Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Bart., G.C.B., D.S.O. — His Life And Diaries Vol. II

By Major-General Sir Charles E. Calwell and Marshal Ferdinand Foch

These two volumes form the official biography of Sir Henry Wilson, a key figure in the British Army during the First World War, who was a passionate “Westerner” and advocate of the Anglo-French alliance. Major-General C. E. Callwell recounts the story of the outspoken, opinionated and well connected Field Marshal using extensive quotes from his diary, often dripping with acerbic wit, in the greatest of detail.

“Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, an Irishman who in June 1922 was assassinated on his doorstep in London by Irish republicans, was one of the most controversial British soldiers of that age. Before 1914 he did much to secure the Anglo-French alliance and was responsible for the planning which saw the British Expeditionary Force successfully despatched to France after the outbreak of war with Germany. A passionate Irish unionist, he gained a reputation as an intensely ‘political’ soldier, especially during the ‘Curragh crisis’ of 1914 when some officers resigned their commissions rather than coerce Ulster unionists into a Home Rule Ireland. During the war he played a major role in Anglo-French liaison, and ended up as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, professional head of the army, a post he held until February 1922. After Wilson retired from the army, he became an MP and was chief security adviser to the new Northern Ireland government. As such, he became a target for nationalist Irish militants, being identified with the security policies of the Belfast regime, though wrongly with Protestant sectarian attacks on Catholics. He is remembered today in unionist Northern Ireland as a kind of founding martyr for the state. Wilson’s reputation was ruined in 1927 with the publication of an official biography, which quoted extensively and injudiciously from his entertaining, indiscreet, and wildly opinionated diaries, giving the impression that he was some sort of Machiavellian monster.”-Professor Keith Jeffrey.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781786254726

Major-General Sir Charles E. Calwell

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Text originally published in 1927 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON BART., G.C.B., D.S.O. — HIS LIFE AND DIARIES

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. E. CALLWELL K.C.B.

WITH A PREFACE BY MARSHAL FOCH

Volume II

WITH Eight Plates

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

LIST OF PLATES — Volume II 5

CHAPTER XIX — 1917. — TWO MONTHS UNEMPLOYED 16

Wilson attends a meeting of the War Cabinet—Visits Ireland—The Flanders offensive started—Wilson’s plan of an Inter-Allied War Committee—He accepts the Eastern Command. 16

CHAPTER XX — 1917.—THE SETTING UP OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL 25

The Eastern Command—Lord French and Sir Henry at a War Cabinet meeting—The Caporetto disaster—Wilson proceeds to Italy with Lloyd George and others—Rapallo—Definite decision to set up the Supreme War Council—Wilson at the Italian Front—Clemenceau becomes French Prime Minister— Wilson returns to London—The Supreme War Council constituted. 25

CHAPTER XXI — 1917-18. — TWO AND A HALF MONTHS MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL 41

Outline of the strategical situation on December 1—Organization of Wilson’s staff at Versailles—The question of the B.E.F. taking over more line—Differing views of Robertson and Wilson as to conduct of the War—Smuts and a High Commissionership—Meetings of the Supreme War Council on January 30, 31, and February 1—Wilson, after strange indecision in high places, becomes C.I.G.S. 41

CHAPTER XXII — FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1918. — THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE 63

Wilson C.I.G.S.—Difficulties as to General Reserve—The great Enemy Offensive launched near St. Quentin—The Doullens Conference—The Enemy checked short of Amiens. 63

CHAPTER XXIII — 1918. FROM APRIL TO THE END OF JUNE 79

Conference at Beauvais, April 3—German offensive on the Lys— Question as to Haig’s line of retirement if it becomes necessary—Divergent views of Foch and Wilson—Conference at Abbeville, April 27—German offensive towards the Marne— Grave situation—Lively meeting of the Supreme War Council —Haig’s American divisions. 79

CHAPTER XXIV — 1918. JULY TO SEPTEMBER. — THE TURN OF THE TIDE 100

The Generalissimo’s confidence—Differences of opinion on the Supreme War Council—Lloyd George, and Foch’s action in withdrawing divisions from Haig—Foch’s counterstroke— Meeting of Imperial War Council—Rawlinson’s victory of August 8—Confidence of Haig and the B.E.F.—The Police strike, Macready becomes Commissioner of Police—Haig breaks the Hindenburg Line—The Bulgars surrender. 100

CHAPTER XXV — 1918. — LAST SIX WEEKS OF THE GREAT WAR 113

Difficulties between the Allies—The Turks surrender—President Wilson ignores his Allies—Problem of the terms to be insisted upon—The question of conscription for Ireland—Austria-Hungary requests an armistice—November 11. 113

CHAPTER XXVI — THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1918 129

Disinclination of H.M. Government to consider the new military situation—Sir Henry present at the Belgian King and Queen’s entry into Brussels—Foch and Clemenceau in London— Problem of demobilization—President Wilson in London. 129

