbentrop wrote to his wife:

Everyone knows that the verdict is quite untenable, but I happen to have been Adolf Hitler’s Foreign Minister and political considerations therefore call for my conviction. Fate willed that my principal witness, Adolf Hitler, is dead. Were he able to give evidence, the whole verdict would collapse. As it is, I must bear the fate of the followers of such a mighty and perhaps demoniac personality.⁷

Much has been written on German foreign policy during 1871 to 1945. However, there exist few studies of the German Foreign Office during this period.⁸ In regards to the Foreign Ministers of the Third Reich, Neurath and Ribbentrop have received some recent attention.⁹ This study of the Foreign Office adds to the already published research by including findings from the unpublished American Military Tribunal papers located in the Chester Fritz Library at the University of North Dakota.

The writing of this study was influenced by Professor (Emeritus) Playford Thorson of the University of North Dakota, Richard Langhorne, a former Fellow of St John’s College and Director of the Centre of International Studies at Cambridge University, and C. Edmund Clingan of Queensborough Community College at the City University of New York. The author would also like to thank David G. Rowley of the University of Wisconsin-Platteville. The staff of the Special Collections and Inter-Library Loan Office at the University of North Dakota Chester Fritz Library were extremely helpful in this endeavor.

The work could not have been completed without the support of my wife Patricia Young, Mark Massen, and Martin Skotzke. I also want to thank my parents, Kenneth and Marilyn Young, as well as my sisters, Joni Young, Jami Komatz, and Mary Schepp for their encouragement. Patricia, as always, served as my proofreader. Our children, Mark, William, Geoffrey, and Heather, also played a vital role.

William Young Grand Forks, North Dakota June 2006

1

Rise of Prussia to 1862

Hohenzollerns and Brandenburg-Prussia

The House of Hohenzollern began their rule over the Mark of Brandenburg with the reign of Frederick I (1417-40). The Margrave of Brandenburg was one of seven important German princes that had the right to elect Holy Roman Emperors as outlined in the Golden Bull of 1356. Two hundred years later, Elector John Sigismund (1608-19) acquired the Duchy of Cleves and the Principality of Ravenstein on the Lower Rhine River, as well as the Counties of Mark and Ravensberg on the Weser River in the Treaty of Xanten (1614). Then, in 1618, John Sigismund inherited the Duchy of Prussia (East Prussia) which lay outside the Holy Roman Empire. He held East Prussia as a vassal of the King of Poland-Lithuania. Overall, however, the lands of the Hohenzollerns were now referred to as Brandenburg-Prussia.¹

The lands of the Hohenzollerns were trampled during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48).² Elector George William (1619-40) was too weak to defend his territories. By the time of his death his lands were in the hands of the Swedes, Dutch, Hessians, and Imperial forces. But, he was succeeded by his son, Elector Frederick William I (1640-88). Frederick William gradually built up a power base and slowly won back Hohenzollern lands in the final stages of the Thirty Years’ War. He acquired East Pomerania and several secularized bishoprics, including Minden, Cammin, Halberstadt, and the promise of the Bishopric of Magdeburg in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The Hohenzollerns were quickly becoming the second most important ruling family in Germany.³

In the 1650s, Frederick William became entangled in conflicts that threatened to destroy his electorate. In 1654, Muscovy invaded the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth beginning the Thirteen Years’ War (1654-67). Then, Sweden invaded the Commonwealth starting the Second Northern War (1655-60). In these wars Elector Frederick William balanced his allegiance to the King of Poland-Lithuania concerning East Prussia with his desires to acquire West Prussia and West Pomerania. He had only 2,000 troops,⁴ and was forced to change sides several times. In the Peace of Oliva, Frederick William acquired full sovereignty over East Prussia in 1660. He then defeated a Swedish army at Fehrbellin during the Pomeranian War (1674-79), earning the title the Great Elector. Frederick William and his army of 12,000 men supported the Dutch Republic, Spain, and the Austrian Habsburgs in the struggle against French aggression in the Dutch War (1672-78/79).⁵ The Great Elector made defensive alliances with the German Emperor, Dutch Republic, and Sweden in light of Louis XIV of France’s aggression in 1685-86. His son, Elector Frederick III (1688-1701), and a force of 30,000 troops fought on the side the Grand Alliance against the Sun King during the Nine Years’ War (1688-97).⁶ In the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713/14), Frederick III allied with the Austrian Habsburgs and joined the Second Grand Alliance against Louis XIV in return for the German Emperor recognizing him as Frederick I, King in Prussia (1701-13). In the Peace of Utrecht (1713), Frederick I acquired the towns of Moers and Krefeld in the County of Moers, north of Düsseldorf; the County of Lingen in Westphalia; the towns of Valengin and Neuchâtel in the Swiss Canton of Neuchâtel; Geldern; and part of Upper Guelders.⁷

