British Submarines in the Cold War Era

By Norman Friedman

The first comprehensive technical history on the subject, with photos: “A must-read for all professionals, designers and scholars of modern submarines.” —Australian Naval Institute
 
The Royal Navy’s greatest contribution to the Allied success in World War II was undoubtedly the defeat of the U-boat menace in the North Atlantic, a victory on which all other European campaigns depended. The underwater threat was the most serious naval challenge of the war, so it was not surprising that captured German submarine technology became the focus of attention for the British submarine service after 1945. It was quick to test and adopt the schnorkel, streamlining, homing torpedoes, and, less successfully, hydrogen-peroxide propulsion. Furthermore, in the course of the long Atlantic battle, the Royal Navy had become the world’s most effective anti-submarine force and was able to utilize this expertise to improve the efficiency of its own submarines.
 
However, in 1945 German submarine technology had also fallen into the hands of the Soviet Union—and as the Cold War developed it became clear that a growing Russian submarine fleet would pose a new threat. Britain had to go to the US for its first nuclear propulsion technology, but the Royal Navy introduced the silencing technique that made British and US nuclear submarines viable anti-submarine assets, and it pioneered in the use of passive—silent—sonars in that role. Nuclear power also changed the role of some British submarines, which replaced bombers as the core element of British Cold War and post-Cold War nuclear deterrence.
 
As in other books in this series, this one shows how a combination of evolving strategic and tactical requirements and new technology produced successive types of submarines. It is based largely on unpublished and previously classified official documentation, and to the extent allowed by security restrictions, also tells the operational story—HMS Conqueror is still the only nuclear submarine to have sunk a warship in combat, but there are many lesser-known aspects of British submarine operations in the postwar era.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Sep 30, 2020
• ISBN: 9781526771247

Norman Friedman

NORMAN FRIEDMAN is arguably America’s most prominent naval analyst, and the author of more than thirty books covering a range of naval subjects, including Naval Anti-Aircraft Guns & Gunnery and Naval Weapons of World War One.

Book preview

BRITISH SUBMARINES

IN THE COLD WAR ERA

BRITISH SUBMARINES

IN THE COLD WAR ERA

NORMAN FRIEDMAN

Valiant, the first all-British nuclear submarine, seen on 29 June 1977. (James Mortimer)

Copyright © Norman Friedman 2021

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by

Seaforth Publishing

An imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd

47 Church Street, Barnsley

S Yorkshire S70 2AS

www.seaforthpublishing.com

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing of both the copyright owner and the above publisher.

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CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

1. RN SUBMARINES AFTER 1945

2. YEAR ZERO: 1945

3. SONAR AND SOUND IN THE SEA

4. INTERIM SUBMARINES: CONVERSIONS

C

OLOUR GATEFOLD between 80 and 81

5. THE FAST BATTERY SUBMARINE

6. THE HTP ADVENTURE

7. GOING NUCLEAR

8. THE STRATEGIC SUBMARINE

B

LACK AND WHITE GATEFOLD between 136 and 137

9. NEW-GENERATION NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES

10. REVIVING THE DIESEL SUBMARINE

11. BRITISH COLD WAR SUBMARINES IN ACTION

12. AFTER THE COLD WAR

Appendix A. British Submarine Sonars/Asdics

Appendix B. Command and Control Systems

Appendix C. Submarine Weapons

Appendix D. Midget Submarines

Notes

Bibliography

Submarine Data

Submarine List

ABBREVIATIONS

ABM = anti-ballistic missile

ACMS = Astute Combat Management System

ADA = Action Data Automation

ADEB = Admiralty Development Establishment Barrow

AEL = Admiralty Experimental Laboratory

AERA = Atomic Energy Research Authority

AERE = Atomic Energy Research Establishment

AIO = Action Information Organisation

ANF = Atlantic Nuclear Force

ARL = Admiralty Research Laboratory

ASR = Admiralty Standard Range (diesels)

ASW = anti-submarine warfare

ASWE = Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment

ASWO = Anti-submarine Weapons Officer

ATP = air turbine pump

AUWE = Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment

BAOR = British Army of the Rhine

BMD = Ballistic Missile Defence

CDS = Combat Direction System

CEP = Circular Error Probable

CIC = Combat Information Center

CNO = Chief of Naval Operations (US)

CRNSS = Chief of the Royal Navy Scientific Service

CRT = cathode ray tube

dB = decibels

DEE = Department/Director of Electrical Engineering

DEMON = DEMOdulated Noise

DGS = Director General Ships

DIMUS = Digital Multibeam Scanning

DNC = Department/Director of Naval Construction

DNO = Department/Director of Naval Ordnance

DNW = Director of Naval Warfare

DOR = Director of Operational Research

DP = dual purpose

DRPC = Defence Research Policy Committee

DSDT = Directorate of Staff Duties and Training

DTASW = Director of Torpedo, Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare

DUSW = Director Under-Surface Warfare

DUW = Director of Underwater Weapons

ECM = electronic countermeasures

EinC = Engineer-in-Chief

EW = electronic warfare

FBC = Future Building Committee

FOM = Figure of Merit

FOSM = Flag Officer Submarines

FOSSN = Follow-On SSN

GCHQ = Government Communications Headquarters

GIUK = Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (Gap)

GNP = gross national product

HE = hydrophone effect

HP = horsepower

HTP = high-test (hydrogen) peroxide

Hz = Hertz

IDD = Initial Detection Display

IFF = Identify Friend or Foe

IPT = Integrated Product Team

JIC = Joint Intelligence Committee

LOFAR = Low-Frequency Analysis and Recording

LOP = Local Operational Plot

LPD = Labelled Plan Display

LTCs = Long-Term Costings

MAD = magnetic anomaly detection/detector

MDA = Mutual Defence Agreement

MDU = Mine Detection Unit

MEZ = Maritime Exclusion Zone

MIRV = multiple independent re-entry vehicle

MLF = Multi-Lateral Force

MRBM = medium-range ballistic missile

MSE = Missile Setting Equipment msec = milliseconds

NCRE = Naval Construction Research Establishment

nm = nautical mile(s)

NOIC = naval officer in charge

NSR= Naval Staff Requirements

ONI = Office of Naval Intelligence (US)

OR = Operational Requirement

ORC = Operational Requirements Committee

OST = Outline Staff Target

PAC = penetration aid carrier

PCO = Principal Coordinating Officer

RAP = Reliable Acoustic Path

RCNC = Royal Corps of Naval Constructors

RPM = revolutions per minute

SACEUR = Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SACLANT = Supreme Allied Commander North Atlantic

SADS = Submarine Action Data Automation System

SALT= Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SBS = Special Boat Squadron

SDPC = Ship Design Policy Committee

SHAPE = Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe.

