Free Will and Will to Power

By Mike Hockney

Are you free, or are you a machine that suffers from a delusion that it’s free? Free will is perhaps the most important subject of all because if we are authentically free, scientific materialism is ipso facto false, and the world is in urgent need of a revolutionary paradigm shift. This book shows that free will has a most unexpected advocate – mathematics. Only in a mathematical universe can we be free. Only in a mathematical universe can we have a soul. And in a mathematical universe, free will is much better understood as will to power, and to have an intimate connection with cosmic symmetry and “God”. It’s all in the math!

• Language: English
• Publisher: Mike Hockney
• Release date: May 1, 2016
• ISBN: 9781311128232

Mike Hockney

Mike Hockney invites you to play the God Game. Are you ready to transform yourself? Are you ready to be one of the Special Ones, the Illuminated Ones? Are you ready to play the Ultimate Game? Only the strongest, the smartest, the boldest, can play. This is not a drill. This is your life. Stop being what you have been. Become what you were meant to be. See the Light. Join the Hyperboreans. Become a HyperHuman, an UltraHuman. Only the highest, only the noblest, only the most courageous are called. A new dawn is coming... the birth of Hyperreason. It's time for HyperHumanity to enter HyperReality.

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Introduction

Is the most self-evident fact of your life also the greatest illusion of your life? You might think you are free, but you will find a host of intellectuals telling you it’s impossible. You are a marionette, they say. You have never once performed a free action. You only imagine you have. What an imagination you have! Not that you have any choice over what you imagine. You’re just a machine, after all.

Are you controlled by the will of God? Are you the helpless puppet of scientific forces over which you have no control? Do the Fates stand over your shoulder, dictating everything you do? Do you have a destiny that no power can alter? Were you predestined for heaven or hell before you were even born?

How, exactly, can you be free? What does freedom even mean? What on earth is free will? Do you really know that you have it, or do you just delude yourself that you do, while always doing what you were inevitably going to do? If you are made of nothing but atoms obeying inexorable scientific laws how can you possibly be free? How can unfree atoms produce free human beings? Isn’t that a simple impossibility?

There is only one way in which you can be free. You must be as old as existence itself, i.e. eternal. That means that nothing caused you and nothing created you. It means that you are an autonomous agent, equipped with your own causation. You yourself cause things to happen. As poet William Ernest Henley famously said, you are the master of your fate and the captain of your soul.

For you to be free, it must be false that you live in a scientific materialist world. Only then can it be true that you are not merely imagining that you are free.

This book explains how you really are free, and you are emphatically not experiencing the most bizarre fantasy of all time, constructed by mindless, dead atoms that have never once fantasised.

You are free because you have no master, because you have existed forever, because you are an infinite soul with infinite power.

What is an immortal, indestructible soul? It’s a mathematical mind – a monad. It’s an immaterial singularity, outside space and time. It’s a frequency domain, defined not by God, but by the God Equation.

You yourself are a soul. And that’s exactly why you are free. No machine can ever be free. Nothing born in time can be free. You may think that you yourself were born in time, but you weren’t. Your body was created at a specific time, but not your soul. Your soul was never created at all and doesn’t exist in time. It’s eternal.

Free Will by Galen Strawson

The question of free will remains one of the most fiercely debated in the whole of philosophy. Galen Strawson provides an excellent introduction to the main positions that philosophers have adopted:

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‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. It is a topic in metaphysics and ethics as much as in the philosophy of mind. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for it seems clear that freedom of action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, even if it is not sufficient.

Philosophers give very different answers to these questions. Consequently they give very different answers to two more specific questions, which are questions about ourselves: (1) Are we free agents? and (2) Can we be morally responsible for what we do? Answers to (1) and (2) range from ‘Yes, Yes’, to ‘No, No’ – via ‘Yes, No’ and various degrees of ‘Perhaps’, ‘Possibly’, and ‘In a sense’. (The fourth pair of outright answers, ‘No, Yes’, is rare, but it has a kind of existentialist panache, and appears to be embraced by Wintergreen in Joseph Heller’s novel Closing Time, as well as by some Protestants).

