Smith-Dorrien [Illustrated Edition]

By Brigadier Colin R. Ballard

Includes 17 maps and the First World War Illustrations Pack – 73 battle plans and diagrams and 198 photos

In this volume, Brigadier Ballard, provides a detailed biography and defence of his former commander, General Horace Smith-Dorrien.

‘With the outbreak of war Smith-Dorrien, who was a veteran of the 1879 Battle of Isandhlwana and the Second Boer War of 1899-1902, was given command of II Corps of Sir John French’s British Expeditionary Force (BEF). He was praised for his conduct during the Battles of Mons and Le Cateau in August 1914, and was given command of Second Army from December 1914 to April 1915.

Smith-Dorrien fell foul of Sir John French, whom he little respected, during the Second Battle of Ypres, when he recommended a strategic withdrawal closer to Ypres, feeling that nothing short of a major counter-offensive was likely to regain the ground taken by the Germans during their offensive.

French disagreed, dismissing Smith-Dorrien home to England upon the pretext of ill-health, and replacing him with Herbert Plumer, who ironically also recommended a withdrawal upon taking up his position; French accepted Plumer’s advice.’-Michael Duffy

• Language: English
• Publisher: Verdun Press
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781786255228

Brigadier Colin R. Ballard

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Text originally published in 1931 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

SMITH-DORRIEN

BY

BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. BALLARD C.B., C.M.G.

AUTHOR OF KITCHENER

WITH A PORTRAIT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

LIST OF SKETCH MAPS 6

GENERAL SIR HORACE LOCKWOOD SMITH-DORRIEN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O. 7

INTRODUCTION 9

PART I — SOME SMALL WARS 12

CHAPTER I — ZULULAND 12

CHAPTER II — EGYPT, 1882-1886 28

CHAPTER III — TEN YEARS IN INDIA 40

CHAPTER IV — OMDURMAN 44

CHAPTER V — FASHODA 53

CHAPTER VI — SOUTH AFRICA 60

PART II — TWELVE YEARS OF PEACE 79

CHAPTER VII — SIMLA AND QUETTA 79

CHAPTER VIII — ALDERSHOT AND SALISBURY 90

PART III — THE GREAT WAR 99

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE II CORPS, AUGUST-DECEMBER, 1914 99

CHAPTER IX — A BAD START 101

CHAPTER X — MONS 109

CHAPTER XI — LE CATEAU 117

CHAPTER XII — THE RETREAT 129

CHAPTER XIII — THE MARNE 137

CHAPTER XIV — THE AISNE 144

CHAPTER XV — FIRST YPRES 151

THE APPROACH PERIOD 151

THE SECOND PERIOD-THE GERMAN ATTACKS 162

THIRD PHASE-THE CRISIS 167

FOURTH PHASE-THE LAST GERMAN ATTACKS 169

CHAPTER XVI — THE DEADLOCK 174

CHAPTER XVII — GAS 188

CHAPTER XVIII — THE RESIGNATION 198

CHAPTER XIX — 1914 209

INACCURACIES 215

OMISSIONS 217

PREJUDICE 219

CHAPTER XX — CONCLUSION 224

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 225

Maps and Battle Diagrams 226

1914 226

Opposing Plans and Concentration Areas 226

The German Advance and the Battle of the Frontiers 228

Allied Retreat 231

The Battle of Mons 233

The Battle of Le Cateau 237

The Battle of the Marne 240

The First Battle of Ypres 242

1915 247

The Battle of Neuve Chapelle 249

The Second Battle of Ypres 252

The Battle of Loos 254

1916 257

The Battle of Verdun 257

The Battle of the Somme 265

1917 278

The Battle of Vimy Ridge 278

The Battle of Arras and the Second Battle of the Aisne 282

The Battle of Messines 283

The Third Battle of Ypres - Passchendaele 286

1918 291

The German Spring Offensives 291

The Allied Counterattacks 296

1914-1915- Illustrations 302

The Somme - Illustrations 368

Ypres - Illustrations 459

LIST OF SKETCH MAPS

ZULULAND

ISANDHLWANA

EGYPT

OMDURMAN

SOUTH AFRICA

THE MARCH TO PAARDEBERG

PAARDEBERG

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA

MOVEMENTS OF THE II CORPS

MONS

LE CATEAU

EVE OF THE MARNE

FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES

THE PRUSSIAN GUARD ATTACK

THE GERMAN GAS ATTACK

COUNTER ATTACKS OF THE II ARMY

GENERAL SIR HORACE LOCKWOOD SMITH-DORRIEN, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O.

