SHAKE ’N BAKE SERGEANTS
By the first months of 1965, Viet Cong battlefield successes caused Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to request an expansion of the American military presence, launching a troop buildup that foreshadowed a long-term commitment of ground forces. As early as April, a U.S. Marine brigade was directed to Chu Lai in northern South Vietnam and the U.S. Army 173rd Airborne Brigade was sent to Bien Hoa, near Saigon. Soon the entire 1st Infantry Division would join them, with many more combat units to follow.
The introduction of large-scale operations in Vietnam was accompanied by the inevitable increase in combat casualties. When mustered for battle, the Army’s overall active duty strength was approximately 970,000 personnel (110,000 officers and 860,000 enlisted soldiers).
As combat losses increased, Westmoreland requested additional forces from Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. After a fact-finding trip to Vietnam, McNamara recommended that President Lyndon B. Johnson increase the U.S. presence there from 75,000 to 175,000. He also requested a call-up of reservists and National Guardsmen to boost the “strategic reserves”—forces available to react on short notice to threats anywhere in the world. However, Johnson declined McNamara’s request, leaving active duty forces to fight the war on their own.
In most past conflicts, such as World War II, massive troop formations division size and larger, led by senior commanders, maneuvered across vast distances against equally large enemy forces. But in Vietnam the brunt of combat was borne at the smaller-unit level of infantry companies, cavalry troops and artillery batteries, which placed an incredible burden on the leadership, resourcefulness and skills of platoon leaders, squad leaders and fire team leaders.
Without the deployment of reservists and guardsmen, U.S. officials had
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