Prominent among the ‘Yes, Yes’ sayers are the compatibilists. They have this name because they hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Briefly, determinism is the view that the history of the universe is fixed: everything that happens is necessitated by what has already gone before, in such a way that nothing can happen otherwise than it does. According to compatibilists, freedom is compatible with determinism because freedom is essentially just a matter of not being constrained or hindered in certain ways when one acts or chooses. Suppose one is a normal adult human being in normal circumstances. Then one is able to act and choose freely. No one is holding a gun to one’s head. One is not being threatened or manhandled. One is not drugged, or in chains, or subject to a psychological compulsion like kleptomania, or a post-hypnotic command. One is therefore wholly free to choose and act even if one’s whole physical and psychological makeup is entirely determined by things for which one is in no way ultimately responsible – starting with one’s genetic inheritance and early upbringing.

Compatibilism has many sophisticated variants, but this is its core, and to state it is to see what motivates its opponents, the incompatibilists. The incompatibilists hold that freedom is not compatible with determinism. They point out that if determinism is true, then every one of one’s actions was determined to happen as it did before one was born. They hold that one can’t be held to be truly free and finally morally responsible for one’s actions in this case. Compatibilism is a ‘wretched subterfuge..., a petty word-jugglery’, as Kant put it. It entirely fails to satisfy our natural convictions about the nature of moral responsibility.

The incompatibilists have a good point, and may be divided into two groups. First, there are the libertarians, who wish to answer ‘Yes, Yes’ to questions (1) and (2). Libertarians hold that we are indeed free and fully morally responsible agents, and that determinism must therefore be false. Their great difficulty is to explain why the falsity of determinism is any better than determinism, when it comes to establishing our free agency and moral responsibility.

For suppose that not every event is determined, and that some events occur randomly, or as a matter of chance. How can this help with free will? How can our claim to moral responsibility be improved by the supposition that it is partly a matter of chance or random outcome that we and our actions are as they are? This is a very difficult question for libertarians.

The second group of incompatibilists are less sanguine. They answer ‘No, No’ to questions (1) and (2). They agree with the libertarians that determinism rules out genuine moral responsibility, but argue that the falsity of determinism can’t help. Accordingly, they conclude that we are not genuinely free agents or genuinely morally responsible, whether determinism is true or false. One of their arguments can be summarized as follows. When one acts, one acts in the way that one does because of the way one is. So to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions, one would have to be truly responsible for the way one is: one would have to be causa sui, or the cause of oneself, at least in certain crucial mental respects. But nothing can be causa sui – nothing can be the ultimate cause of itself in any respect. So nothing can be truly morally responsible.

Suitably developed, this argument against moral responsibility seems very strong. But in many human societies belief in ultimate moral responsibility continues unabated. In many human beings, the experience of choice gives rise to a conviction of absolute responsibility that is untouched by philosophical arguments that put it in question.

This conviction is the deep and inexhaustible source of the free will problem: there are powerful arguments that seem to show that we cannot be morally responsible in the ultimate way that we suppose. But these arguments keep coming up against equally powerful psychological and cultural reasons why we continue to believe that we are ultimately morally responsible.

*****

While Strawson’s article expertly sets out how most philosophers view the free will debate, it is in fact full of fallacies, most especially regarding compatibilism.

Strawson writes, Briefly, determinism is the view that the history of the universe is fixed: everything that happens is necessitated by what has already gone before, in such a way that nothing can happen otherwise than it does.

This is emphatically not what determinism means. Determinism means that everything that happens is determined by prior causation, i.e. it has a sufficient reason. This does not mean that everything must unfold in a particular, set, fixed way, cast in stone since the Big Bang. To endorse Strawson’s claim is already to buy into the scientific materialist understanding of determinism whereby there are no genuinely causal agents in the world, only non-causal objects to which causality simply happens, and over which they have zero control, zero say and zero influence. As soon as you accept the existence of a myriad of uncreated, uncaused causal agents (monads) that are free to determine their actions rather than having them determined for them by causal forces imposed on them from outside, Strawson’s definition of determinism is rendered untenable, hence all of his arguments concerning compatibilism fail.

What has gone before informs and influences what happens next, but does not determine it, because what’s going to happen next depends on decisions taken by inherently free agents acting for their own reasons. We cannot know in advance what these decisions are going to be.

Consider your schedule for the rest of today. Is everything you are going to do already set like concrete? Are you simply an actor performing a role already written for you, about which you can change nothing? Or are you going to interact with your environment and decide what to do next on the basis of what happens to you (regarding which you do not yet have any knowledge because nothing has happened yet), and on the basis of your views, reactions and decisions regarding those things? Self-evidently, the latter is true. You are not a programmed machine and you are not going to behave today like a robot. Nevertheless, no matter what you do, you will certainly have a reason for everything you do. You will not act randomly. You will not do things for no reason. Everything you do will be determined – self-determined!

