El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi

By Joseph T Stanik

Long before the overt war in Afghanistan and the covert war against al-Qaida, U.S. forces struck at one of the world’s hotbeds of terrorism. On 15 April 1986, in the dead of night, American strike aircraft roared into the heart of Muammar Qaddafi's Libya, attacking carefully selected targets and nearly killing the “brother leader” himself. Codenamed Operation El Dorado Canyon, the raid was in direct response to Qaddafi's support of a terrorist act against U.S. service personnel stationed in Europe and was a result of President Ronald Reagan's pledge to respond to terrorism with “swift and effective retribution.” Stanik, a retired naval officer and Middle East scholar, provides a detailed account of the raid as well as an in-depth analysis of its causes and effects. He also describes three other hostile encounters between U.S. and Libyan forces during Reagan's presidency and details U.S. covert operations. From a bombing in West Berlin, to terrorism in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland, and from the halls of power in Washington to airbases in England and on the decks of American warships in the Mediterranean, Stanik weaves an international thriller that is relevant to current events.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press
• Release date: Dec 15, 2015
• ISBN: 9781612515809

Book preview

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

© 2003 by Joseph T. Stanik

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

First Naval Institute Press paperback edition published in 2016.

ISBN: 978-1-61251-580-9 (eBook)

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:

Stanik, Joseph T.

El Dorado Canyon: Reagan’s undeclared war with Qaddafi / Joseph T. Stanik.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States—Foreign relations—Libya. 2. Libya—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1981–1989. United States—Military relations—Libya. 5. Libya—military relations—United States. 6. Reagan, Ronald. 7. Qaddafi, Muammar. I. Title.

E183.8.L75 S726 2002

327.730612—dc21

2002016520

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

242322212019181716987654321

First printing

For my father, Joseph Stanik,

and in memory of my mother,

Maxine Slaven Stanik

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

Prologue: The Air Battle Near Tobruk

1Muammar al-Qaddafi and the Libyan Jamahiriyya

2Swift and Effective Retribution

3The Wave of Terror

4Operation Prairie Fire

5Planning to Strike Qaddafi

6Operation El Dorado Canyon

7The Aftermath of Operation El Dorado Canyon

Epilogue: Lockerbie and Beyond

List of Abbreviations

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Errata

Preface

In the dead of night on 15 April 1986, U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers and U.S. Navy attack aircraft struck terrorist headquarters and support facilities in and near the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. President Ronald Reagan had ordered the operation—code named El Dorado Canyon—in retaliation for Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi’s involvement in a terrorist bombing in West Berlin that had claimed the life of one U.S. serviceman, mortally wounded a second, and injured several other Americans. The raid’s purpose was three-fold: to punish Qaddafi for the West Berlin attack, to disrupt Libyan terrorist operations by crippling the country’s terrorist infrastructure, and to dissuade Qaddafi from sponsoring or supporting further acts of terrorism. The American public overwhelmingly supported Reagan’s decision to use force against Qaddafi, though many believed that Reagan should have acted much sooner against the agents and sponsors of international terrorism.

When Ronald Reagan took office as the fortieth president of the United States on 20 January 1981, the country was under assault from the forces of international terrorism. American citizens were the primary targets of terrorist violence and, on the day Reagan began his presidency, fifty-two American hostages were freed after 444 days of captivity in Iran. The hostage crisis was a humiliating experience for the United States, and it played no small role in driving Reagan’s predecessor, Jimmy Carter, from office. A week later, at a public ceremony celebrating the homecoming of the hostages, Reagan pledged that his administration would respond to acts of terrorism with swift and effective retribution. Over the next five years terrorist aggression against Americans became increasingly violent, and after each incident Reagan stated that the responsible party would be held accountable for its deed. Yet he did not act. He did not avenge the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, the destruction of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut six months later, the murder of off-duty Marine embassy guards in El Salvador in June 1985, the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 that same month, or the massacres of innocent travelers at the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985. With each new and more horrifying act of violence the American people felt more vulnerable, became increasingly angry and frustrated, and began to believe that Reagan’s war against terrorism consisted of powerful rhetoric but not much else. By early 1986 it seemed likely that Reagan’s presidency would fall victim to terrorism, just as Carter’s had years before. Then, in mid-April 1986, the president gave a convincing response to a specific terrorist incident by ordering Operation El Dorado Canyon.

Why did it take Reagan so long to retaliate? The likely answer is that it was much easier for him to promise military action than to carry it out. It was difficult to locate the perpetrators of a terrorist act. State sponsors, if their involvement could be established, were often immune from attack because of unique political or strategic circumstances. One of Reagan’s most important advisers was opposed to using military force except under strict criteria. At the same time America’s European allies were staunchly opposed to military action due to their own political and economic concerns.