In 1714, King Frederick William I (1713-40) of Brandenburg-Prussia quickly became involved in the Great Northern War (1700-21) against Sweden. He was allied with Russia, Denmark-Norway, Britain, and Hanover. The Prussians took control of Stettin, and then captured Stralsund, Rügen, and Wismar. In the Second Treaty of Stockholm (1720), Frederick William I acquired Wollin, Usedom, and West Pomerania south of the Peene River, including Stettin. Prussia now controlled both banks of the lower Oder River and possessed in Stettin a first-class Baltic port. During his reign Frederick William increased the size of the Prussian Army from 40,000 to 80,000 men, increasing the importance of Bran-denburg-Prussia in international relations.⁸

Frederick the Great

In 1740, King Frederick II of Prussia (1740-86) invaded the Austrian Habsburg possession of Silesia, beginning the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48). Frederick II’s chief diplomatic adviser, Heinrich von Podewils, was against such a brash move.⁹ The invasion was a complete surprise to Maria Theresa of Austria and to Europe.¹⁰ The war quickly grew into a conflict between Austria, Britain, Hanover, and the Dutch Republic against Prussia, France, Bavaria, Saxony, and Spain. The Austro-Prussian conflict was called the First Silesian War (1740-42). Frederick II’s military success at the Battle of Chotusitz (1742), and the combined threat of her enemies, forced Maria Theresa to agree to the Peace of Breslau (1742). The Habsburgs made peace with Prussia at the cost of Silesia. However, Austrian military success in 1743 and 1744 led to Frederick II launching the Second Silesian War (1744-45) against the Habsburgs to protect Silesia. Prussian forces, numbering about 124,000, now faced the combined might of Austria, Saxony, Britain, and the Dutch Republic.¹¹ Frederick II invaded Saxony. The Prussians defeated the Austrians and Saxons at the Battle of Hohenfriedberg in Silesia; the Austrians at the Soor in Bohemia, Hennersdorf, and Görlitz; as well as the Saxons at the Battle of Kesseldorf in 1745. These victories resulted in the Peace of Dresden (1745). In this treaty, Austria confirmed the Prussian acquisition of Silesia.¹²

The Great Powers of Europe were alarmed at the growth in power of Prussia under Frederick II. The Prussian King spent the next decade strengthening the Prussian economy, increasing his war chest, improving the cavalry, building up an army of 143,000 men, and making an alliance with Britain.¹³ In 1756, Austria, France, Russia, Sweden, and Saxony created a coalition to cripple or destroy Prussia. But, Frederick II made the first move. Prussian forces invaded Saxony in August 1756, beginning the Seven Years’ War (1756-63). During the next seven years the Prussians defeated the Austrians at Lobositz and Prague (1757), the French at Rossbach (1757), Austrians at Leuthen (1757), Russians at Zorndorf (1758), as well as Austrians at Liegnitz and Torgau (1760) despite being heavily outnumbered during the entire war. These victories kept Prussia from defeat in the conflict. Nevertheless, Frederick the Great and the Prussians suffered setbacks against Austria at Kolin (1757), Russia at Gross-Jägersdorf (1757), Austria at Hochkirch (1758), Russia at Kay (Paltzig) (1759), Austro-Russian forces at Kunersdorf (1759), and Austria at Maxen (1759). Berlin was overrun by the enemy twice during the war. In 1761, Frederick II was too weak to afford battle and tried to keep his enemies at bay through a series of maneuvers. By December 1761 the Prussians were on the brink of defeat. But, the death of Empress Elizabeth I of Russia turned the situation in favor of Frederick II when Tsar Peter III allied with Prussia in 1762. Frederick II fought on, defeating the Austrians at the Battle of Burkersdorf, and forced Maria Theresa of Austria to agree to the Peace of Hubertusburg in 1763. Frederick the Great would keep Silesia. Moreover, as Hamish Scott has written, it [the Seven Years’ War] established the Hohenzollern state as a great power.¹⁴

