XII Corps, Spearhead of Patton’s Third Army pt. II

By Lt.-Col. George Dyer

Part II of a very fine, richly illustrated reference book on General Patton’s Third Army.

The XII Corps fought from northern France to Austria in World War II. Constituted in the Organized Reserves in 1933, it was activated on 29 August 1942 at Columbia, South Carolina. XII Corps became operational in France as part of Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s Third Army on 1 August 1944. Initially commanded by Major General Gilbert R. Cook, bad health forced MG Cook to relinquish command to Major General Manton S. Eddy within three weeks. MG Eddy commanded the corps until late April 1945, when his own health problems forced him to turn over command to MG Stafford LeRoy Irwin.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Arcole Publishing
• Release date: Jul 11, 2017
• ISBN: 9781787206861

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Text originally published in 1947 under the same title.

© Arcole Publishing 2017, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

XII Corps, Spearhead of Patton’s Third Army

by

Lt.-Col. George Dyer

Formerly Combat Liaison Officer and Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff,

Headquarters, XII U.S. Army Corps

Part II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

Chapter 11 — THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE. 21 DEC 44—7 FEB 45 6

1. The Long Cold Move 6

2. What Happened to XII Corps Units 14

3. Holding the Southern Shoulder 23

4. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 25

5. Debulging the Bulge 31

6. Gains and Losses 42

7. Facing the Siegfried Line—Again 44

Chapter 12 — SIEGFRIED LINE TO RHINE. 7 FEB 45—14 MAR 45 48

1. Engineers’ Battle 48

2. Infantry Across the Rivers 55

3. More Rivers, More Fortified Towns 60

4. Germany, the Germans, and Some Others 68

5. XII Corps Breaks Through to the Rhine 74

6. Which Way? 80

Chapter 13 — SECOND MOSELLE. 14 MAR 45—22 MAR 45 85

1. The Real Operation Grab 85

2. Six Divisions 95

3. The Nahe 101

4. Simmern and Bad Kreuznach 106

5. Wind-up of the Palatinate Campaign 110

Chapter 14 — FIRST ASSAULT CROSSING OF THE RHINE. 22 MAR 25—26 MAR 45 120

1. Preliminary 120

2. The Fifth Infantry Division’s Great Day 127

3. U.S. Army Engineers—and the U.S. Navy 138

4. All-out Support for the Bridgehead 142

5. Darmstadt, Frankfurt, and the Main 151

6. Payoff 153

Chapter 15 — FROM THE RHINE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 26 MAR 45—22 APR 45 158

1. End of a Banner Month 158

2. The Strange Case of the 6th SS Mtn Div 163

3. Gotha, and Ohrdruff 173

4. Peculiar Treasures 178

5. Salted Gold 183

6. Germany Cut in Two 184

7. To Kronach and Bayreuth 189

Chapter 16 — AUSTRIA—AND VE-DAY. 2 APR 25—9 MAY 45 199

1. Grafenwohr 199

2. Into Austria; and the Myth of the National Redoubt 200

3. The Last Week of Battle 207

4. End of the 11th Pz. Div.; the Werewolves, and Others 212

5. Plan Eclipse 215

6. Death Marches and Death Camps 220

7. The Russians, and VE-Day 221

Chapter 17 — REORIENTATION AND REGENSBURG. 9 MAY 25—28 MAY 45 233

1. Two Dozen and One to Go 233

2. VE-Day Round-up—Divisions 236

3. VE-Day Roundup—Some Non-Divisional Units 239

4. VE-Day Roundup—Closely Associated Units, and the Headquarters 244

5. First Phase of Occupation 251

6. Move Down from the Hills 254

CHAPTER 18 — OCCUPATION TO VJ-DAY. 28 MAY 45—2 SEP 45 257

1. Regensburg 257

2. Second Phase 260

3. PW’s and DP’s 262

4. The Germans 267

5. The Americans 275

6. Redeployment—and VJ 283

Chapter 19 — OCCUPATION AFTER VJ-DAY. 2 SEP 45—27 OCT 45 291

1. Redeployment with a Vengeance 291

2. Reconstruction 295

3. I & E 298

4. Extra-curricula 300

5. Last Phases of Active Occupation 307

6. Oh. Why Can’t We Go Home 314

Chapter 20 — RETURN FROM THE WARS. 9 MAY 45—15 DEC 45 317

1. Early Birds 317

2. The Middle Period 318

3. The Big Blow 322

4. The Big Jam 328

5. Clean-up Squad 330

6. "Je Renais de Mes Gendres 337

APPENDIX 341

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 392

Chapter 11 — THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE. 21 DEC 44—7 FEB 45