Once Reagan committed his administration to a campaign against terrorism in January 1981, his policymakers trained their focus on Qaddafi’s radical regime in Tripoli. They did so for several practical reasons: Qaddafi was the most open advocate of international terrorism, many leaders in Africa and the Middle East reviled his regime, and Libya was the weakest militarily of the leading state supporters of terrorism (a list of states that included Syria and Iran).

America’s difficulties with Qaddafi did not begin with Reagan’s presidency. In 1973 Qaddafi declared the entire Gulf of Sidra an integral part of Libyan territory. His unlawful claim violated international conventions governing territorial waters and spurned the right of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and other navies serving in the Mediterranean to conduct naval exercises in international waters and airspace. Furthermore, during the 1970s Qaddafi became a leading practitioner of state-sponsored terrorism, which he considered a practical means of achieving his foreign policy objectives. He instigated acts of subversion against moderate governments in the Middle East and Africa, he aided liberation movements in countries all over the world, and he provided training, arms, and funding for a disparate collection of terrorist organizations. By the end of the decade the United States and other Western governments considered Qaddafi the world’s most notorious champion of terrorism.

The Reagan administration set out to develop a multifaceted strategy to challenge Qaddafi’s illegal claim over the Gulf of Sidra, to contain his subversive activities, and to confront his reprehensible involvement with terrorism. The strategy consisted of diplomatic and economic sanctions, covert operations, and demonstrations of military power. During the first five years of Reagan’s presidency certain elements of the strategy became stricter, bolder, and more assertive. In 1981 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched a covert operation in Chad designed to challenge indirectly Qaddafi’s hold on power. In 1985 the CIA planned to provide lethal aid to Libyan dissident groups in the hope that they would abolish the Qaddafi regime, and the National Security Council (NSC) actively encouraged an Egyptian attack on Libya. In 1982 Reagan ordered an embargo on imported Libyan oil and in 1986 he severed all economic ties between the two countries. During his first year in office Reagan directed the U.S. Sixth Fleet to conduct a large naval exercise near Libya; five years later he ordered the fleet to carry out a series of progressively larger and more complex demonstrations, which eventually culminated in major surface and air operations in the Gulf of Sidra.

The Sixth Fleet exercises vigorously challenged Libya’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra and forcefully demonstrated the will of the American people in the struggle against Libyan terrorism. In August 1981 and March 1986 Qaddafi attempted to strengthen his illegal claim to the gulf with military force. In each instance the fleet defended itself and answered Qaddafi’s challenge with a stern rebuke. To avenge his humiliating defeat in March 1986 Qaddafi ordered several terrorist operations against American citizens and interests overseas. In early April his agents carried out the deadly attack on La Belle discothèque in West Berlin.

Ironically, for about two years Reagan’s Libya strategy seemed to have a quieting effect on Qaddafi but, by 1984, the Libyan dictator was linked to several notorious acts of subversion, terrorism, and dangerous mischief. Reagan’s strategy had failed to induce Qaddafi to renounce terrorism and subversion largely because America’s European allies had given the policy little support and rejected certain portions of it outright. Reagan had sought the closure of all Libyan embassies and a total ban on the purchase of Libyan oil, but the Europeans for the most part were unwilling to take those steps. They feared Libyan reprisals and wanted to avoid any action that might threaten their lucrative commercial relationships with Libya. When U.S.-Libyan relations reached a crisis in early 1986, the United States found itself virtually alone in confronting Qaddafi. After the West Berlin bombing Reagan realized that other steps that fell short of military force—diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, and large naval demonstrations—had not produced a noticeable change in Qaddafi’s behavior. Knowing full well that few allies would support his decision, Reagan nevertheless proceeded with Operation El Dorado Canyon. Most of them later criticized his action.

Yet the air strike profoundly affected both Colonel Qaddafi and America’s allies. Qaddafi received the unambiguous message that he could no longer attack Americans with impunity. The allies, on the other hand, sought to forestall further U.S. military action by implementing stronger counterterrorism measures and pledging to cooperate more closely with the United States in the fight against international terrorism.

Several years have passed since American bombs fell on Libya, and the events leading up to Operation El Dorado Canyon and the raid itself have faded from public memory. By 1991 the air strike was eclipsed by several important foreign affairs developments, such as the Iran-Contra affair, a large U.S military commitment in the Persian Gulf during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War, U.S.-Chinese relations following the massacre at Tiananmen Square, the collapse of Soviet communism, the U.S. invasion of Panama, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Moreover, it is worth noting that two well-known biographies of Ronald Reagan—President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime by Lou Cannon, originally published in 1991, and Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan by Edmund Morris, published in 1999—each devote only a few paragraphs to the U.S.-Libyan showdown of the 1980s.

