History Of The Consulate And The Empire Of France Under Napoleon Vol. XII [Illustrated Edition]

By Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe Thiers

The product of twenty years of laborious hard work, this is the definitive work on Napoleon and his times at the helm of the French Nation, written by no less than the first President of the Third Republic.

Thiers moved in the highest circles of society and met with many of the surviving generals and statesmen of France and her opponents and wove their recollections into this monumental history. Filled with a particularly Gallic flavour without going into hero-worship, this multi-volume history has stood the test of time.

Volume Twelve is the final volume in the series and Napoleon’s final gamble leads to the end of his European career as the newest incarnation of the Grande Armée is wrecked on the battlefield of Waterloo.

Includes the Napoleonic Wars Map Pack with over 155 maps and plans following the military career of Napoleon.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Wagram Press
• Release date: Mar 28, 2016
• ISBN: 9781786259196

Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe Thiers

Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe Thiers (15 April 1797–3 September 1877) was a French statesman and historian. He was the second elected President of France, and the first President of the French Third Republic. Thiers served as a prime minister in 1836, 1840 and 1848. He was a vocal opponent of Emperor Napoleon III, who reigned from 1848–71. Following the defeat of France in the Franco-German War, which he opposed, he was elected chief executive of the new French government, negotiated the end of the war, and, when the Paris Commune seized power in that city in March 1871, gave the orders to the army for its suppression. He was named President of the Republic by the French National Assembly in August 1871. Opposed by the royalists in the French assembly and the left wing of the Republicans, he resigned on May 24, 1873, and was replaced as President by Patrice de MacMahon, Duke of Magenta.

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Text originally published in 1893-1894 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2016, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON

BY

LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL OF THE AUTHOR, BY

D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND JOHN STEBBING

With Twenty-Eight Steel plates

VOL. XII.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

PLATES IN VOL. XII. 16

BOOK LX.—WATERLOO 20

Forces assembled by Napoleon for opening the campaign of 1815—The fortresses being occupied, and Paris and Lyon provided with sufficiently strong garrisons, and Vendée kept in check, he still has 124,000 men under arms to commence offensive operations on the northern frontier—In another month Napoleon would have had 100,000 men more—Notwithstanding which, he determines to take the offensive immediately: in the first place, that the enemy may not be allowed to overrun the most fertile and the most devoted provinces of France; and in the next, because that the enemy’s column coming from the East, not being so forward as that coming from the North, he hoped that by commencing operations immediately he should be able to attack them the one after the other—His plan for concentrating his forces, and for interposing them between the English and Prussians before they could suspect his coming—Napoleon commences operations at three o’clock in the morning of the 15th June—Takes Charleroi, overpowers the Prussians, and takes up his position between the two adverse armies—The Prussians having Liége, and the English Brussels, for their base of operations, could only combine their forces on the highroad leading from Namur to Brussels, and which passed through Sombreffe and Quatre Bras—Napoleon determines to advance with his centre and right wing towards Sombreffe in order to attack the Prussians, whilst the left wing, under Ney, would keep the English in cheek at Quatre Bras—Combat of Gilly on the road to Fleurus—Ney’s hesitation at Quatre Bras—Notwithstanding these vacillations, everything on the forenoon of the 15th proceeds according to Napoleon’s wishes, and he has taken his position between the two armies, so as to be able on the next day to attack the Prussians before the English could come to their assistance—His arrangements for the 16th—Napoleon is obliged to defer his attack on the Prussians until the afternoon, in order to allow his troops time to draw up in line of battle—He orders Ney to seize Quatre Bras at any risk, and then to direct his column on the Prussian rear—About the middle of the day Napoleon with his army débouchés before Fleurus—Blücher’s eagerness to engage—His position before Sombreffe, behind the villages of St. Amand and Ligny—Battle of Ligny, from three until nine o’clock on the evening of the 16th—Violent resistance of the Prussians at St. Amand and Ligny—Fresh directions to Ney to seize Quatre Bras, and to send a corps to the rear of St. Amand—Napoleon, finding that his orders are not executed, makes a new arrangement, and with his guard forces the Prussian line above Ligny—Decisive result of this skilful manoeuvre—After immense loss the Prussian army is thrown back beyond Sombreffe, and Napoleon remains master of the highroad leading from Namur to Brussels, and passing through Quatre Bras—During the combat at Ligny, Ney, fearing that he should have to encounter the entire British army, allows the propitious moment to escape, and does not attack until the English have assembled in immense numbers, so that he is only able to keep them in check; and d’Erlon, on his side, going sometimes to Ligny and sometimes to Quatre Bras, loses the day in these marchings and counter-marchings, and is of no assistance to any one—Notwithstanding this, Napoleon’s plan has succeeded, for he was able to attack the Prussians apart from the English, and would be able on the next day to attack the English alone—Arrangements for the 17th—Napoleon wishing to observe the Prussians, and complete their overthrow, and above all, to keep them at a distance whilst he engages with the English, detaches his right wing under the command of Marshal Grouchy, with express directions to keep up a constant communication with himself—This wing is composed of the corps of Vandamme and Gérard, fatigued from the battle of Ligny—He himself with his centre, composed of the corps of Lobau, the guards, and the reserve of cavalry, advances towards Quatre Bras to support Ney and attack the English—These arrangements occupy him during a part of the morning of the 17th, after which he sets out to join his troops, who are