CHAPTER XXVII — 1919. JANUARY TO MARCH. — THE PEACE CONFERENCE IN PARIS 136

Aftermath of wanton Election promises—Opening of the Peace Conference—Its slow progress—Trouble amongst the smaller States—Force to be allowed the Germans—Difficulties at Constantinople—Experiences at the Conference—A gathering at Fontainebleau. 136

CHAPTER XXVIII — 1919. APRIL TO JUNE. — THE PEACE CONFERENCE IN PARIS 151

The Hungarians defy Paris—The difficulty over Fiume—The Russian problem—The Peace Terms handed to the German Plenipotentiaries under extraordinary circumstances—Three of the Big Four give Smyrna to Greece behind the back of the Fourth—Syria—The signing of the Treaty of Versailles. 151

CHAPTER XXIX — 1919. JULY TO DECEMBER 171

The Russian situation—Dinner to Wilson at the House of Commons —The Lightning Railway Strike—Problem of the Territorial Army—The question of Constantinople—Prospect of serious industrial unrest. 171

CHAPTER XXX — 1920. — JANUARY TO JUNE 184

Wilson’s contention that policy must have relation to fighting strength—Denikin’s collapse—The C.I.G.S. at issue with the Cabinet over Batoum—The San Remo Conference—The troubles in Ireland—The case of General Dyer—Transcaucasia and Persia. 184

CHAPTER XXXI — 1920. JULY TO DECEMBER. 206

The Spa Conference—The Allies and Turkey—The situation in Ireland growing graver—The struggle between Poland and Bolshevik Russia—Lloyd George’s relations with Krassin and Kameneff—Question of reprisals in Ireland—Possibility of a Triple Strike—The Unknown Warrior—Sinn Fein outrages in Ireland—The Cabinet’s volte-face about Persia and Mesopotamia—Wilson’s disgust at the Cabinet’s proceedings. 206

CHAPTER XXXII — 1921. JANUARY TO JUNE 228

Visits to the Rhine, Paris and Madrid—The Greek offensive in Anatolia—Steps taken to meet a General Strike—The Government and Ireland—Wilson’s advice as to distribution of troops ignored by the Cabinet—He realizes impossibility of strong measures in Ireland while England is kept in ignorance of the state of affairs. 228

CHAPTER XXXIII — 1921-22. — THE FIELD-MARSHAL’S LAST EIGHT MONTHS AS C.I.G.S. 245

Wilson’s strong line as to meeting representatives of Sinn Fein— Narrow escape from drowning at Cowes—His attitude with respect to Turkey—The Irish negotiations—The Geddes Axe Committee—Wilson elected M.P.—Close of his military career. 245

CHAPTER XXXIV — 1922. — IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 269

Experiences as a legislator—Presentation to the Field-Marshal by the French Government—Visits to Ulster—Last speech in the House. 269

CHAPTER XXXV — THE DEATH OF THE FIELD-MARSHAL 282

June 22—At Liverpool Street Station—The assassination—The burial in St. Paul’s—A brief appreciation. 282

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 288

LIST OF PLATES — Volume II

MARSHAL FOCH AND FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON

VERSAILLES: ALLIED MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AND STAFFS

H.M. THE KING AND SIR HENRY WILSON AT VERSAILLES

AT SAN REMO

INSPECTION OF THE 1ST ROYAL ULSTER RIFLES ON BOARD THE BRITANNIA

THE FUNERAL

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR HENRY WILSON

CHAPTER XIX — 1917. — TWO MONTHS UNEMPLOYED

Wilson attends a meeting of the War Cabinet—Visits Ireland—The Flanders offensive started—Wilson’s plan of an Inter-Allied War Committee—He accepts the Eastern Command.

ENTRIES in Sir Henry’s diary leave no doubt that when he returned to England he felt somewhat troubled as to the possible issue of the contest. Optimistic though he was by nature, he had been profoundly impressed by well authenticated reports of indiscipline amongst the French troops, and he had lost all faith in the Ribot-Painlevé Government and in French politicians as a body. Then again, he regarded the lack of co-ordination between the responsible military authorities of the Allied Powers, and the absence of a common understanding between their respective Governments, with the gravest concern. There furthermore was the question of the extensive operations in Flanders which the B.E.F. was about to undertake, and in respect to the outcome of these operations he felt misgivings.