Nevertheless, the story of Operation El Dorado Canyon and the events and circumstances leading up to it deserve to be told. On a number of occasions the dispute between Reagan and Qaddafi dominated U.S. foreign policy and, during the first three and a half months of 1986, it was a full-fledged crisis. This book presents a political-military history of relations between the United States and Libya from the beginning of Reagan’s presidency through the aftermath of the air strike, including the development of Reagan administration policies regarding international terrorism and its most prominent advocate, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and the political and economic strategies, diplomatic initiatives, covert actions, and military operations aimed at the Qaddafi regime. During Reagan’s presidency hostilities erupted between U.S. and Libyan forces on four occasions. Therefore, considerable space here is devoted to operational planning, descriptions of military equipment and tactics, and a portrayal of the combat actions that took place.

In recounting the turbulent relationship between Reagan and Qaddafi I have emphasized a number of points. First, developing a comprehensive U.S. strategy toward Libya was a long and difficult process. Many policy decisions took months to achieve because of bureaucratic infighting, disagreements between senior officials, conflicting interpretations of intelligence, and the need to assuage allies’ concerns. Second, despite having a reputation among his critics as a trigger-happy cowboy, Reagan refrained from using force in response to Libyan terrorism until he could reliably attribute responsibility for a specific terrorist incident to the Qaddafi regime and until other measures had been given a reasonable chance to modify Qaddafi’s behavior. Third, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force planned and trained for operations against Libya with exceptional skill and precision—often facing short deadlines and working under intense political pressure—and carried them out with extraordinary heroism. Fourth, the Sixth Fleet played an indispensable role in the prolonged confrontation with Libya by demonstrating the advantages of using naval power to achieve and maintain foreign policy objectives without resorting to all-out war or the long-term deployment of military forces. Finally, the air strike of 15 April 1986 was a devastating political and psychological defeat for Qaddafi. It undercut his ability to carry out or support further acts of terrorism, and it convinced him that he could no longer harm Americans without paying a terrible price. After Operation El Dorado Canyon Qaddafi was haunted by the prospect that the next terrorist incident that bore his fingerprints could trigger another armed riposte from the United States. While he did not forswear the use of terrorism, he was forced to adjust his operational methods, which in turn significantly reduced his involvement in the deadly practice. Moreover, the effect of the air strike on Qaddafi, namely the effective employment of military force against his regime, was not lost on other practitioners and supporters of global terrorism.

Certain portions of this book reveal a particular bias of the author. As a retired naval officer I take great pride in describing the extraordinary professionalism and heroic actions of Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force servicemen who risked their lives in combat against Libyan air, naval, and air defense forces. I have the highest admiration of and deepest respect for the courage of our servicemen and, in the case of two airmen, their supreme sacrifice. On the other hand, I am not blind to the faults of the Reagan administration and the U.S. military, especially regarding policies that did not serve the interests of the American people and tactical decisions that placed American forces in exceptional danger.

The body of this work begins and ends with a look at Libya. Chapter one contains an overview of Libyan history, an account of Qaddafi’s rise to power, and a description of revolutionary Libya. Portions of chapter seven examine the impact of El Dorado Canyon on Libya’s leader and describe Qaddafi’s attempts to end his country’s isolation in the years immediately following the air strike. The epilogue recounts the Lockerbie incident, its lasting impact on U.S.-Libyan relations, and Qaddafi’s succeeding efforts to rejuvenate his prestige in Africa, the Middle East, and the West. The final pages of this work contain an assessment of the legacy of El Dorado Canyon, an overview of the terrible events of II September 2001 and President George W. Bush’s call for a global war to eradicate terrorism, and a glimpse at the prospects for U.S.-Libyan relations in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

Editorial Note: Concerning the transliteration of Arabic words into English, I followed the system practiced by the Middle East Journal, with the following exceptions: first, I assimilated the definite article al- when it precedes sun letters of the Arabic alphabet (for example, Anwar as-Sadat, not Anwar al-Sadat); second, to avoid confusion I retained the widely accepted spellings of well-known people and places (such as Gamal Abdul Nasser, not Jamal abd an-Nasir, and Tripoli, not Tarabulus); and third, to maintain consistency with regard to geographic names, I adopted the system used by the editor of Libya: A Country Study, an area studies handbook published by the U.S. government in 1989.