SHP = shaft horsepower

SINS = Ships Inertial Navigation System

SMCS = Submarine Multiscreen Command System

SNAPS = Smiths Industries Navigation and Plotting System

SNCP = Special Naval Collection Programme

SR = Staff Requirement

SSBN = Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

SSK = Conventional submarine

SSN= Nuclear-powered attack submarine

SSTG = ship service turbo-generator

STD = Submarine Torpedo Director

SULE = Superintendent of Underwater Launching Equipment

TCC = Torpedo Control Calculator

TCSS = Torpedo Control System Submarines

TDC = Torpedo Data Computer

TDHS = Tactical Data Handling System

TEE =Torpedo Experimental Establishment

TGCU = Torpedo Guidance Control Unit

TIOS = Tactical Information Organisation, Submarine

TMA = Target Motion Analysis

TNA = The National Archives

TPDS = Target Parameter Derivation System

TSC = Tactical Support Centre

TSD = Tactical and Staff Duties (Department)

TSW = Tactical Weapons System

TTWCS = Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System

TTZ = Tactical-Technical Requirement

UAR = Underwater Acoustic Recognition System

UCWE = Underwater Countermeasures and Weapons Establishment

UDE = Underwater Detection Establishment

UKAEA = United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

UWE= Underwater Weapons Establishment

UWLE = Underwater Weapon Launching Establishment

VCNS = Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff

W/T = wireless telegraphy

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is based largely on documents in the Public Record Office (The National Archives, Kew) and in the Brass Foundry out-station of the National Maritime Museum. For assistance at the Brass Foundry, I am grateful to Jeremy Michell and to his very able assistant Andrew Choong Han-Lin. I am also grateful to Jennie Wraight, the Admiralty Librarian, to the staff of The National Archives at Kew (which I think of as the Public Record Office), to the staff of the US National Archives at College Park, and to the staffs of the US Navy Department Library and of the Library of Congress. For photographs I am indebted to A D Baker III, to Dr Josef Straczek, to Janis Jorgenson (photo curator of the US Naval Institute), to John Mortimer, to John Gourley, and to Christopher C Wright (editor of Warship International). Leo van Ginderen very kindly gave me permission to use some of his photographs.

I could not have written this book without the loving support and encouragement of my wife Rhea. That is true of everything I have written, but it is especially true now. Her being there made all the difference in the face of the Covid-19 plague.

CHAPTER 1

RN SUBMARINES AFTER 1945

This book recounts a revolution in British submarine design and operation. In 1945 submarines were numerous and relatively inexpensive. They operated in support of the fleet, but not in conjunction with it. The only exception was the assignment of some submarines to Arctic convoys, presumably to submerge and attack if major German surface ships appeared. By the 1960s, with the advent of nuclear power and consequently high sustained submerged speed, the Royal Navy was intensely interested in direct support: a nuclear submarine operating in close proximity to surface ships would detect and track hostile submarines beyond their detection range. By that time submarines were as expensive as cruisers, with the same sort of speed. By the late 1960s the four ‘R’-class submarines were the basis of the British national deterrent, so they and their Vanguard-class successors might be considered the most important of all British warships. Submarines were now sometimes called capital ships. Like the capital ships of the past, generally they were best countered by others of their own kind. They could certainly deal with surface ships, as HMS Conqueror showed when she sank the Argentine cruiser Belgrano during the 1982 Falklands War. With limited resources, the Royal Navy found itself having to choose between this new kind of weapon and a more classic capital ship, the aircraft carrier. The only major role the submarine could not fill was that of peacetime presence.

The Royal Navy ended the Second World War with a large and successful submarine force, which had been designed for a war that seemed unlikely to recur. British priorities shifted towards ASW, the question being what role submarines would have in the future. The ‘A’ class embodied wartime British experience. Alcide is shown in March 1947. She was expected to operate in classic submarine mode, spending considerable time on the surface – so she had a twin 20mm gun at the after end of her fin, to deal with possible air attack. (Baker collection)

Through the period covered by this book, the Royal Navy’s submarine service was headed by Flag Officer Submarines, typically abbreviated as FOSM, who was generally a vice admiral.¹ For much of the time he was headquartered at Fort Blockhouse in Portsmouth, which had been the main submarine base since before the First World War. During the Second World War the submarine headquarters was moved temporarily to Ringways near Manchester. In the 1960s it was moved to the main naval operational headquarters at Northwood. That move might be said to symbolise the increasing integration of nuclear submarines with the rest of the fleet. The barrier to complete integration was difficulty in communication. Typically a surface group did not communicate directly with a submarine, except by short-range underwater telephone or, later, teletype. Anything not immediate had to go through the distant submarine command authority ashore, which could send messages to the submarine when it went to periscope depth (via VLF) or when it put an antenna through the surface of the water. This consideration continues to apply, as submarines still connect with long-haul communications media only periodically. Now, however, communication is typically via a high-capacity satellite dish and the submarine typically connects with what amounts to an Internet.

Until well into the 1960s, British naval policy was formulated by the Board of Admiralty (which I have often abbreviated as the Board), which approved each warship design by affixing the ‘Board Stamp’. Controller (Third Sea Lord) was generally responsible for the technical departments: Naval Construction (DNC), Ordnance (DNO) and Engineer-in-Chief (machinery). A separate Department of Electrical Engineering (DEE) was responsible for generators, motors and batteries, all of which were crucial to submarines. A Naval Staff headed by First Sea Lord (as Chief of the Naval Staff) developed Staff Requirements or outline specifications, for ships and their equipment.

In theory the Admiralty was abolished in favour of a Navy Board in 1964. The office of First Lord, who stood between Parliament and the Navy, was replaced by a single Minister of Defence with a Navy Minister (for the Navy Department) under him. Correspondingly, the Minister of Defence was advised by a single Chief of the Defence Staff, initially former First Sea Lord Admiral Lord Mountbatten, although the services retained their own chiefs. That was the context of decisions like the cancellation of the new carrier in 1965 and the abortive choice to sell off the three light carriers in 1981.