He had stayed two nights at Blondecques, Haig’s headquarters, on his way to Boulogne, and had come to the conclusion that in their views and their anticipations the Field-Marshal and his C.G.S., Kiggell, were unduly sanguine. A special responsibility had moreover been imposed upon him in connexion with this contemplated offensive on a great scale to be undertaken by the B.E.F. For he had been informed at G.H.Q. that the War Cabinet were opposed to Sir Douglas’s plans, but had been urged to give them his support when he was called before the War Cabinet on arrival in London, and he wrote as follows in his diary after getting home to Eaton Place on June 28:—

I had a long talk with Haig this morning. He told me that the War Committee had only given him authority to go on making his arrangements for an offensive, that Albert Thomas (just back from Russia) was going to report on the state of France in a fortnight, and that the War Committee would then decide whether to let Haig attack or not. The Committee were going to send for me, and very much, if not everything, would depend on what I said, and he wanted to know.

I told him the same as I told Kigg last night, viz: that I did not think the French would be able to make another serious attack this year under Pétain’s leadership, but that they would fight all right defensively, and would help all they could by simulating attacks, and that, as one of our main objects now was to keep the French in the field, I was absolutely convinced that we should attack all we could, right up to the time of the mud, and should then be prepared to take over.

I told Haig that if he was successful in his attacks, and he later on got the chance of disengaging Ostend and Zeebrugge, or of disengaging Lille, he was not to hesitate for a moment, but should disengage Lille. Haig told me that in his opinion, if he disengaged Ostend and Zeebrugge he would form such a salient there that the Boches could not remain in front of the French. However, he was satisfied with what I was going to say to the War Cabinet.

He was most nice to me, begged me to do something with my great brains, and said that there was always a bed and a welcome at his headquarters for me. He told me that there was much chat about me at home, as (he reminded me) I had predicted. So I told him that if no employment was found for me I would probably get into mischief, but that it would always be the sort of mischief that had the object of beating the Boches. He said that he knew it well, that he trusted me absolutely, and that I had been invaluable to him and so on. So we parted.

Suggestions had been made to Wilson from various quarters that he ought to go into the House of Commons, and he had further been given to understand that there would be no difficulty about finding him a seat; but, although he had been somewhat attracted by the idea, he would not seem to have regarded it very seriously at this time. Still, this, no doubt, was what was in his mind when he was closeted with Haig, and when he spoke of possibly getting into mischief if unemployed. He saw Carson after arriving in London, and was promised a seat in Ulster if he should care to stand; but Milner on the following day urged him not to do anything of the kind in a hurry, and gave him to understand that the Cabinet had some employment for him in their minds. He was summoned to attend a meeting of the War Cabinet on July 3, and of his experiences in Downing Street on this occasion he wrote in his diary:—

I explained the situation in France and finished by saying that, although not desperate, it undoubtedly was serious. I was struck by the tone of the Committee, except Smuts who seemed rather to revel in the idea that the situation was desperate and impossible. Of course, this is nonsense. After 35 minutes the Committee broke up, no one saying anything to me about myself, and so I walked away.

Sir Henry then went to see Milner at his house, and this appears in the diary:—

He told me that he wanted to see me as C. in C. in the Balkans vice Sarrail. This does not smile much on me, as I told him, because I can’t see that there is much to be done there, even now that the Greeks have joined us; and I told Milner I was more inclined to go in for mischief. Milner did not mention my going on to the War Committee.

Wilson would appear to have had the notion that it was something of this kind which the Cabinet had in view for him.{1} On his visiting the C.I.G.S. at the War Office later in the afternoon Robertson told him that there was absolutely no way of employing him at home, and Sir Henry noted in his diary:—

So I told him that I should probably get into mischief. It seems a little hard to be shuffled about the board, and, in order to suit other people, to drop from £3,000 a year to £600.

I had nearly two hours with Smuts at the Savoy. He wants to put Egypt and Salonika under one command. I think that this might be an improvement, but I don’t know enough about it. He has vague ideas of bringing in Holland, Denmark and Norway, but he does not yet understand the European questions, though he is learning. I thundered about the Foreign Office; of the absolute necessity for diplomatic action while Russia was still in the field; of the necessity for a real strong, clean-cut policy and of obliging the French to conform; of the rottenness of our Foreign Office, and the vital need of the War Committee taking it by the throat. I think that I impressed him.

He was very anxious to know what I was going to do, and I replied—mischief. Which amused him, but he said that I must be available here. I told him that we had all the cards, and if we were beaten we should richly deserve it. We had more men, more guns, more ammunition, more money, and the salt water. How could we be beaten?

While he happened to be with Bonar Law at 11 Downing Street during the forenoon of July 7, the great German daylight air raid over London took place, and he viewed it from the garden in company with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He wrote in the diary:—

Then when Bonar and I came in from watching this show we discussed my affairs. He told me that Robertson and Haig were terrified of Lloyd George. This made me smile. They are terrified of his mad schemes and not of him. Then he told me that all the members of the War Committee were very fond of me and had an intense admiration for me.