Another thought on this subject: There are literally hundreds of English renderings of the last name of the leader of Libya. Qaddafi, Qadhafi, Qadhdhafi, Gadhafi, Gaddafi, Gadaffi, and Kaddafi are some of the more common spellings. Qaddafi is used throughout the body of this work because it is less cumbersome than Qadhdhafi, which is the most accurate transliteration. The reader can gain some appreciation of the range of alternate spellings of the name Qaddafi by browsing through the titles of books, articles, and documents shown in the bibliography.

Acknowledgments

I wish to recognize the assistance and support of several individuals and groups who aided me in the preparation of this work. I am particularly grateful to four accomplished historians, valued colleagues, and dear friends: Professor Craig L. Symonds of the Department of History at the U.S. Naval Academy, whose invaluable lessons on researching and writing history (which I learned as a midshipman) greatly influenced this endeavor; Dr. Edward J. Marolda, senior historian at the Naval Historical Center, who entrusted me with writing an illustrated history of the confrontation between the United States and Libya and provided valuable advice and direction during the preparation of that work (which is titled Swift and Effective Retribution: The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Confrontation with Qaddafi); Lt. Comdr. Thomas J. Cutler, USN (Ret.), my former colleague at the U.S. Naval Academy and Walbrook Maritime Academy, who encouraged me to follow up the earlier work with a book-length history; and Professor Earnest S. Tucker of the Department of History at the U.S. Naval Academy, who greatly enhanced my knowledge and understanding of the history of the Middle East and who on several occasions has graciously allowed me to share my work on Libya with his midshipmen.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to several friends and colleagues who reviewed the manuscript and offered constructive criticism and helpful suggestions. They include Professors David F. Appleby, Thomas E. Brennan, Nancy W. Ellenberger, John G. Kolp, David P. Peeler, Thomas Sanders, Brian VanDeMark, Lt. Kylan Jones-Hoffman, USN, and Capt. Chris Morton, USMC, all of the Department of History at the U.S. Naval Academy; Ms. Barbara M. Manville of the Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy; Comdr. Richard J. Cassara, USN (Ret.) and Mr. John Morrow, both of Walbrook High School-Uniform Services Academy; Professor James C. Bradford of the Department of History, Texas A&M University; Mr. Roy A. Grossnick and Comdr. Michael S. Lipari, USN (Ret.), both of the Aviation History Branch at the Naval Historical Center; and Dr. William Armstrong of the Naval Air Systems Command.

Since I began studying U.S. military operations against Libya, the dedicated professionals at the Naval Historical Center have provided me with a steady supply of information, materials, and support. These individuals include Dr. Dean C. Allard and Dr. William S. Dudley, successive directors of naval history; Dr. Robert J. Schneller, Mr. Robert J. Cressman, and Mr. Curtis A. Utz of the Contemporary History Branch; Mr. Todd Baker, Mr. Steven D. Hill, Ms. Gwendolyn J. Rich, and Ms. Judith A. Walters of the Aviation History Branch; Comdr. Diana Cangelosi, USN, Ms. Sandra Russell, Mr. Morgan I. Wilbur, Ms. Wendy Leland, Mr. Charles C. Cooney, and JO1 Eric S. Sesit, USN, of the Naval Aviation News Branch; Mr. Bernard F. Cavalcante, Ms. Kathy Lloyd, Ms. Judith Short, Mr. John Hodges, Ms. Regina T. Akers, and Ms. Ariana A. Jacob of the Operational Archives Branch; OSCS Rashad W. Shakir, USNR, FOIA coordinator; Ms. Ella W. Nargele, information security specialist; Mr. John C. Reilly and Mr. Ray Mann of the Ships’ History Branch; and Ms. Tonya Montgomery of the Navy Department Library.

The following individuals and organizations furnished important information and materials: Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, USN (Ret.); Ms. Cate Sewell of the Ronald Reagan Library; the information and privacy coordinator at the Central Intelligence Agency; the Archives Section of the Marine Corps Historical Center; headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe; the Nimitz Library at the U.S. Naval Academy; the Albin O. Kuhn Library at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County; the McKeldin Library at the University of Maryland, College Park; Mr. Bob Lawson of the Tailhook Photo Service; Mr. Hill Good-speed of the National Museum of Naval Aviation; the Photo Archives Department at the U.S. Naval Institute; the Department of Defense Still Media Records Center; the Still News Photo Division at the Navy Office of Information; and the National Archives Still Pictures Branch.

Most important I wish to thank my wife, Julie, and sons, Michael and William. Without their encouragement, patience, love, and support I could not have completed this significant undertaking.

