Memoirs Of The Marne Campaign

By General Max Clemens Lothar Freiherr von Hausen

General Baron von Hausen, after a long and successful career in the Royal Saxon Army, was charged with the most important command of his career as the head of the German Third Army in 1914. The army participated in the Battle of the Frontiers, mainly in the battles of Dinant and Charleroi gained infamy for their responsibility for the destruction of Reims in September 1914. After the Second Army’s was forced back after the First Battle of the Marne, Von Hausen saw his own flank exposed and ordered a retreat. Upon the stabilization of the front on the river Aisne, Von Hausen was made a scapegoat for the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and relieved of his command and replaced by General Karl von Einem. Affronted by the stain on his and his Saxon comrades, von Hausen considered it his duty to write his personal testimony concerning the Third Army under his command. Kircheisen comments that “According to the most authoritative sources, the Battle of the Marne can not be considered as a strategic defeat for the Germans. It should be regarded rather as a battle lost by us on account of tactical reasons”.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781786255396

General Max Clemens Lothar Freiherr von Hausen

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Text originally published in 1922 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

MEMOIRS OF THE MARNE CAMPAIGN

TRANSLATION OF MEMOIRS OF THE MARNE CAMPAIGN OF 1914

Original Text in German Written By Colonel-General Baron von Hausen

Commander of the German Third (Saxon) Army From August 3, 1914, to, September 12, 1914

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With an Accompanying Historical Study by Friedrich M. Kircheisen, noted German Historian and Publicist

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Translated into French by Brevet Battalion Commander Mabille, With a Preface by General Joseph L Mangin, (Defender of Verdun and Commander of French and American Forces in the Great Offensive Begun in July, 1918, Between Chateau-Thierry and Soissons)

***

French Translation Included in the Collection of Memoirs, Studies, and Documents Gathered Together to Serve as a History of the World War for the French General Staff

***

Translated into English from the French by Captain John B. Murphy, Military Intelligence Reserve

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY ENGLISH TRANSLATOR 5

PREFACE By General Mangin 7

FOREWORD 14

HISTORICAL STUDY 18

I 18

II 21

III 30

IV 35

V 43

VI 56

VII 58

AUTHOR’S FOREWORD By Baron von Hausen 62

CHAPTER I 64

MOBILIZATION—AUGUST 8TH-7TH 64

CONCENTRATION—AUGUST 8TH-17TH 65

CHAPTER II 71

ADVANCE ON THE MEUSE—AUGUST 18TH-22ND 71

CHAPTER III 79

COMBATS OF AUGUST 23RD AND 24TH AT DINANT AND VICINITY 79

CHAPTER IV 90

FROM THE MEUSE TO THE AISNE AUGUST 25TH-31ST 90

CHAPTER V 102

FROM THE AISNE TO THE MARNE—SEPTEMBER 1ST-5TH 102

CHAPTER VI 115

ON THE MARNE—FROM SEPTEMBER 6TH TO 10TH 115

CHAPTER VII 132

FROM THE MARNE TO THE DEFENSIVE POSITION IN CHAMPAGNE—SEPTEMBER 11TH-13TH 132

FINAL REMARKS 139

APPENDIX TO HISTORICAL STUDY 147

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST, 1914 147

WESTERN FRONT 147

EASTERN FRONT 148

ANNEX NO. 1—Composition Of The Headquarters Of The Third Army 150

ATTACHES OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE THIRD ARMY 151

ANNEX NO. 2—BATTLE ORDER OF THE THIRD ARMY 152

EXPLANATORY NOTE 160

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 161

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY ENGLISH TRANSLATOR

Baron von Hausen’s Memoirs are particularly interesting to American military readers because they bring to light certain hitherto unknown and intriguing human factors and relationships in the German High Command during the World War. His book is mainly an apologia in which he recounts facts already known merely to try to show that neither he nor the German Third (Saxon) Army should be held responsible for the failure of the initial German shock movement on the Western Front in 1914. The moral of his story is that even with a perfect war plan, the human equation—jealousy between rival Commanders, lack of energy, poor judgment, incompetency, and so on—may work havoc in its execution.

It is amusing in a sense to read why this German failure or that German fault caused the loss of the first Marne Campaign in 1914 and the eventual loss of the war. The Germans do not seem to comprehend that some share of the credit for their loss of the war should go to Joffre, Foch, Haig, Pershing, Diaz, and their subordinate Commanders. King Albert and his gallant Belgians also played no small role in the final winning of the war by the Allies.