already in advance—His surprise at finding Ney, who was to form the head of the column, inactive in the rear of Quatre Bras—Ney still believing that he was in presence of the entire English army, was waiting Napoleon’s arrival in order to advance—This delay obliges the army to spend a long time in passing Quatre Bras —Sudden storm which converts the whole country into a marsh—Great distress suffered by the troops—Combat of the rearguard at Genappe—Napoleon pursues the English army, which stops on the plateau of Mont St. Jean, in front of the forest of Soignes—Description of the country—The Duke of Wellington’s plans—He intends to take up his position on the plateau of Mont St. Jean, to await the Prussians, and with their assistance commence a decisive engagement—Although Blücher is displeased with the English for their conduct on the 16th, he sends them word that on the morning of the 18th he will be on their left, in front of the forest of Soignes—Prolonged reconnoitre of Napoleon on the evening of the 17th under a shower of bullets—His great satisfaction when he is convinced that the English are determined to fight—His confidence in the result—He orders Grouchy to advance, and sends on a detachment to attack the left wing of the English in the rear—Grouchy’s movements on the 17th—He needlessly follows the Prussians on the road to Namur, and does not see his error until near the end of the day of their march towards Wavre—He directs his infantry towards Gembloux, but only advances two leagues and a half in a day—However, they are so near each other that Grouchy, by setting out at four o’clock of the morning of the 18th, might come on the Prussians’ track, and prevent their operations in any direction—In the evening he sends word to Napoleon that he is on their track, and will make every exertion to keep them from joining the English —During the night Napoleon rises several times to observe the enemy—The bivouac fires of the English leave no doubt as to their determination to fight—As the rain did not cease until near six in the morning, Drouot declares, in the name of the artillery, that it would be impossible for them to act before ten or eleven o’clock—Napoleon determines to defer the combat until that hour—His plans for the day—He wishes to drive the English left on the centre, and cut them off from the road to Brussels, the only practicable passage through the forest of Soignes—Distribution of his forces—Appearance of the two armies—Having slept for some moments, Napoleon ascends a hill in front of the farm of La Belle Alliance—Before giving the signal of battle he sends another officer to Grouchy to tell him of his position, and to order him to come and take his station on his right—The firing commences at half-past eleven—Great battery in the French front, which is firing furiously on the English lines—The firing has hardly commenced when a dark mass is seen at a distance to the right—The light cavalry are sent to reconnoitre—Our left, commanded by General Reille, attacks the wood and chateau of Goumont—In spite of the enemy’s resistance, both wood and orchard are taken; but the chateau resists—Obstinate determination to seize this post—The light cavalry informs Napoleon that the mass seen at a distance to the right was troops, and these troops Prussians—Another officer sent to Grouchy—Count Lobau is commanded to keep the Prussians in check—Attack in the centre on the road to Brussels, in order to seize La Haye Sainte; and to the right, to expel the left wing of the English from the plateau of Mont St. Jean—Ney directs this double attack—Our soldiers seize the orchard of La Haye Sainte, but without succeeding in seizing the buildings of the farm—The d’Erlon corps attacks the English left—Excitement of the troops—The position is taken, and the French are about to debouch on the plateau, when our infantry columns are assailed by a furious charge of the Scotch dragoons, and thrown into disorder because they had not been drawn up so as to be able to resist the cavalry—Napoleon sends a brigade of cuirassiers to attack the Scotch dragoons—Horrible slaughter of the Scotch dragoons—Although the check of the d’Erlon corps had been repaired, the attempt had to be recommenced— The Prussians appear, and Lobau crosses the field to oppose them—Napoleon stops the attack on the English, orders Ney to seize La Haye Sainte as a point of support for the centre, and to remain there until he could estimate the value of the Prussian attack—The Count de Lobau repels the first divisions of Bülow—Ney attacks and seizes La Haye Sainte—He drives back the English cavalry who were advancing to attack him, and pursues them as far as the plateau—He sees the English artillery apparently abandoned, and thinks the time is come for a decisive stroke—He asks for a reinforcement, and Napoleon entrusts him with a division of cuirassiers that he may be able to join Reille at the château de Goumont—Ney, with the cuirassiers, falls on the English, and breaks their first line—All the reserve cavalry, and those of the guard, follow him without the emperor’s orders—Extraordinary combat of the cavalry—Ney performs prodigies, sends to Napoleon for some infantry in order to complete the overthrow of the English army—Napoleon being engaged in a desperate combat with the Prussians, cannot send any infantry to Ney, for he has none himself but those of his guard—He sends directions to Ney to hold his position on Mont St. Jean as long as possible, and promises to come and conclude the combat with the English if he can conclude that with the Prussians—Napoleon at the head of his guards attacks the Prussians with great fury—Bülow is driven back with great loss—Napoléon, after this success, recalls his right wing to the centre, and forms them into columns of attack, in order to put an end to the combat with the English—First engagement of four battalions of the guards against the British infantry—Heroism of these battalions—Whilst Napoleon is hastening to their assistance he is suddenly attacked in flank by the Prussian corps of Ziethen, the last that lead arrived—Frightful confusion—The Duke of Wellington now takes the offensive, and our exhausted army, attacked in front, flank, and rear, without aid, overtaken by night, and unable to see Napoleon, is for several hours in a frightful state of confusion—Disorderly retreat to Charleroi—Grouchy’s operations during this fatal day—When the cannons of Waterloo are heard, all his generals ask him to join the combat—He does not understand their views, and refuses—How easily he might have saved the army—At the end of the day he sees his mistake, which he regrets excessively—Character of this last campaign, and real cause of the overthrow of the French army. 21

