Transitional Energy Policy 1980-2030: Alternative Nuclear Technologies

By Hugh B. Stewart

Transitional Energy Policy 1980-2030: Alternative Nuclear Technologies discusses concerns regarding the use of nuclear technology as an energy source. The book covers issues such as the reservations regarding the use of nuclear, energy resource supply/demand problems, and controversial concepts. The book is comprised seven chapters; each tackles a different area of concern. Chapter I discusses the trends, logistic curves, economic cycles, and predictions of energy growth. Chapter II covers the perils of paucity of fossil fuels, and Chapter III deals with nuclear energy directions. Chapters IV and V discusses the strategies used in pursuit of nuclear technology evolution. The sixth chapter tackles institutions and commercialization of nuclear technologies from a historical perspective, while the seventh chapter covers its possible patterns. The text will be of great interest to readers concerned with the development of nuclear technology as an energy source.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Release date: Oct 22, 2013
• ISBN: 9781483148199

Book preview

America

PREFACE

History may mark the 1970-1980 decade as the period when world society recognized the true gravity of an impending international energy supply/demand crisis. The cost of that belated recognition, however, has already been political upheavals in the near-east, deteriorating international stability, severe inflationary pressures and the more mundane aggravation of waiting-lines at gasoline pumps. At best, the impact of the energy supply/demand crisis in the 1980s and 1990s will be measured by economic disruptions in world societies; at worst, by a disastrous nuclear holocaust. An irony associated with the spectrum of possible outcomes is the present-day preoccupation of policy planners with the suppression of nuclear technology evolution to avoid the possibility of nuclear-weapons proliferation, when a more aggressive and thoughtful guidance of nuclear-energy directions might otherwise contribute to an earlier resolution of the international and national energy problems.

In suggesting nuclear energy as a potential solution to world energy problems, though, at least three cautions are necessary, viz:

– the length of time required for the substantial deployment of any new technology may be too great relative to the time available;

– nuclear energy may not be an appropriate solution to the pressing problem of oil supply; and

– even assuming appropriate nuclear directions can be found, the institutional problems of prompt development and deployment may preclude its usefulness.

Each of these reservations is critically important. It is an intent of this book to examine all of them.

As a basis for evaluating time constraints, the first chapter of this book will address the important subject of energy growth. It is becoming generally recognized that energy conservation is our best hope for gaining time in the emerging energy-resource supply/demand crisis. But, even if energy conservation is achievable, it will undoubtedly offer only a respite for the development of a more substantial solution. A great danger is the complacency that might come from an apparent near-zero energy growth. It is highly improbable that a near-zero growth can be sustained in the U.S. for more than one or two decades. More importantly, though, it is almost certain that energy growth cannot be throttled in the rest of the world where the energy budget is already far below that of the U.S.

It is particularly important to identify the nature of the energy-resource supply/demand problem, and to examine carefully the capability of nuclear energy to provide a resolution. That problem is addressed in Chapters II and III. Since the problems are somewhat different for the U.S. and the rest of the world, attention is given to both. Resolutions to the nuclear technology problems are examined in Chapters IV and V. And resolutions to the institutional problems are examined in Chapters V and VI.

An important theme of the book is that the nuclear energy issues, as they were viewed in the period 1965-1975, have changed dramatically in the last five years. Moreover, further changes might be expected in the next ten, twenty and even thirty years. Nuclear policies and development plans have been slow in responding to the changing issues of the last few years and may again be less than responsive in the next few decades, if the pertinent issues are not correctly defined. Hence, most of the attention in this book will be directed toward the critically important transitional period–the period between the existing energy technologies and the ultimate self-sufficient energy systems that might be expected in 50 to 75 years.

Some attempt has been made to introduce new approaches and controversial concepts throughout this book. The use of a cycle-adjusted-logistic growth curve for projecting domestic and world energy consumption is one such concept. Appendix A attempts to put this methodology in perspective with other more traditional projection methodologies. As will be observed from data presented in Chapter I, there appears to be persuasive reasons for believing that energy growth is likely to evolve in surges or cycles rather than monotonically. While much of the energy-growth and resource-requirement data in Chapters II and III use this growth pattern for illustrative purposes, that concept is not essential to the technology and institutional conclusions of this book. The concept is, however, useful for illustrating how some significant degree of energy conservation might be realized in the next 10 to 20 years, yet a substantial energy growth could subsequently occur.