1858-1930

1858. May 26. Born at Haresfoot, Berkhampstead. Sixth son of Colonel T. A. Smith-Dorrien (16th Lancers).

1872. To Harrow School.

1876. To Royal Military College, Sandhurst.

1877. Jan. 4. Gazetted to 95th Foot. At Cork and Dublin.

1879. Zulu War.

1880-1881. With 95th at Curragh, Aldershot, Gibraltar.

1882. Aug. 22. Promoted Captain.

1882. Aug.-Oct. At Alexandria.

1883. To India. Then invalided to England.

1884-1885. Joined Egyptian Army. Service round Suakin and up the Nile. D.S.O. Osmanieh and Medjidieh.

1887-1888. At Staff College, Camberley.

1889-1897. In India with Regiment and on staff at Lucknow and Umballa.

1897-1898. Tirah Campaign. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel.

1898. Omdurman Campaign, and to Fashoda with Kitchener. Brevet-Colonel.

1899. Commanded 1st Battalion Derbyshire Regiment at Malta.

1900-1901. Boer War. Commanded 19th Brigade and 21st Division.

1900. Feb. 11. Promoted Major-General.

1901. May. To England.

Nov. To India as Adjutant-General.

1902. Sept. 3. Married Miss O. Schneider.

1903. At Simla and Calcutta under Lord Kitchener.

1903-1907. Commanded 4th Division at Quetta.

1907. K.C.B.

1907-1911. G.O.C.-in-C., Aldershot.

1911. Nov. 11. To India with H.M. the King as A.D.C. General.

1912. Feb. 4. Returned to England.

1912-1914. G.O.C.-in-C., Southern Command. At Salisbury.

1913. G.C.B.

1914. Aug. 18. Appointed to command II Corps, B.E.F.

Aug. 23-24. Battle of Mons.

Aug. 26. Battle of Le Cateau.

Sept. 9. Battle of the Marne.

Sept. 13-Oct. 3. Battle of the Aisne.

Oct. 12-Nov. 15. Battle of Ypres.

Dec. 25. Appointed to command II Army.

1915. April 22. The German Gas Attack.

May 7. To England.

June 22. Commanded I Army Home Defence. G.C.M.G.

Nov. 22. Appointed to command Expedition in East Africa.

1916. Feb. 13. Invalided back from Cape Town after severe illness.

1918-1923. Governor of Gibraltar.

1930. Aug. 11. Fatally injured in a motor accident.

INTRODUCTION

THE popular idea of Victory is derived from historical examples, such as Austerlitz, where Napoleon pierced the line of Russians and Austrians and in one brilliant half-hour humbled the pride of two Emperors; or Waterloo, where the Iron Duke stood the long day’s hammering till his Allies came up for the famous counterstroke; or Sedan, where the Imperial Army was completely hemmed in, and the last of the Bonapartes surrendered. In each case there was a brilliant manoeuvre, planned by a great commander, to crush or at least cripple his enemy at one blow.

In the Great War there was no sudden victory. And yet the triumph of the Entente was the most complete in all history. The German forces laid down their arms; they surrendered a valuable strip of their own soil with bridgeheads over the Rhine; Alsace and Lorraine, the prizes of 1870, had to be returned to France; the Hohenzollern fled. We could have exacted even harsher terms if we had insisted.

The victory, though not so dramatic as Austerlitz, Waterloo or Sedan, was even more complete. That is the one incontrovertible fact.

How was it brought about? Not by the occupation of any vital strategic point. Up till August 1918, the Germans were better off than we were as regards the occupation of territory; they held all Serbia and Belgium, as much of Russia as they wanted, a valuable slice of France. We held no German soil except oversea colonies.

Nor had we pierced their front. It had been thrust back some forty miles, but was still continuous. They still had a million men under arms. Then why did they surrender? The answer is that their power of resistance was gone—it was not the number of dead that counted, but the mental state of the living. A moral collapse.