Friedrich M. Kircheisen, the German historical and military writer, has the deserved reputation throughout Europe of being among the foremost contemporary Napoleonic authorities. He has therefore the proper background for his historical study and critique, which is published as an introduction to Baron von Hausen’s Memoirs. This study is remarkable for its devastating frankness. While naturally he cannot quite brim himself around to the point of appreciating the military talents of the French to their fullest extent, he is nevertheless severely critical of the evident faults of the German Great General Staff and of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, whose errors of commission and of omission he recites in detail. German diplomacy also comes in for its share of blame on account of its contribution toward the loss of the war by the Fatherland.

In discussing the various Army Commanders, Kircheisen exhibits an understandable sympathy for Baron von Hausen, whom he regards as a victim of Prussian intrigue. He also showers praise on von Kluck, and intimates that von Kluck might have achieved his tactical objective had it not been for the interference of Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch, the ill-starred representative of the German Great General Staff—an episode that already has been widely publicized. Kircheisen can scarcely conceal his contempt for von Moltke, the Chief of the Great General Staff at the outbreak of the war, whose vacillating’ policy the historian feels absolutely killed Germany’s chances of winning the war.

The English translation was made from the French translation contained in the book entitled SOUVENIRS DE LA CAMPAGNE DE LA MARNE EN 1914, No. 20087 (M9403-I:44:4-N5.43) of the Library of the General Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth. The original text of course is in German. This French translation is included among the collection of memoirs, studies, and documents collected by the French General Staff to serve as a history of the Great War. The Gallic observations contained in the preface to the French edition by General Joseph Mangin—translated by me into English—will add to the zest of the American readers, particularly any who may have served under the Hero of Verdun. All rights have been reserved in the French translation by the publishers, Payot & Cie., Paris.

Annexes Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 could not be conveniently translated into English with the facilities at hand because the first three named are maps and the last named consists of a set of charts. These may be referred to, however, without any great difficulty in the French original by any American military reader familiar with the French war zone. The titles of these annexes are as follows:

ANNEX NO. 3—(MAP) Concentration and advance of the Third Army as far as the Meuse.

ANNEX NO. 4—(MAP) Advance from the Meuse to the Aisne. (Routes of march of the units of the Third Army.)

ANNEX NO. 5—(MAP) Advance from the Aisne to the Marne. (Routes of march of the units of the Third Army.)

ANNEX NO. 6—(CHARTS 1 TO 6) Showing marches and situations of the German armies.

 Every effort has been made to present a clear and trustworthy English translation; but as my task of translating was done as a superimposed activity far into the night at the close of many a busy day, errors doubtless have crept in. It will be noted in some instances, especially with reference to von Hausen’s relations with Supreme Headquarters and with Hentsch, that texts of conversations and telegrams—mentioned in several places in the text—are not always exactly alike. It is evident, therefore, that Baron von Hausen was not writing from notes, or not checking his material. For any errors in my English translation, I ask forbearance on the ground of fatigue. I only hope the reader will get as much information from reading the book as I did from translating it.

John B. Murphy,

Captain Military Intelligence Reserve.

Washington, D. C., May 23, 1933.

PREFACE By General Mangin

COLONEL-GENERAL BARON von HAUSEN was in command of the German Third Army from its formation on August 3rd, 1914, until September 12, 1914, on which date a serious attack of typhus caused his removal from the front. This German Third Army (XI, XII, and XIX Active Corps and the XII Reserve Corps) was entirely Saxon. General von Hausen declares that his object in publishing his Memoirs is to defend his army against the false clamor which has attributed to its conduct the general retreat of the German armies in September, 1914.

It is interesting to compare the narrative of General von Hausen with that of General von Bülow, Commander of the German Second Army;{1} with that of his neighbor on the right, General von Kluck, who commanded the German First Army, which formed the extreme right of the German army;{2} with the testimony of Major-General von Tappen, Chief of the Operations Section of the German Great General Staff; and with that of General von Kühl, Chief of Staff of the German First Army.{3} Von Kluck confirms and makes clear the testimony of the Commanders of the German First, Second, and Third Armies. Thus the Battle of the Frontiers and the Battle of the Marne, as seen through the eyes of the German east wing, are thereby clearly unfolded to us.

From the work of General Lanrezac, Commander of the French Fifth Army, we know the condition of the French right following the Battle of Charleroi.{4} When the French right found itself in the air and in danger of being turned and cut off, it was by General Lanrezac’s orders that liaison was effected with the main body of the French army in the rear.

These recent publications by the Germans enable us to determine the precise moment when the retreat of the German army was ordered following its defeat.