Immediately after the Seven Years’ War, Frederick the Great stood alone without allies in Europe. The Anglo-Prussian alliance had broken down toward the end of the war.¹⁵ Prussia was suffering from the devastation of war. Prussia had to rebuild. The Prussian King now needed to avoid war at all costs. He knew that Prussia could easily lose its newly won Great Power status, which rested upon the strength of the Prussian Army. He therefore gradually built up the Prussian Army to 190,000 men.¹⁶ He wanted to use the army as a strategic deterrent. Frederick the Great did not want war. He wanted to use the army to deter other Great Powers from attacking Prussia. Paul W. Schroeder has written that:

fear underlay Prussia’s policy and ambitions in general, a consciousness that its power base was fragile and its great-power status marginal. More than once Frederick remarked that Prussia’s crest should feature a monkey rather than an eagle, for it could only ape the great powers.¹⁷

Frederick II controlled Prussian foreign policy and he sought peace in Europe. The most significant threat to Prussia was Russia under Empress Catherine II.

Russian armies had achieved several notable victories over the Prussian Army in the Seven Years’ War. After the conflict Russia was the most powerful state in East Europe. As such, Frederick II sought and achieved a defensive alliance with Russia in 1764. Catherine II needed the Prussian alliance to control the election of a new king to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. She wanted to control Poland-Lithuania through Stanislaw Poniatowski. But, the Empress feared Ottoman interference and a Turkish invasion of southern Russia. Catherine II got what she wanted, but then so did Frederick II with a Russian alliance to deter an Austrian attack against Prussia.

Despite the Prusso-Russian alliance, the Turks declared war against Russia in 1768. The armies of Catherine the Great crushed the Turks in the Russo-Turkish War (1768-74). The Russians quickly overran a vast amount of Ottoman territory. Consequently, Austria became alarmed at the increasing power of Russia. Austria demanded compensation for the territorial growth of the Russian Empire. To resolve the growing crisis, Austria, Russia, and Prussia negotiated the First Partition of Poland in 1772. Frederick the Great gained Ermland, the Netze district, and West Prussia. The partition was a significant action because it linked East Prussia to Pomerania and Brandenburg.¹⁸

The War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-79) was the one occasion in which Frederick II went to war in the late eighteenth century. In this conflict, which had no pitched battles, Prussia prevented Austria from annexing the Electorate of Bavaria after the death of the last Wittelsbach. In the Peace of Teschen (1779) the Habsburgs were forced to accept only a small strip of Bavarian territory.¹⁹ Frederick the Great had established and upheld the balance of power between the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs.

After the death of Frederick the Great, Prussia was heavily involved in international politics. In September 1787, the Ottoman Turks declared war against Russia. Catherine the Great had annexed the Crimea in 1783, and a buildup of Russian forces near the Turkish border encouraged the Sublime Porte to launch a preemptive strike. Austria and Prussia were busy with revolts in the Austrian Netherlands and United Provinces. Prussia and Britain cooperated in putting down the rebellion in the Dutch Republic in 1787. Even so, Austria joined the Russians against the Turks in February 1788. Initially, the Austro-Russian alliance had a difficult time against the Turks. In March, Count Ewald Friedrich von Hertzberg of the Prussian Department of Foreign Affairs suggested a Prussian alliance with Austria and Russia in exchange for a Second Partition of Poland. He wanted Danzig, Thorn, and the Palatinates of Poznan and Kalisz for Prussia.²⁰ Catherine II of Russia and Joseph II of Austria were not interested in this idea. They had no interest in the further growth of Prussian power. Then, in June 1788, Sweden attacked Russia. Hertzberg then offered a Prussian alliance with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. But King Stanislaw Poniatowski feared Prussian intentions. In 1789, Catherine the Great withdrew Russian forces from Poland-Lithuania to prevent the provocation of Prussia. Russian power in Poland was quickly collapsing. The Russians were at war with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire, facing the threat of Prussia, and experiencing a Polish rebellion against Russian dominance. Then, in 1789-90, the Russians and Austrians won a series of military victories against the Turks and Sweden. As a result, in March 1790, Prussia and Poland agreed to a defensive alliance. With the death of Leopold II, Austria bowed out of the war in the Peace of Reichenbach (1790). Russia continued the wars alone. Russian forces defeated the Swedes and forced the Peace of Verela (1790). This allowed the Russians to move troops to counter the Prussians on the Polish front. At this point, Frederick William II (1786-97) sought to improve relations with Catherine the Great. Russia agreed to consider a partition of Poland to remove the Prussian threat. As a consequence, a major revolt against Russian domination broke out in May 1791. The Poles created a constitution. Then, in 1791, the Russians achieved a series of victories against the Turks that resulted in the Peace of Jassy (1792).²¹