This collapse was not the result of one battle or of a sudden panic. It came as the accumulated result of four years, which wore out their fighting power. It was a victory not of superior numbers and armament, nor yet of superior strategy, but of sheer determination.

We get an amusing glimpse of the mentality which won the war from the following story, which happens to be true:—

Just before the big German attack in March, 1918, a certain American Major was sent up to study British methods with a battalion in the front line. As matters turned out, the attack did not come in that sector, but the Germans were busy with a demonstration to detract attention from the real thing. The Commanding Officer of the battalion, who was young and much decorated, received his guest with such hospitality as the circumstances allowed. During supper it came on to shell. Later the Colonel said he was going out to inspect his trenches, and the American asked leave to go with him. They set forth, but found it slow work, for the Germans were spraying with machine-gun fire, and at times they had to sit tight till it passed over. When they reached the front line an outlying post had just come in to report that Germans were advancing; there was half an hour’s excitement till the alarm turned out to be false. The Colonel, who was very active, took a little malicious pleasure in showing his guest round even the stickiest part of the trenches, and it was 2 a.m. before they got back to the dug-out. The Colonel went to his telephone and rang up: Hullo, Brigade! I am just back from the line. Quite a lively evening, but I don’t think it is real. No casualties to speak of yet. Good night. He then suggested they should turn in for a couple of hours, as everybody must stand to arms before dawn.

The American looked steadily at his host and said slowly: Colonel, when I first came in here and saw your row of medal ribbons I was wondering to myself whether any mortal man could have done enough to deserve them. But if you have been doing for three years what I’ve seen you doing tonight, by God! I’ll give you all those and as many more as you have room for. I don’t know when this war will end, but I know now who will win it.

The shrewd American had seen no active fighting, but while passing along the line he could sense the strain and he could see how British troops faced it.

I maintain that every bit of fighting in France added its weight towards building up our moral superiority. Some of our strategy was weak and half-hearted; some battles were badly planned; mistakes were made—in Downing Street, at G.H.Q. and elsewhere—it would be absurd to deny them or to gloss them over. But even in those battles which critics denounce as disastrous the sacrifice was not altogether in vain, because it impressed on Germans the unconquerable spirit of British troops. I maintain that every life lost was a direct contribution towards the final result. Wellington said: When I made mistakes my men pulled me through. These words might well have been spoken in the Great War, and no praise can be too high for the man in the ranks.

This leads to the next argument—that the battles of 1914 were quite as important as those of 1918. They warded off the threat to Paris and threw the Germans out of their stride. But they did much more than that—they set the form of British troops, they laid the foundation of the superiority which was finally crowned by the success of the New Armies in 1918.

This brings us to Smith-Dorrien. I shall show that he did as much, if not more, than any other general to build up the form. The greater part of his service was spent not in office, but in close touch with troops. He held command of his battalion, of the 19th Brigade in South Africa, of the 4th Division at Quetta, and then at Aldershot and Salisbury. He was better known to all ranks than any other general. It is true that he gave vent to occasional outbursts of terrible wrath—but they never fell on innocent shoulders. He was a happy General to serve under, and everybody looked forward to a visit from him; this is more than could be said of some commanders.

The feeling of comradeship which he had planted at Aldershot and Salisbury was very marked in the II Corps. The Retreat from Mons and the first winter at Ypres were severe tests, yet nobody could feel depressed when Smith-Dorrien came along. He had not the exuberant spirits and optimism of men like Henry Wilson, but he always left an impression of strength and sympathy, which was very helpful and won the confidence of his men.

I feel very strongly that the justification of his action at Le Cateau and Ypres would be quite incomplete unless emphasis is laid at the same time on his qualities a leader. Consequently, it is necessary, before dealing with the Great War, to run through the story of his previous career.