Libya

Central Intelligence Agency

Prologue: The Air Battle Near Tobruk

Bogeys have jinked back at me for the fifth time. They’re on my nose now, inside of twenty miles.¹

Master arm on. Master arm on. Centering up on the T.

Bogeys have jinked back into me again. Sixteen miles. Centering the dot.²

Fourteen miles. ‘Fox one’! Fox one!³

Aw, Jesus!

Ten miles. He’s back on my nose! Fox one again!

Six miles. Six miles.

‘Talley two’! Talley two! Eleven o’clock high. They’re turning into me!⁴

Five miles. Four miles.

Okay . . . Got a missile off.

Good hit! Good hit on one!

Roger that. Good kill! Good kill!

I’ve got the other one.

Select ‘Fox two’! Select Fox two!⁵

All right, Fox two! . . .

Shoot him!

I don’t got a tone!⁶

Lock him up! Lock him up!

Shoot him! Fox two!

I can’t! I don’t have a fucking tone!

Good kill! Good kill!

Good kill!

Pilot ejected.

Okay. Let’s head north. Head north.

Let’s go down low, on the deck. Unload, five hundred knots. Let’s get out of here!

We’re showing two good chutes in the air here.

Roger that. Two Floggers. Two Floggers splashed.⁷

THIS FRENETIC DIALOGUE between American airmen was captured by the recording equipment in their fighter aircraft. It describes vividly the air battle that took place between two U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats and a pair of Libyan MiG-23 Floggers on 4 January 1989 in the noonday sky over the central Mediterranean Sea. The entire engagement—from the moment the Floggers left their base in Libya until the Tomcats shot them down—lasted about seven and a half minutes. The combat occurred just sixteen days before the end of Ronald Reagan’s presidency.

At the start of the new year 1989, Ronald Reagan and Muammar al-Qaddafi were engaged in a process that had become all too familiar during the previous eight years. Typically it involved the following progression: first an underlying controversy, then an escalating war of words, and finally a demonstration of American military power. On three previous occasions the process had culminated in hostilities. There were important differences between this confrontation and those of 1981 and 1986, however. This time the controversy did not involve an illegal territorial claim, subversion, or terrorism.⁸ It concerned the likelihood that Libya was developing the capacity to produce chemical weapons. This time the military action did not take place in the Gulf of Sidra or in the skies over Tripoli and Benghazi. It happened north of Tobruk, an historic city in northeast Libya. This time the battle between U.S. and Libyan forces was for the most part unexpected (whereas in 1981 and 1986 the United States had determined when and where it would challenge Qaddafi militarily). This time Qaddafi called the shot by deciding to confront a U.S. naval task force as it steamed through the central Mediterranean several miles from the Libyan shoreline. Nevertheless, the outcome of this clash was the same as the others before it: for the fourth and final time in eight years Ronald Reagan’s military had trounced the armed forces of Muammar al-Qaddafi.

1

Muammar al-Qaddafi and the Libyan Jamahiriyya

History of Early Libya

Libya, whose name derives from the appellation given a Berber tribe by the ancient Egyptians, did not become an independent and unified state until the middle of the twentieth century. Since antiquity the three regions that comprise modern Libya—Tripolitania in the northwest, Cyrenaica in the east, and Fezzan in the southwest—have maintained relations with different parts of the outside world and developed unique histories and identities due to the harsh deserts that kept them separate. This internal disunity combined with Libya’s history of foreign domination had a profound impact on its modern political development and the ideology of its mercurial leader, Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi.¹

Greek settlers founded Cyrene and four other city-states in Cyrenaica between the seventh and fifth centuries B.C. Phoenicians from Carthage established several commercial settlements in Tripolitania by the fifth century B.C. From about 1,000 B.C. Fezzan was loosely governed by the Garamentes tribe, which controlled major caravan routes in the Sahara Desert. The native Berbers, especially those of the hinterland, maintained their autonomy and preserved their distinct culture despite the influence of Greek and Carthaginian settlers and domination by several foreign masters including, by the time of the Arab conquest of the seventh century, the Egyptians, the Persians, the forces of Alexander the Great, the Ptolemies of Egypt, the Romans, the Vandals, and the Byzantines.