According to Strawson’s version of determinism (a view shared by most philosophers), you are nothing but a set of atoms subject to scientific laws, and your environment is nothing but a set of atoms subject to scientific laws. Therefore, when you interact with your environment, everything you proceed to do, could, in principle, be calculated in advance by anyone with a sufficient understanding of atoms and the scientific laws that apply to them. There are no self-sufficient causal agents present in this system, nothing that can inject its own causation into the environment using criteria that belong to it and cannot be calculated in advance by anyone else.

As soon as you accept the existence of causal agents (i.e. autonomous minds; subjects; eternal souls; monads), Strawson’s entire argument becomes unmitigated nonsense that does not reflect reality in any way. What’s truly remarkable is that our own behaviour each and every day spectacularly contradicts Strawson’s view of determinism, and yet his model of determinism continues to be the one to which most philosopher subscribe.

Quite simply, Strawson’s claim that "everything that happens is necessitated by what has already gone before is entirely wrong. Everything that happens is a reaction and response to what has already gone before. It’s not necessitated by it. Our next action is not necessitated by what has just happened to us in terms of atoms moving around, i.e. the atoms in our body, our brain and our environment. Our next action is not determined by atoms at all. It’s determined by our mind, and our mind isn’t physical and isn’t made of atoms! Our mind is an autonomous causal agent that takes its own decisions, regardless of the rest of the world. In fact, our mind must be conceived in the same sort of terms that apply to the Abrahamic God. Does anyone say that God is made of atoms and is causally determined by scientific forces? God" is an uncreated, uncaused, eternal causal agent who decides what to do next according to his own decisions – and exactly the same is true of all of us.

Strawson is in fact talking about physicalist determinism but has unpardonably dropped the physicalist qualifier because he has simply taken it for granted. He has assumed it and then applied it as if it’s incontestable. Everything changes as soon as you have a system of physicalist and mentalist determinism, linked by Fourier mathematics, which allows the physical and mental domains to interact, and permits subjective causal agency.

Strawson writes, One is therefore wholly free to choose and act even if one’s whole physical and psychological makeup is entirely determined by things for which one is in no way ultimately responsible – starting with one’s genetic inheritance and early upbringing.

Here, Strawson applies 1) an ultra-physicalist notion of our behaviour being determined by our genetic inheritance, i.e. by atoms subject to the inescapable laws of science (by nature), and 2) an ill-defined notion of our early upbringing (i.e. nurture). Does it even make any sense to refer to nurture if the people bringing us up are genetically determined machines that had no choice about how to raise us up since they were simply carrying out the fixed laws of science? At no stage does Strawson reflect any notion that we are eternal souls that have a history that, of necessity, precedes our genes and precedes our upbringing. If there’s an eternal component to us, then, plainly, it’s absurd to claim that the nature and nurture arguments that apply to our current incarnation are the whole of us, i.e. are all that we are.

Strawson’s argument is destroyed as soon it’s conceded that we existed prior to our current physicalization in this world. We therefore have a core character independent of our genes and independent of how we have been raised. Our genes and environment will certainly influence and inform us, but, crucially, they will not determine us, which is the factor that Strawson requires to be true for his argument to be tenable. Again, he has relentlessly applied a physicalist set of arguments and once again ignored mental agency independent of matter and of our current bodily physicalization.

Philosophy is full of unstated assumptions. It’s full of people reflecting undeclared Meta Paradigms and schemas, all of which simply beg the question.

Strawson writes, The incompatibilists hold that freedom is not compatible with determinism. They point out that if determinism is true, then every one of one’s actions was determined to happen as it did before one was born.

Once again, this reflects a physicalist understanding of reality. Our soul was never born. It’s eternal. It didn’t have any parents. Nothing caused it and nothing created it. It’s influenced and informed by things outside itself, but is not their puppet. It has its own internal agency. It can do things for its own reasons.

Strawson writes, "So to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions, one would have to be truly responsible for the way one is: one would have to be causa sui, or the cause of oneself, at least in certain crucial mental respects. But nothing can be causa sui – nothing can be the ultimate cause of itself in any respect. So nothing can be truly morally responsible."