He has given us his own book of Memories of Forty-eight Years’ Service.{1} It is a very complete record of service in many lands, military work, sporting adventures, and social life. With the kind permission of Messrs. John Murray considerable use will be made of it in the following pages. But for obvious reasons there were certain things which he could not say for himself, and therefore the chief task which I have in mind is to fill up the gaps, especially in those places where controversy has been aroused. By the kindness of Lady Smith-Dorrien, his Diaries have been placed at my disposal, also many private papers and letters from his friends. Other sources of information are the Official Histories of campaigns in Zululand, Egypt, South Africa—and, of course, the very carefully compiled History of the Great War. Unfortunately it has been necessary to devote attention to Lord French’s book, 1914. Finally, it may be as well to mention that I wrote a Life of Lord Kitchener{2} which in many places overlaps with this present effort; and I have to thank Messrs. Faber & Faber for their courtesy in allowing me to use some of the material over again.

PART I — SOME SMALL WARS

CHAPTER I — ZULULAND

FIFTY years ago the British Army was still very much in the stage of scarlet and pipe-clay. A battalion was ruled by its adjutant and sergeant-major—the adjutant in the orderly room, the sergeant-major on the barrack square. Once a week a mysterious and generally rather stout gentleman appeared on Commanding Officer’s Parade; the battalion went through movements with a precision which would have done credit to a musical comedy chorus, ending with a march past in slow time. On rare occasions there was a field day in full marching order; for officers this meant a tunic stiff with gold lace and high collar, blue overalls tightly strapped over well-polished Wellington boots; white gloves carefully pipe-clayed. The redeeming feature of a field day was the established law that all troops must be back in barracks by 1 p.m. in time for the men’s dinners. Such aids to warfare as a revolver, map-case, or note-book had not yet appeared. The introduction of field-glasses (circ. A.D. 1884) was considered revolutionary.

The London Gazette of January 4th, 1877, posted Lieut. Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien to the 95th Foot, then stationed at Cork. This young officer came from a family of fifteen, of which he was the eleventh member and sixth son. He had passed through Harrow School and Sandhurst Military College without distinction, and his recollections of his first two years’ service in Ireland seem to have been chiefly connected with sport, dances at the Viceregal Lodge in Dublin, and adventures in a ramshackle boat on the Shannon. Much as he enjoyed this life, he shared the ambition of all British officers to see active service, and in October, 1878, there appeared a chance, of which he says:—

"An old 95th Commanding Officer, General the Hon. F. A. Thesiger (becoming Lord Chelmsford in October this year on the death of his father) was commanding in Natal, and, seeing war could not be avoided and wanting to get officers from his old corps, he cabled to the War Office asking for three of us, Captain Tower, Lieuts. Hore and Smith-Dorrien, to be sent out on special service. This was wired to the C.O. of the battalion, and I, as acting adjutant, asked for his orders. He merely said he would allow none of us to go. We had a few words about this, and it ended in my wiring to the Military Secretary at the War Office from myself, saying I was ready to start for the Cape at a moment’s notice in any capacity which H.R.H. the Field-Marshal C.-in-C. might think fit to employ me. It was really an unwarrantable piece of cheek, and inexcusable, but it paid, for that same afternoon orders were telegraphed to the C.O. from the War Office ordering me to proceed forthwith to Dartmouth and embark in the Edinburgh Castle."

This unwarrantable piece of cheek is the first symptom of what afterwards grew into a habit—he was determined to be on the spot and he always succeeded in getting there. The probability is that he had never heard of Zululand until the orders came. Special service might mean anything, and as yet he had no qualifications for anything beyond the routine of garrison life; as matters turned out, he found himself placed in charge of ox-transport—of which he was, of course, profoundly ignorant—with native drivers of whose language he knew not a word. Such trifles, however, do not distress a subaltern who is ordered on active service for the first time.

As the little war of 1879 has faded from our memories, it may be as well to recall the circumstances which provoked it.