The Board’s functions continued and it continued to decide whether to approve projects. The difference was increased review by the separate Ministry of Defence organisation; the Minister of Defence, not the First Sea Lord, was increasingly the ultimate authority. It became more and more necessary to conduct elaborate studies to justify naval programmes. This evolution was much like that in the United States a few years earlier under Secretary of Defense Robert S McNamara and his system analysts. To a considerable extent the growth in the Ministry of Defence consciously mirrored developments in the United States. In both cases the result was that programmes were considerably stretched out.

Throughout, projects also had to be approved by the Treasury, which sometimes asked technical questions (the SSBN story is a case in point). Beginning in 1959, the Ministry of Defence demanded ten-year plans (with their costs), the Long-Term Costings (LTCs). Long-range programmes were not new, but the demand for spending estimates, on which long-range budgeting for all three services could be based, was.

The symbol of the shift to underwater operation was the replacement of the gun by a snorkel (snort). Alderney is shown in 1954, her snort mast folded down on deck abaft her bridge. She has been modestly streamlined, her external bow and stern torpedo tubes having been removed and plated over. In addition, a second passive sonar (Type 138) has been mounted on her bow. (Baker collection)

The naval organisation encountered difficulties as electronics and advanced weapons became more and more important. Thus the Director of Naval Construction (DNC), who as Assistant Controller had been the Board’s official technical advisor, became Director General Ships and there was a separate Director General Weapons in the 1960s. Perhaps the most extreme cases of a sense that electronics dominated physical issues recounted in this book were the appointment of Marconi to fix the Mk 24 torpedo and, much later, the selection of BAE (a systems company) to build the Astute class.

During the Second World War the Board created a Future Building Committee (FBC), which was intended to address the shape of the fleet as well as requirements for particular types of ships. Prior to the creation of the FBC there had not been any Naval Staff element charged specifically with developing a fleet to fit any particular policy. Presumably the carrier revolution had made it obvious that something new was needed. The main wartime role of the FBC was to take into account the explosively growing role of aircraft carriers; its wartime record also includes the issue of the size and shape of the post-war fleet. After the war the committee became the Ship Design Policy Committee (SDPC), which in 1953 created a dedicated submarine sub-committee. Later the SDPC morphed into multiple committees, including a Ships Characteristics Committee and the Fleet Requirements Committee (FRC), which morphed into the Fleet Effectiveness Committee (FEC). The post-war SDPC submarine papers have not been released, but some of the FRC and FEC papers have been used in this book. The FEC included a long-range objectives sub-committee. Director of Plans (in the Naval Staff) sat on these committees.

For the historian, the fall of the independent Admiralty is obvious in the ending of ADM series of documents in the Public Records Office (now The National Archives, TNA) and the rise of DEFE (Ministry of Defence) series, some of them devoted to naval records. The researcher also sees the shift from in-house Admiralty choices to Ministry of Defence in the designation of Staff Requirements. Until about 1960 they were TSDs, issued by the Tactical and Staff Duties Department of the Admiralty. By 1963 they were four-digit NSRs, Naval Staff Requirements (sometimes Naval Air Staff Requirements), which began as Naval Staff Targets and had to be endorsed by a multi-service committee, initially the Operational Requirements Committee (ORC), many of whose papers have now been released. The numbering scheme gave the Royal Navy numbers between 6000 and 7999, but the logic of which systems were given which numbers in that series is obscure. I have quoted NSR numbers so that researchers can follow their history in the papers of various defence committees.

Initially the main Royal Navy submarine role seemed to be to gather experience of the new kind of fast submarine so that surface and air ASW forces could counter it. In the late 1940s that justified conversion of ‘T’-class submarines like HMS Tabard, shown on 27 June 1955. (Baker collection)

Until the end of the 1980s, British submarines were designed by DNC and his successors, which meant the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors (RCNC). Some constructors specialised in submarine design, but in 1956 the cruiser section was shifted to work on the first British nuclear submarine, which became HMS Dreadnought. At the end of the 1980s, under pressure to privatise British defence procurement, the Royal Corps lost much of its power. The first non-DNC nuclear submarine design was the Astute class (Vickers had largely, but not completely, been responsible for the Upholders). This shift wiped out much of the experience in basic submarine design DNC had accumulated. It amounted to a belief that designers outside DNC were somehow needed to solve problems like the rising cost of ships. It did not help that with the end of the Cold War the steady stream of submarine construction stopped. It seems reasonable to blame problems in the Astute design mainly on the loss of expertise due to gaps in British nuclear submarine procurement.

Economics and Strategy

The fundamental problem of British defence, which runs through this book, was slow recovery from the devastation of the Second World War, which was economic as much as physical. In effect the US Lend-Lease programme saved Britain from bankruptcy in 1941, so that Britain could devote an enormous proportion of its economy to the war. With the end of the war and of Lend-Lease, the economic problems returned, to the point that in 1946 the United Kingdom was effectively bankrupt. Disaster was staved off by a large US loan negotiated that year. Yet Britain had to cope with the costs of early post-war disorder, including the continuing need to police the Empire and of peacekeeping in Europe (including the occupation of Germany). It did not help that the Empire lost its greatest source of non-British manpower when India became independent in 1947. The British found themselves maintaining conscription (National Service) from the end of the war through 1962. The Army and the RAF had first call on conscripts, making naval manpower a perennial problem (the naval plans of the late 1950s were keyed to the numbers of men expected to be available).

As a post-war global power, Britain found itself trying to sustain forces comparable to those of the United States on a far smaller economic base. In 1948 the British gross national product (GNP) was about $35 billion, which compared to about $257.6 billion for the United States. At this time US intelligence estimated that the Soviet GNP was $95 billion, of which about $25 billion was going for defence. In 1948 the British defence budget was about $3.6 billion (10.3 per cent of GNP). The United States was spending a lot more ($9.75 billion) but the associated burden was considerably smaller (3.8 per cent). These figures give some idea of the extent to which even very reduced defence spending slowed British recovery.² It was generally accepted that the first priority was to recover from the wartime economic disaster, which meant that Britain had to emphasise exports. British analyses of this period often mention the need to limit the naval load on the ‘metal-using industries’.³

Serious financial problems led to two major Defence Reviews, the first in 1952 and the second in 1956–7. Among the consequences of the second review was increased defence unification, the hope being that a more powerful Ministry of Defence could overcome parochial service interests in favour of national strategic ones.