It, however, turned out that Bonar Law could see no post that was suitable for him at the moment, and could only beg him to exercise patience. They then discussed the progress of the war, and Bonar Law expressed himself as opposed to Haig’s offensive because of the loss that it would entail, to which Sir Henry rejoined that the loss of men might have been a good reason for not entering into the war, but a bad reason for not fighting when in the war. Bonar Law entertained hopes of the Irish Convention, then sitting; but of this assemblage and of its labours, Wilson entertained no hopes whatever, and he came away from Downing Street with an impaired confidence in the War Cabinet.

In so far as the daylight air-raid was concerned, his diary serves to show that considerable trouble arose at the War Office in connexion with that unpleasant incident. Two air squadrons had, as it happened, been removed from England and sent over to France during the very week before the raid took place, this, in spite of a protest from Lord French, which protest had, however, somehow gone astray. The War Cabinet were much incensed in consequence, and Wilson wrote in the diary:—

The whole thing is rather mysterious, and meanwhile the House of Commons has so far lost its head—and so has the Government—that there is to be a secret session tonight at 8.30 p.m., and I hear that a couple of squadrons are to be brought back from France. How the Boches will laugh!

Of a meeting with the Adjutant-General, Sir N. Macready, at the War Office, he wrote on the 9th:—

He says that this Government is worse than Asquith’s, that there are 500,000 men available in Government employ and they can’t be got, that in consequence he gets very few recruits; and he showed me his monthly returns for January last, when he got 44,000 men, this number steadily dropped, and last month (June) he only got 25,000 and now he did not expect more than 18,000 in July.

Of course, all this is most scandalous work. The Government is afraid to comb out, and afraid of the north of England, and terrified of Ireland, and so they are losing 1,000,000 men. What a scandalous thing. Macready said that he had written the strongest letter which had ever emanated from the War Office, so strong that the Army Council would not sign it, but endorsed it and said they agreed with it—the whole theory of the Council being a corporate body! Macready told me that he had made up the forces in France to within 18,000 of estimate by emptying the convalescent homes, etc., which, he said, was a monstrous thing, and I agree.

Macready also told me that he was so disgusted with the Mesopotamia Report,{2} and the evident intention of the Government to cart the soldiers and save Hardinge, Meyer & Co., that he had ordered a Court of Inquiry on the soldiers, and had put Rundle on as President. He says that the evidence will damn the civilians and to some extent save the soldiers—or some of them.

Wilson arrived in Ireland on July 12—his first visit to his own country since before the War—and in the first instance he proceeded to Garvagh, a house on the Currygrane estate where his brother Jemmy was living, as Currygrane House was too large for him. Lord French was over in Ireland on inspection duty, so Sir Henry went on to Galway by arrangement to meet him and he wrote of this visit in his diary:—

I wandered about the town; there were a good many Sinn Fein flags. Amazing. We went to the old fishing village of Cladagh, which is intensely loyal and has all its men either in the Navy or the Army. I had a talk with some old men. We were mobbed by women shouting, Long live the King; Long live England. A curious experience in Galway.

Lord French held a review in Eyre Square, and from Galway the party proceeded to Belfast, where Wilson found himself warmly welcomed by the Ulster leaders. They were very anxious that he should stand for North Belfast, where a vacancy was expected very shortly, and where, he was told, he would get in as round as a hoop. He promised to give them an answer soon, and he wrote in the diary:—

I was very much struck by the number of people who knew me; and when Sir Robert Liddell introduced me at the club as General Sir Henry Wilson and then added, our General Wilson, the reception was instantaneous.

He returned to England more convinced than ever that conscription ought to be introduced in Ireland without delay, and this not merely because the men were so urgently wanted for the effective prosecution of the war, but also because he believed that the measure was called for in the interests of law and order in Ireland itself.

Duncannon and others were busy organizing a party in the House of Commons to bring pressure on the War Cabinet, and to oblige that body to adopt Wilson’s ideas concerning the plenary tapping of the existing resources of the United Kingdom in man-power, and concerning the vital importance of, by some means or other, eliminating Turkey and Bulgaria from the struggle. Sir Henry had indeed come to the conclusion that, with the honourable exception of Smuts, no member of the War Cabinet believed in the possibility of victory. In illustration of its ineptitude and incapacity, Macready informed him that, whereas the Government departments had in March been commanded to hand over 225,000 men to be recruited as soldiers, the Adjutant-General’s representatives had not, up to May 25, secured one single man from this source. Just at this time Sir E. Carson was transferred by Lloyd George from the position of First Lord of the Admiralty to that of Member of the War Cabinet without portfolio, Sir E. Geddes taking his place at the Admiralty; and Wilson was informed that the reason for this change was that Carson had refused to remove certain of his subordinates at the dictation of the Prime Minister.