Another controversial subject might be that of the thorium fuel cycle and the role of fast-spectrum reactors during the next 25 to 50 years. Yet there is good reason to believe the rapid commercialization of the LMFBR, simply as an alternative power plant could become an enormously expensive and risky business venture without some significant change of direction. The proposed strategy modification, discussed in Chapter V, could allow a fewer number of fast-spectrum reactors to contribute a greater leverage on fuel-resource utilization within the context of a more favorable commercialization climate.

The argument can be made, of course, that the commercialization of the thorium cycle could also be expensive. However, this latter expense would probably be an order of magnitude less than that for introducing the LMFBR in the traditionally-proposed role. Moreover, an earlier commercialization of the thorium cycle could encourage the development and deployment of more efficient thermal-spectrum reactors, a goal that should be beneficial for long-range planning. Perhaps most importantly, the combination of a fast-spectrum transmuter reactor, a thermal spectrum near-breeder reactor, the thorium fuel cycle and some institutional expedients would appear to offer an economically attractive way for moving through the transitional period.

Much of the nuclear-technology symbiosis strategy that provides the basis for some of the discussions in Chapters IV and V leans heavily on the many papers and speeches by Dr. Peter Fortescue of the General Atomic Company. Acknowledgement is made in the text to the Fortescue literature, but it is impossible to acknowledge adequately the full effect of his outstanding work.

It will also be obvious that the work of Dr. Alvin Weinberg and the Institute of Energy Analysis at Oak Ridge has had a profound impact on directions taken in this book. The IEA work on institutional studies has been particularly stimulating. This, of course, is not intended to suggest that the IEA would endorse or even agree with conclusions of this book.

While this author strongly believes that gas-cooled reactor technologies should be pursued because of some of their unique characteristics, there has also been considerable emphasis in this book on light-water reactors and liquid-metal fast-breeder reactors. That emphasis has been chosen since deployment and development directions have already favored those reactors. To assure a significant impact, then, strategic planning must put major attention on those reactor types, at least for the imminent transitional period.

In summary, it is a hope this book will offer some fresh views on energy problems and policies, with particular emphasis on:

– energy policy time constraints,

– potential energy technology directions, and

– potential energy institutional directions.

As a postscript to this preface, it may be useful to indicate the timeframe of manuscript preparation. Most of the material in this book was prepared in 1979 and the early part of 1980. A few references have been added following completion of the original manuscript, but no substantial changes have been made after early 1980.

In this context, it is interesting to note that very recent total-energy-consumption data for the full year of 1979 showed less than a 1% energy growth over that of 1978; and energy consumption in the first quarter of 1980 appears to be lower than that in the corresponding period of 1979 (data from Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency monthly reviews). While 1980 might be regarded as an abnormal year because of the economic recession, nevertheless, the overall trend in energy consumption appears to be generally consistent with projections of energy growth discussed in the first chapter of this book.

It is anticipated that the continuing decrease in energy growth will lead government and industry to lower their long-range energy consumption projections still more. While this would seem appropriate for the period 1980 to 1995, there is a great danger that a complacency will develop toward technology and institutional planning that could lead to serious problems after 2000. Perhaps the potential danger resulting from such a complacency, might be regarded as one of the important cautionary admonitions of this book.

PART 1

ENERGY GROWTH

Chapter I

Energy Growth: Trends, Logistic Curves, Economic Cycles and Crystal Balls

Publisher Summary

World energy consumption increased almost three-fold from 1950 to 1970. The U.S. energy consumption doubled during that period. This chapter focuses on the subject of empirical growth projections—methodologies, comparisons with history, and forecasts for the future. Energy growth forecasts that have been projected by the government and industry in the past fifteen years have not proven to be remarkable for their accuracy. It has been generally observed by energy policymakers that there tends to be a significant correlation between the gross national product and energy consumption from country to country. Energy growth can be projected by any of at least three general approaches, that is, those involving econometrics, end-use integration, or trend analysis. The logistic or sigmoid growth curve has commonly been used in the study of biological growth, demography, and, occasionally, economics or business systems. The logistic growth function is characterized by well-defined constraints on the initial and terminal boundary conditions.