Prussia in the Age of the French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars

The era of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) and Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) were difficult for Prussia.²² The French Revolution brought Prussia and Austria together. In August 1791, Frederick William II of Prussia and Leopold II of Austria (1790-92) issued the Declaration of Pillnitz threatening France that Austria and Prussia would intervene in the French Revolution to protect the French royal family. In February 1792, Austria and Prussia concluded a defensive alliance. Then, in April, the French government declared war against the new German Emperor, Francis II of Austria (1792-1835), and invaded the Austrian Netherlands. The Austrians defeated the French at the Battles of Mons and Tournai. Afterwards, an Austro-Prussian army assembled at Coblenz, and began its march, under the command of Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, towards Paris in July 1792. The allied army defeated the French at Longwy and Verdun in early September, and the road seemed open to Paris. But, the allied army was defeated by the French at the Battle of Valmy in late September 1792. As a result, the allied army retreated to Germany. French forces conquered the Rhineland, Austrian Netherlands, and Savoy, and then invaded central Germany in late 1792.

In the meantime, Frederick William II had little interest in getting heavily involved in an anti-French coalition. Instead, the Prussian King sought territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Poland-Lithuania. Russian forces had invaded and occupied Poland-Lithuania while Prussia and Austria were busy with France in 1792. Catherine II then renewed the alliance with Austria and made an alliance with Prussia in August 1792. She feared the spread of the French Revolution throughout Europe. Two months later, after the Battle of Valmy, Frederick William II made territorial demands against Poland-Lithuania. He refused to further support Austria against France until Prussia gained Polish lands. As a result, in January 1793, Catherine II agreed to the Second Partition of Poland in the Convention of St. Petersburg.²³ Prussia gained Danzig, Thorn, as well as the Palatinates of Poznan and Kalisz.

After the acquisition of territory, Frederick William II committed troops to the War of the First Coalition (1792-97). An Austro-Prussian army under the Duke of Brunswick recaptured Mainz and pushed into the Rhine Palatinate and Alsace. The Prussians defeated the French at the Battle of Kaiserslautern in May 1794. Before long, however, a conflict in war strategy led to a deterioration of the Austro-Prussian war effort against Revolutionary France. Once again, Frederick William II became more interested in the Polish Question. In March 1794, a general revolt had broken out against foreign oppression in Poland. Russian, Prussian, and Austrian forces responded by suppressing the revolt. In January 1795, Russia and Austria agreed to the Third Partition of Poland. To satisfy Prussian demands concerning Poland, Russia and Austria ceded Warsaw and other Polish territories to Prussia in October 1795.²⁴ Meanwhile, in April 1795, Prussia had deserted the coalition against France in the Peace of Basle and declared neutrality. Prussia and France agreed to a demarcation line that roughly followed the Ems, Old Ijssel, and the Rhine Rivers, and included Frankfurt and all of Franconia where Prussia held the important lands of Ansbach and Bayreuth. The line was completed by following the northern boundaries of Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, and Bohemia to Silesia. Frederick William II was to guarantee that no army would use the territories behind the line as a staging area for an attack against France. In return, France promised not to march any of its armies across this area in pursuit of the enemy.²⁵