1. The Long Cold Move

GOD, FOR a little while, seemed to be fighting on the side of the Nazis. Everybody found out pretty quickly that the Germans had scored a major breakthrough. The bad news spread fast. Between the 17th and the 21st of December, 1944, the rumors reached all levels of XII Corps, and for once the facts appeared to support the rumors. The only difference at different levels throughout the army was that the higher echelons learned a bit sooner what facts there were. At 12th Army Group Headquarters (Eagle Tac) in the city of Luxembourg, for instance, the serious nature of the emergency was recognized within 24 hours. Says Ralph Ingersoll in Top Secret: The Germans seemed to have everything—surprise, speed, fire power and morale. When you looked at the map on the morning of December 17th, it seemed impossible that they would ever be stopped—for they had torn a fifty mile gap in our lines and were pouring through it like water through a blown dam. And on every road ahead of them to the west there were Americans fleeing for their lives....

At Third Army Headquarters G-2 admitted for the first time on the 18th that a Major Enemy Effort was involved: at 0930 that morning Gen. Hap Gay, Third Army C/S, was telephoning Gen. Eddy at XII Corps Hq. that the enemy had made some penetrations on a wide front, but it (the situation) is under control. By 5:30 o’clock the following morning, however, Gen. Eddy and Gen. Lentz were off in the chill darkness summoned to a special meetings of corps commanders, their artillery officers and G-3’s, at 0830 in the office of Brig.-Gen. H G Maddox, Third Army G-3, at Nancy. What transpired there is given in an eyewitness account by Col. Brenton G Wallace in Patton and His Third Army:

"General Patton told us that the situation with the First Army was serious but not alarming. The Germans had made a major breakthrough to a depth of 15 to 20 miles in the north sector of the VIII Corps and the south sector of the V Corps, First Army. One whole U.S. Division—the 106th—had been decimated,{1} the 28th Division had been badly battered and one Combat Command of the 9th Armored had been practically destroyed. The VIII Corps Headquarters had been forced to flee and no one knew exactly where it was at that time. Enemy armor and infantry had penetrated to within a half mile of the First Army command post, forcing its withdrawal.

"General Patton said that the preceding day he had met at Luxembourg with General Bradley and had talked with General Eisenhower by telephone. The situation was very fluid but, in general, the Third Army had been ordered to be prepared to turn on its axis and attack to the north. He, General Patton, was to attend another meeting with General Eisenhower and General Bradley at Verdun at 0930 that morning, but he desired the staff to know as much of the plan as possible so they could be thinking along new lines and working out details while he was gone.

The general plan, which of course was subject to change and confirmation after the meeting at Verdun, was as follows: The XII Corps, presently holding the south sector of Third Army (Col. Wallace might have said more accurately "presently attacking in the south sector of Third Army’s zone of action. GD) and composed of the 35th and 87th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions, might be ordered to extend to the north and take over all the present Third Army front. In all probability the Seventh Army would be asked to extend its front, to the north, relieving the XII Corps of part of the front or else the XV Corps might be assigned to Third Army to help hold the front....He added that in all probability the VIII Corps Headquarters, if it had not been destroyed, would be placed under the Third Army, as well as what was left of the 4th and 28th Infantry and 9th Armored Divisions....After the meeting, General Maddox instructed me as Chief Liaison Officer to send an officer to try to locate VIII Corps Headquarters. Major Wolf was immediately dispatched.

Then General Patton left for his meeting at Verdun with Generals Eisenhower and Bradley.

No one then in XII Corps will ever forget the confusion and apprehension of the days preceding that great and historic change of front. German armored columns were expected around every bend in the road. German parachutists, in American uniforms and speaking perfect English, were reported scattered by the score deep inside the Allied lines. The Krauts, just when they were supposed to be practically licked, without offensive capabilities, had seized the initiative from the Allied forces. This was a new experience to the personnel of XII Corps, and it was extremely disquieting to say the least. All that could be done was to sit tight, wait for orders, and, if possible, take comfort in some such counsel as that contained in one of Gen. Eddy’s favorite maxims: Things are never half as good or half as bad as they look at first. But it was a relief to get going, even though few knew exactly where they were bound.

