On a cold night in January 1917, German infantry launched a raid at Main de Massiges, east of Reims, and came across plans to attack the Aisne River. General Erich Ludendorff declared it a “capital piece of information”. The Germans’ alarm grew after another raid in March 1917 led to the discovery of French General Robert Nivelle’s “Instructions Concerning the Aim and Conditions of a General Offensive”, revealing the planned operation’s incredible scale. Despite these disastrous leaks, Nivelle continued widely circulating operational plans. The dam of his secrecy ultimately burst open with the capture of a sergeant carrying a document detailing the movements of specific units.
That is not to say that Nivelle ever seriously tried to protect intelligence on the offensive. While lobbying for support, he showed the press and politicians his ambition and promised a breakthrough within 48 hours. The press and the Chamber of Deputies then publicly debated aspects of his proposal. It was said every waiter in Paris knew about the coming action. Yet Nivelle’s openness with the French political and media establishment made his rise to commander-in-chief possible. The French needed a charismatic and politically acceptable alternative to General Joseph Joffre, who had resisted any attempts from politicians to interfere in military matters.
Nivelle wasn’t just an effective lobbyist, he was also a respected general who had cut his teeth at Verdun in 1916. There, he had ended localised stalemates by deploying overwhelming violence concentrated on weak points in the enemy line. By removing the need to attack along the whole front, Nivelle hoped to bring to an end the long, grinding battles that defined the Western Front. Nivelle’s offensive began to take shape as he implemented his Verdun tactics on a larger scale