The new post-war context was that the only likely future great-power enemy was the Soviet Union. There was some hope among politicians that Stalin’s wartime alliance with the West might lead to a friendly post-war relationship, but by early 1946 that seemed less and less likely. Beginning in 1945, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the British Chiefs of Staff had regularly evaluated the future war potential of the Soviet Union, not least as an indicator of future British military preparedness. The great question was when a war might come. In 1947 the JIC estimated that it would take a decade for the Soviets to recover from the devastation of the Second World War. They had lost more than 20 million people. The main industrial areas had been severely damaged, even though many plants had survived after being moved east. It seemed that war could be ruled out altogether for the first half of the period to 1957. The possibility of war would begin to rise in 1952. If it would take a decade for the Soviets to recover completely, so 1957 became the ‘year of maximum danger’. The US government seems to have accepted this idea; a US war plan (actually a feasibility study) was written in 1949 to see how the force then envisaged for 1957 might be expected to perform. The reprieve offered by the JIC was conditional. Unless the British maintained a credible army and air force in their zone of Germany, the Soviets might simply seize it. Post-war naval operational demands were not as heavy as those on the Army.

The weapons with which the West had won the Second World War were obsolescent. Any future war would be fought with new technology invented, but not fully implemented, during the war, things like nuclear weapons, jet aircraft, fast submarines and guided missiles. In 1948, for example, First Sea Lord Admiral Fraser wrote that the three key problems for the future were how the fleet could cope with jet attackers, with the new submarines capable of high underwater speed and with pressure mines. They became the themes of post-war British naval development. Fast jets bred a need for automated command systems. They eventually bred submarine versions. The Royal Navy built its own fast submarines, initially at the least to gain insight into how to combat them. Mine countermeasures became a major programme, including mine hunting as a counter to, among other things, pressure mines.

Given the JIC prediction, for the first post-war years the Royal Navy could concentrate its limited funds on experimentation. It was able, for example, to embark on development of hydrogen peroxide as a means of enabling submarines to sustain very high underwater speed.

By the early 1950s the Royal Navy submarine role was shifting towards ASW and the high speed of the conversions and new-build submarines no longer seemed so important. It seemed to be enough to provide submarines with snorkels, sonars and effective fire-control systems. This view helps explain the programme of snort conversions of medium-range ‘S’-class submarines, which would have sufficient performance to operate in Western European waters. HMS Scorcher, 17 June 1953, shows her snort mast, folded down onto her deck. Her Type 138 passive sonar has been moved into her bow to act as an attack sonar. Her casing has been cut back aft. (Baker collection)

The Soviet Union was a land power. The question for all Western navies in the aftermath of the Second World War was what their role would be in a war against it. In Britain, the RAF blocked any strategic land-attack role for the Royal Navy (the nascent US Air Force failed in a similar attack on the US Navy). The Royal Navy therefore concentrated on sea control. A future protracted war would more or less resemble the Second World War. It would be crucial to maintain free use of the North Atlantic connection between Britain and North America. The Royal Navy emphasised the two threats to North Atlantic sea control, submarines and mines.⁴ The air threat to shipping closer to Europe justified maintaining a carrier force and developing jet carrier fighters. To some extent, too, it remembered attacks by German surface raiders. Thus it pointed to the threat of major Soviet warships operating against convoys. It was difficult to imagine that any British or Allied naval attack on Soviet coastal shipping would much affect the course of a war.

Before the Second World War the Soviets had maintained the world’s largest submarine fleet. It had achieved very little in wartime, but that was no reason for optimism about the future. In 1945 the Soviets had captured new German technology which had promised to upend Allied naval superiority. The most important post-war British naval task was to maintain that superiority, which meant, among other things, finding counters to the new fast submarines. Initially that meant developing new tactics and weapons. At the very least British submariners had to duplicate fast German-type submarines well enough to make development possible. That effort had begun during the war with ‘fast target’ conversions of ‘S’-class submarines, beginning with HMS Seraph. Work on fast battery conversions of existing ‘T’-class submarines, which became the first of a new generation of operational submarines, was justified in 1947 by the need to test new sensors, weapons and tactics.

If the JIC was to be believed, the period through about 1952 could be devoted to development, including producing small numbers of prototypes. That work would lead to the ‘ultimate’ weapons to be produced and deployed by about 1956. Current production could be limited to interim weapons or even to obsolescent Second World War types. To some extent continued limited production was a way to keep vital defence suppliers in business. A snorkel-equipped wartime submarine fell into the first category and could be used to gain necessary operating experience. The true interim submarine, it seemed, was the fast battery Type XXI. The ‘ultimate’ 1957 submarine would be a high-test (hydrogen) peroxide (HTP)-powered ‘true submersible’ or some equivalent.

Royal Navy submarines had an important Commonwealth ASW training role. Initially that helped justify the size of the submarine force, but as nuclear submarines entered service the Royal Navy sought to shed this conventional role by encouraging Australia and Canada to build up their own submarine forces. HMS Tabard is shown on 4 September 1969 while serving with the 4th Submarine Squadron based at Sydney. (John Mortimer)

Despite serious financial problems, post-war British governments agreed that Britain had to have nuclear weapons if she was to retain great-power status. The high cost of this project added to the problems suffered by the services, which were struggling to keep their non-nuclear forces alive and reasonably modern. With the bomb went the requirement for a delivery system, which in the 1940s meant long-range jet bombers. The costs of the bomb and the bombers significantly reduced available funding for other military projects, including new submarines. However, the bomb project created a UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) and a nuclear research facility at Harwell. This resource made it possible for the Royal Navy to contemplate developing nuclear submarines.

The JIC view must have seemed less and less realistic by 1948–9. Despite his wartime losses, Stalin was willing to threaten war over Berlin, blockading the city – but not blocking the Anglo-American airlift which saved it. He had already sponsored subversion in France and Italy and a civil war in Greece.⁵ These conflicting signals seem to have justified a political rather than military response. The British sponsored creation of a Western European Union and then (in 1949) of NATO, which linked Western Europe to the main source of likely wartime supply in North America. The US, by far the strongest NATO power, sought to improve deterrence by supplying surplus weapons to European NATO powers, including the United Kingdom. Newer American weapons and related systems also became available. In August 1949 the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb, considerably eroding the US deterrent.⁶ The British Chiefs of Staff produced a three-year plan in which procurement would cost about £800 million per year. It entailed considerable cuts in current forces and even then it was unaffordable.

