Scouts Out! The Development Of Reconnaissance Units In Modern Armies [Illustrated Edition]
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Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance are battlefield missions as old as military history itself and missions for which many armies have created specialized units to perform. In most cases, these units were trained, equipped, and used differently from the majority of an army’s fighting units. Horse cavalry performed these missions for centuries, for it had speed and mobility far in excess of main battle units. Once the horse was replaced by mechanization, however, the mobility advantage once enjoyed by the horse cavalry disappeared. Since the early 20th century, the search for the proper mix of equipment, the proper organization, and the proper employment of reconnaissance units has bedeviled armies around the world. This survey uses a diverse variety of historical cases to illustrate the enduring issues that surround the equipping, organizing, and employment of reconnaissance units.
It seems that these specialized units are either too heavily or too lightly equipped and too narrowly specialized or too conventionally organized. Pre-war reconnaissance doctrines tend to undergo significant change once fighting begins, leading to post-conflict analysis that reconnaissance units were “misused” in one way or another. McGrath ends his study with an intriguing conclusion about the role that specialized reconnaissance units should have in the future that may surprise many readers.
John J. McGrath
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Scouts Out! The Development Of Reconnaissance Units In Modern Armies [Illustrated Edition] - John J. McGrath
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Scouts Out!
The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies
John J. McGrath
The cover photo was taken by SSG Jacob N. Bailey on 2 June 2006 of SGT David Burns from the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, conducting a checkpoint assessment in Tal Afar, Iraq.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
Foreword 5
Acknowledgments 6
Figures 7
Key to Symbols Used in This Work 9
Introduction and Background 10
Definitions 10
Pre-1914 Background 11
Summary 13
Chapter 1 — The Death of Cavalry: Reconnaissance Units and World War I 14
Pre-war Organization and Theory 14
Equipment 14
Organization 16
Tactical Employment 18
Tactical Reconnaissance 20
Operational Reconnaissance 21
The Opening Campaign, August 1914 21
Combat Case Study: The Battle of Hamipré, 20 August 1914 23
Prelude to the Battle: Cavalry Operations in Early and Mid-August 1914 23
The Advance on Hamipré and the Opposing Forces 27
The Battle of Hamipré 34
Insights From the Opening Battles 41
Reconnaissance Operations in World War I After August 1914 42
US Army Reconnaissance Units in World War I 46
Summary 48
Chapter 2 — Reconnaissance Theory and Organization in the Interwar Period 49
Introduction 49
The American Experience The Air Force as the Army’s Reconnaissance Element 49
The Development of Mechanized Cavalry 51
Divisional Reconnaissance Elements 55
The German Experience 55
Doctrine and Theory 55
Reconnaissance Troops in Other Armies in the Interwar Period 64
The British 64
The French 67
The Soviets 69
Summary 70
Chapter 3 — Reconnaissance Units in World War II 72
Introduction 72
The German Experience in World War II 72
General German Theory, Doctrine, and Organization 72
The Polish and French Campaigns—Ardennes Redux 73
Later German Organizational Developments 82
North Africa and Russia 85
Fusilier Battalions and the Last Years of the War 89
Summary 91
The American Experience in World War II 92
General 92
The Mechanized Cavalry Group 93
The Armored Division 99
The Infantry Division, Regimental, and Separate Battalion Reconnaissance Units 101
Marine Corps Reconnaissance Units 103
Summary 104
The Experiences of Other Armies 105
The French 105
The British 106
The Soviets 107
Summary 107
Chapter 4 — Reconnaissance Units and Operations, 1945-2005 110
Introduction 110
Reconnaissance and the Israeli Defense Force 110
Reconnaissance Unit Organization to 1973 110
The IDF 1973 Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and Company 116
Since 1973 119
The Soviet Experience 120
Organizational Structure 120
Operational Employment 122
Summary 124
Reconnaissance Units in European Armies 124
The British Army 125
The French Army 127
The German Army 127
Operational Reconnaissance Units 130
The American Experience, 1945-2005 131
Post-war to Vietnam, 1945-63 131
The Armored Division, 1945-63 133
The Pentomic Division 134