Already well developed, the cultural and historical differences between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica intensified during nearly five hundred years of Roman governorship. The two regions maintained their distinct Carthaginian and Greek cultures and, after the partition of the Roman Empire in 395, Tripolitania was attached to the western empire and Cyrenaica was assigned to the eastern. In the fifth century Rome recognized the mastery of the Vandals (a Germanic tribe) over much of North Africa including Tripolitania. Belasarius, a general serving the Byzantine Empire—the successor to the Eastern Roman Empire—recaptured Tripolitania in 533 but, by the time of the Arab invasion, the once prosperous cities of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were racked by political decay and religious strife and resembled bleak military outposts.²

Ten years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, an Arab general by the name of Amr ibn al-As conquered Cyrenaica. Spirited Berber resistance, however, delayed al-As’s conquest of Tripolitania until 649. Another Arab general, Uqba ibn Nafi, subdued Fezzan in 663. By 715 the Arabs had spread across North Africa and had captured all but the extreme northern portion of the Iberian Peninsula.

Over the next few centuries waves of Arab armies and settlers transmitted Islam, the Arabic language, and Arab culture to the indigenous populations of North Africa. City dwellers and farmers there converted to Islam and adopted Arab culture somewhat readily, but the Berbers of the interior, while professing Islam, remained linguistically and culturally separate from the Arabs. As part of the umma or community of Muslims, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were ruled by the caliph (the successor to the Prophet Muhammad) from Damascus and, later, from Baghdad, and were governed according to sharia, the Islamic legal code.³

From the early tenth to the sixteenth centuries Tripolitania and Cyrenaica suffered widespread intraconfessional violence and political instability. Consequently, the regions were dominated by a series of Islamic dynasties, tribes, and Christian governments, which included the Fatimids of Egypt, the Berber Zurids, the Hilalian Bedouins from Arabia, the Normans from Sicily, the Almohads of Morocco, the Hafsids of Tunis, the Mamluks of Egypt, the Hapsburgs of Spain, and the Knights of St. John of Malta. During this very turbulent period corsairs operating from North African ports harassed commercial shipping in the Mediterranean.⁴

In the sixteenth century the Ottoman Turks captured the entire North African coast except Morocco, and the sultan, the Ottoman ruler in Constantinople, established regencies in Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, the principal city of Tripolitania. In Tripoli the political authority was conferred upon a pasha or regent, who represented the sultan there. In the early seventeenth century Tripoli lapsed into political chaos as coup followed upon coup, and few military dictators survived a year in power. In 1711 Ahmad Qaramanli, a Turkish-Arab cavalry officer, seized power in Tripoli and founded an independent ruling dynasty while acknowledging the Ottoman sultan as his suzerain. Politically savvy and ruthless, Ahmad Pasha recognized piracy as a valuable source of revenue.⁵ During the reign of one of Ahmad’s successors, Yusuf ibn Ali Qaramanli, Tripoli’s program of state-sponsored piracy led to a naval war with the newly independent United States.

Mr. Jefferson’s War

For centuries the seizure of merchant ships and the imprisonment of their crews by North African corsairs prompted several European countries, and later the United States, to pay tribute or protection money to the potentates of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli—the so-called Barbary states—to ensure the safe passage of their merchant ships in the Mediterranean. The capture of several American merchantmen by Algerine corsairs spurred Congress to pass the Navy Act of 27 March 1794, which authorized the construction or purchase of six frigates to protect American commerce. Furthermore, in 1799 President John Adams began paying annual tribute to the rulers of the Barbary states. The share allotted to the pasha of Tripoli was eighteen thousand dollars. In exchange for the payment Yusuf Pasha promised that the corsairs based in his country would not harass American shipping.

In 1801 President Thomas Jefferson rejected Yusuf’s demand for a huge increase in annual tribute and in response the pasha declared war on the United States. Unaware of the pasha’s actions, Jefferson had already dispatched a naval squadron to the Mediterranean to protect American merchantmen and to dissuade the Tripolitan government from demanding additional tribute.⁶

The lackluster performances of the first two U.S. squadron commanders, Capt. Richard Dale and Capt. Richard V Morris, did not make much of an impression on the pasha. The deployment of the third squadron, commanded by Capt. Edward Preble, got off to a disastrous start when the frigate Philadelphia ran aground on a reef outside Tripoli harbor, resulting in the capture of the ship and the imprisonment of her crew. Despite the stunning loss, Preble displayed a relentless fighting spirit during his yearlong command of the Mediterranean Squadron. His first order of business was to destroy the U.S. frigate to prevent Yusuf from adding her to the Tripolitan fleet. In February 1804 Lt. Stephen Decatur led a raiding party that boarded and burned the Philadelphia directly beneath the guns of the citadel that protected the harbor.