BOOK LXI.—SECOND ABDICATION. 148

Military events on the different frontiers—Successful combats and armistice in Savoy—The Vendéans are defeated, and a treaty made with the heads of the insurrection—Napoleon arrives at Laon—Bulletin of the battle of Waterloo is drawn up—Napoleon considers whether it would be better to remain at Laon to rally the army, or proceed to Paris to ask for fresh troops—He determines on going to Paris—Effect at Paris of the fatal account of the battle of Waterloo —All consider that Napoleon, having lost the power of conquering, would be henceforth but an unprofitable danger for France—Almost all parties, except the revolutionists and Bonapartists, who were too deeply compromised, wish him to abdicate, and thus end the dangers he was bringing on France—Fouché’s intrigues—He thinks that if Napoleon be put aside that the destiny of France would be in his hands—He threatens the representatives—He advises the representatives to oppose Napoleon should he wish to involve France in a desperate struggle—Napoleon arrives at the Elysée on the morning of the 21st June—His physical prostration—Despair of those around him—Council of ministers, at which Prince Joseph and Prince Lucien are present—Marshal Davout and Lucien advise that the chambers be immediately prorogued—Embarrassment and silence of the ministers—Napoleon seems to believe that the time for an 18th Brumaire is past—Whilst they are deliberating, M. Fouché sends word to M. de Lafayette that Napoleon intends to dissolve the Chamber of Representatives—Great commotion in this chamber—M. de Lafayette proposes, and the resolution is adopted, that whoever should seek to prorogue or dissolve the chambers should be declared a traitor, and the ministers are required to come and give an account of the state of the country—Once this tone has been adopted, there is no further restraint, and all speak of an abdication—Napoleon becomes angry, and throwing off his dejection, seems inclined for violent measures—M. Regnaud, secretly influenced by M. Fouché, tries to calm him, and suggests the idea of an abdication, which Napoleon does not reject—Meantime the Chamber of Representatives is greatly excited, and insists on a reply from government—The ministers at length repair to the bar of the two chambers, and propose that a committee of five members be formed, in order to take measures for the public safety—M. Jay makes a speech, in which he begs Napoleon to abdicate—Prince Lucien replies—The assembly does not wish to wrest the sceptre from Napoleon, but would rather that he should lay it down—The proposal of the ministers is accepted, and a commission of five members is appointed who in conjunction with the government are to consider by what means the country may be saved—The Chamber of Peers follows the example of the Chamber of Representatives in everything—Napoleon is surrounded by those who advise him to abdicate—His brother Lucien, on the other band, advises violent measures—Reason why Napoleon does not adopt them—Meeting of the commissioners of the two chambers at night at the Tuileries—M. de Lafayette directly proposes an abdication—The others do not attend to him, but turn their attention to the finances and the means of recruiting, whilst M. Regnaud says, that by managing Napoleon they can soon get him to agree to their wishes—Report of this meeting to the Chamber of Representatives—Displeasure excited by the unimportance of the report—General Solignac, who had been a long time in disgrace, reminds the chamber of the respect due to misfortune, and hastens to the Elysée Palace to demand an abdication—Napoleon receives him calmly, and promises to give the chamber a satisfactory answer in a short time—Second abdication—Napoleon inserts the condition that the crown is to descend to his son—The instrument of abdication is taken to the chamber, where, their wish being granted, all are greatly moved—An executive commission is appointed to succeed the imperial power—MM. Carnot, Fouché, Grenier, Caulaincourt, and Quinette are appointed members of this commission—M. Fouché becomes president by his own vote—M. Fouché sets M. de Vitrolles at liberty privately, and enters into communication with the royalists —He would prefer Napoleon II., but foreseeing that the Bourbons are most likely to succeed, he determines to make conditions with them—Scenes in the Chamber of Peers—La Bédoyère proposes that Napoleon II be proclaimed at once—Altercation between Drouot and Ney concerning the battle of Waterloo—Napoleon seeing that the members are anxious to evade the question relative to the transmission of the crown to his son, complains to M. Regnaud that he has been deceived—MM. Regnaud, Boulay de la Meurthe, and Defermon promise that on the following day they will make an effort in favour of Napoleon II.—Animated discussion in the Chamber of Representatives on the 23rd—M. Boulay de la Meurthe denounces the royalist plots, and proposes that Napoleon II be immediately proclaimed—The entire assembly are willing to proclaim him—M. Manuel, by a skilful discourse, succeeds in calming them, and inducing them to return to the order of the day—Different measures voted by the chamber—What is occurring at the same time on the frontiers—The army rallies at Laon, and miraculous escape of Grouchy—The army contains 60,000 men, who recover all their enthusiasm at the name of Napoleon II.—Grouchy assumes the command, and leads the army towards Paris, following the left bank of the Oise—When the foreign generals hear of the abdication they advance towards Paris; and Blücher, being the most animated, is two days in advance of the English—Increasing excitement at Paris—The royalists are thinking of attempting a movement, but M. Fouché restrains them by the intervention of M. de Vitrolles—The Bonapartists and revolutionists want Napoleon to place himself at their head, and rid them of the chambers—Numbers of the people assemble in the Avenue of Marigny, and cheer vehemently when they see Napoleon—M. Fouché’s anxiety and desire to remove Napoleon—He commissions Marshal Davout to undertake this, and the latter repairs to the Elysée Palace to ask Napoleon to leave Paris—Napoleon retires to Malmaison, and asks for two frigates that are at Rochefort that he may retire to America—M. Fouché sends to the Duke of Wellington for a safe conduct—Napoleon awaits the reply at Malmaison—General Beker is ordered to guard him—M. de Vitrolles demands that M. Fouché puts an end to the crisis—M. Fouché seeks to throw the responsibility on the generals by making them declare that defence is impossible—The royalists turn their attention to Marshal Davout — Marshal Oudinot consults with Marshal Davout—The latter declares that if the Bourbons consent to return unaccompanied by foreign soldiers, to respect the lives of individuals, and protect the rights of France, that he will be the first to proclaim Louis XVIII.—Marshal Davout declares his opinion on this subject to the executive commission—M. Fouché does not venture to support him — Just then a report arrives from those who had been sent to negotiate with the allied sovereigns, from which it is supposed that they are not absolutely determined to support the Bourbons—This report affords a fresh excuse for deferring coming to a resolution—The enemy’s armies approach Paris — Other persons are appointed to negotiate an armistice—The Duke of Wellington’s particular arrangements—His wisdom—His advice to the court at Ghent—Inclinations of this court—Plans of vengeance—Anger felt against M. de Blacas, and approval of M. Fouché—Momentary rule of M. de Talleyrand—Louis XVIII. arrives at Cambray—His declaration—The Duke of Wellington does not wish to enter Paris in a warlike but in a peaceable manner, that the Bourbons may not be made unpopular—Marshal Blücher’s violence: he wants to get rid of Napoleon—Noble sentiments of the Duke of Wellington—Those who are come to negotiate an armistice have an interview with the latter—He requires that Paris and Napoleon be given up to him—M. Fouché determines on making Napoleon leave at once—Napoleon, hearing that the enemies are approaching, and that the Prussians are two days in advance of the English, offers the executive commission to take the command of the army for a few hours, gain a battle, and then lay down his command—This proposal is rejected—Napoleon leaves for Rochefort on the 28th June—Napoleon having left, the Duke of Wellington can no longer demand his being surrendered to him, but says the French must decide on accepting the Bourbons, and promises that they will act with good sense—Conversation with the French negotiators—M. Fouché’s secret agents give him the same information as the negotiators, from which it is evident that the Bourbons must be accepted—M. Fouché sees that an end must be put to these delays, and summons a great council, to which the bureaux of the chambers and several marshals are summoned—He seeks to throw the responsibility on Marshal Davout by making him declare that defence is impossible—The marshal, irritated by M. Fouché’s mean plots, declares that he is ready to fight, and promises to gain a victory if he should not be killed within the first two hours—M. Fouché’s embarrassment—Carnot asserts that resistance is impossible—The question is referred to a special military commission—M. Fouché puts the question in such a way as to get the answer he wishes—The answer being received from this council, it is admitted that they must capitulate—General Exelmans’ brilliant cavalry engagement with the Prussians—Notwithstanding this success, all see that they must come to terms—Commissioners are sent to Marshal Blücher at St. Cloud—These commissioners pass through Marshal Davout’s quarters—Scenes at which they are present—Convention for the capitulation of Paris—The different articles—The French army is to retire beyond the Loire, and leave the service of the capital to the national guard—Scenes between the féderés and the French army as the latter pass through Paris—M. Fouché has an interview with the Duke of Wellington and M. de Talleyrand at Neuilly—Not being able to obtain satisfactory conditions, he resigns, and accepts the portfolio of police—His colleagues consider that he has betrayed them—He returns to Neuilly, and obtains an audience of Louis XVIII.—He makes arrangements for that monarch’s return, and causes the chambers to be closed—The general opinion is that. he has betrayed all parties—Review and estimate of the period called the Hundred Days. 149