Yet again, we have a blatant and invalid physicalist assumption being applied. We are causa sui, in the sense that we are eternal, uncreated and uncaused by anything else – just like the Abrahamic God! If we exist but are not caused by anything else then we can say either that we are the cause of ourselves or that we are simply uncaused. Either way, we are responsible for ourselves and can’t blame any other cause for the way we are.

So, Strawson’s article really serves to illustrate how full of unwarranted and unstated assumptions the philosophical debate regarding free will is. It’s the assumptions themselves that have to be clarified before any progress can be made in the definitions that erroneously flow from them, thus miring the whole debate in confusion.

*****

Do we have free will? It depends what you mean by the word ‘free’. More than 200 senses of the word have been distinguished; the history of the discussion of free will is rich and remarkable. David Hume called the problem of free will ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’. – Galen Strawson

Remember, it’s all in the definition. Make sure you sign up to the correct one! If you don’t, you’ll turn yourself into a machine or a random behaviour generator.

The free will debate isn’t so much about free will itself as about definitions of free will, interpretations of free will and speculations about free will. The question of what free will is must be framed within a well-defined ontological and epistemological theory – such as that of ontological mathematics.

Self-Causing

Either you are caused by another thing or other things or you are not caused by another thing or other things. If the latter, shall we say that you are uncaused or that you are the cause of yourself? Does uncaused = causa sui?

In a strictly causal system, everything caused must have a first cause, but what of the first cause itself? Nothing caused it. Hence, it is uncaused or its own cause, depending on how we wish to define it. In a causal system, if you are not caused by anything else, you are your own cause, i.e. your essence ensures your existence. Your essence is eternal and so is your existence. Your essence necessitates your existence and does so forever. We might say that your essence is the cause of your existence. This argument applies solely to monads. Nothing else qualifies. In Abrahamism, such an argument would be applied to a single Creator God. In ontological mathematics, it’s applied to myriad monads. All of them are thus would-be Gods.

The Turing Test

The phrase ‘The Turing Test’ is most properly used to refer to a proposal made by Turing (1950) as a way of dealing with the question whether machines can think. According to Turing, the question whether machines can think is itself ‘too meaningless’ to deserve discussion. However, if we consider the more precise – and somehow related – question whether a digital computer can do well in a certain kind of game that Turing describes (‘The Imitation Game’), then – at least in Turing’s eyes – we do have a question that admits of precise discussion. Moreover, as we shall see, Turing himself thought that it would not be too long before we did have digital computers that could ‘do well’ in the Imitation Game. – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Mathematician Alan Turing envisaged a sophisticated computer that could be programmed to generate responses that would be indistinguishable from those of a human (or convincing enough to fool a human). A huge amount of deterministic thinking is predicated on humans being essentially nothing but Turing machines, programmed by nature rather than by a designer.

In fact, Turing’s test is ludicrous. No machine could ever be invented to simulate a human. Why not? Because humans are controlled by eternal monadic souls, and this necessary condition could never apply to any machine.

To support Turing’s contention is already to have assumed a physicalist understanding of reality.

*****

According to the physicalists, programmed biological machines (humans) can program mechanical machines. Indeed, it’s inevitable that they will do so since, from the dawn of time, it was deterministically decreed that this would happen. No programmer has any choice since each programmer was in turn programmed.

In the physicalist worldview, there’s no fundamental reason why programmed biological machines made of atoms and obeying the laws of science should be distinguishable from programmed mechanical machines made of atoms and obeying the laws of science. However, there’s all the difference in the world in the mentalist worldview. Humans have souls and machines don’t. It’s a category error to claim that the Turing test could ever be valid.

*****

Deep Blue, IBM’s chess-playing computer, defeated World Chess Champion Garry Kasparov in a famous match in 1997. Did this computer pass the Turing test, at least as far as chess is concerned? Clearly, it did since it beat the greatest human chess player of all time. Yet would anyone consider Deep Blue in any way human and in any way conscious? Even if you produced a perfect Deep Blue for every aspect of human existence, it still wouldn’t be human, and still wouldn’t be conscious. It would remain exactly what it is: a programmed machine, a simulation of a human, a simulacrum. It has no soul (no eternal monadic essence), and no one can program a soul – something eternal – into a temporal machine. In nature, souls take possession of biological bodies via a Fourier docking process that accompanies conception. The only way to get a machine to become alive would be to set it up so that a soul could likewise dock with it. If a programmer could set up a sufficiently rich and complex AI environment, they could conceivably lure a soul into it, but they could never program a living soul into it.