Battalion-Level Reconnaissance Units 135
The Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1948-63 136
US Army Reconnaissance Units, 1964-2003 138
ROAD Reorganization 138
Battalion Scout Platoons 141
New Equipment 141
Vietnam 143
Long-Range Reconnaissance and Patrol Units 146
The Armored Cavalry Regiment Since 1964 147
The Division 86/AOE Cavalry Squadron 150
Maneuver Battalion Scout Platoons, Brigade Reconnaissance Troops, and Force XXI 155
The Marines 158
DESERT STORM, 1991 158
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 2003 162
Modular Army 164
Stryker Brigades 164
Modular Brigades 166
Non-brigade Units 168
Summary 169
Conclusions 171
Overview 171
The Light Versus Heavy Debate 171
The Availability of Forces 174
Hybrid Units 174
Echelonment 175
Conclusion 175
The Nature of Reconnaissance 176
Glossary 179
Selected Bibliography 184
Primary Sources 184
Secondary Sources 186
Appendix — Selective Comparative Reconnaissance Platforms 202
About the Author 204
Combat Studies Institute 205
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 206
Foreword
The Combat Studies Institute is pleased to present Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies by CSI historian John J. McGrath. Scouts Out is a wide-ranging historical survey of the theory, doctrine, organization, and employment of reconnaissance units since the era of mechanization in the early 20th century.
Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance are battlefield missions as old as military history itself and missions for which many armies have created specialized units to perform. In most cases, these units were trained, equipped, and used differently from the majority of an army’s fighting units. Horse cavalry performed these missions for centuries, for it had speed and mobility far in excess of main battle units. Once the horse was replaced by mechanization, however, the mobility advantage once enjoyed by the horse cavalry disappeared. Since the early 20th century, the search for the proper mix of equipment, the proper organization, and the proper employment of reconnaissance units has bedeviled armies around the world. This survey uses a diverse variety of historical cases to illustrate the enduring issues that surround the equipping, organizing, and employment of reconnaissance units.
It seems that these specialized units are either too heavily or too lightly equipped and too narrowly specialized or too conventionally organized. Pre-war reconnaissance doctrines tend to undergo significant change once fighting begins, leading to post-conflict analysis that reconnaissance units were misused
in one way or another. McGrath ends his study with an intriguing conclusion about the role that specialized reconnaissance units should have in the future that may surprise many readers.
Scouts Out is a thought-provoking historical study that we believe will contribute to the Army’s current and future transformation efforts. If this study of the past stimulates thought among today’s professionals, it will have achieved its purpose. CSI—The Past Is Prologue!
Timothy R. Reese
Colonel, Armor
Director, Combat Studies Institute
US Army Combined Arms Center
Acknowledgments
My previous several works were quantitative ones. I’m proud to say I did not turn on a calculator once while completing this project. The work is the completion of a long process that began several years ago as a project assigned to another historian. When circumstances prevented its completion by that person, it was reassigned to me. However, the needs of the service diverted me to other projects before I could return to complete the research and writing in the fall of 2007. This is an important subject. I have felt a historical study of reconnaissance units was long overdue since it seemed in the US Army that such units frequently fluctuated organizationally between wheeled and armored vehicles on a regular basis. At the same time, commanders in the field often used such units as regular combat units rather than specialized reconnaissance elements. However, despite this trend, when the Army devised its new modular structure starting in 2003, it added a cavalry squadron to each brigade while removing a line maneuver battalion. Since no historical works existed analyzing the light-heavy debate while looking at operational employment of reconnaissance units, the modular decision was not made based on historical precedent. Although this work cannot assist, in retrospect, the formulation of the modular construct, it should provide background for future decision-makers if and when the issue of the misuse
of cavalry units reappears.