For XII Corps the definite break came on 20 Dec 44. The event was briefly recorded in the CG Journal for that date: "1750. 6 to Lucky 6.{2} Gen. Patton stated that XII Corps will move to Luxemburg (sic) tomorrow morning leaving someone back to turn over to the other Corps. It had been decided that XV Corps would take over most of XII Corps’ zone in the Saar front. An advance section of Third Army Headquarters, Lucky Tac, was already set up alongside of Eagle Tac" (to say nothing of XIX TAC) in the tight little city of Luxembourg. The CG Journal goes on:

21 Dec 44. 0800—Gen. Eddy, C/S and other members of Staff left Corps CP and drove to Luxemburg (sic) arriving at 1000 at 12 Army Gp Hq.....0930—Adv Gp of Corps CP moved to Luxemburg (sic) arriving at 1500 at Lucky Tac....{3}

It will be noted that the CG and his small party made better time infiltrating along the traffic clogged roads than the larger remainder of the Fwd. Ech.. It is worth giving first-hand accounts from a person with each of the two serials. The first is from Gen. Canine:

It was cold as hell riding up there....We got there the morning of the 21st of December and went right to Gen. Bradley’s Headquarters. We were there for awhile and then took off and went over to Third Army Hq., three or four blocks away. Gen. Patton was there, and a whole gob of other guys; Gen. McBride, Gen. Irwin, Gen. Walker, Gen. Morris, Gen. Barton, ‘Georgie’ told us what he wanted us to do....

Here the C/S’ statement does scant justice to a scene of tremendous impact. Gen. Patton’s courage and exuberance never appeared to better advantage than during these gloomy conferences in the early days of the Bulge. In this case he not only hold his commanders what he wanted them to do. but, when uncertainty and discouragement were at a peak, when the Germans were reported just outside the city and apparently with nothing immediately at hand to stop them from entering, he accompanied his instructions with a rip-snorting fight-talk which gave renewed confidence to everyone present. After the meeting, Gen. Canine’s account continues, We operated there from Army Hq. the rest of that day while they were out trying to find a place to put our headquarters. We finally got a place that night. We went over and moved in. We only stayed there part of that next day, when Army Hq. was cleaning out a building for themselves; it wasn’t big enough for them, but it was big enough for us, so they gave it to us and we moved in.... This was the École des Jeunes Filles, of long and vivid memory for the headquarters.

How the headquarters move was effected with reasonable order and dispatch under virtually impossible conditions is suggested in a comment by Col. Lieber:

This move was into the blue, no destination except Luxembourg City. In order to keep from jamming into a city where traffic would be bad and confusion easy, I picked Leudelange from the map, as a likely spot to establish an Info Cen (see strip map herewith) told the PM to set up a post there, get communication by wire or messenger to Gen. Canine in Luxembourg City, Hq. Comdt to allot whatever space was assigned there, and the Info Center to instruct sections there as they arrived, and guide them to destination. The MPs found a convenient inn, with heat, put up lighted signs, got their communications, and guided the sections to their destinations. I closed the Saaralbe CP when XV Corps Hq. agreed that they had taken over, and high-tailed for Leudelange.

T/Sgt. Nathan Hellman, of the QM. Section, was in the main body of the Fwd. Ech.. Like everyone else who made the long cold move to accomplish XII Corps’ change of front, he was impressed with the bitter weather, the enormous volume of traffic, and the scary uncertainty of everything:

"Just before the Bulge started, we had been making inspection tours to find out about the supply situation of our units. The (German) offensive blew our schedule apart and we were told to sit tight and wait for further instructions. So we sat around and wondered what was going to happen. The following day (20 Dec 44) when the Colonel came back from the staff meeting, he told us to ‘be prepared to move at a moment’s notice.’ We didn’t have any definite idea, but we knew the attack was pretty big if everyone was going. We packed everything and kept out only the minimum essentials for the office and waited. That evening we got the movement orders for the next morning.