Meanwhile the role of the British submarine force shifted. In 1946–7 it was intended mainly to support the development of surface and air anti-submarine warfare (ASW) by providing what amounted to realistic targets. By 1948, however, British submariners were arguing that their craft might be extremely effective anti-submarine weapons. Submarine attacks on other submarines had figured in both World Wars, though they had had only minor impact during the Second. However, wartime experience offered a pointer to the future. In April 1945 HMS Venturer sank a submerged snorkelling U-boat while herself submerged. This unique feat suggested a direction for future British submarine tactical and technical development. In both World Wars, submarines had effectively attacked enemy submarines en route to their patrol areas or their bases. Exercises showed that even with existing straight-running torpedoes, a British submarine had a fair chance of hitting a submerged submarine proceeding at periscope depth. The enemy submarine would have to be detected passively, on the basis of noise it generated. Submarines were typically noisy when snorkelling and relatively quiet when running on their batteries and their electric motors. Venturer’s U-boat was apparently particularly noisy due to a machinery problem; she was hit returning to her base for repairs. Later the emphasis was on cavitation noise the submarine would produce even if her diesel was silenced (as the British learned to do). The shallower the submarine, the lower the speed at which she would cavitate, so it seemed that almost any snorkelling submarine would do so. Attacking at periscope depth also eliminated the need to gauge the target’s depth; it converted the problem into much the one submarines had always solved when attacking surface ships.

The larger naval view seems to have been that, as in the Second World War, the most effective measure to protect trade would be convoy, which made building escorts the main ASW priority. If, as expected, the Soviets produced an equivalent to the late-war German Type XXI, most existing escorts were obsolete, because they were far too slow. In this context new high-performance submarines were justified mainly because they would provide experience in the sort of tactics the Soviets were likely to employ and also because they could help train ASW forces. The submariners managed to ensure that the new submarines, both conversions and new construction, were fully operational types, but they did not sell the Admiralty on the idea that submarines rather than convoy escorts were likely to be the most effective future ASW craft.

The Admiralty felt constrained to sketch a relatively small affordable active fleet, but it retained large numbers of inactive war-built ships as a reserve and a possible source of modernised units.⁷ Because maintenance resources were limited and also because of technological obsolescence, this wartime fleet was a waning asset.

It seems to have been assumed that if war did break out, the powerful Soviet army in Central Europe would drive west towards the Channel, much as the Germans had done in 1940. Britain would become the forward base for a counter-offensive. Like the Germans, the Soviets would subject Britain to air attacks, but until they had enough atomic bombs to destroy the United States, it was unlikely that they would have any to spare for the United Kingdom. The Admiralty envisaged a period of ‘broken-backed’ war, during which it would be vital to maintain sea supply of the United Kingdom. That justified continued investment in ASW and other means of sea control. It also, incidentally, justified continued investment in a large reserve fleet which could be mobilised to make up for early wartime losses. Submarines figured heavily in this kind of war.

During the run-up to the 1957 Defence Review the Royal Navy emphasised its ‘warm war’ role, meaning its importance in limited wars mainly East of Suez. Deck guns, which were very much an anachronism in major war, mattered. HMS Andrew was the last British submarine so armed. Because the streamlined ‘A’ class retained their ammunition-passing hatch forward of the fin, installation was relatively simple. (RAN Historical Section via Dr Josef Straczek)

The situation changed dramatically when Stalin’s puppet, the North Korean dictator Kim Il-Sung, invaded South Korea in June 1950. Many in the West saw the attack as the opening phase of a much larger war. There is some evidence that they were right, that by 1952 Stalin really was contemplating a Third World War. Many in the West feared that if they failed to resist the North Koreans, Stalin might try something similar in Europe, perhaps using the militarised East German police (effectively already an army) to attack West Germany. The British Government began to mobilise. In October 1950 First Sea Lord Admiral Fraser proposed to bring the date of modernisation forward to 1955.⁸ It was expected to cost £900 million, the naval share of the £3600 million the Government planned to allocate to defence. This was still conceived within the limits of a peacetime economy, the object being to fight more effectively with ‘the fleet we have got’. It emphasised counters to threats to shipping by supporting frigate and minesweeper construction, port defences and modern naval aircraft. By this time, however, there was an increasing feeling that war might be coming.⁹

In November 1950 the NATO Defense Committee approved a Medium-Term Defence Plan which required increased spending by NATO members. Deficiencies were calculated in terms of declared national contributions; the Royal Navy declaration was based on what the Fraser Plan had provided for 1954. The British Government formally approved the British national contribution. The Atlantic Council recommended that all NATO countries re-examine their plans. The British Government formulated a Hypothesis for Defense Preparedness initially published on 20 December 1950. It called for completion of the £3600 million plan by December 1952 rather than March 1954. All possible measures should be taken to increase readiness in 1951. Initially six Porpoise-class fast battery submarines were all brought forward to the 1950–1 programme. They were later moved to the 1951–2 programme.

The Korean War transformed NATO into a military alliance with a Supreme Commander, initially US General Dwight D. Eisenhower. His naval equivalent was Supreme Allied Commander North Atlantic (SACLANT), a US admiral at Norfolk, Virginia. NATO delegations met at Lisbon in 1951 to decide each country’s contribution. Although the Lisbon goals were not met, governments formally promised forces to the NATO naval commands. These and subsequent formal promises in turn were cited by the Royal Navy (and other NATO navies), to justify force levels to government.

A new £4700 million plan was formulated, covering all three services, for the 1951–2 through 1954–5 programmes. The naval plan emphasised escorts and mine warfare craft. Four more fast battery submarines were planned for 1953–4; later they were moved back to 1952–3. This plan also showed ‘T’-class modernisations (one in 1951–2, one in 1952–3 and three in 1953–4) and ‘S’-class modernisations (four in 1951–2 and five in 1952–3). In fact two ‘T’-class submarines were actually modernised in 1951–2 and another two in 1952–3. Other versions of the programme extended through 1957–8.

It turned out that the British economy could not support the £4700 million plan, to the point that it was already suffering delays in 1951, and the 1952–4 Estimates had to be reduced. Initially the plan was stretched to four years rather than three. Soon it had to be admitted that the United Kingdom probably could not make the recommended NATO contributions.¹⁰ The problem was not just financial. Rapid expansion of the Army made it difficult to find naval manpower. The Navy had to extend sailors and officers who would otherwise have retired.