A graphics-intensive work such as this taxes the limits of the editorial and layout staff. Their efforts were extraordinary and produced an excellent product. Mrs. Marilyn Edwards provided yeoman service as editor and layout specialist. Ms. Robin Kern, who has edited or done graphics on most of my previous works, again played a key role in this product. CSI staff management personnel, Mr. Kendall Gott, Dr. W. Glenn Robertson, and CSI Director Colonel Timothy Reese also played key roles in the creation, revision, and production.
Several other individuals require acknowledgment. Mr. David Goldman of the US Army Center of Military History provided key research materials. Ms. Sharon Strein of the Combined Arms Research Library greatly assisted with several important interlibrary loans. Finally, Dr. Alexander Bielakowski, Department of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College, began this project, providing a draft document that proved helpful in the early stages.
The soldiers of the United States Army and the other armed services, as well as all the civilian and family support components, require specific acknowledgment. As with all the works of the Combat Studies Institute Press in general and my works in particular, it is hoped that in some small way this work will augment the efforts of the troops in the field.
John J. McGrath
Combat Studies Institute
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Figures
Figure 1—The echeloning of French and German reconnaissance units, 1914
Figure 2—French cuirassiers
Figure 3—French and German cavalry maneuvers, 1-19 August 1914
Figure 4—Situation in the Ardennes, 19-20 August 1914
Figure 5—German infantry on the march
Figure 6—Organization of the French 9th Cavalry Division, August 1914
Figure 7—German organization, Battle of Hamipré, 20 August 1914
Figure 8—Battle of Hamipré, 0900, 20 August 1914
Figure 9—Battle of Hamipré, 1100, 20 August 1914
Figure 10—Battle of Hamipré, 1230, 20 August 1914
Figure 11—Battle of Hamipré, 1530, 20 August 1914
Figure 12—Battle of Hamipré, Dusk, 20 August 1914
Figure 13—Typical air observation group, AEF, 1918
Figure 14—M1 (T4) medium armored car
Figure 15—Proposed German infantry division reconnaissance battalion, 1923
Figure 16—German light division, 1939
Figure 17—German infantry division reconnaissance battalion, 1939
Figure 18—The SdKfz 221 light armored car
Figure 19—German armored reconnaissance battalion, 1939—
Figure 20—British divisional mechanized cavalry regiment, 1939
Figure 21—The echeloning of German and French reconnaissance units, 1940
Figure 22—Operations in southern Belgium, 1940
Figure 23—Guderian (center) and the staff of the 4th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (Lieutenants Voss and Munck in black panzer uniforms standing behind Guderian and battalion commander Major Alexander von Scheele to his left) at Bouillon, Belgium, 12 May 1940
Figure 24—The German armored reconnaissance battalion, 1944
Figure 25—German infantry division fusilier battalion, 1944
Figure 26.—The echeloning of German and American reconnaissance units, 1944
Figure 27.—US Army mechanized cavalry group in World War II
Figure 28.—14th Cavalry Group in the Losheim Gap, morning, 16 December 1944
Figure 29.—14th Cavalry Group situation, afternoon, 16 December 1944
Figure 30.—US Army armored division mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron, 1944
Figure 31.—US Army infantry division mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop, 1942
Figure 32.—An M8 armored car in Paris, August 1944
Figure 33.—The Sinai theater of operations, 1956 and 1967
Figure 34.—Israeli AMX-13 light tank
Figure 35.—IDF 643d Reconnaissance Company, 5 June 1967—
Figure 36.—IDF armored reconnaissance battalion, 1973
Figure 37.—IDF 87th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in the 1973 Yom Kippur War
Figure 38.—Soviet divisional reconnaissance battalion
Figure 39.—Soviet regimental reconnaissance company
Figure 40.—Soviet reconnaissance vehicles: the PT-76 light tank (left), BRDM-22 (right)
Figure 41.—British first-line armored reconnaissance regiment, 1983
Figure 42.—British reconnaissance vehicles: Scimitar (left), Scorpion (right)
Figure 43.—French reconnaissance vehicles: AMX-10 (left), Panard ERC-90 (right)
Figure 44.—German reconnaissance vehicles: Fuchs (left), Luchs (right)
Figure 45.—West German panzer reconnaissance battalion, 1985
Figure 46.—US Army light tanks: M3/M5 Stuart (left), M41 Walker (right)