BOOK LXII.—ST. HELENA. 248

Irritation of the Bourbons and foreign generals against M. Fouché, whom they accuse of aiding Napoleon’s escape—Napoleon proceeds to Rochefort—His reception there, and at different places on his way—He lingers on the coast, hoping for some unexpected event—At one moment be thinks of joining the army on the Loire—He gives up the idea—Different modes of embarking are proposed—Napoleon rejects them all, and sends a message to the English cruisers — Captain Maitland, commanding the Bellerophon, replies that he has not received any instructions, but supposes that the British people will accord to Napoleon a hospitality consistent with his dignity and their own—Napoleon determines to go on board the Bellerophon—His reception—He proceeds to the shores of England—Extraordinary curiosity of the English about Napoleon —The British ministers’ decision concerning him—The island of St. Helena is chosen as the place of his detention—He is to be treated there as a general, guarded, and allowed but three companions—Napoleon is taken from the Bellerophon to the Northumberland—His farewell to France and those friends that cannot accompany him—Voyage in the Atlantic—The English sailors’ attention to Napoleon—His occupations during the voyage—He relates the different events of his life to his companions, who request him to allow them to write them from his dictation—Length of the voyage—Arrival at St. Helena after a voyage of seventy days—Appearance of the island —Its condition, soil, and climate—Napoleon lands — He is first stationed at Briars—Immediately after landing he is subjected to a close and continual surveillance—His displeasure at it—First news from Europe—Napoleon feels the deepest interest for Ney, La Bédoyère, Lavalette, and Drouot—Two months later Napoleon is transferred to Longwood—His apartments there—Precautions taken to guard him—His life and occupations at Longwood—Napoleon dislikes his residence, and does not properly appreciate Admiral Cockburn’s attention to him—In the commencement of 1816 Sir Hudson Lowe is sent as governor to St. Helena—His •character and his sentiments at his arrival—Disagreeable circumstances occur during his first interview with Napoleon—Sir Hudson Lowe is afraid of being accused, like Admiral Cockburn, of being influenced by his prisoner—He executes his orders with the utmost rigour—Many causes of dispute—Shabby quarrel about the expenses of Longwood —Napoleon orders his plate to be sold—Admiral Cockburn leaves, and the new admiral, Sir Pulteney Malcolm, arrives—Excellent disposition of this officer—His efforts to reconcile Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe useless—Final rupture—Annoyances experienced by Napoleon—His occupations—Explanation of his conduct during his reign—His historical labours—End of 1816—M. de las Cases is expelled from St. Helena—Causes great dejection to Napoleon—The first year at St. Helena—Napoleon, not wishing to be guarded when he rides out, refuses to take exercise, by which his health is injured—His family offer to join him, and give him what they possess—He refuses—Some English persons visit Napoleon and converse with him—Sir Hudson Lowe becomes uneasy about Napoleon’s health, and instead of sending him to Plantation House, has a new residence built for him—The year 1818—Napoleon’s conversations on religious and literary subjects—Departure of General Gourgaud—Napoleon is successively deprived of Admiral Malcolm and Dr. O’Meara—The cause of the departure of the latter —Napoleon without a physician—Useless entreaties of Sir Hudson Lowe to induce him to see an English doctor—The year 1819—Napoleon’s health is injured for want of exercise—His legs swell; he is attacked by frequent vomiting, caused by a disease of the stomach—He is induced to exercise a little on horseback—His health improves somewhat —Napoleon puts aside his own history, and occupies himself with those of other great commanders—He occupies himself with Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick the Great—Napoleon’s health soon declines again—Difficulty of seeing him, and of proving that he is still on the island—Disgraceful attempt of Sir Hudson Lowe to force his door—The year 1820—A doctor and two priests, sent by Cardinal Fesch, arrive at St. Helena—Napoleon does not think this sufficient—He has the two priests to say mass every Sunday at Longwood—The good effects produced in a moral sense by this—As Napoleon would not ride because of being followed by a guard, Dr. Antomarchi prevails on him to occupy himself with gardening—He and his companions in exile work in the garden—Part of the year 1820 is spent in this employment—Napoleon’s health improves—This improvement is only temporary—He suffers from violent pains in the stomach, his legs swell, he loses strength, and declines rapidly—His satisfaction at the approach of death—His will—His agony and death on May 5, 1821—His funeral —Estimation of Napoleon’s genius and character—His character in its normal state, and as it was influenced by events—His qualities in private life—His genius as legislator, administrator, and general—His place amongst great warriors—Progress of military tactics from the time of the ancients until the French Revolution—Alexander, Hannibal, Cesar, Charlemagne, the Nassaus, Gustavus Adolphus, Condé, Turenne, Vauban, Frederick, and Napoleon—In what Napoleon advanced military tactics —Napoleon’s talents and destiny compared with those of other great men—Lessons to be deduced from his life—End of this History. 249

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 361

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS 362

Europe, The Italian Campaigns, 1796 - Strategic Situation 362

Northern Italy, 1796 - Seizing Central Position, 10 - 14 April 364

Northern Italy, 1796 - Using Interior Lines, 15 - 23 April 365

Northern Italy, 1796 - Pursuit to the Po, 24 April - 8 May, and Exploitation to Cerona, 9 May - 1 June 366

Lake Garda and Vicinity, 1796 - Wurmser's Advance & Bonaparte's Pursuit, 1-13 September 368

Lake Garda and Vicinity, 1796 - Mobile Defense, 1-12 November 369

Lake Garda and Vicinity, 1796 - Bonaparte Forces The Decision, 14-17 November 370

Lake Garda and Vicinity, 1797 - Rivoli Model of Interior Lines, 7-14 January 371

THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS 372

Europe, 1798 - The Egyptian Campaigns, Strategic Overview, 1798 - 1799 372

THE MARENGO CAMPAIGN 374

Northern Italy, 1800 - The Marengo Campaign, Strategic Envelopment and Battle of Marengo 374

The Marengo Campaign, 1800 - Situation Late April 376

The Marengo Campaign, 1800 - Situation 14 May 377

The Marengo Campaign, 1800 - Situation 5 June and Movements Since 27 May 378

The Marengo Campaign, 1800 - Situation Late 13 June and Initial Movements 14 June 380

The Marengo Campaign, 1800 - Situation About 1000, 14 June 381

The Marengo Campaign, 1800 - Situation Shortly Before 1400, 14 June and Movements up to 1500 382

THE EXPANSION OF FRANCE 383

Europe, 1801 - The Expansion of France, Territorial Gains 383

Europe, 1803 - The Expansion of France, Restructuring Germany 385

Europe, 1805 - The Expansion Of France, Redeployment of the Grande Army 386

THE ULM CAMPAIGN 387

Central Europe, 1805 - The Invasion of Bavaria, Situation, 2 - 25 September 387

Central Europe, 1805 - French Strategic Envelopment, Situation, 26 September- 9 October 389