In December 1952 the Admiralty Finance Committee reported that one fast battery submarine and four midget submarines had been deleted from the 1952–3 programme, along with other ships. Later another was deleted, leaving two ships in 1952–3, for a total of eight Porpoise class. Plans for the 1954–5 programme called for another four, which were later moved back to 1953–4. By 1952 this programme was in trouble and it was being stretched out. Two fast battery submarines were deleted from the 1953–4 programme. When the 1954–5 sketch estimates were prepared, the 1952–3 programme included the two Porpoises (to be ordered in mid-1954) plus the first of a new class of small submarines, to be ordered in May 1955 for completion in July 1957.¹¹ At this time the projected 1953–4 submarine programme was the prototype midget, to be ordered in December 1955 for completion in December 1957. It appears that the six deferred submarines from the 1953–4 and 1954–5 programmes became the new smaller ‘1953 Submarine’.

Andrew was not unique. Anchorite is shown with her 4in Mk 23 gun. (RAN Historical Section via Dr Josef Straczek)

It is striking that although ASW was the primary role of British submarines, submarines were hardly primary British ASW weapons. The great lesson of the previous war, as far as the Royal Navy was concerned, was that convoy was by far the primary counter to enemy submarines. In some places enemy aircraft had been the most potent threat, hence the need to modernise the carrier air force. Another great Second World War lesson was the need for extremely large numbers of mine warfare craft.

The inability to execute the £4700 million plan led to a 1952 review of Global Strategy by the British Chiefs of Staff. It was intended to reshape British defence into something affordable. This review coincided with a change in circumstances. Britain exploded her first nuclear bomb in 1952. About a month later the Americans exploded a thermonuclear device, with about a thousand times as much explosive force. The Chiefs of Staff argued that central war was now far less likely, because Western (mainly US) nuclear strength would deter a Soviet attack. This conclusion was elaborated over the next few years.

The 1954 Chiefs of Staff review of ‘United Kingdom Defence Policy’ called, among other things, for an urgent review of the escort programme which had largely driven the Admiralty’s rearmament plan. The Chiefs of Staff argued that it would be more justified for the British to take risks during the next four or five years than later, presumably because the Soviets would not yet have enough nuclear weapons. During this period the means to exert influence as a world power and to meet Cold War commitments should take priority over preparations for global war.

The Admiralty argued that deterrence had a wider meaning. If Western nuclear weapons could deter the Soviets from deliberately beginning World War III, it was also important to deter lesser crises and wars which might trigger something larger and disastrous. Deterrence thus embraced support for NATO and also support for Commonwealth nations and dependencies which could come under attack.¹² At this time the British were fighting a counterinsurgency war in Malaya.

The financial disaster had shown that the Royal Navy could never build enough escorts even for its current limited needs. Director of Plans argued that ASW strategy had to change. He suggested three options: submarine interdiction of enemy submarines in forward areas, attacks on enemy submarines in their bases (‘attack at source’) and attacks on enemy submarines based on long-range detection (in 1954 the Royal Navy was working on a seabed system called CORSAIR).

Under intense financial pressure, the Admiralty began to argue that forces useful only in a near-term global war could be eliminated. That applied, for example, to the large reserve fleet, which consumed expensive support manpower. If the deterrent was staving off imminent war, ships with limited capacity for modernisation could also be eliminated. Over the next two years, tightening finances forced the Royal Navy to emphasise the ability to fight and deter limited (‘warm’) wars while British strategic weapons contributed to the Western deterrent which prevented global (‘hot’) war. There was no question that deterrence at the hot end would end the East-West struggle; the fight would be redirected into the Third World, including the Commonwealth and what was left of the Empire. Korea had been the first of the ‘warm wars’. The ability to fight ‘warm wars’ might deter them and help the West win the battle of non-military subversion (‘cold war’).

In 1955 the Board tried to lay out the constantly-changing 1952–3, 1953–4, 1954–5 and 1955–6 programmes, which had been subject to constant ministerial revision since the end of 1951.¹³ Probably the most significant decision, which had been taken in January 1954, was to prioritise new construction over modernisation. At that time plans called for four new submarines each year. About 1955, the 1952–3 programme showed two fast battery submarines (the last two Porpoises) and one submarine of a new design (the first ‘1953 Submarine’). Another five ‘1953 Submarines’ were shown in the 1954–5 programme. No further full-size submarines were shown in 1955–6. Given the decision to emphasise new construction, that was unacceptable. The ‘1953 Submarine’ design was never bought, so more Porpoises were ordered to maintain the size and preparedness of the submarine fleet.

As of December 1955, the submarines in the 1956–7 programme were four Improved Porpoises, the first of the Oberon class.¹⁴ They were seen as a stopgap pending completion of a new dedicated high-priority ASW design to replace the ‘1953 Submarine’. Design work was expected to be completed in the spring of 1956, after which work could begin on the ASW submarine (which would also be capable of attacking surface ships). It was to be powered by HTP re-cycled diesels, although the first units might have to rely on conventional power plants. This was probably an Albacore-hull design with six bow torpedo tubes (eighteen torpedoes). As of March 1956 it was expected that Staff Requirements would be finalised by the spring of 1956, when the design team would have finished work on the Improved Porpoise. The first unit would be laid down at the end of 1957.

Two other new types were contemplated, a Strike Submarine, which seems to have been envisaged as a cruise missile carrier, and a prototype nuclear submarine. The requirements of the SSN design would depend on the envisaged role, other than nuclear trials. As of March 1956, design effort was expected to be available for the Strike Submarine in 1959, by which time firm Staff Requirements would have been formulated. Similarly, it was expected that requirements for the nuclear submarine would be firm by 1959.

‘Warm war’ justified submarine operations far from home, dooming the modified ‘S’ class but supporting continued construction of long-range Oberon-class submarines. Osiris is shown leaving Portsmouth. (Naval Institute collection)

In January 1956 the 1956–66 new construction plan showed the four Improved Porpoises in the 1956–7 programme. After that a total of twenty-four ASW submarines would be built, three per year beginning in 1957–8 (four in 1964–5). After 1960, one Strike Submarine could be laid down each year in place of one ASW submarine. The prototype nuclear submarine would be built beginning in the 1961–2 programme. These projections survived in the July 1956 version of the plan. Prototype trials of the submarine nuclear power plant were expected in 1960. A revised plan drawn up in September showed a total of twelve ASW submarines, two per year except for one in each of 1958–9, 1960–1, 1962–3 and 1964–5. This plan still showed the four Improved Porpoises. In fact the ASW submarine was never built and more Improved Porpoises were ordered: two each year in the 1957–8 through 1959–60 programmes, then a final three in 1960–1. The prototype nuclear submarine was brought forward to the same 1956–7 programme under which the first Improved Porpoises were built.