From two of those present at a recent big conference in Paris—there had been no fewer than 43 representatives at the table—Wilson gathered that its proceedings had been even more than usually inept and unprofitable. There had been a wrangle about sending a division from Salonika to Palestine, and no decision had been come to even about that.{3} Russians, Rumanians, Greeks, Portuguese, Siamese, and French had given vent to impassioned harangues, but nothing whatever had been settled. The question of replacing Sarrail, as to the expediency of which the War Cabinet and all our military authorities were absolutely at one, had not even been mentioned. This particular fiasco was, however, for the moment forgotten in Cabinet circles owing to a bolt from the blue during the progress of a meeting in 10 Downing Street on July 26. It was the practice at these reunions for a good many people, besides the actual Members of Cabinet and the secretariat, to be present, and by one of these interlopers Wilson was furnished with a spirited account of what had occurred, and this is duly recorded in the pages of the diary:—

There were present Bonar Law, Curzon, Carson, Henderson, Barnes, Bob Cecil. At this meeting Henderson had said that he was going to Paris with four Russian Socialists (of whom two were Boche) and with Ramsay Macdonald, to make arrangements for the Socialist gathering in Stockholm, where he [Henderson] was going to take part.{4} There was to be a preliminary meeting in England on August 4. Henderson wanted a destroyer to take the party across the Channel the following day.

Bonar Law said, in Lloyd George’s absence, that he did not know what to do; Curzon made some pompous observations; Carson said he was a new boy; Barnes did not utter a word; and Bob Cecil asked if he was to issue passports. Henderson said that of course he was to issue passports and to order a destroyer. These things were done, and the party went over yesterday. This is a shocking business.

Wilson dined with Smuts a night or two after this, and he there heard about the recent abortive Paris Conference. Smuts had been shocked by the experience, pronounced it to have been the most futile exhibition of incompetence that he had ever witnessed, and said that such meetings really must be stopped. He entirely agreed with Wilson’s contention that there ought to be a body composed of three soldiers, English, French, and Italian, with suitable staffs and full knowledge, who would be empowered to draw up plans of attack and defence along the whole line from Nieuport to Egypt; Smuts, moreover, declared that Wilson must be the English soldier. He realized that something of this kind was imperatively needed, and that the existing procedure of huge conferences ought to cease, and he was much incensed with Henderson for taking Ramsay Macdonald to Paris. But when Wilson tried to persuade Smuts to take up the question of conscription for Ireland, the South African statesman displayed no inclination to intervene in that particular matter.

 He called me the Hindenburg and Ludendorff of this country, Wilson wrote in the diary, and was altogether friendly.

Sir Henry was enjoying a very interesting conversation with Admiral Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence, on the following day, and was being made acquainted with much that was very secret concerning German communications with President Wilson, with Mexico, and with the Sinn Feiners, when the First Lord’s secretary came flying in to ask Hall whether he knew if Macdonald had gone over in a destroyer with Henderson, and said there was the devil to pay going on at a War Committee over the way! Good. There is also the further entry in the diary:—

The Lord rang up before dinner to tell me that he had asked Bonar Law about Henderson and Ramsay Macdonald,{5} and there had been no end of a business over it. A Cabinet had sat, and the whole place was rocking. Bonar Law begged the Lord not to ask the question, but he had stuck to it.

Haig started his offensive in Flanders on July 31, and he made a very good beginning; for Gough’s Army, and the French on Gough’s left, secured all their objectives on a long front to the north-east of Ypres, took 5,000 prisoners, and recovered the whole of the ground which had been lost on the occasion \of the first German gas attack at the end of April, 1915. Rain, unfortunately, came on and interfered seriously with further operations, just as wet weather was to thwart this Flanders offensive during practically the whole of its prolonged duration. Foch arrived in London with Ribot and Painlevé on August 6 for another of those recurring civil and military conferences that were so popular with the politicians, but which never appreciably advanced the cause of the Entente. Foch told Wilson when they met that he was very anxious to make progress with plans for 1918, but that he found it difficult to arouse any interest in the subject on this side of the Channel. He favoured the idea of sending an expedition to Alexandretta so as to cut the railway near there, and he also would like to withdraw some of the British and French troops from the Salonika theatre as soon as a few Greek divisions were ready to take their place.{6} He did not hold with the idea that Salonika should be evacuated altogether, because the result of such a withdrawal would be to lose the services of the Serb forces which were under Sarrail. Foch, moreover, gave Wilson the following account next evening of events since the party from France had arrived in London:—

He told me that Painlevé, on arrival yesterday about 5 o’clock, went straight from Charing Cross to see Lloyd George, who was in the country, and that he lost his way and did not get back to the Ritz till 2.30 a.m.; but he saw Lloyd George. Poor Ribot wandered about all this morning, having no one to talk to, as Painlevé said that he did not wish to be called till 11 a.m.