Central Europe, 1805 - The Engagements Around Ulm, Situation, 7 - 9 October 390

Central Europe, 1805 - The Engagements Around Ulm, Situation, 9 - 11 October 391

Central Europe, 1805 - The Engagements Around Ulm, Situation, 11 - 14 October 392

THE AUSTERLITZ CAMPAIGN 393

Central Europe, 1805 - Pursuit to Vienna, Situation, 26 October - 1 November 393

Central Europe, 1805 - General Situation, 25 November 395

Europe, 1805 - Strategic Situation, 25 November 396

The Battle of Austerlitz, 1805 - Situation, 1800 hours, 1 December 397

The Battle of Austerlitz, 1805 - Situation, 0900 hours, 2 December 398

The Battle of Austerlitz, 1805 - Situation, 1400 hours, 2 December 399

THE EXPANSION OF THE EMPIRE 400

Europe, 1806 - The Expansion of the Empire, September and Territorial Changes Since December 1805 400

THE JENA CAMPAIGN 402

Central Europe, 1806 - Situation, 6 October and Deployment of Opposing Armies 402

Central Europe, 1806 - Situation, Noon 10 October and Movements Since 8 October 404

Central Europe, 1806 - Situation, 1800 12 October and Movements Since 10 October 405

Jena and Vicinity, 1806 Base Map with Contours 406

Jena and Vicinity, 1806 - Battles of Jena and Auerstädt, Situation at Midnight, 13 October 407

Jena and Vicinity, 1806 - Battles of Jena and Auerstädt, 1000 hours- 14 October 408

Jena and Vicinity, 1806 - Battles of Jena and Auerstädt, 1400 hours- 14 October 409

Central Europe, 1806 - Pursuit to the Oder, 15 - October - 1 November 410

THE EYLAU AND FRIEDLAND CAMPAIGNS 411

Europe, 1807 - East Prussia, The Eylau and Friedland Campaigns 411

The Battle of Eylau, 1807 - Situation Early, 8 February 413

The Battle of Eylau, 1807 - Situation About 1600, 8 February 414

The Battle of Friedland, 1807 - Situation Shortly After 1700, 14 June 415

The Battle of Friedland, 1807 - Situation About 1800, 14 June 416

The Battle of Friedland, 1807 - Situation About 1900, 14 June 417

THE TREATY OF TILSIT AND THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM 418

Europe, 1807 - The Treaty of Tilsit and the Continental System - Naval Ground Actions in 1807 418

DEFENDING THE GRANDE EMPIRE 420

Europe, 1808 - Defending the Grande Empire, Strategic Situation July and the Continental System 420

THE CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN 422

Iberian Peninsula, 1808 - June- 21 - August 1808 422

Iberian Peninsula, 1808 - October 1808 - 20 January 1809 424

DEFENDING THE GRANDE EMPIRE 425

Europe, 1809 - Defending the Grande Empire, Strategic Situation 1 February 425

THE DANUBE CAMPAIGN 427

Central Europe, 1809 - Situation, 15 April and Deployment of Opposing Forces 427

Ratisbon and Vicinity, 1809 - Situation Noon, 19 April and Movements Since 17 April 429

Ratisbon and Vicinity, 1809 - Situation, Midnight 21 - 22 April and Movements Since 19 April 430

Southern Germany, 1809 - Situation, 0800 22 May and Movements Since 22 April 431

Southern Germany, 1809 - Situation, 1030 6 July and Movements Since 22 May 432

Ratisbon, Battle of Abensberg, 1809 - Situation About 1000, 20 April 433

Ratisbon, Situation About Midnight, 1809 21-22 April and Main Routes of Retreat 434

Ratisbon, 1809 = Battle of Eggmuhl, Situation About 1500, 22 April 435

Ratisbon To Wagram, 1809 - Situation 13 May and Movements of Opposing Forces 436

The Battle of Aspern-Essling (1st Day), 1809 - Situation About 1500, 21 May 437

The Battle of Aspern-Essling (2nd Day), 1809 - Situation About 0730, 22 May 438

Wagram, 1809 - Situation Late 4 July 439

The Battle of Wagram (1st Day). 1809 - Situation About 1400, 5 July. Crossing of the Danube 440

The Battle of Wagram (2nd Day, 1809 - Situation About 1030, 6 July 441

The Battle of Wagram (2nd Day), 1809 - Situation About 1300, 6 July 442

THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA 443

Iberian Peninsula, 1809 -1814 - Strategic Overview To Include Major Actions and Defensive Works 443

THE NAPOLEON FAMILY SYSTEM 444

Europe, 1810, Napoleon's Family System 444

DEFENDING THE GRANDE EMPIRE 446

Europe, 1812, Defending the Grand Empire 446

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN 448

Eastern Europe, 1812 - Situation, 1 July and Movements Since 1 June 448

Eastern Europe, 1812 - Situation, 24 July and Movements Since 1 July 450

Eastern Europe, 1812 - Situation, 14 August and Movements Since 24 July 451

Eastern Europe, 1812 - Situation, 27 August 1812 452

The Battle of Borodino, 1812 - Situation 0630, 7 September 453

The Battle of Borodino, 1812 - Situation 0930, 7 September 454

The Battle of Borodino, 1812 - Situation 1600, 7 September 455

Eastern Europe, 1812 - Situation, 4 October 456

Eastern Europe, Situation, 18 October - 5 December 1812 457

Germany, 1813 - Situation, The Defense of the Elbe, 1813 458

THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 459

Europe, 1813 - Situation 17 March 459

Germany, 1813 - Napoleon's Spring Counteroffensive 461

Germany, 1813 - Situation At The End of the Armistice, 16 August 462

Germany, 1813 - Situation, 26 August and Movements Since the Armistice 463

Germany, 1813 - Situation, 6 September and Movements Since 26 August 464

Germany, 1813 - Situation, 2 October and Major Movements Since 26 September 465

Germany, 1813 - Situation, 9 October and Movements Since 2 October 466

Germany, 1813 - Situation, 13 October and Movements Since 9 October 467

THE CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE 468

Western Europe, 1814 - Situation 1 January and 10 February 468

THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 470

Northwestern Europe, 1815 - Situation 1 June and Deployment of Opposing Forces 470

Brussels and Vicinity, 1815 - Situation, 0700 16 June 1 and Movements Since 1 June 472

Quatre-Bras and Ligny, 1815 - The Battles of Ligny and Quatre-Bras, Situation at Noon on 16 June 473

Quatre-Bras and Ligny, 1815 - Situation at 2000 on 16 June 474

Brussels and Vicinity, 1815 - Situation, Midnight 17-18 June and Movements Since 16 June 475

Waterloo and Vicinity, 1815 - The Battle of Waterloo, Situation 1000 Hours, 18 June 476

Brussels and Vicinity, 1815 - Situation, 1000 hours 18 June 477

Waterloo Battlefield, 1815 - Situation, 1600 hours 18 June 478

Waterloo Battlefield, 1815 - Situation, 1930 hours 18 June 479

EUROPE 1810 - 1815 480

Europe, 1810 - Under Napoleon 480

Europe, 1815 - Under the Monarchs 482

PLATES IN VOL. XII.