World energy consumption increased almost three-fold from 1950 to 1970. U.S. energy consumption doubled during that period The production and consumption of oil grew at an even more astounding rate and, at this time, accounts for more than 40% of energy consumption in the world. It is abundantly clear that oil consumption can no longer maintain its historic growth rate. And in the very long range, it is equally clear that essentially all energy production will have to depend on inexhaustible energy resources.

Of fundamental importance is the time interval society has available to make the transition from current energy technologies to the longer–range ones. And, the time interval available for that transition depends critically on the growth rates of both energy consumption and fuel-supply capabilities.

Policy planning for the transitional period must make distinctions between energy-supply problems and oil-supply problems; between U.S. problems and world problems; and between near-term solutions and long-range solutions. Of greatest concern at this time is the oil-supply problem, not energy supply in general. However, a continuing energy-consumption growth and the transfer of energy-consumption patterns from oil to other resources, such as natural gas, coal and uranium, could simply extend the problem to those other resources. Moreover, the larger energy growth rates in other parts of the world and the unavailability of alternative fuel resources in some of those countries will create different kinds of problems for different countries. In all cases, energy conservation appears to be the best alternative for the next few years. But, again, the potential for energy conservation may be quite different for different countries. In the long range, though, inexhaustible energy resources appear to be essential for all parts of the world.

The magnitude of the problems that can develop as the result of mismatches between the demand and supply of energy resources will be subjects to be discussed in Chapters II and III. But, the severity of those problems can only be identified with confidence if the energy growth can be projected with some reasonable reliability. Hence, this first chapter will focus on the very important subject of empirical growth projections–methodologies, comparisons with history and forecasts for the future. Historical data to be used for the illustration of principles will draw heavily from United States statistical information since those data are more readily available.

One interesting conclusion of this examination will be that energy growth has, for more than 100 years, evolved in surges or cycles. If history repeats itself, and reasons will be suggested for such a possibility, energy growth will be slower in the period 1970 to 1995, but another surge will begin in 15 to 20 years. Presuming this conclusion is correct, energy conservation should be achievable in the next one to two decades, and time should be available, at least in some cases, for the development and implementation of technology and institutional redirections to gird for the next surge in energy growth. Potential nuclear technology and institutional redirections to meet that possible surge will be the subject of the last four chapters.

GROWTH TRENDS

During the 20-year period from 1950 to 1970, the growth of domestic energy consumption averaged a robust 3.3% per year. In 1977, the growth had fallen to 2.7%. In 1978, it was 2.1%. Similarly, electricity growth from 1950 to 1970 averaged a remarkable 7.4% per year. In 1977, the growth had diminished to 5.1%, and in 1978 it was 3.7%. It is, of course, risky to attach too much significance to energy statistics over short time intervals, but it would appear that energy consumption is currently showing a decreasing growth trend. Whether this trend marks a success in energy conservation, whether it is a reaction to higher energy prices, or whether it might be attributable to still other more subtle conditions are important questions. Possibly all these factors are contributors, though not necessarily in definable ways.

Energy growth forecasts that have been projected by the government and industry in the last fifteen years have not proven to be remarkable for their accuracy. Just as our typical stock broker is generally optimistic during bull markets and pessimistic during bear markets, national energy planners have shown a proclivity toward this inertial syndrome. In the late 1960s, during the final years of the 20-year high-energy-consumption period, long-range projections for future electrical energy growth were generally bullish. Toward the end of the 1970s when the growth rate of electrical energy consumption had shown a significant reduction, long-range projections for future growth became increasingly bearish, with each new prognosis more conservative than the previous one. One explanation for this apparent change in trends has been that energy growth was encouraged in the late 1950s and 1960s by cheap energy resources, while energy growth in the late 1970s has been discouraged by high resource costs. Undoubtedly that is a factor, but as will be seen subsequently, it may not be the only reason nor even the most important reason for the lower trends in energy consumption.

It has been generally observed by energy policymakers that there tends to be a significant correlation between the gross national product and energy consumption from country to country. How closely coupled that relationship is has been the subject of much argument. Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between GNP and energy consumption for a number of countries. ¹ While there is considerable scatter in the data, it is apparent that countries enjoying a relatively large GNP also tend to be large energy consumers. However, it should be noted that the highly-industrialized European countries (particularly West Germany, Switzerland and Scandanavia) have succeeded in achieving a per capita GNP approximately equivalent to that of the U.S. with about half the energy consumption. The strong implication is that some room exists for conservation of energy in this country without threatening our