The first meeting of the Conference took place at mid-day at Downing Street, with Lloyd George in the chair. Lloyd George was very "maladroit"; was tired and peevish, he wanted to send troops and guns to Italy now, he wanted to wire to Russia to say they were conducting their business badly, he said that we always were late. But he did not approve of Foch’s proposals to get ready for the 1918 campaign. Foch thinks Lloyd George is beaten. He said that the Conference was an absolute fiasco, even though it had agreed to another of our divisions being withdrawn from Salonika to be sent to Egypt—the only decision reached. The meeting in the afternoon was even worse than in the morning, and, as there was no agenda, the talking became general. Lloyd George, who was in the chair, did nothing, and the whole thing was deplorable. Smuts was not present either morning or evening.

Sir Henry saw Smuts next day and told him how disappointed Foch had been at the proceedings of this latest conference, whereupon Smuts declared that he entirely agreed as to such gatherings being pure waste of time, and he moreover expressed his intention of attending no more of them. Smuts also told Wilson that Lloyd George was now eager to send ten divisions and 400 heavy guns to Italy at once, and that Milner was rather taken with this idea. Smuts, however, fully realized that there was no time for such a transfer of force to take place before the bad weather might be expected to set in, and that it would entirely dislocate Haig’s plans. Wilson wrote in his diary:—

I warned Smuts that the French were getting more and more tired, and that next year they would like to change the theatre and have fighting carried on either in Italy or Turkey rather than in France, and that this was a factor to be considered. He said to me, You must help us by doing some hard thinking, to which I replied that I was not in possession of the facts and that without facts hard thinking was simply waste of time!

A few days later Sir Henry was sent for by Robertson. He was asked if he would accept a Home Command, and it was settled that he should take up the Eastern Command on September i. He also heard that Lloyd George and Lord French had between them hit upon a scheme under which Robertson was in future to submit his plans to a military triumvirate composed of French, Wilson and another general; but Sir Henry realized at once that this was a ridiculous and unworkable plan. He said so when he saw French, to whom he unfolded his own plan of a superior Inter-Allied staff, charged with dealing with the whole of the various fronts, a staff which would set to work at once on plans for the year 1918. French thought this an excellent idea, and arrangements were made for Sir Henry to have a talk with Lloyd George on the subject, the meeting taking place on August 23. Of what passed, Wilson wrote in his diary:—

Found Lloyd George and Philip Kerr there. A long talk, and got back here at 7 o’clock. Johnnie was quite good about Haig, who, he said, was all right in fighting and in asking for all that he could get. Lloyd George then asked me for my plan.

I first told him that I thought his plan of Johnnie and me and another soldier to overhaul Robertson’s work was a bad plan and unworkable, and unfair to Robertson. I then disclosed my plan of three Prime Ministers and three soldiers, to be over all C.I.G.S.s and to draw up plans for the whole theatre from Nieuport to Baghdad. I told him that I had had this plan in mind for 2 ½ years, and I made it clear that it was not aimed at Robertson, or Haig, or anybody. I told him that if he was to remove Robertson, now, and to place me as C.I.G.S., I would still press for my plan, as being the only one which would allow us really to draw up a combined plan of operations.

He was distinctly taken. He explained the position as follows: He was satisfied with Haig, but dissatisfied with Robertson. He was quite clear in his mind that we were not winning the war by our present plans, and that we never should on our present lines; but he did not know how, or what we should do, and he had no means of checking or altering Robertson’s and Haig’s plans though he knew they were too parochial. He said that he was not in the position, nor had he the knowledge, to bring out alternative plans and to insist upon their adoption, as it would always be said that he was overruling the soldiers. It was because of his profound disgust that he had thought of forming a committee of Johnnie and me and another, but he now quite agreed with me that that would not work and that my plan was infinitely better. He ordered me to go and see Milner and Bonar Law and lay my plan before them.

I demurred, but he said that he wished it. He is evidently inclined to stop Haig’s offensive in another ten days because of our losses, which, he says, we cannot stand. He was inclined to substitute Milner and Painlevé and Sonnino on my High War Committee, but I told him that, if he did, he must give those men the power to commit their Governments, and to this he quite agreed. Altogether he rose well at my proposals.

He told Johnnie when I was out of the room that he would nominate me as the English soldier on this War Committee. He realizes that Russia is done and that America is a long way off. I rubbed in the five months of mud and snow (1/2 November-1/2 April){7} during which we (and Italy) can do nothing, though the weather a little farther down the Une in Asia Minor and Egypt is perfect.