"Very early the trucks started to arrive and the convoy began to form. By 1100 everything was ready. It was very cold and cloudy when we started out, and we rode all day long in the back of the truck. The roads were jammed with vehicles. Toward evening we approached the vicinity of Luxembourg, about 20 miles out, and we stopped to wait for orders guiding us into the area. By that time, we began to feel the cold. We had eaten only ‘K’ rations, so we got out and some of the boys built fires along the side of the road. It wasn’t a very good idea to build fires, as there were enemy planes overhead, but it was getting very foggy. We waited on the edge of the road for two hours. Capt. Rollman arrived then and picked up one vehicle at a time. It was too slow taking one at a time, so he picked up all of them together.

"In one spot the road was narrow and slippery, with sharp banks on either side. It had been raining and the road was muddy. There was another unit parked on the same road and as we tried to pass several trucks slid into the ditch. Our truck didn’t overturn, but lay at a 45 degree angle four feet into the ditch. We were lucky, though, because on either side of us the ditch was eight or ten feet deep. Another truck towed us out and we went on to Luxembourg. We noticed that there was a lot of firing and ack-ack over the town, and we could see the red streaks in the sky. It was getting pretty thick, and in the back of the truck we looked at each other and said, ‘This is going to be a warm approach.’

When the raids got heavy we halted and then went on again. They were coming about every five minutes and we couldn’t keep stopping every time, so we just went on. The firing was so loud we couldn’t hear ourselves speak. The sirens seemed to sound just as the planes were leaving as well as when they appeared and nobody knew what was going on. We were so tired we didn’t care, and all we wanted was a place to sleep. Finally we reached the buildings and when we talked to the guides we found out they were more confused than we were, so we sat in the trucks. Then we went inside the building and slept on the floor with our blankets. The place was heated. In the morning we moved to a school where the new CP was located. We got the office set up and were billeted and by 2000 we were settled and ready for work. Then the work really began.

The Fwd. Ech. got in under cover before it snowed, but snow had begun to fall by the time the Rr. Ech. moved from Morhange to Metz on the 23rd. Sgts Frank E Redding, Joseph H Stoklosa and Cpl. Bernard J O’Rourke, of the Chaplain’s section, report on the discomforts of this part of the movement.

On 23 December, we waited from 0900 until noon. We had everything packed in the trucks except the stove which we left in the office. Everyone came in to keep warm. When we finally pulled out we had to load the stove onto the truck while it was still hot. We had K rations at Morhange before we left and got to Metz, about 1500. It was very cold all the way. We moved into a school building that had been formerly used by the Hitler Jugend....That night we had no heat, and it was really cold. We even lit a gasoline lantern to try to keep warm. Everybody was really hurtin’, it was so cold. The next day we got the stove set up. We had our billets and offices under the same roof, and were quite comfortable.

The traffic on the roads was, of course, mainly XII Corps divisions, FA and AAA battalions, and other special corps and army troops pouring northward into the little Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to start sawing von Rundstedt’s push off at the base, as Gen. Patton put it. Everyone in these units was having a similar experience to that reported above by members of the headquarters, except that many were out in the weather more. The overall picture of the Long Cold Move (see also photos, p 135) is well presented in Third Army’s After Action Report:

The offensive movement necessary to throw Third U.S. Army’s striking power to the north was a gigantic and complicated operation involving a switch of the majority of Third U.S. Army’s divisions and their supporting troops. Some of the most rapid troop movements in the history of warfare were required, but they had to be combined with a high degree of precise timing and coordination. Not only did the tactical units have to be faced at right angles to the Western Front but the entire supply organization had to follow in support. By 17 December the 10th Armd. Div. was in Luxembourg having been directed to leave XX Corps for VIII Corps (First U.S. Army). In the early morning hours of 19 December, the 4th Armd. Div., located at Epping-Urbach, 11 miles east of Sarreguemines, moved northward with a task force in the lead. It was followed closely by the 80th Inf. Div., located at Bining, and the 26th Inf. Div., then in training at Metz. On 20 December the 5th Inf. Div., located in the Saarlautern bridgehead, joined the procession. On 21 December 16 field artillery and six antiaircraft battalions began to move. On 22 December the 35th Inf. Div., located at Bebelsheim, started for Metz for refitting before being committed. On 23 December a provisional task force of the 6th Armd. Div., then located at Lixing started for the northern front. Spaced between these major tactical units on the road network were various regimental combat teams infiltrating toward the front, artillery, tank destroyer and engineer units, followed by the supply and service troops. Movements of varying lengths, some to positions on the north-south front of XII and XX Corps, were made by six infantry and three armored divisions, 26 battalions of field artillery and various combat teams. From 17 to 23 December 133,178 motor vehicles passed the seven traffic control points. Trucks traveled 1,254,042 miles from 18 December until the end of the month. 37 truck companies operated on virtually a full-time basis, carrying 41,935 tons of supplies of which 16,910 tons were ammunition. The equivalent of a division a day for 30 days moved during the month.