In 1956 another ‘warm war’ broke out after Egyptian dictator Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. The British and the French, working with the Israelis, invaded Egypt to regain control. Their bid failed, not because the Egyptians defeated the attacking force but because the United States was able to force the British back. It did so not by military force but by threatening a run on the pound sterling which would wreck the weak British economy.

Nuclear power was considered essential because it seemed that only a nuclear submarine could deal with another nuclear submarine. It was also so expensive that it crowded out non-nuclear construction. The reach of nuclear submarines made it possible to deploy them globally. Warspite is shown arriving in the Falklands, April 1984. (Leo van Ginderen copyright)

The British Government drew the lesson that its heavy military burden had not done much good; it was time for a re-think, the Duncan Sandys Defence Review. The Admiralty’s ideas stood it in good stead. It was able to convince the Government that the fleet should be configured mainly to fight ‘warm war’ far from home. For about a decade the Royal Navy concentrated on ‘warm war’ capability, which was generally described as ‘East of Suez’ capability. That did not mean low technology. The Soviets soon showed that they were willing to export quite sophisticated equipment to clients such as Egypt and Indonesia, including modern submarines. It also did not mean completely abandoning the NATO demands, which were based more on the possibility of having to fight a major war in Europe. Thus the Royal Navy retained much of its ASW orientation, which in turn much affected the development of British submarines. However, at least in theory, the submarine force was shaped by the demands of a war against a sophisticated Third World opponent, mainly ‘East of Suez’.

Aside from the financial cuts, a political decision was made to end National Service. That drastically cut naval manpower, from about 150,000 in 1956 to 88,000 after the cuts (there was consideration of deeper cuts). The deep manpower cuts projected forced the Admiralty to prune shore facilities, for example the care and maintenance of the reserve fleet, whatever its strategic reasoning.

The great fact of naval life was the huge Soviet submarine force. It seemed, moreover, that the Soviets were quite willing to transfer modern submarines to their clients. In 1957 they transferred four modern ‘Whiskey’-class diesel-electric submarines to Egypt.¹⁵ Indonesia received fourteen in 1959–62, although some were to be used only for spares. Later recipients of Soviet submarines outside the Warsaw Pact were Algeria and Libya. Given these and probably future transfers, any British ‘warm war’ naval operation had to include a major ASW component. Hence much of the technology, including submarine ASW, which had been built up over the previous decade remained applicable. Ultimately that made nuclear attack submarines a natural part of the ‘warm war’ strategy. In 1962 ‘warm war’ considerations justified annual construction of one nuclear attack submarine. The perceived value of non-nuclear submarines was more questionable.

In peacetime, the nominal British submarine role was to train ASW forces, including those of the major Commonwealth navies. This role justified deployments including submarine squadrons at Halifax (to train the Royal Canadian Navy), at Singapore (to train the Indian and Pakistan navies) and at Sydney (to train the Royal Australian Navy). When money became tight, the Royal Navy sought to induce the navies involved to create their own submarine services, so that the training role could end and the Royal Navy submarine service could be reduced.

There was also a vital peacetime intelligence-gathering role, exercised by British submarines as early as the 1950s in areas near Soviet bases. Initially it seems mainly to have involved communications and radar intercepts; later British and US submarines collected the acoustic signatures of Soviet submarines, particularly nuclear submarines. Comments made in the 1970s and later about the need to silence British submarines reflect the information acquired. Possibly the earliest example of the use of such intelligence was the choice of passive homing frequency of the initial British passive homing torpedo, Bidder (Mk 20), which was adjusted to the loudest frequency of a cavitating Soviet ‘Whiskey’-class submarine (see Appendix C).

Through the 1950s the Soviets developed their own nuclear forces, including medium-range ballistic missiles. In 1956, Khrushchev ‘rattled’ his missiles during the Suez operation, though the threat was not taken seriously. However, British strategists increasingly worried that once the Soviets had sufficient long-range forces, they might be able to deter the Americans from intervening in a NATO war. This type of question helped shape the evolving British deterrent force through the 1960s, when Polaris was bought.¹⁶

The logic of deterrence, as reflected in the 1957 Review, was paradoxical. Initially the deterrent made it possible to economise on the mass forces needed to fight a major war. However, that had limits. Britain had to retain substantial air and ground forces in Germany for alliance solidarity. It was also understood that in a situation of mutual deterrence the Soviets might think that they could make initial moves to which the West could not reply if it relied entirely on nuclear weapons. The example often given was the ‘Hamburg Grab’, a quick seizure of Hamburg after which the Soviets would announce that they would go no further – yet. The Soviets were often credited with the idea of using ‘salami tactics’, in which they would slice off one bit of NATO territory after another, never slicing off enough to cause the big war no one wanted to fight. The problem was the mismatch between available NATO forces and the sheer mass the Soviets had. In the early 1950s, the United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons as an equaliser, but later the Soviets too had such weapons in quantity. By 1963 NATO land and air strategy envisaged the creation of ‘shield forces’ which would raise the price of any limited adventure to the point where the Soviets would not be tempted.¹⁷

It seemed that the real threats would come on the periphery, in the form of ‘warm wars’ like the Malayan Emergency and the Confrontation with Indonesia.¹⁸ However, through the 1950s the cost of deterrence rose rapidly. In the late 1950s it seemed that the V-bombers would not be viable beyond 1965, due to improving Soviet air defences. To what extent could the cost of successors be allowed to squeeze out warm war resources? In 1958–60 the RAF’s preferred successor to the V-bombers was the Blue Streak ballistic missile, whose cost kept rising. The alternatives were the bomber-launched Skybolt and the submarine-borne Polaris. Skybolt was chosen but died when the US Government killed it. From the Navy’s point of view, Polaris was very much a mixed blessing. Its cost would crowd out the ‘warm war’ capability the Navy greatly valued, probably including the badly-needed next-generation carrier.¹⁹

Another shock administered in 1957 was the discovery that existing ASW forces could not deal with nuclear submarines, as USS Nautilus demonstrated in exercises. Describing his impressions, First Sea Lord Mountbatten wrote in October 1957 that ‘if the Royal Navy did not acquire these submarines it would cease to count as a naval force in world affairs’.²⁰ After further encounters in 1958 the conclusion was that nothing other than a nuclear submarine could counter nuclear submarines. That radically changed the balance between surface ships and submarines in ASW. When the first Royal Navy nuclear attack submarines entered service, they were envisaged as escorts for surface ships. It seems likely that much of the impetus for automation in British surface escorts was to handle the information a nuclear submarine could provide (see Chapter 10). This was very different from the view of the US Navy or, for that matter, the Soviet Navy. It seems to have lasted through the mid-1970s, although it was probably never liked within the Submarine Service. It was probably connected with emphasis on active use of the huge Type 2001 sonar.