The Turing test is simply a test of the quality of an AI simulation of a human. It doesn’t establish any equivalence between human thinking and machine thinking. It simply demonstrates that, in certain situations, machines can be effective imitators of humans. That doesn’t make them human any more than a parrot is human when it repeats what someone said.

Imitation/simulation isn’t correspondence. Science itself is a kind of reality Turing test. Scientific theories, in specific situations, successfully imitate reality to a good approximation. Scientists then fallaciously conclude that their theories are authentic statements about reality. They’re not. They’re never anything more than synthetic attempts to describe analytic reality. The sole reason they work is that they use mathematics, the language of analytic reality.

The Compatibilism Fallacy?

As its name declares, [compatibilism] is compatible with determinism. It is compatible with determinism even though it follows from determinism that every aspect of your character, and everything you will ever do, was already inevitable before you were born. – Galen Strawson

Wrong! Determinism means that every effect has a cause; everything is determined, everything has a sufficient reason. It does not mean that these reasons existed before you were born, which is to make an absolutely extraordinary claim, rendering life 100% pointless, meaningless and incomprehensible, in no way reactive to the events of the world, and wholly devoid of any genuine evolution (Darwinian evolution involves natural selection, but nothing is selected if every selection was fully determined at the Big Bang before anything was even available to be selected!). Strawson’s definition of determinism is fallacious, which automatically leads to his understanding of compatibilism being fallacious. Of course, he is by no means alone – virtually the entire philosophical community argues in like fashion.

*****

"Suppose tomorrow is a national holiday. You are considering what to do. You can climb a mountain or read Lao Tzu. You can mend your bicycle or go to the zoo. At this moment, you are reading the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. You are free to go on reading or stop now. You have started on this sentence, but you don’t have to ... finish it.

"In this situation, as so often in life, you have a number of options. Nothing forces your hand. It seems natural to say that you are entirely free to choose what to do. And, given that nothing hinders you, it seems natural to say that you act entirely freely when you actually do (or try to do) what you have decided to do. ...

‘What more could free agency possibly be?’, compatibilists like to ask (backed by Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, among others). And this is a very powerful question. – Galen Strawson

Exactly. If free agency isn’t free will, what on earth is it?

Monadic Freedom

Only monads exist. There are two types of monadic causation: intra-monadic and inter-monadic:

Intra-monadic causation corresponds to subjective, self-generated behaviour. This is internaldeterminism. When the individual is the cause of his own actions, he acts freely. This is free determinism, meaning that the monadic subject freely determines what it does.

Inter-monadic causation corresponds to objective, other-generated behaviour. This is external determinism. When the individual is not the cause of his actions, he does not act freely. This is constrained determinism.

Compatibilism in Illuminism is the position that free will (= free determinism; internal determinism) is absolutely compatible with constrained will (= constrained determinism; external determinism), i.e. the existence of constrained determinism in no way precludes free determinism, but free determinism constitutes a different character of determinism from constrained determinism, being subjective rather than objective, yet equally mathematical.

Incompatibilism is the fallacy that determinism and free will fundamentally contradict each other. One strain of incompatibilism is hard determinism. This is the fallacy that only constrained determinism exists, hence free will is impossible. This is the scientific materialist view.

The opposite strain of incompatibilism is metaphysical libertarianism. This is the fallacy that free will exists, but has nothing to do with determinism, and indeed there is no determinism at all. This is an uncompromisingly indeterministic stance.

Hard incompatibilism is the fallacy that determinism (which may or may not be true in this view) and indeterminism (which may or may not be true) are both incompatible with free will. Either way, free will is false.

All of these incompatibilist positions are fallacies that fail to understand what free will actually is. Free will is causal agency by entities that are uncaused causes. Free will cannot be associated with any agent that is created, caused, contingent or temporal (i.e. in time, hence not eternal). The human body, for example, is all of these: created, caused, contingent and temporal. The human body itself can never be free. It belongs to the domain of constrained determinism. However, it has to be understood that it’s subject to two radically different types of constraint: internal and external, subjective and objective, mental and physical. Its actions are determined from the inside by the mind and from the outside by the physical environment. It’s precisely because of this that internal and external, subjective and objective determinism, must be compatible – because otherwise the human body would be a mad, incomprehensible thing, beset by two contradictory and incompatible forces.