Frederick William III of Prussia (1797-1840) was cautious in his foreign policy.²⁶ He refused the join the coalition of Russia, Austria, Britain, Naples, Portugal, and the Ottoman Empire in the War of the Second Coalition (1798-1802) against Revolutionary France. He also declined the request for an alliance with France. Frederick William III could remain neutral because of the inflated reputation given to the Prussian Army by the other Great Powers.²⁷ As such, in 1802, France rewarded Prussia with territory in Westphalia and to the north of Thuringia.²⁸ With dreams of acquiring Hanover, Frederick William III wanted to remain neutral in the War of the Third Coalition (1805-7) against Napoleon I and France.²⁹ However, France had violated the north German neutrality by invading and occupying Hanover in 1803. Continued French violations of neutral north German territory by Napoleon I’s troops resulted in Frederick William III, under the advice of Baron Karl August von Hardenberg, to sign the Agreement of Potsdam with Tsar Alexander I of Russia in November 1805. Frederick William III would offer armed mediation in the conflict, and if Napoleon I refused, Prussia would join the coalition against France. Napoleon I, nevertheless, defeated the Austrian and Russian armies at the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805. Austria was forced out of the war in the Peace of Pressburg (Bratislava). Prussia quickly agreed to the humiliating Treaty of Schönbrunn with France two weeks later. Frederick William III would have to give up the Franconian principalities and Cleves in return for Hanover.³⁰ Prussia, however, was now at Napoleon I’s mercy. By the Treaty of Paris (1806) Frederick William III was forced to promise to supply troops for the continuing French war against Russia. He was also required to join the Continental System and to close Prussian ports to British shipping.³¹ At the same time, the French Army continued to threaten Prussian lands.³² Franco-Prussian relations quickly deteriorated, resulting in Frederick William III declaring war against France in August 1806. The result was the shattering defeat of the Prussian Army at the Battles of Jena and Auerstädt in October 1806.³³ French forces then overran the core of the Hohenzollern lands. As a result, the French shattered the myth of Prussian invincibility which the victories of Frederick II had created.³⁴ Napoleon I took Berlin, but Frederick William III would not concede to French territorial demands. Frederick William III and his court moved to Königsberg and then to Memel in East Prussia. He agreed to a Russian alliance to drive the French back across the Rhine River in the Treaty of Bartenstein in 1807. But, Napoleon I defeated the Russians at the Battle of Friedland in June, with the consequence that Alexander I agreed to the Peace of Tilsit in July 1807. Decimated Prussia now lay at Napoleon I’s mercy. Napoleon I allowed Frederick William III to keep his throne, but took away most of the Hohenzollern lands.

The Prussian Army was unprepared for war against Napoleon I. The army’s deficiencies at Jena and Auerstädt reflected Prussian’s failure to prepare for the inevitable, an all-out war against France. However, the era of the Prussian reform movement was already underway. The reform movement began with Frederick William III and the Prussian high nobility in the bureaucracy and army.³⁵ Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl von Stein, Frederick William III’s Chief Minister, began the reform of the Prussian government in 1807.³⁶ Napoleon I forced Frederick William III to dismiss Stein in 1808, but Prince Hardenberg as Prussian State Chancellor (Staatskanzler) (1810-22), a position without precedent in Prussian history, continued government reform after 1810. As for military reform, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the Prussian Minister of War, established the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin.³⁷ Even so, Scharnhorst’s project for changing Prussia’s military command structure and military was a long-term program. Prussian military reformers wanted to reform the ways of thinking about military doctrine (how the army fought), improve the army’s administration and logistics, and change the organization of the military (the creation of a divisional system).³⁸ Nonetheless, Prussia remained under French domination, and, as such, provided 20,000 military troops to support Napoleon I’s invasion of Russia in 1812.³⁹

Napoleon I’s retreat from Russia provided a window of opportunity for Prussia. General Ludwig von Yorck boldly signed the Convention of Tauroggen, declaring Prussian neutrality, in the French war with Russia in December 1812. Shortly thereafter, in February 1813, Prussia allied with Russia against Napoleon I in the Treaty of Kalisch. Tsar Alexander I agreed that Prussia would gain Saxony in exchange for former Prussian lands in Poland.⁴⁰ In the upcoming struggle Frederick William III was able to mobilize 280,000 men for his army and established the Landswehr and Landsturm in 1813.⁴¹ The Prussians were fueled by their hatred for Napoleon I. Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher commanded the Prussian Army. The Prussian General Staff included Gebhard von Scharnhorst and Neithard von Gneisenau. Austria joined the war against France in August 1813. The coalition defeated Napoleon I at the Battle of Leipzig in October, freeing all of Germany east of the Rhine River.⁴² Soon Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden joined forces against France. The allied armies, commanded by Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg, invaded France at the beginning of 1814.⁴³