Figure 47.—US Army armored division reconnaissance battalion, 1948
Figure 48.—US Army armored cavalry regiment, 1948
Figure 49.—US Army ROAD divisional armored cavalry squadron, 1968
Figure 50.—An M114 vehicle in Vietnam showing its difficulty with cross-country mobility
Figure 51.—M551 Sheridan firing a Shillelagh missile
Figure 52.—A troop of M48 tanks and ACAVs in Vietnam
Figure 53.—US Army AOE armored cavalry regiment, 1988
Figure 54.—American reconnaissance vehicles: M3 CFV (left), HMMWV (right)
Figure 55—US Army light cavalry regiment, 1997
Figure 56.—J-series divisional cavalry squadron, armored and mechanized division, 1987
Figure 57—L-series divisional cavalry squadron, armored and mechanized division, 2003
Figure 58—AOE light infantry division cavalry squadron, 1997
Figure 59—Cavalry forces in Operation DESERT STORM, 1991
Figure 60.—Cavalry units in Iraq, March-April 2003
Figure 61.—SBCT RSTA squadron, 2003
Figure 62—Modular brigade RSTA squadron
Figure 63—The reconnaissance paradox
Figure 64—A new paradigm
Key to Symbols Used in This Work
Introduction and Background
This special study examines the development, role, and employment of units in modern armies designed specifically to perform reconnaissance and security (counter-reconnaissance) missions. The analysis discerns common threads from the past. Conclusions are drawn from historical trends that may apply to future force development planning and unit operational employment.
In the past, dedicated reconnaissance units were unique in their organization and capabilities due to the presence of the horse. This provided cavalry with a marked mobility differential over infantry and artillery. In the mechanized age, this monopoly on mobility vanished. Non-reconnaissance mechanized and motorized forces were equipped with similar weapons and vehicles. Reconnaissance units then became distinctive primarily by their organizational structure and specialized mission rather than by their equipment.
This conceptual transformation has created a great dichotomy for modern reconnaissance forces. Should such forces be light or heavy? A lighter force might be able to conduct reconnaissance operations, at least theoretically, in a more nimble fashion, while a heavier force could defend itself when conducting reconnaissance and security operations. An additional consideration is the question as to what organizational level should dedicated reconnaissance forces be provided and used. This work examines these two major threads from a historical perspective since World War I.
Definitions
Following the development of gunpowder, but before the development of industrial age weaponry, reconnaissance and security activities at the operational and strategic levels were primarily the responsibility of horse cavalry forces. At the tactical level, such reconnaissance was generally a unit responsibility. After the development of industrial age technology and the decline of horse cavalry, modern armies have deployed various units configured and dedicated to conducting reconnaissance and security missions at both the operational and tactical levels. Apart from this, many other former roles of horse cavalry (and some infantry) have been taken over by mechanized combined arms teams built around the tank. Particular among these are offensive combat, pursuit, and exploitation.{1}
The World War II US Army defined reconnaissance as the directed effort in the field to gather the information of the enemy, terrain or resources [to] gain the information upon which to base tactical or strategic operations.
{2} In turn, counter-reconnaissance was defined in the same period as the measures to screen a command from hostile observation.
{3} Before the end of World War II, the term cavalry
used in this work refers to horse cavalry; during World War II, the term mechanized cavalry
is used for US Army reconnaissance units; and after World War II, the terms armored cavalry
and air cavalry
are most commonly used in the US Army. However, since the adoption of the Army of Excellence organizational structure in the mid-1980s, the unmodified term cavalry has reappeared to designate the division reconnaissance unit that consisted of a combination or variation of ground helicopter units and the ground units equipped with armored or wheeled vehicles. Therefore, the use of the term cavalry in that context does not refer to a unit equipped with horses.