Much encouraged by the favourable hearing which the Prime Minister had accorded him, Sir Henry seized early opportunities for placing his ideas before Milner and Bonar Law, and he also explained his project to Carson. They all three highly approved of his proposal, and he was well satisfied in consequence with the attitude which the War Cabinet seemed disposed to take up in connexion with a subject that had for a long time been dear to his heart. The setting up of the Supreme War Council at Versailles a few weeks later was indeed the direct result of these conversations which took place in England at the end of August. It should be mentioned that Wilson had a few days before this been telephoned for by Lord Derby to come to the War Office in connexion with quite a different matter, and Sir Henry recorded their discussion in his diary thus:—

He told me that at a meeting of the War Committee this morning they had decided unanimously that I should go to America and put the English case before them. I asked who I would be under, and he said he thought Northcliffe. I flatly refused to go. We then went over to see Bonar and he tried to persuade me to go; but I said that I could not see any good in it and that I would not serve under Northcliffe, which rather irritated Bonar because he said Northcliffe represented the British Government, to which I naturally replied by asking whether we had not got an Ambassador.

During these few weeks of unemployment he had spent several days at Grove End, digging and gardening, as was his wont on such occasions. But he had also kept in touch with the progress of Haig’s operations by studying the official reports as they came in. He had never shared the confidence entertained at G.H.Q. that the line would be pushed far enough forward before the winter to disengage Ostend and Zeebrugge. On the other hand, he fully realized the advantages that would accrue to the Allies, from the defensive point of view, supposing that all the high ground to the east and to the north-east of Ypres overlooking the great Flanders plain, extending to beyond Bruges and Ghent, were to be wrested from the enemy before the close of operations. Nor was anyone more alive than he to the vital importance of keeping the Germans occupied along this section of the Western Front for the present, so as to afford the French troops and the French people ample time to recover from the untoward depression that had descended upon them after the military disappointments of April and May under Nivelle.

CHAPTER XX — 1917.—THE SETTING UP OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

The Eastern Command—Lord French and Sir Henry at a War Cabinet meeting—The Caporetto disaster—Wilson proceeds to Italy with Lloyd George and others—Rapallo—Definite decision to set up the Supreme War Council—Wilson at the Italian Front—Clemenceau becomes French Prime Minister— Wilson returns to London—The Supreme War Council constituted.

WILSON took over charge of the Eastern Command from Sir J. Wolf e-Murray on September i, and the arrangement suited him well. The pay was a consideration; owing to his headquarters being in London he was able to reside at his house in Eaton Place, and, although he had every reason to expect that he would ere long be employed in some capacity more directly concerned with the actual prosecution of the war, the appointment in the meantime gave him occupation. The fact of being stationed in London, moreover, enabled him to keep in touch with his friends in the Cabinet, his friends at the War Office, and his friends in Parliament. He wrote in the diary on the 4th:—

Foch came to see me at 10 p.m. He came over because Cadorna, who is doing well (he took Mt. Gabrielle and 1,000 prisoners today), wants the help of some guns. Foch is in favour of giving him 100 heavy guns, but Robertson and Haig oppose him, with the result that Haig has agreed to Antoine{8} sending 50 medium guns if Pétain can find 50 from the rest of his front—which Foch says is impossible, and Haig, who has 800 heavy guns at Ypres, won’t send one. This is unfortunate, especially as Haig is not going to do anything really serious at Ypres this year.{9}

Foch says that Lloyd George was entirely on his side, but Bonar Law was against, and Curzon and Milner said little. Haig, Robertson and Kiggell are running the maxim of superior forces at the decisive point, etc., to death, and I told Foch we should never have any plan worth a d— until we got my Superior War Council, and he agreed.

The next day he wrote:—

I believe that Lloyd George, knowing that Haig will not do any good, has allowed him to keep all his guns, etc., so that he can, later on, say, Well, I gave you everything. I even allowed you to spoil the Italian offensive. And now, owing to gross miscalculation and incapacity you have entirely failed to do anything serious except lose a lot of men. And in this indictment he will include Robertson, and then get rid of both of them.

On September 14 there appears:—

The Lord dined last night with Montagu of Beaulieu. Montagu said that we were six months behind the Boches both in design and in output of aeroplanes; that we had only 1,100 aeroplanes on our front and were faced by 1,600 Boche aeroplanes; that the Boches would presently try and make life in London insupportable; that the Americans could not help us for a year, and so on.

I saw Amery before lunch and had a talk with him. I asked him what was being done about my plan for a Superior War Council. He replied—nothing. As I said—here we are at September 14 of our fourth winter, not only with no common plan for the whole front, but with no plan for our small section of front. I quoted the case of sending Cadorna 100 guns some 10 days ago, and now Montagu’s story of our 1,100 aeroplanes against 1,600 Boches, as proving once more the want of superior direction and of common plan. I quoted also a letter I had received yesterday from Sidney Clive from Compiègne, which said the relations are very smooth here and will be for another three weeks. No letters pass between the C. in C.s. Each works out his own salvation. This is further proof of absolute failure in common effort.