In March 1814, the Great Powers allied against Napoleon I established the Quadruple Alliance of Chaumont. It included Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Britain. Schwarzenberg and Blücher quickly captured Paris. At the end of March, Tsar Alexander I of Russia and King Frederick William III of Prussia entered Paris as the victors. The Quadruple Alliance soon dictated the First Peace of Paris (May 1814). Representatives of the Great Powers met at the Congress of Vienna to decide the outstanding territorial issues in October 1814.⁴⁴ Prussia was represented by Frederick William III, Chancellor Harden-berg, and Wilhelm von Humboldt.⁴⁵ The Quadruple Alliance was most concerned about establishing a balance of power in Europe. Hardenberg sought to establish a role for Prussia that rewarded it for the Prussian Army’s major contribution in defeatin Napoleon I. Frederick William III wanted to annex all of Saxony while Russia took control of Poland. But, Count Clemens von Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister, objected to Prussian control of all of Saxony. It was agreed, nevertheless, that Prussia would control Danzig and West Prussia, Thorn, and the Province of Poznan. Prussia also gained the northern half of Saxony, Upper and Lower Lusatia, land around Wittemberg, northern Thuringia with Erfurt, as well as Stralsund and the island of Rügen. Moreover, Prussia acquired much territory on the northern left bank of the Rhine River.⁴⁶ The Prussian Rhineland was separated from the rest of Prussia by Hanover and Hesse-Kassel. In the meantime, the German Committee of Five, consisting of Prussia, Hanover, Austria, Bavaria, and Württemberg, examined the possibility of a German constitution. In June 1815, in the Treaty of Vienna, the Great Powers established the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund). The Federal Diet at Frankfurt-am-Main became the main governmental tool of the association. The German Confederation consisted of thirty-five monarchial states and four city republics. Austria would become the dominant power in the German Confederation.

Towards the end of the Congress of Vienna, the Great Powers received word that Napoleon I had escaped from exile on the island of Elba and returned to France to raise an army in an attempt to restore the French Empire. Napoleon I had to act fast, and defeat the British and Prussian armies in Belgium before the arrival of Russian and Austrian forces. He defeated Blücher and Gneisenau at the Battle of Ligny in June 1815.⁴⁷ Even so, two days later, British and Prussian forces defeated Napoleon I at the Battle of Waterloo. In September 1815, the Tsar, while at the Congress of Vienna, created the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia to protect Europe against revolutionary forces. Moreover, as a result of Napoleon I’s action in 1814-15, France was forced to accept the Second Peace of Paris (November 1815). In this treaty, Prussia gained Saarbrücken and Saarlouis.⁴⁸

Concert of Europe, German Confederation, and Customs Union

After the Napoleonic Wars, the Habsburg Empire dominated the politics of the German Confederation and the Italian states. The period from 1815 to 1848 is generally known as the Age of Metternich. Metternich was the Chancellor (1821-48) and Foreign Minister (1809-48) of Austria. Metternich and Austria played a key role in the diplomacy of the Concert of Europe.⁴⁹ Austria sought to restore the conservative order in Europe. The Habsburg Empire contained many different ethnic groups, including Germans, Poles, Croats, Serbs, Czechs, Italians, Magyars, Rumanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Slovenes.⁵⁰ As such, the Austrian Foreign Minister and the Metternich System attempted to prevent the spread of nationalism and liberalism. What was the Metternich System? The historian Alan Sked has written:

Essentially it is that Metternich strove to uphold the interests of an aristocratic, European social order through maintaining the 1815 Settlement by means of a repressive alliance of monarchical states, whose internal and external security were to be preserved by military and police co-operation as well as by efficient and centralised bureaucratic rule. In this way he hoped to exorcise51the threat of revolution and so maintain the status quo.

Metternich had a central role in the diplomacy of the Concert of Europe from 1815 to 1822. During this time, Tsar Alexander I commanded the dominant Russian Army,⁵² Viscount Castlereagh negotiated for Britain while Frederick William III, Chancellor Hardenberg, and Foreign Minister Christian Günther von Bernstorff (1818-1832) represented Prussia.⁵³ Bernstorff has been called the first modern Prussian Foreign Minister by some historians.⁵⁴ But Prussia was the weakest of the Great Powers of Europe.