During the ambitious converging movement of the German right across Belgium, the German First and Second Armies deployed along the left bank of the Marne. Liege taken and Namur invested, they spread out along the Sambre from Namur to Charleroi, while the Third Army of von Hausen aligned itself along the Meuse from Namur to Givet. The French Fifth Army of Lanrezac, aligned along the Sambre, found itself in the jaws of a huge pair of pincers formed by the German First and Second Armies deployed to face the south on the one side, and by the German Third Army deployed to face the west on the other. The left wing of Lanrezac’s army did not have sufficient liaison with the small English army under the command of Marshal French, while its right was guarded by only one reserve division which defended the crossings of the Meuse, and which, faced to the east, had before it the four corps of the Saxon army.

The German High Command made perfect use of the advantage of the enveloping base which it found at its disposal on that part of the front. Its order of August 20th provided:

The attack of the Second Army against the enemy west of Namur must coincide with the attack of the Third Army against the line of the Meuse from Namur to Givet. The army commanders will act in concert to that effect.

On that date General von Hausen thought he had before him the I, II, and perhaps the X French Corps, while General von Bülow did not believe he was confronted by more than three cavalry divisions. It was only on the 23rd that the concerted effort prescribed by the German Supreme Headquarters was finally realized and the German Third Army actually engaged in battle.

We are unable to comprehend clearly from the Memoirs of General von Hausen the reason for his tardiness and for his indecisions during that day. He was able to seize footholds on the left bank at five or six different points, but apparently tarried so that the advance of the Second Army would facilitate the crossing of his main body. His 24th Division, which alone was in force on the left bank, captured Onhaye, which commanded all the crossings between Hastières and Dinant. This should have resulted in the establishment of a bridgehead for the entire German Third Army; but this division permitted itself to be dislodged by only two battalions of the French 8th Brigade which were sent to the rescue by General d’Esperey. Without doubt poorly informed by his subordinates, General von Hausen erroneously affirms that this division relinquished the terrain to superior forces.

One division of the XIX Corps, under the command of General Götz von Olenhüsen, received the mission of forcing the crossing of the Meuse south of Givet. This movement would have resulted in the complete separation of the French Fourth and Fifth Armies, a rupture of the front which would have entailed the gravest consequences. But this division, allowing itself to be diverted by some French rear-guards on the right bank of the Meuse, paused at Fumay on the edge of the river, which it finally decided to cross only after a great deal of hesitation. On the right bank the march of the division was retarded during the succeeding days by several companies of a reserve regiment, which adroitly disputed the terrain with it.

To sum up, during the Battle of Charleroi, the German Third Army did not play the part which was indicated by its strategic position and the predominance of its forces. But its presence in the rear of the right flank of Lanrezac’s army constituted a menace which, coupled with the retreat of the English beyond Mons, placed the French Fifth Army in a very dangerous situation, from which it succeeded in escaping only by a prompt withdrawal which began on the 24th (of August).

***

During the Battle of the Marne, the Saxon army fought with great bravery and achieved some degree of success, but this success did not reach the point where it could decide the fate of the battle; and as it was not sufficient to cause a rupture of the (French) front, the Third Army was ordered to fall back forthwith to the German line.

In approving the plan of von Kluck, which was to ignore Paris and move obliquely toward the southwest, the German High Command prescribed the echelonnement of the First Army north of the Marne, and at the same time ordered the First and Second Armies to change their fronts to the west so as to cover the right flank of the armies of invasion while they were annihilating the French center. But when these orders were given, the First Army had already crossed the Marne, and only one army corps was able to oppose the initial movement of Maunoury’s army toward the Ourcq on September 5th. On the 7th, von Kluck was forced to transfer from his left to his extreme right the II and IX Corps. Because of this movement, a gap was formed between the First and Second Armies. The IX Corps was thrown into great disorder in the Escardes-Courgivaux region, and the VII Corps, which replaced it in the battle-line, continued to give ground before the French attacks. The left of d’Esperey’s army achieved a tactical success by rolling back the right of von Billow’s army, and the three corps of the British army, thus having before them only the cavalry of von der Marwitz, were able to advance and to accentuate their outflanking movement and at the same time menace the right and rear of von Kluck’s army.

By September 8th von Bülow had but one remaining recourse to organize a retreat to get out of his constrained position. At that moment there arrived at his Headquarters Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch (liaison agent of Supreme Headquarters), who approved this decision to retreat, and who, therefore, together with von Bülow, must share the consequence: the general retreat which it made necessary. We read in the Historical Study of Frederic Kircheisen the narrative of the interview of Hentsch with General von Kühl during the afternoon of September 9th, taken from the diary of the First Army.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch added the following communication:

The situation is not favorable. The Fifth Army is immobile before Verdun, the Sixth and Seventh before Nancy and Epinal, and the Second Army is badly cut up. Retreat behind the Marne is inevitable. The right wing of the Second Army did not fall back voluntarily; it was driven back. It is therefore necessary to move all the armies to the rear simultaneously and reform them: The Third north of Châlons; the Fourth and Fifth via Clermont-en-Argonne without losing contact with Verdun. The First Army also must fall back in the direction Soissons—Fere-en-Tardenois, or at the worst even as far back as Laon-La Fere.