On five occasions in late summer Preble shelled Tripoli with two bomb ketches borrowed from the Kingdom of Naples. Meanwhile, boarding parties led by Decatur captured or sank several Tripolitan gunboats after vicious hand-to-hand fighting. Despite the furious assaults Yusuf rejected Preble’s offer of ransom for the crewmen of the captured frigate. In early September Preble’s men loaded the ketch Intrepid with one hundred barrels of black powder and 150 rounds of shot and planned to detonate her inside Tripoli harbor. Preble hoped the explosion would stun the pasha, destroy the remainder of the pasha’s fleet, and blast a hole in the city wall near his castle. The plan failed when the Intrepid blew up prematurely, killing Lt. Richard Somers and his volunteer crew of two midshipmen and ten men. A week later Preble’s plucky squadron was relieved by a larger naval force commanded by Capt. Samuel Barron. Preble returned to the United States, where he received a hero’s welcome and accolades from Jefferson and the Congress.

While Preble had relied on naval power to confront Yusuf, Barron supported a political scheme to remove the Tripolitan despot from power. William Eaton, the American naval agent in North Africa, located Yusuf’s older brother, Ahmad ibn Ali Qaramanli, in Alexandria and persuaded Ahmad to join him in a march on Tripolitan territory. Ahmad’s promised reward for participating in the expedition was the regency of Tripoli, which Yusuf had snatched from him in a bloodless coup in 1796. Eaton’s army included Lt. Presley N. O’Bannon of the Marine Corps, seven enlisted Marines, a midshipman, a sailor, several Greek mercenaries, and hundreds of desert tribesmen and camp followers. In April 1805 the irregular force, supported by cannon fire from the brig Argus, schooner Nautilus, and sloop Hornet, captured the Cyrenaican city of Darnah. When Yusuf learned of the loss of Darnah he quickly sued for peace. Yusuf dropped all demands for tribute and ransomed the imprisoned Americans for sixty thousand dollars. In return the United States abandoned support of Ahmad and evacuated Darnah. On 10 June 1805 the United States and Tripoli signed the Treaty of Peace and Amity, which ended the four-year Tripolitan War.⁷

Ottoman Rule, the Sanusis, and Italian Colonization

In the years following the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, the European powers forcefully eradicated Mediterranean piracy and put an end to the system of paying tribute to the Barbary states.⁸ Deprived of the revenue derived from piracy, Tripoli’s economy declined and the country slipped into civil war. In 1835 the Ottomans forced the Qaramanli ruler, Ali II, into exile and reestablished direct rule over Tripoli. The Ottomans combined the three regions of the country into one vilayet or province—Tripolitania—ruled by an Ottoman wali (governor general) who was appointed by the sultan. In 1879 Cyrenaica became a separate province. Ottoman rule in the two provinces was for the most part turbulent, repressive, and corrupt.⁹

In the early nineteenth century Muhammad ibn Ali as-Sanusi, a highly respected Islamic scholar and marabout (holy man) from present-day Algeria, preached a message of Islamic revival based on the purity and simplicity of the early faith. He won many followers among Cyrenaican Bedouins who were attracted to his message of personal austerity and moral regeneration. In 1843 the Grand Sanusi, as he came to be known, founded the first of many lodges in Cyrenaica, which became the center of the new religious order. By the end of the nineteenth century virtually all of the Bedouin tribes in the region had pledged their allegiance to the Sanusi brotherhood. In the next century the Sanusis spearheaded the nascent Libyan nationalist movement.¹⁰

A late starter among European powers in the race for overseas colonies, Italy coveted the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. In 1911 the Italian government sent an ultimatum to the sultan, demanding to occupy the two provinces to protect Italy’s growing commercial interests. When Constantinople ignored the demand, Rome declared war. Italian forces invaded and captured Tripoli and occupied several coastal cities in Cyrenaica. Libyan tribesmen fought alongside Ottoman troops to resist the Christian invaders, but with war looming in the Balkans the Ottoman government had no choice but to sue for peace. Under the ambiguous terms of the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1912, the sultan gave up his political dominion in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica but retained the right to supervise Libya’s religious affairs. Rome’s annexation of the provinces, recognized by the other European powers, marked the start of a colonial war that lasted off and on for two decades.¹¹

Fighting for both Islam and their independence, Sanusi tribesmen prevented the Italians from expanding beyond their enclaves on the Cyrenaican coast. By contrast, in Tripolitania the Italians had greater success subduing and controlling large portions of the region because many local leaders lacked the will to continue armed resistance. After Italy’s entry into the First World War on the side of the Allies, Sanusi leader Ahmad ash-Sharif sided with the Central Powers. Following a disastrous raid into British-occupied Egypt in 1916, ash-Sharif turned the leadership of the movement over to the young, pro-British Muhammad Idris as-Sanusi. In 1917 Idris negotiated a truce with the Allies whereby Italy and Great Britain recognized him as the ruler over the interior of Cyrenaica, while he agreed to halt attacks on Italian-held coastal cities and Egypt.¹²