In 1818, France was restored as a Great Power in the Concert of Europe, making it a Quintuple Alliance, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen). France had a larger standing army than Austria or Prussia.⁵⁵ France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia were interested in maintaining the conservative order in Europe. Then, in January 1820, a liberal revolt broke out against King Ferdinand VII of Spain. The spirit of revolution quickly spread across southern Europe. Soon, in July, a revolt broke out in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Consequently, the Great Powers met at the Congress of Troppau to discuss the spread of revolution. They issued the Protocol of Troppau in November 1820. In this document, Austria, Russia, and Prussia reaffirmed the principle of intervention by the Great Powers if revolution in one state posed a threat to others. Two months later, in January 1821, the Great Powers at the Congress of Laibach authorized Austria to put down the liberal rebellion in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Then, in 1822, the Congress of Verona, attended by Frederick William III, Hardenberg, and Bernstorff, considered the rebellion in Spain. France, with the diplomatic support of Russia, invaded and crushed the liberal rebellion in Spain.⁵⁶ Austria and Britain opposed the action. But, by this time, Metternich was conducting the foreign policy of a financially and military weakened state.⁵⁷ The Concert was quickly falling apart. Even so, the Great Powers handled the issues of Greek independence at the London Conference in 1830,⁵⁸ and Belgian independence at the London Conference in 1831.⁵⁹ The cornerstone to Metternich’s foreign policy was a strong alliance with the conservative powers of Russia and Prussia.

In the meantime, Prussia pursued an economic policy that gradually increased its influence in the German Confederation. Karl Georg Maassen, the Prussian Director-General of Customs, used the Customs Law of 1818 to rid the Prussian state of internal import taxes and to implement low tariffs at Prussian external borders to encourage trade. Hesse-Kassel joined the Prussian Customs Union in 1828, followed by a merger of the Prussian Customs Union and South German Customs Union as the Prusso-German Customs Union Zollervein) in 1833

34.⁶⁰ Baden and Nassau joined the Customs Union in 1836. All of Germany except Brunswick, Hanover, Oldenburg, Holstein, Austria, and the Hanseatic cities were connected to the Zollervein. Many viewed this economic union as a step towards political union under Prussian leadership.⁶¹ In addition to the Customs Union, the building of railroads contributed to the economic rise of Germany. The first German railroad was built in 1835. The Potsdam to Berlin railroad was completed in 1838, Berlin to Anhalt in 1841, Berlin to Stettin in 1842, Berlin to Frankfurt-on-the-Oder in 1842, Berlin to Hamburg in 1846, and Berlin to Cologne in 1848.⁶²

Revolutions of 1848 and Frankfurt Parliament

In 1840, Frederick William IV (1840-61) became the King of Prussia.⁶³ He was a romanticist, deeply inspired by poetic and mystical ideas. The monarch sought greater political freedom and stronger national unity in Prussia. He was interested in obtaining these objectives through the rule of the estates, not through constitutionalism. In 1841 he gave the provincial assemblies the right to elect committees to meet in Berlin and discuss legislation for Prussia. But, Frederick William IV informed the committees in 1842 that they were not a popular assembly. Even so, the King was forced to agree to the summoning of the United Landtag (combined provincial assemblies) in an attempt to acquire funding for financial difficulties in 1847. He, nevertheless, informed the United Landtag that it had no power concerning legislation, the budget, and it could not hold regular meetings. The Prussian liberals were very upset at the situation.

In February 1848, revolution broke out in France and spread across Europe. The Habsburgs became busy with revolts by the Hungarians, Czechs, Croats, Venetians, and Lombards. By the end of July Austria temporarily ceased to be a factor in international politics. In the meantime, the German states of Württemberg, Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and Prussia experienced uprisings. The instigators called for liberal reforms and the unification of Germany. Revolt broke out in Berlin, the fourth largest city in Europe, with a population of 400,000, in March 1848.⁶⁴ The demonstrators erected barricades while the Prussian Army attempted to clear the streets. Frederick William IV, however, agreed to make concessions to the liberals instead of killing his people. He agreed to liberal reforms, including parliamentary elections, a constitution, and the freedom of the press. Furthermore, the King announced his willingness to work towards giving a united Germany a constitution.

In March 1848, liberal nationalists agreed to convene a German National Assembly (Nationalversammlung) at Frankfurt-on-the-Main. Eight hundred and thirty-one deputies from the German states met at the Frankfurt Parliament in May 1848.⁶⁵ The parliament was predominately a middle-class body, consisting of lawyers, professors, and businessmen. They discussed the possibility of German unification, a liberal German constitution, and the issue of a grossdeutsch or kleindeutsch solution to German unification. Those individuals who favored a grossdeutsch solution