On the following day Lady Wilson and he went to Chequers to stay with Sir A. Lee, and they found Sir E. Geddes, who was now First Lord of the Admiralty, there as a fellow guest. Geddes expressed himself as anxious to withdraw as many men as could be safely spared from France, so that they might be employed on ship-building, agriculture, and so forth, at home, but Sir Henry wrote in his diary:—

I told him that I also want to take troops away from France during the mud months, not to grow cabbages here, but to beat the Turks, and I asked him if he could ferry over 8 or 10 divisions; and he said that he certainly could. He told me that the Sinai railway had a capacity of 12 divisions. I would improve this, and also land troops on the Palestine coast, and see if I could knock out the Turk this winter. He described how he would tackle the U-boats. He will confine these to certain channels and certain seas, then nose them out with these wonderful new instruments, then go for them with destroyers and kites and deep-sea charges. He again said he could carry all the divisions I want to Egypt and Palestine this winter, but he must have good notice.

The Prime Minister had—amongst other projects—contemplated the possibility of dispatching an army from the Western Front to the Gulf of Alexandretta, to act against the Ottoman communications with Palestine and with Mesopotamia. But Wilson’s idea, as is evident from the above, was to land the troops—or, at all events, the bulk of them— at Alexandria, where ample facilities existed, a very different proposition from disembarking them in the Gulf of Alexandretta, where, for all practical purposes, there were no facilities at all.

Encouraging tidings came to hand from Flanders on September 21 and 22; for Plumer’s Second Army had delivered an attack on the 21st which had resulted in the assailants gaining the whole of their objectives and also making large captures. This success was followed up by another satisfactory day’s work on the 26th. But, even so, the progress of the operations was proving slower than G.H.Q. had anticipated, owing very largely to the abnormal rains that had been falling at frequent intervals during the late summer. The steady decline in recruiting was giving the War Office serious grounds for anxiety, as the efforts of the Military Members of the Army Council to induce the War Cabinet to take the man-power question with the seriousness that the situation demanded, were proving of little effect. The closing days of September were also, it will be remembered, signalized by a succession of air raids by night over London, which caused both loss of life and material damage, and which may have helped to strengthen the Prime Minister’s dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war as a whole. Mr. Lloyd George, at all events, rang up Sir Henry at 10 p.m. on October 5, wanting to see him that night, and sent a car to bring him; and of the important interview that then took place, the following account appears in Wilson’s diary:—

I found him at 20 Queen Anne’s Gate (Sir G. Riddell’s house). Johnnie French was there. We three [Lloyd George, Johnnie and I] had a long talk. Lloyd George is mad to knock the Turks out during the winter on the plan that I explained to him on August 23, his difficulty being that Haig was hostile (which he thought natural) and Robertson was mulish, which he thought maddening. He wanted to know my advice. I repeated all I had said on August 23, and expressed the strong belief that, if a really good scheme was thoroughly well worked out, we could clear the Turks out of Palestine, and very likely knock them completely out, during the mud months, without in any way interfering with Haig’s operations next spring and summer.

I asked Lloyd George about a superior organization, and he said that, of course, was the best plan, but the French and Italian Governments made it impossible to get such an organization started; therefore, he was reverting to his former idea of calling me in to examine Robertson’s plans. Lloyd George told me to see Carson as soon as possible and try and persuade him to agree to action in Palestine during the mud months. Lloyd George said that Milner and Smuts were already persuaded to that view. Lloyd George wanted me to go down to Birchington tomorrow to see Carson, but I really thought this a little hot.

Lloyd George has no illusions about Haig’s victory of yesterday.{10} At the same time I again insisted on Lloyd George giving Haig all the men and guns that he possessed, up to the time of the mud, to which he agreed. The fact is that Lloyd George is profoundly dissatisfied, but does not know what to do.

Wilson met Lloyd George and Lord French at dinner on the 10th, and he was then told that a meeting of the War Cabinet was to be held on the following day, at which French and he were to be present. The Prime Minister was much concerned at the very heavy losses that were being incurred during the Flanders offensive; and it was already only too apparent that the somewhat sanguine hopes that had been entertained by G.H.Q. as to recovering possession of the Belgian littoral were going to be grievously disappointed. That the operations had been greatly retarded by exceptionally bad weather was a matter of common knowledge. But Sir Henry had, even at the time when the attack was opened and when there was no reason to suppose that the late summer and the autumn would be signalized by an unwonted rainfall, doubted the possibility of Haig’s troops reaching Ostend before the winter.

Lloyd George and the War Cabinet did not, perhaps, sufficiently realize the vital importance of keeping the enemy occupied while the French troops were recovering from the events of May and June. How greatly enemy morale was suffering from the steady, if slow, pressure being exercised under Haig’s directions has, moreover, only been made known to the Allies by Ludendorff since the conclusion of the war. But, be that as it may, the Prime Minister’s dissatisfaction in connexion with the Flanders offensive was to become a potent factor in bringing about the setting up of the Supreme War Council at Versailles. The Prime Minister had told Robertson, so he said, that "the patient after a