Col. Lieber brings the whole business down to the XII Corps level by commenting:

The move of the corps troops and divisions was an achievement of the corps and Third Army troop movement and traffic control sections in G-3 and G-4. Every available road was used to capacity, and we authorized night movement with lights in the rear part of the area. When a column was strafed by German air we switched the following serials to other routes for the time being, ultimately bringing the serials back to their proper routes. All this had to be done while the XV Corps divisions (including three freshly arrived from the States, getting into their first combat in their nice clean field uniforms, and looking very dubiously at the wrecked villages and dead animals) were arriving by rail or motor and moving laterally through the XII Corps zone of action. It was a brilliant operation for our troop movement group, moving 100,000-odd men with all their matériel and transport for a centre-of-mass distance of about 150 miles, in about two days. There was little sleep.

2. What Happened to XII Corps Units

HOW XII Corps’ Order of Battle was dislocated by the Battle of the Bulge is indicated by a comparison of Station List No 49 (Appendix A, Part II, 5) for 12 Dec 44, with No 51 (Appendix A, following 49) for 24 Dec 44.{4} Troop assignment sheets for the same period show similar evidences of the fluid situation. By the time the Corps After Action Report was being written at the end of the month, however, it was becoming possible to cast a trial balance somewhat more accurately, and that document has the following to say:

"A major change in the composition of the Corps arose for the shift from the Sarreguemines zone of action to counter the enemy penetration in the Luxembourg sector, in the period from 17-23 December. The changes in assignments and attachments in the Corps during the month are shown in Station Lists 48-53....

"(1) The additions were:

4th Inf. Div., reinf, Maj.-Gen. R O Bartoon, Comdg

5th Inf. Div., reinf, Maj.-Gen. S L Irwin, Cmdg

10th Armd. Div., reinf, Maj.-Gen. W H Morris, Cmdg

{5}87th Inf. Div., reinf, Brig.-Gen. F Culin, Comdg

2nd Plat, Trp B, 2nd Cav. Sq, 1st Lt. G H Orcutt, Cmdg

*422nd FA. Gp., Hq. & Hq. Btry., Col. W Clark, Cmdg

277th FA Bn. (240 How), Lt.-Col. W A Gudmundson, Cmdg

736th FA Bn. (8" How), Lt.-Col. W A Peach, Cmdg

*81st FA Bn. (155 How), Lt.-Col. U P Williams, Cmdg

215th FA Bn. (155 How), Maj. A A Grunwald, Cmdg

*174th FA Bn. (155 Gun) (SP), Lt.-Col. M A Langley, Cmdg

*Btry. B, 558th FA Bn. (155 Gun) (SP), Capt. J S Martino, Cmdg

244th FA Bn. (155 Gun), Lt.-Col. J J Davis, Cmdg

695th Armd. FA. Bn. (105 How), Maj. H W Kale, Cmdg

*115th AAA Gun Bn. (Mbl), Lt.-Col. D W Hopper, Cmdg

357th Engr. GS Regt, Col. W H Bell, Jr, Cmdg

372nd Engr. GS Regt, Lt.-Col. F F Arnold, Cmdg

398th Engr. GS Regt, Lt.-Col. A H Douglass, Cmdg

1103rd Engr. C Gp, Hq. & Flq Co, Col. G H Walker, Cmdg

160th Engr. C Bn., Maj. J H Jackson, Cmdg

204th Engr. C Bn. Lt.-Col. W J Peters, Cmdg

509th Engr. L Pon. Co., Capt. W T Johnson, Cmdg

537th Engr. L Pon. Co., Capt. O W Maraska, Cmdg

*996th Engr. Trdy Br Co, Capt. W C Head, Jr, Cmdg

88th Engr. Hv Pon Bn. (less Co. B), Maj. C. W Hair, Cmdg

91st CML Bn., Lt.-Col. R W Muth, Cmdg

553rd Engr. Hv Pon Bn.

72nd Engr. L Pon. Co.

513th Engr. L Pon. Co.