The colonies in South Africa are the latest of the big additions to our Empire, but only a small proportion of the inhabitants are of British birth. The first settlement had been made by the Dutch in 1652, when they established a station at Capetown, chiefly as a port of call on the highway to the east. But when the French occupied Holland, during the wars of the Revolution, England seized Cape Colony and held it after the peace of 1815. The new owners, like the Dutch, valued the station as a half-way house to India, and therefore were keen to hold firmly the sea-coasts, without troubling to govern or administer the interior. The Colonists, known as Boers, gradually spread northward, and in 1836 the Great Trek carried them, with their wagons and families, their rifles and Bibles, across the Orange River and led them into the Transvaal. About the middle of last century the Orange River Free State and the Transvaal Republic were allowed to proclaim their independence. They might have been left undisturbed but for the discovery in 1871 of the diamond field near Kimberley; this, of course, attracted a huge mass of adventurers who called themselves British subjects and expected protection against Boers on one side and savage tribes on the other. The Transvaal had fallen on evil days; its government was bankrupt, its leaders were disunited; constant wars with the savages on all sides had been only partially successful. In 1877 the situation seemed grave; if the tribes overcame the Boers they would be a danger to all white men. Therefore the British Government decided to annex the Transvaal. Small garrisons were sent to Pretoria and a few other towns.

In taking over the Transvaal, however, we also took over the enmity of several tribes who had hitherto kept on friendly terms. The Boers, though not cruel, had been heavy-handed in their treatment of the natives, who, according to their ideas, should be slaves of the white man.

British colonists, chiefly out of jealousy of the Boers, had been inclined to side with the natives — but, having occupied the Transvaal, we were bound to defend it. This brought about trouble with a pugnacious chief called Sekukuni, whose tribe lay north and east of Pretoria; gradually the unrest spread southwards into Zululand.

Fifty years earlier a clever and bloodthirsty chief, by name Chaka, had made the Zulus the dominant native race in South Africa. His nephew Ketchwayo, who succeeded him in 1873, maintained and improved the organisation of the impis or native regiments till they amounted to 40,000 well-trained fighting men. Of their bravery there could be no question; under a very strict law no man was allowed to marry until he had steeped his assegai in blood, and this was, of course, a powerful stimulant to youthful warriors. Unhampered by field transport, they were very mobile; constant drill had given them considerable power of manoeuvre. Previous to the annexation of the Transvaal, we had looked on Ketchwayo’s military preparations as a lawful means to defending himself against the Boer—and probably he had obtained rifles and munitions through British traders. These rifles were now to be used against ourselves.

Zululand is roughly an inverted triangle, each side being about 150 miles long. The south-eastern side lay on the sea; there were no harbours, and landing on the open beach was rarely possible on account of heavy surf; the south-western, with a badly-defined frontier, joined Natal; the northern had for long been a subject of dispute with the Transvaal—and became the central point of the quarrel with us. There was a stretch which for years had been known as the Disputed Territory.

Ketchwayo at first seemed willing to come to terms, and on December 11th, 1878, there was a meeting between his envoys and British commissioners. As regards the occupation of land, we were prepared to be generous, chiefly because it was of little value to ourselves; and when this decision had been announced the Zulus received it with great satisfaction. The British, however, were determined that the gift should not be regarded as a sign of weakness or fear, and therefore other conditions were added: two or three Zulus who were known to have made raids into Natal were to be surrendered to British justice; a fine of Soo head of cattle must be paid for the outrages; the Zulu army must be disbanded; finally, every tribesman on reaching man’s estate should be free to marry. The envoys knew that this last condition, though perhaps acceptable to the tribesmen, would not suit their ambitious and war-like king—who, furthermore, would refuse to disband his army. They were given till January 11th to submit, and the meeting broke up.

Those who had experience of the country were agreed that Ketchwayo would refuse to accept these terms, and consequently it became necessary to make active preparation for war. Passive defence along a frontier against such mobile enemies would be impossible, so an advance must be made against the King’s kraal, which lay at Ulundi, roughly in the centre of the country.

The chief difficulty was expected to be found in the matter of transport. There were no roads; a few rough tracks had been made by the wagons of traders or sportsmen, but no maps existed to show where they led to or how far they went. Though most of the ground consisted of high grassy downs, it was furrowed by deep rocky watercourses, fordable for horses, but often impassable for wheels. It was decided to rely chiefly on ox-wagons, because if the animals were allowed to graze for three or four hours a day they required no other forage. Each wagon had a span of sixteen oxen and on easy ground could carry up to 8,000 lb. The rate of movement, however, was terribly slow, and even under the most favourable conditions they could not do more than twelve or at the outside fifteen miles a day. Each wagon took up about 60 yards of road; therefore in order to avoid having too long a line of march it was decided to move in small columns; this would also facilitate grazing —for a herd of, say, 5,000 oxen, would soon have exhausted the meagre supply of grass. At first the plan was to advance in five columns which would converge on Ulundi from the north and west; later the number was changed to three.