A 16 April 1959 Board memo on the LTC projected the building programme through 1969–70.²¹ It envisaged laying down one SSN in 1961 and then once a year beginning in 1963. Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (VCNS) pointed out that the submarine fleet was barely adequate, particularly for Commonwealth training, hence that he was reluctant to cut the rate of building conventional submarines in anything like the suggested rate of two conventionals for one SSN. This may have been the first Board paper proposing to pressure the Commonwealth countries (particularly Australia and Canada) to create their own submarine forces or else to pay for RN-supplied ASW training. At this time VCNS considered thirty-six operational diesel submarines a reasonable number to provide adequate Royal Navy training and to meet obligations, specific and moral, to Commonwealth navies. The absolute minimum was thirty-two operational submarines, which meant a total of forty-three. This figure would not be attained even if SSK construction were maintained at the current rate. It would be many years before the greater efficiency of the SSNs could be felt, so the Board decided not to substitute SSNs for SSKs. However, it was also unwilling to add SSKs to the original programme. That left the possibility of pressing the Commonwealth navies to do more and particularly to persuade the Canadians to set up a submarine service sooner rather than later. Later the Canadians evaluated building submarines in the UK or locally. As for the long-term programme, the Board proposed that SS 27 be the last Oberon. From 1965–6 the programme would be two SSN per year and from 1966–7 it would include one SSK per year, to a better design than Oberon, at an additional cost of £1 million per ship. When the Board revisited the LTC in June 1960 (ADM 167/156) it assumed one SSN per year, but reserved the right to reopen the issue (with more SSN per year) after experience had been gained with the prototype submarine Dreadnought. In October, the Long Term Costing envisaged building one SSN per year from 1962–3, but there was no provision for the two per year (from 1965–66 envisaged the previous year). This was in a discussion of a 27 May 1960 memo covering the first five years of the ten-year LTC (Phase I). Phase II (1966–7 through 1969–70) would include six SSKs, two more than in the previous year’s LTC, to compensate for reduction in SSNs. The LTC did not include Polaris and it assumed that the new ONGAR torpedo would be in service in 1967. In 1961 the LTC was revised again (ADM 167/158). Now it was assumed that construction of conventional submarines would end in 1968–9, with one SSN each year beginning in 1961–2. At this point the expectation was that SS 24 would be the last Oberon, followed by SS 25–35 of a new design. No SSBNs were included.

In the aftermath of the British Government decision to drop the East of Suez role, the Royal Navy shifted to a Cold War mission, to deal with the possibility of a Soviet attack in Europe. The nuclear deterrence which in 1957 had seemed to preclude any such attack seemed, a decade later, to make it possible for the Soviets to fight a limited non-nuclear war. Half a century later it is still not at all clear whether their plans fitted NATO expectations. The new orientation led to increased interest in Arctic operations. Here HMS Narwhal lies in a polynya, an open space in the Arctic ice. Note the cage protecting her bow sonar. (US Naval Institute)

NATO maritime strategy changed more slowly than land strategy. Through at least 1963 it was embodied in SACLANT’s Emergency Defense Plan, which assumed that there would be little or no warning of an attack. Nuclear weapons would be used from the outset. War, if it came at all, would begin with a short initial phase of intense nuclear attack. It would be followed by a longer period which was sometimes called ‘broken-backed war’. During this phase shipping would be needed to keep badly-damaged countries alive. It would have to fight through in the face of a large Soviet submarine force. This image of war had justified the escort force which the British had found unaffordable after Korea.

It appeared that the Admiralty had sold the ‘warm-war’ strategy too well.²² In 1961 Prime Minister Macmillan (and others in government) began saying that there was no global war maritime requirement at all, that no British ships should be built or maintained solely for that mission. First Sea Lord said that of course the ships nominally promised to NATO were the ones needed for the global deterrent and ‘warm war’ mission. However, if anything happened to that mission – if, in his words, the country retreated to a Fortress Britain mentality – Macmillan and others echoing him, would eliminate the Royal Navy. It was time to press for a new NATO maritime strategy more like the land and air strategy which had been adopted. This strategy should emphasise the stages of a crisis or war before large-scale nuclear exchange, when maritime pressure might de-escalate the crisis or mitigate its effects.

It could be argued that a maritime version of the ‘Hamburg Grab’ would be an anti-shipping campaign. In peacetime, NATO countries relied heavily on shipping, as they still do. In 1963 the Soviets were credited with 373 first-line submarines, far more than the Germans had had early in the Second World War. They were thought to be building ten nuclear submarines each year and they had a massive mine stockpile. They also had the second largest surface fleet, in the world. A Russian maritime ‘grab’ might well be attractive because it would involve far less risk of escalation than its land equivalent. NATO maritime forces could also frustrate limited Soviet operations outside Europe, hence less risky. The Admiralty cited the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had been difficult to prevent – and which had de-escalated after imposition of a US blockade.

With US support, in 1963 the Royal Navy argued successfully that NATO should shift to emphasising maritime shield forces. The Admiralty argued that once NATO navies were strong enough to force the Soviets to choose either to escalate or to back off, action would shift to the Third World, to governments the Soviets were giving the means to fight limited naval wars.²³ If the Soviets supplied ‘volunteers’ to man the new ships, they could become effective threats.²⁴

The huge Soviet Northern Fleet submarine force would figure in a limited confrontation at sea, so the anti-submarine orientation of much of the Royal Navy was relevant to the new strategy. By this time it was accepted that limited Royal Navy ASW forces should be concentrated in the choke point through which Soviet submarines had to pass between their Northern Fleet bases and the Atlantic: the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap. The basic Naval Staff paper argued that submarine should be provided for the killer role ‘and nuclear submarines should have preference. In addition to the employment of submarines in the anti-submarine role off enemy bases and on barrier patrols in focal areas, nuclear submarines may also be deployed in more direct A/S support of surface forces and convoys.’

The main role of British forces assigned to NATO would be defending shipping in the Atlantic against submarine and air attack. A balanced fleet presented to the Minister of Defence in May 1961 included seventeen nuclear submarines (increasing) and fifteen conventional submarines (decreasing); these numbers could be achieved, it was thought, by about 1980.²⁵

Under US pressure, NATO adopted a strategy of ‘flexible response’ which lasted through the rest of the Cold War. The object was to stop any attack at the lowest possible level of