NAPOLEON (1815)

MARSHAL SOULT

KING OF ROME

HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

BOOK LX.—WATERLOO

Forces assembled by Napoleon for opening the campaign of 1815—The fortresses being occupied, and Paris and Lyon provided with sufficiently strong garrisons, and Vendée kept in check, he still has 124,000 men under arms to commence offensive operations on the northern frontier—In another month Napoleon would have had 100,000 men more—Notwithstanding which, he determines to take the offensive immediately: in the first place, that the enemy may not be allowed to overrun the most fertile and the most devoted provinces of France; and in the next, because that the enemy’s column coming from the East, not being so forward as that coming from the North, he hoped that by commencing operations immediately he should be able to attack them the one after the other—His plan for concentrating his forces, and for interposing them between the English and Prussians before they could suspect his coming—Napoleon commences operations at three o’clock in the morning of the 15th June—Takes Charleroi, overpowers the Prussians, and takes up his position between the two adverse armies—The Prussians having Liége, and the English Brussels, for their base of operations, could only combine their forces on the highroad leading from Namur to Brussels, and which passed through Sombreffe and Quatre Bras—Napoleon determines to advance with his centre and right wing towards Sombreffe in order to attack the Prussians, whilst the left wing, under Ney, would keep the English in cheek at Quatre Bras—Combat of Gilly on the road to Fleurus—Ney’s hesitation at Quatre Bras—Notwithstanding these vacillations, everything on the forenoon of the 15th proceeds according to Napoleon’s wishes, and he has taken his position between the two armies, so as to be able on the next day to attack the Prussians before the English could come to their assistance—His arrangements for the 16th—Napoleon is obliged to defer his attack on the Prussians until the afternoon, in order to allow his troops time to draw up in line of battle—He orders Ney to seize Quatre Bras at any risk, and then to direct his column on the Prussian rear—About the middle of the day Napoleon with his army débouchés before Fleurus—Blücher’s eagerness to engage—His position before Sombreffe, behind the villages of St. Amand and Ligny—Battle of Ligny, from three until nine o’clock on the evening of the 16th—Violent resistance of the Prussians at St. Amand and Ligny—Fresh directions to Ney to seize Quatre Bras, and to send a corps to the rear of St. Amand—Napoleon, finding that his orders are not executed, makes a new arrangement, and with his guard forces the Prussian line above Ligny—Decisive result of this skilful manoeuvre—After immense loss the Prussian army is thrown back beyond Sombreffe, and Napoleon remains master of the highroad leading from Namur to Brussels, and passing through Quatre Bras—During the combat at Ligny, Ney, fearing that he should have to encounter the entire British army, allows the propitious moment to escape, and does not attack until the English have assembled in immense numbers, so that he is only able to keep them in check; and d’Erlon, on his side, going sometimes to Ligny and sometimes to Quatre Bras, loses the day in these marchings and counter-marchings, and is of no assistance to any one—Notwithstanding this, Napoleon’s plan has succeeded, for he was able to attack the Prussians apart from the English, and would be able on the next day to attack the English alone—Arrangements for the 17th—Napoleon wishing to observe the Prussians, and complete their overthrow, and above all, to keep them at a distance whilst he engages with the English, detaches his right wing under the command of Marshal Grouchy, with express directions to keep up a constant communication with himself—This wing is composed of the corps of Vandamme and Gérard, fatigued from the battle of Ligny—He himself with his centre, composed of the corps of Lobau, the guards, and the reserve of cavalry, advances towards Quatre Bras to support Ney and attack the English—These arrangements occupy him during a part of the morning of the 17th, after which he sets out to join his troops, who are already in advance—His surprise at finding Ney, who was to form the head of the column, inactive in the rear of Quatre Bras—Ney still believing that he was in presence of the entire English army, was waiting Napoleon’s arrival in order to advance—This delay obliges the army to spend a long time in passing Quatre Bras —Sudden storm which converts the whole country into a marsh—Great distress suffered by the troops—Combat of the rearguard at Genappe—Napoleon pursues the English army, which stops on the plateau of Mont St. Jean, in front of the forest of Soignes—Description of the country—The Duke of Wellington’s plans—He intends to take up his position on the plateau of Mont St. Jean, to await the Prussians, and with their assistance commence a decisive engagement—Although Blücher is displeased with the English for their conduct on the 16th, he sends them word that on the morning of the 18th he will be on their left, in front of the forest of Soignes—Prolonged reconnoitre of Napoleon on the evening of the 17th under a shower of bullets—His great satisfaction when he is convinced that the English are determined to fight—His confidence in the result—He orders Grouchy to advance, and sends on a detachment to attack the left wing of the English in the rear—Grouchy’s movements on the 17th—He needlessly follows the Prussians on the road to Namur, and does not see his error until near the end of the day of their march towards Wavre—He directs his infantry towards Gembloux, but only advances two leagues and a half in a day—However, they are so near each other that Grouchy, by setting out at four o’clock of the morning of the 18th, might come on the Prussians’ track, and prevent their operations in any direction—In the evening he sends word to Napoleon that he is on their track, and will make every exertion to keep them from joining the English —During the night Napoleon rises several times to observe the enemy—The bivouac fires of the English leave no doubt as to their determination to fight—As the rain did not cease until near six in the morning, Drouot declares, in the name of the artillery, that it would be impossible for them to act before ten or eleven o’clock—Napoleon determines to defer the combat until that hour—His plans for the day—He wishes to drive the English left on the centre, and cut them off from the road to Brussels, the only practicable passage through the forest of Soignes—Distribution of his forces—Appearance of the two armies—Having slept for some moments, Napoleon ascends a hill in front of the farm of La Belle Alliance—Before giving the signal of battle he sends another officer to Grouchy to tell him of his position, and to order him to come and take his station on his right—The firing commences at half-past eleven—Great battery in the French front, which is firing furiously on the English lines—The firing has hardly commenced when a dark mass is seen at a distance to the right—The light cavalry are sent to reconnoitre—Our left, commanded by General Reille, attacks the wood and chateau of Goumont—In spite of the enemy’s resistance, both wood and orchard are taken; but the chateau resists—Obstinate determination to seize this post—The light cavalry informs Napoleon that the mass seen at a distance to the right was troops, and these troops Prussians—Another officer sent to Grouchy—Count Lobau is commanded to keep the Prussians in check—Attack in the centre on the road to Brussels, in order to seize La Haye Sainte; and to the right, to expel the left wing of the English from the plateau of Mont St. Jean—Ney directs this double attack—Our soldiers seize the orchard of La Haye Sainte, but without succeeding in seizing the buildings of the farm—The d’Erlon corps attacks the English left—Excitement of the troops—The position is taken, and the French are about to debouch on the plateau, when our infantry columns are assailed by a furious charge of the Scotch dragoons, and thrown into disorder because they had not been drawn up so as to be able to resist the cavalry—Napoleon sends a brigade of cuirassiers to attack the Scotch dragoons—Horrible slaughter of the Scotch dragoons—Although the check of the d’Erlon corps had been repaired, the attempt had to be recommenced— The Prussians appear, and Lobau crosses the field to oppose them—Napoleon stops the attack on the English, orders Ney to seize La Haye Sainte as a point of support for the centre, and to remain there until he could estimate the value of the Prussian attack—The Count de Lobau repels the first divisions of Bülow—Ney attacks and seizes La Haye Sainte—He drives back the English cavalry who were advancing to attack him, and pursues them as far as the plateau—He sees the English artillery apparently abandoned, and thinks the time is come for a decisive stroke—He asks for a reinforcement, and Napoleon entrusts him with a division of cuirassiers that he may be able to join Reille at the château de Goumont—Ney, with the cuirassiers, falls on the English, and breaks their first line—All the reserve cavalry, and those of the guard, follow him without the emperor’s orders—Extraordinary combat of the cavalry—Ney performs prodigies, sends to Napoleon for some infantry in order to complete the overthrow of the English army—Napoleon being engaged in a desperate combat with the Prussians, cannot send any infantry to Ney, for he has none himself but those of his guard—He sends directions to Ney to hold his position on Mont St. Jean as long as possible, and promises to come and conclude the combat with the English if he can conclude that with the Prussians—Napoleon at the head of his guards attacks the Prussians with great fury—Bülow is driven back with great loss—Napoléon, after this success, recalls his right wing to the centre, and forms them into columns of attack, in order to put an end to the combat with the English—First engagement of four battalions of the guards against the British infantry—Heroism of these battalions—Whilst Napoleon is hastening to their assistance he is suddenly attacked in flank by the Prussian corps of Ziethen, the last that lead arrived—Frightful confusion—The Duke of Wellington now takes the offensive, and our exhausted army, attacked in front, flank, and rear, without aid, overtaken by night, and unable to see Napoleon, is for several hours in a frightful state of confusion—Disorderly retreat to Charleroi—Grouchy’s operations during this fatal day—When the cannons of Waterloo are heard, all his generals ask him to join the combat—He does not understand their views, and refuses—How easily he might have saved the army—At the end of the day he sees his mistake, which he regrets excessively—Character of this last campaign, and real cause of the overthrow of the French army.