Each column was to consist of two battalions of British infantry, about 300 mounted volunteers from the colony, one battery of 7-pounder guns, and some levies. These last, known as the Natal Native Contingent, were of doubtful quality; in fact so doubtful that they were only allowed one rifle to every ten men, for fear that they might use their rifles in the wrong way. But they had a considerable number of white officers and were very necessary for scouting and picket work.

The right column was to march from Durban along the coast to the mouth of the River Tugela and thence strike northwards to Ulundi. It had the assistance of three Naval Brigades—a brigade consisting of a landing party of about seventy men from the warships on the station. Colonel Parsons was in command.

The centre column was to start from Helpmakaar, where a large depot of supplies had been accumulated. It was to make its way as best it could eastwards. Lord Chelmsford, who commanded the whole force, accompanied this column.

The left column, under Colonel E. Wood, V.C., started from Utrecht and moved south-eastward.

Smith-Dorrien was posted for duty with the transport, and found himself conducting convoys from Durban to Helpmakaar—purchasing oxen and equipment, and endeavouring somewhat vainly to improve the road. What seems to have struck him most was the bribery and corruption practised by local contractors, not without connivance on the part of certain senior officers. He has quoted the following case:

"There was a certain contractor employed in matters connected with the Commissariat. In the course of the war I found myself in temporary charge of an important centre, and one day received a telegram from the Base directing me to take a lease of a local farm belonging to this contractor at a profiteering price.

"Now, the occupant of the farm had just cleared all cattle off it, as it was saturated with lung-sickness. This disease was deadly for cattle and it was a recognised rule that no oxen should be allowed near a farm where it had appeared. I therefore wired back stating these facts, and at once got a reply directing me to carry out the transaction as ordered. I again telegraphed, respectfully objecting to have anything to do with the deal.

"The next communication was another wire saying that the lease had been signed, and I was to take over the farm. I dutifully replied that I had complied with the order, but would allow no Government cattle to graze there. I heard no more about it, and the farm was never used—facts which speak for themselves.

"Whilst negotiations were going on the contractor came up from the Base, and, presenting himself in my tent, suggested blandly that he should keep me supplied with champagne. He seemed immensely surprised when I rushed at him and kicked him out of my tent. He returned straight to the Base.

I am bound to say that this incident gave my young mind a great shock. I have—thank goodness!—had no such experience since.

No communication had been received from the Zulu king by the time the ultimatum expired, and Chelmsford therefore decided to advance. A couple of days were spent in getting the column and supplies across the Buffalo River at Rorke’s Drift, and on January 10th the column marched ten miles eastward to Isandhlwana. This was a curious rocky height, shaped something like a Sphinx, facing south. Further south lay another conical kopje, and the track ran over the neck between them.

Camp was pitched on the east slope, but as scouts reported the country clear for some miles no entrenchments were dug; the wagons, instead of being drawn up to form a square laager, were grouped behind the tents. Pickets and vedettes, spread out a couple of miles, were considered sufficient security.

On the 21st mounted troops and levies under Major Dartnell went eastwards to reconnoitre the tracks, which led over very rugged country. The Major saw strong bodies of the enemy and decided to bivouac about eight miles from camp, asking that reinforcements should be sent to him early next morning. On this Chelmsford gave orders for six companies of the 2/24th and 4 guns, with some levies, to march out at 4 a.m. on the 22nd; he himself and his staff accompanied this force. The troops left in camp were six companies of the 24th, about 100 mounted men, and some levies, amounting altogether to 1,700 men. They were under Colonel Pulleine, who had strict orders to remain on the defensive; no steps were taken, however, to construct entrenchments or obstacles; mounted vedettes were kept well out. Colonel Durnford, who was then at Rorke’s Drift, got orders to join the camp with all available mounted men and a rocket battery; he arrived about 10 a.m. and took command.