996th Engr. Trdy Br Co

998 Engr. Trdy Br Co

808th TD Bn. (T)

115th AAA Gun Bn.

16th Fld Hosp Hq.

2nd Plat, 16th Fld Hosp

3rd Plat, 16th Fld Hosp

60th Fld Hosp Hq. (detached from 24-26 Dec only)

1st Plat, 60th Fld Hosp

2nd Plat, 60th Fld Hosp (detached from 20-26 Dec only)

3rd Plat, 60th Fld Hosp (detached from 11-26 Dec only)

The foregoing fails to reveal what the XII Corps units were doing during this critical period, and for this the same source gives a clear summary:

Soon after the German breakthrough in northern Luxembourg on 16 December, the 4th Armd and 80th Inf. Divs. had been relieved from the Corps and moved to the north. On 20 December instructions were received from the Army Commander to transfer control of the Corps zone of action to the XX and XV Corps, to move the 35th Inf. Div. to Metz, and to move the Corps headquarters and greater part of the Corps troops to Luxembourg and take over the defense of the southern shoulder of the breakthrough. The Corps CP opened in Luxembourg City on 21 December and by 23 December the movement of Corps troops was completed. On arrival, the Corps Commander assumed command of the troops then in the area, the 4th and 5th Inf. Divs. (reinf) and the 10th Armd. Div. (less CCB) reinforced with CCA of the 9th Armd. Div. and RCT 109 and other elements of the 28th Inf. Div. The line was stabilized and the Corps attacked to drive the enemy back over the Sauer and Moselle Rivers. The 10th Armd. Div. on the northwest flank was relieved from the Corps and replaced by the 6th Armd. Div., which in turn was relieved from the Corps and replaced by the 5th Inf. Div. The 4th Inf. Div. operated to the northeast, and the 2nd Cav. Gp. (reinf) operated to the Moselle River to the east and maintained contact with the XX Corps. The 80th Inf. Div., operating in the III Corps just west of the Corps west boundary, was transferred to the Corps. The 351st, 372nd, and 398th Engr. GS Regts. were transferred from the Advance Section Com Z, to the Corps. By the close of the period the Corps front had been advanced about five miles generally to the lines of the Sauer and Moselle Rivers, retaking about 58 square miles from the enemy. On 31 December the Corps was disposed with the 80th Inf. Div. to the northwest, in contact with the 26th Inf. Div., III Corps, at the Sure River near (P7247), to junction with the 5th Inf. Div. at Ettelbruck, the 5th Inf. Div. on the north front along the Sauer River to junction with the 4th Inf. Div. at (P9938), the 4th Inf. Div. on the northeast front generally along the Sauer River to junction with the 2nd Cav. Gp. (reinf) about three Km west of Wasserbillig and the 2nd Cav. Gp. (reinf) on the east front along the Moselle River to contact with the 3rd Cav. Gp, XX Corps, in the vicinity of Besch and near Basce Kontz. Successive defensive positions to hold the corner of the penetration against possible enemy attacks were being prepared.

The daily narrative of operations in the Corps After Action Report is usually far too detailed for a work of this scope, but for the day of the headquarters’ long cold move and the one thereafter, it is worthwhile dipping into this portion of the report if only to show how quickly XII Corps units mounted on actual attack on the base of the Bulge. After the entry for 20 Dec 44, which notes that at midnight XV Corps officially assumed responsibility for its lion’s share of the XII Corps zone in the Saar Basin, the narrative continues:

"21 Dec 44. (a.) During the period, units of the Corps moved from their positions in the Sarreguemines zone in Lorraine to their new areas in the Luxembourg zone of action. At 2300A the Fwd CP of the Corps opened at Luxembourg. The Corps assumed command of its new zone, and the 4th and 5th Inf. Divs. (reinf), and the 10th Armd. Div. (less CCB) reinforced with CCA, 9th Armd. Div., and RCT 100 and the 107th and 108th FA Bus of the 28th Inf. Div. The Corps zone was bounded on the east by the line Buttleange-Beyren-Basse Kontz-west bank of Moselle River-Wasserbillig-south bank of Moselle River-Konz-Karthaus, and on the west by the line generally north from Luxembourg (incl)-east bank of Alzette River-point on Sauer River ½ Km west of Ingledorf-east of the highway Diekirch to Weiswampach-Our River at Steinebruck. The XX Corps was on the right (southeast), and the III Corps on