In addition, General von Billow sent to Supreme Headquarters, at 1:00 o’clock A.M. on the 10th, the following message:

In accord with Hentsch, the situation is judged as follows: Retreat of the First Army behind the Aisne is demanded by the strategic and tactical situations. The Second Army must depend upon the First Army north of the Marne; otherwise the right wing of the armies will be driven back and rolled up....

The High Command responded immediately by subordinating the First Army to the command of the Second, and during the afternoon gave orders to fall back to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies. The Battle of the Marne was won.

General von Hausen tells us of the severe fights against the French Ninth Army in which the Saxon corps participated, reinforced by a Guard division, from September 6th to 10th. He has good grounds for insisting that neither he nor his army is responsible for the retreat on the right bank of the Marne, but he is stretching it a little when he affirms that on September 9th there was a chance of piercing a breach in the enemy’s center wide enough to change the face of things. After reducing his front somewhat, General Foch was ready to oppose the attack for which he had already prepared a reinforced resistance. His neighbor, General d’Esperey, had already made his dispositions of the X Corps; and on September 9th he was able to issue to his troops his celebrated order:

The situation is excellent...I order a renewal of the offensive.

General von Hausen was therefore much farther from the decision than he realized.

In reality the German retreat was precipitated by the advance of the left of d’Esperey’s army along the line Escardes-Montmirail-Thillois. The German testimony we are able to cite to support this statement is formal:

"…The right wing of the Second Army did not fall back voluntarily; it was driven back...

...The Second Army must depend upon the First Army north of the Marne; otherwise the right wing of the armies will be driven back and rolled up…

***

The recent German publications, particularly the Memoirs of General von Hausen, are of interest not only because they definitely fix the maneuvers and the moment which decided the victory of the Marne, but also because they reveal the faults of organization and of command which swung the pendulum of Fate to the side of France. The German Supreme Headquarters were located first at Coblenz and then at Luxemburg, both too far away to enable it to appreciate the situation soundly or to make its decisions with a proper knowledge of the subject and thereafter issue the necessary orders in time. Each of the German armies maneuvered on its own account, with wholly insufficient liaison with its neighbors and with the rear. The misunderstandings between the army commanders were flagrant. This is proved by the works of von Kluck, von Bülow, and von Hausen. Under such circumstances, the temporary subordination of the General Staff of one army to that of another was an insufficient palliative.

General von Hausen ardently desired a unified army group command to coordinate the actions of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth German Armies. He hesitates to say whether such an army group organization should be permanent or merely a step to be taken occasionally in the case of certain particular operations; but he seems to lean toward the former plan.

In this particular case, a unified command of the German right wing should have been organized. The great distance of German Supreme Headquarters from the front, and the difficulty of liaison, well-nigh imperfect from the very beginning of the campaign, made the organization of an army group indispensable. On the contrary, experience proved during the last war that the idea of permanence for such a heavy and unwieldy organization should be rejected absolutely. With the Germans, the army group plan served principally to provide posts of exalted honor for members of the reigning families; for example, the German Crown Prince, the Crown Prince of Bavaria, and the Duke of Württemberg. The question of personages played a most important rile. The Prussian Crown Prince was placed in direct command of the attack against Verdun in February, 1916, over the head of the army commander. Then, when success was slow in crowning his efforts, he organized one command to attack on the right bank and another to attack on the left bank of the Meuse. In March, 1918, Ludendorff selected an especially prepared terrain for a ceremonious attack by two army-group commands, those of the two Crown Princes.

I felt that it would exercise a great  influence on the outcome of the battle,

he tells in his Memoirs of the war.{5} He goes on to say:

Success would be difficult of achievement if the operation were directed by only one army group, because then it would be too easy for the authority immediately superior to intervene with unnecessary interference.

Further, in defending himself against the charge of being a courtier, Ludendorff reveals his unalloyed joy in prevailing upon His Imperial Highness, the Crown Prince, to take part in the first great offensive battle on the Western Front. Elsewhere the High Command was forced to direct operations on far-distant fronts, for example: Poland, Galicia, Rumania, and Italy, where the operations at certain times required all its attention.

But on the French front, which diminished in proportion to the increase of the English front, and where the dynastic interest was non-existent, army groups were found to be nothing but an inconvenience. When the will of the Commanding General is not promptly and .energetically transmitted, the resulting action is bound