NOTWITHSTANDING all the exertions Napoleon had made during the two months which elapsed from the 25th of March to the 12th of June, the result was not equal either to his efforts, his expectations, or his wants. He had, in the first place, reckoned on having 150,000 men to encounter the English and Prussians on the northern frontier; then after the events of La Vendée he reckoned on 130,000; and in the end he was able to assemble only 124,000 combatants in his last struggle with fortune. Any one either theoretically or practically acquainted with the difficulties of government will consider this a surprising result. Thus, as was seen in the preceding volume, when Napoleon resumed the exercise of the supreme authority on the 20th of March, he found an effective army of 180,000 men, from which, subtracting the inefficient (that is the gens d’armes, the veterans, the staffs, &c., &c., amounting to 32,000), there remained 148,000 men, of which latter number there was left when he had supplied the depôts, and made the necessary subdivisions in the different parts of the country, not quite 30,000 men whom he could concentrate on any part of the frontier. This is the truth, and will not surprise anyone who has held the reins of government in a great State.

Napoleon, in order to remedy this great deficiency as quickly as possible, had recalled 50,000 men, who were on six months’ leave of absence, by which he increased his army from 180,000 to 230,000; and immediately after he recalled the old soldiers, who, instead of the 90,000 he had expected, brought him only an increase of 70,000 recruits, and this because a great number of them had entered the national guards. By this last measure his effective force on the 12th of June did not amount to 300,000, but to 288,000, as 12,000 out of the 70,000 old soldiers were still en route to join the army. There still remained the conscription of 1815, which ought to yield 112,000, of which 46,000 could be called out immediately, and 66,000 when, as we have already explained, the law on this subject should be passed. The precautions needed with everything connected with the conscription prevented any one being yet called out on this claim. The mobilised national guards, who had zealously responded to the call of the State, had already furnished 170,000 men, of whom 138,000 had joined up to the 12th of June, and 32,000 more were ready to follow. Of the 138,000 national guards who had arrived, 50,000, formed into active divisions, composed the principal part of Rapp’s corps on the Rhine, of Lecourbe’s near Béfort, and of Suchet’s on the Alps. The remaining 88,000 were in garrison in the fortresses. The army of the line, the only really effective force was reduced for the moment to 288,000, and by deducting the gens d’armes, veterans, &c., whom we have already mentioned, it did not amount to more than 256,000. It was divided as follows: 66,000 constituted the depots of the regiments, 20,000 were in Rapp’s corps, 12,000 in Suchet’s, 4,000 in Lecourbe’s. (It has been already seen that the remainder of these corps were formed of the mobilized National Guards.) Four thousand were in reserve at Avignon, 7 or 8,000 at Antibes under Marshal Brune, 4,000 under General Clausel at Bordeaux, and about 17 or 18,000 were in La Vendée. There remained 124,000 fighting men, who were to proceed to the northern frontier, under the immediate orders of Napoleon, and all these were tried soldiers, all in their ranks and not liable to those reductions which must be made in estimating the numbers of an army when the exact truth is to be known.

We must add that each succeeding day would add to the strength of these forces. Twelve thousand veteran soldiers were actually on their way to join, and there were besides, 46,000 conscripts from the levy of 1815, and 30,000 or 40,000 of the mobilised national guards, that is to say, about 100,000 men, a reinforcement that would allow of 40,000 or 50,000 recruits being withdrawn from the depôts to strengthen the army of the line, and to add 30,000 to the active divisions of the mobilised national guards. One month would have sufficed to produce such a result, and by allowing two, an additional augmentation of 100 000 men would have been obtained, and the active army would have amounted to 400,000, and the mobilised national guards to 200,000 men. These troops were provided with every requisite. New muskets had been given to the soldiers of the line, repaired ones to the active divisions of the national guards.