After the war Italy attempted to govern the country with a colonial policy that was both moderate and accommodating. The Italians recognized the autonomous Tripolitanian Republic and accepted Idris’s hereditary rule in Cyrenaica.¹³ Nevertheless, in 1922 when Idris reluctantly accepted Tripolitania’s suggestion that he become the ruler over all of Libya, the fascist leader Benito Mussolini responded by launching a brutal campaign of military conquest. The Second Italo-Sanusi War began later that year, and by the end of 1924 the Italians had subdued northern Tripolitania and most of coastal Cyrenaica. Southern Tripolitania was pacified in 1928, Fezzan in 1930. The fiercest action took place in the interior of Cyrenaica where the aged but vigorous Shaykh Umar al-Mukhtar led Sanusi tribesmen in a relentless guerrilla campaign against the larger and technologically superior Italian forces. The Italians completed the conquest of Libya in 1931 when they captured Mukhtar in the Green Mountains of northern Cyrenaica and defeated the remnant of his rebel army at al-Kufrah Oasis in southern Cyrenaica. During the last stages of the war the Italians executed more than twenty-four thousand Cyrenaicans, herded most of the civilian population into concentration camps, and forced the remaining population to flee into the desert.¹⁴

In 1934 Mussolini formally established the Italian colony of Libya, which was comprised of four provinces—Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi, and Darnah—in addition to a military district in Fezzan. In 1939 Libya became part of metropolitan Italy. During the 1930s the Italians invested large amounts of capital and launched several public works projects to modernize Libya’s economy, especially the agricultural sector. They set out to improve the country’s irrigation systems, roads, and port facilities. Significant progress was made, but the improvements primarily benefited the Italian colonists (who numbered over 110,000 by 1940) and a few upper-class Libyans, not the vast majority of Libya’s population. In many respects the Libyans suffered under Italian rule. Tribal grazing lands were transferred to Italian settlers, tribal government was abolished, the Sanusis were repressed, education and training programs were not established, and Libyans were excluded from the administration of their country.¹⁵

World War II and the United Nations

When Italy entered the Second World War in June 1940, Idris and other Libyan leaders declared their support for the Allies and began consulting with British military authorities. Idris pressed the British to endorse Libyan independence, but the government responded that it could not make a commitment while the war was still in progress. Idris accepted the British position, urged his followers to be patient, and continued the program of military cooperation. The British raised five Libyan battalions largely from Cyrenaica. The Libyan Arab Force (or Sanusi Army, as the Libyan contingent was popularly known) served under British command during the epic desert battles that raged between the German Afrika Korps of Gen. Erwin Rommel and the British Eighth Army of Gen. Claude Auchinleck and his successor, Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery. In November 1942 British forces liberated Cyrenaica from Axis control. By February 1943 all of Libya was free of Axis troops.¹⁶

The war was a traumatic experience for many Libyans, who found themselves mere pawns in a major conflict between colossal military powers. Lillian Craig Harris, an analyst with the U.S. Department of State, pointed out that for Qaddafi and many of his countrymen, World War II is no mere historical event but a living reality that must be remembered and used. Thousands of Libyan Arabs, out of a population of less than one million were killed. The country’s economic structure, such as it had been, was devastated. Qaddafi, whose sense of history is infused with the Bedouin idea of blood debt, to this day frequently repeats his demand that Italy and Britain pay reparations for damage to Libya during World War II.

During the war the British established military governments in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and Free French forces from the French colony of Chad set up a military administration in Fezzan. After the war conflicting interests among the victorious powers, conflicts that were exacerbated by the onset of the Cold War, prevented agreement among the Allies on the form and administration of a trusteeship for Libya. Consequently, the issue was referred to the United Nations for a solution. In November 1949 the General Assembly passed a resolution that called for the establishment by January 1952 of a sovereign Libyan state comprised of all three regions. The UN created a special council to supervise the transition to independence and to assist in drafting a constitution.¹⁷

United Nations officials faced extraordinary challenges as they prepared Libya for independence. About 90 percent of the population was illiterate and the country’s economy was extremely weak. In 1950 per capita income was about fifty dollars per year, and the largest source of revenue was the sale of scrap metal salvaged from World War II battlefields. Politically the Libyans could not agree on the structure of their new government. The Cyrenaicans favored a loose federation, while the Tripolitanians advocated a strong central government. Nevertheless, the Libyan Constituent Assembly, which met for the first time in November 1950, agreed unanimously that Libya would be established as a democratic, federal, and sovereign state; that the government would be a constitutional monarchy;