From statements made afterwards by Zulus who were present, it appears that about 14,000 of them had left Ulundi on the 17th, and by the 21st had reached a point seven miles to the north-east of Isandhlwana. They had no intention of attacking on the 22nd, because the state of the moon was unpropitious and the ceremonies which usually precede a battle had not been performed. But they heard firing away to the south—apparently from Chelmsford’s reconnoitering force—and therefore moved forward and became engaged. Their formation was a centre which went straight towards the camp and two wings which worked right round till the circle was completed.

After the departure of the column nothing unusual occurred in camp till 8 a.m. when a vedette sent in a report that a body of the enemy was approaching from the north. Troops stood to arms and a mounted man was sent to inform Chelmsford. As the enemy appeared to be keeping at a respectful distance Colonel Durnford moved out with the rocket battery, and a company of the 24th went to the high ground a mile north of camp. By 12.30 p.m. the Zulus were seen in mass, so all outlying posts were ordered to come in. On its way the rocket battery was ambushed and cut to pieces. The 24th took up a line about 300 yards in front of the camp. At 1 p.m. the Zulus began to charge in full strength. Some of our levies turned and fled, leaving a gap into which a mass of the enemy poured. In an instant all was in confusion. The two guns were limbered up and made a dash for the neck, but the far side was already held by the tribesmen; horses and drivers were assegaied and only two officers managed to escape.

The 24th fought desperately till the last cartridge was fired, after which they were overpowered by numbers in a hand-to-hand struggle. None escaped. By 2 p.m. all was over.

The Zulus pillaged the camp, taking 800 rifles and 400,000 rounds of ammunition in boxes. After this they marched away. They are said to have lost about a 1,000 men.

Smith-Dorrien had marched out to Isandhlwana with his ox-wagons on the 21st. At about midnight Chelmsford sent for him and gave him a letter to take back to Colonel Durnford at Rorke’s Drift. He has left the following account of his own adventures :

"I rode back, ten miles, arriving at Rorke’s Drift just before dawn on the 22nd, and delivered my despatch. It ought to have been a very jumpy ride, for I was entirely alone and the country was wild and new to me, and the road little better than a track; but pride at being selected to carry an important despatch, and the valour of ignorance (for I only realised next day that the country was infested with hostile Zulus) carried me along without a thought of danger. Colonel Durnford was just moving off with his levies away from Isandhlwana, but on reading the despatch which ordered him to join the camp he at once marched in that direction.

"I went to see Captain ‘Gonny’ Bromhead, in command of a company of the 24th, and I told him a big fight was expected and that I wanted revolver ammunition. He gave me eleven rounds, and hearing guns over at Isandhlwana, I rode off and got to that camp about 8 a.m. Colonel Durnford was having a discussion with Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine of the 24th, who had been left by Chelmsford in command of the camp. As far as I could make out the gist of the discussion was that Durnford wanted to go and attack the Zulus, while Pulleine argued that his orders were to defend the camp and that he could not allow his infantry to move out. Durnford and his rocket battery, under Russell, R.A., and some mounted Basutos then rode off towards a small hill a mile and a half from camp.

"Forty-five empty wagons stood in the camp—this was a convoy which I was to have taken back to Rorke’s Drift for supplies, but which was stopped until the enemy should be driven off. These wagons might have at any time been formed into a laager, but no one appeared to appreciate the gravity of the situation, so much so that no steps were taken until too late, to issue extra ammunition from the large reserves we had in camp.

The advance of the Zulus was a marvellous sight, line upon line of men in slightly extended order, one behind the other, firing as they came along, for a few of them had firearms. The rocket battery suddenly ceased fire and presently we saw the remnants of Durnford’s force, mostly mounted Basutos, galloping back to the right of our position. What had actually happened I don’t think we shall ever know. The ground was intersected with ‘dongas’ and in them Russell with his rocket battery was caught. I heard later that Durnford, who was a gallant leader, actually reached the camp and fell there fighting.

"Now, the Zulu army having swept away Durnford’s force, flushed with victory, moved steadily on to where the 24th were lying down covering the camp. They were giving vent to no loud war cries, but to a low musical murmuring noise which gave the impression of a gigantic swarm of bees getting nearer and nearer. The regiment opposed to them were no mere boy recruits but war-worn, matured men, mostly with beards, and fresh from a long campaign