When they attempt to understand the human body, scientists invariably approach the question entirely from the empiricist, materialist Meta Paradigm of science. This means that they conceive of the body being made exclusively of material atoms, each of which is part of the external, objective determinism schema alone. They imagine the mind as being something that is produced solely from the brain, with the brain, like the rest of the body, being made of atoms and nothing else. In these terms, hard determinism is the only rational conclusion. There’s no compatibilism issue here because no other type of determinism is possible in this model.

What so many people fail to understand is that scientific materialism is just a philosophy, stating a philosophical position. It’s not a set of incontestable facts and truths. It’s an interpretation of evidence, not an explanation of that evidence.

Compatibilism becomes a necessary position as soon as it’s concluded that scientific materialism is radically false in its ideology that bodies are all about atoms and nothing else. In ontological mathematics, there’s a whole category of existence denied by science, namely, that of immaterial, dimensionless Fourier frequency domains outside space and time: monadic singularities. These are mental, not physical, atoms, and they do not operate in the same domain. They are, however, fully compatible with physical atoms since they obey exactly the same mathematics: Fourier mathematics. The critical difference is that Fourier mathematics is defined with regard to two distinct domains – a dimensionless frequency domain and a dimensional spacetime domain. Both of these domains are mathematically compatible but they are absolutely different in the sense that an entity must be in one domain or the other, and can’t be in both. So, a monad, a mental atom, is always in the frequency domain outside space and time, while a physical atom is always in the spacetime domain.

A human body is entirely in the spacetime domain, surrounded by other spacetime entities that can deterministically interact with it. However, the body is also linked to a monad (a soul), which is not in the spacetime domain at all but in the frequency domain outside space and time.

The human body is therefore subject to two deterministic sources: 1) its spacetime environment, and 2) the frequency environment, outside space and time, via its controlling monad (an immaterial singularity).

The spacetime domain is the product of all monads – the Monadic Collective – hence all entities within it are collective, not individual. A soul is an individual entity that links to a collective body.

We can understand the whole of reality in terms of monads operating individually or collectively. When they operate collectively, they generate the objective spacetime world of matter that we live in. When they operate individually, they constitute the individual souls that can link to collective bodies in the spacetime environment. The following scheme applies in terms of determinism:

Collective/collective determinism = scientific, objective determinism; spacetime objects interact with each other.

Collective/individual determinism = spacetime objects (bodies) transmit information to individual souls via Fourier transform functions that convert spacetime representations into frequency representations. All sensory information that we experience results from the spacetime information impinging on our bodies being mathematically transformed into frequency representations (which are, of course, mental, not physical, representations). All secondary properties – colours, smells, tastes, and so on, are added at this stage, i.e. they are subjective interpretations of objective spacetime functions.

Individual/collective determinism = a soul transmits information to the physical body it controls via inverse Fourier transforms (= the human will). We can think of an action without actually making it happen (the action exists only in our mind). It happens for real only when we will it to happen, which means specifically sending a Fourier command to our body.

Individual/individual determinism = a soul having one thought after another, each thought causing the next. This all happens in the frequency domain, outside space and time. A dream takes place in the frequency domain, outside space, time and matter, hence why it does not obey the same rules of causal objectivity as the waking world. In our dreams, we are subject to our own will alone. In the waking world, we are subject to the objective will of the whole Monadic Collective, which provides the resistance we all encounter in our day-to-day lives.

It must be understood that the scheme we have outlined is the only possible way to explain the human condition and our experience of manifesting free will, experiencing qualia, and having dreams. It’s impossible to understand the human condition in terms of scientific materialism. If that ideology were correct, we would be unfree machines, we would never experience qualia and we would never dream.

We have shown exactly why the doctrine of compatibilism is necessary: to explain how our body can be affected by things happening to it in the external, spacetime environment (objective, scientific determinism) and be affected by things happening to it in the internal, frequency domain of the soul, which can then transmit Fourier commands to the body to make things happen in the physical world (e.g. we decide to go for a walk and thus we will our body to commence walking in the spacetime world).

Our body is determined by things coming from outside it and things coming from inside it. We thus have a deterministic competition going on, and the strongest determinism at any one time wins. If we want to go for a walk and there is nothing in the physical environment to provide a sufficient resistance, then we will go ahead and do so. However, if