The national guards in garrison in the different fortresses were obliged to content themselves with old muskets, which were to be successively repaired. The artillery were provided with every necessary, except that they had not a sufficient number of horses. On the 20th, Napoleon had at once procured 2000 horses, he had got 6000 from the peasantry, and raised 10,000 more, a number of which had been already distributed to the different corps. The northern army had 350 pieces of ordnance drawn by good horses, a sufficient number, allowing about three guns to every thousand men. The cavalry had 40,000 horses, which it was hoped to increase to 50,000. This corps was magnificent, all the men being tried soldiers, and all the horses good. Their uniforms were almost complete, whilst many in the line had but a vest and greatcoat. The National Guards complained of the unfitness of their uniforms, a blue blouse with a coloured collar, which exposed them to the risk of being treated by the enemy as revolted peasants and not as regular soldiers. The prefects, being very much occupied in these first moments of bustle, and often without sufficient funds, were not able to remedy a defect, which as being a source of danger excited great discontent amongst the National Guards, though it did not detract from their patriotic feeling.

Thus had Napoleon, in the space of two months and a half, raised France from a state of prostration; for whilst on the 10th of March she could not assemble an important force on any one point, on the 12th of June 124,000 men provided with every necessary were assembled on the northern frontier, and able, if fortune were not unpropitious, to give an entirely new aspect to affairs. On the Rhine, the Jura, and the Alps, she had the nuclei of armies, which with some additions would enable Napoleon to assemble at once forces sufficient in number to meet the enemy. The fortresses were well garrisoned, and each succeeding month would have added a fresh 100,000 to the defenders of the soil. Some severe critics have asked why 40,000 men had been divided between the corps of Rapp, Lecourbe, and Suchet, where they did not form real armies, whilst joined with Napoleon they would have decided the victory. Such criticisms are altogether groundless. The Rhine, the Jura, and the Alps could not be left undefended; in these places it was necessary that forces should be maintained, which, being quickly reinforced if danger should threaten in that direction, would be able to arrest an invading army. Napoleon had formed them for the most part of mobilised national guards; but these needed some aid, and 20;000 of the line added to Rapp’s corps, 4000 to Lecourbe’s, and 12,000 to Suchet’s, would give them greater consistency, and furnish them besides with artillery, cavalry, and engineers, which were not to be found amongst the mobilised national guards. Thus Rapp had from 40,000 to 45,000 men, Lecourbe from 12,000 to 15,000, Suchet from 30,000 to 32,000, and if Napoleon, after conquering the Prussians and English, should turn to the Rhine to attack the Austrians and Russians, who were advancing towards the eastern frontier, he would find already assembled there the nucleus of an army which by the addition of 70,000 or 80,000 soldiers that he would bring with him would amount to 120,000 men. Certainly less could not be done for the Rhine, the Jura, and the Alps; and in doing this he had but done what was absolutely indispensable, at the same time that he had sufficient resources to strike a decisive blow in the north. Of all generals, ancient or modern, not one understood so well as Napoleon how to distribute his forces, so as to provide for everything, without doing more than was indispensable, reserving at the same time a large force for decisive operations. These facts are not by any means weakened by our misfortunes in 1815.

What we have said snows how great would have been the folly of hastening to the Rhine on the morrow of the 20th of March to take advantage of the enthusiasm excited by the miraculous return from Elba. Had Napoleon done so, he would have met forces triple and quadruple the strength of his own; he would, by going so far, have made the reconstruction of our regiments more difficult and almost impossible, and finally, he would have turned against him all those who desired that every means of preserving peace should be tried, and who would not pardon his going to war unless it was absolutely inevitable. But if it were wise to wait until our forces were drawn from the inefficient state in which they were on 20th of March, and until the hostile dispositions of Europe were no longer doubtful, there remained an important question, whether having waited until the middle of June, it would not have been better to wait until the middle of July or August, when our forces would have been completely organised.

In fact, as Blücher and Wellington had determined to remain inactive at the head of the northern columns until the eastern column, under Prince Schwarzenberg, could be brought into action, a month would have been of the greatest importance for the development of our resources. The old soldiers, the conscripts of 1815, the mobilised national guards, would all have joined, by which we should have had an additional 100,000 men, who would have almost all been drafted into the active army, and Napoleon would have had 200,000 instead of 124,000 men under his command. If, whilst thus waiting, he had, as in 1814, allowed the enemy to advance into the heart of our provinces, the two armies of our enemies could not have been able to reach, the one Langres, the other Laon, before the 1st August. The depôts in retiring would have added large numbers of men to the different regiments; Rapp, evacuating Alsace, would have joined Napoleon, who would thus have 250,000 men under his immediate command. Meanwhile Paris would have been filled with sailors, federalists, and men from the depôts, and might have accumulated 100000 defenders. Lyon, surrounded by solid fortifications, would have been filled with sailors from Toulon, with national guards from Dauphiné, Franche-Comté, and Auvergne; Suchet, with Lecourbe, would have appeared before Lyon with 50,000 men; and then, whilst Suchet at Lyon defended the south, Napoleon at the head of 250,000 men, and Paris well defended in his rear, would have defended the north, and there could be no doubt of the result of the campaign, even though, as it was asserted, that the invaders amounted to 500,000, of whom at least 100,000 would have been detained in the rear. Now, when it is remembered what Napoleon effected in 1814, with seventy thousand men, whilst Paris was undefended by a single cannon, general, or soldier, and Lyons abandoned to the incapacity of Augereau, we must repeat that it cannot but be regretted that he had not confined himself to the defensive instead of acting on the offensive. But acting on the defensive, however advantageous it may seem, had very serious drawbacks. The eastern and northern provinces, the fairest, richest, and most devoted of all France, would have been sacrificed without striking a blow, their immense resources abandoned to the enemy, and themselves exposed to a second invasion, after having suffered so much from the first, and this at a time when they had furnished nearly 170,000 mobilized National Guards, who would be led into the interior, whilst they left their wives, children, and property exposed to the enemy. This, besides being an immense sacrifice, would have been both cruel and ungrateful, and an acknowledgment of impotency to the people of France, who were tortured with anxiety, and who would be justified in believing that such conduct was an avowal of weakness on the part of the government. The liberal and revolutionary party would have been dejected and dispirited, whilst the royalists would have become more audacious than ever. The Parisians and members of the chambers, already sufficiently anxious, would have become more excited, embittered, and still more disunited. Had Napoleon abandoned Alsace, Franche-Comté, Burgundy, Lorraine, and Champagne to the enemy, after having deprived them of their best defenders, he would have done little less than proclaim his own weakness, encourage his enemies, dispirit his friends, keep the country and himself in a state of painful anxiety for two months, and abandon the chambers to all the vacillations consequent on a state of terror: all this would have occasioned serious disadvantages; and even without taking Napoleon’s natural impetuosity into account, it is evident that any other plan would have been more agreeable to him.

And there was one, of whose expediency he had no doubt, and on which he meditated with all his own peculiar force of thought. The two invading columns were a hundred leagues apart, and besides this the eastern