Various armies have echeloned the conduct of reconnaissance into several levels. In this special study, ground reconnaissance operations are divided into two levels, operational and tactical. Operational reconnaissance, sometimes referred to as strategic reconnaissance in older works, is that information developed by large units at corps level and above, operating at a distance from the supported force about the dispositions and movements of the enemy’s large units. Tactical reconnaissance, sometimes divided into tactical and close or combat intelligence in older works, is that reconnaissance conducted by lower units to identify the enemy forces arrayed against them, either in contact or close enough to be in contact on short notice. For each historical era examined in this work, both operational and tactical levels are examined by organization and employment of dedicated reconnaissance organizations at each level.
Pre-1914 Background
Before World War I, horse cavalry, along with artillery and infantry, was one of the three basic combat arms found in land forces. Cavalry’s role in this triad was the lightly equipped but highly mobile portion of the combined arms force. It was basically an all purpose, mobile combat force.
{4} While considered as such, cavalry generally was used for certain specific roles at the operational level. It guarded the flanks of advancing and retreating forces and generally provided reconnaissance and security for brigade-sized forces or larger. Cavalry also kept the enemy cavalry at bay and provided army commanders with a mobile reserve with which they could present the shock action of a mounted attack as a coup de grace against a shattered enemy army and exploitation of operational success in pursuit of retreating enemy forces.
Horse cavalry forces had specific characteristics that shaped their role and employment. Such units required more logistical support than infantry forces, including the need for forage for the animals and replacement animals as necessary. In most armies, such assets were limited, and commanders husbanded them accordingly, often retaining the cavalry at higher levels in consolidated units.
Before the mid-1800s, horse units typically fought mounted using sabers, pikes, lances, and rapid-firing carbines. Units so equipped could mount a charge faster than defending infantry could fire enough volleys at the advancing cavalry to weaken it to the point where the shock effect of the charge would be neutralized. In such cases, infantry had to use a maneuver in which it formed a complete square formation with a row of riflemen crouched with bayonets sticking up in the air. The bayonets had the effect of stopping the advance of the horses. The utility of the square meant cavalry was usually not used against line infantry unless the latter had already been broken and was in retreat.
Technology, in the form of rifled muskets with faster rates of fire, meant that, by the time of the American Civil War, mounted cavalry could not face the firepower of line infantry under almost every circumstance. Consequently, commanders rarely placed their cavalry in a position where it had to attack line infantry. On the defensive, cavalry fighting dismounted was often used temporarily against advancing infantry to provide security for a main defending force to cover a flank or to delay an enemy advance until the arrival of infantry. In such instances, the horsemen had several distinct disadvantages. A certain number of men had to be retained to hold the reins of the horses, making units proportionally smaller. Additionally, firearms used by the cavalry, while capable of relatively rapid fire, were also short ranged. Except in unusual circumstances, dismounted cavalry could not stand up to line infantry and was not expected to do so.
Horse cavalry possessed a mobility not found in infantry and artillery units. This mobility allowed cavalry forces to move operationally and tactically around the battlefield and area of operations to gather information on enemy dispositions and the terrain. Cavalry also had the responsibility of denying such information to the enemy. Therefore, with the cavalry on both sides being similarly ill-equipped to face infantry, the cavalry forces of opposing sides often ended up fighting each other. Neutralizing the enemy cavalry, therefore, became the de facto main mission for cavalry forces.
Cavalry organization was somewhat more flexible in the Civil War era US Army than was that of the infantry. Unlike the infantry regiment, which was subdivided into companies all directly controlled by the regimental commander, cavalry regiments were typically divided into squadrons of 4 companies each, giving the cavalry regimental commander 3 relatively large subunits to maneuver instead of the 10 companies an infantry regimental commander was expected to control.
Apart from cavalry, which was generally found only at the brigade level in small numbers and larger numbers at higher levels, there were no dedicated reconnaissance elements at the tactical level per se. However, after 1756, the British, in particular, developed specialized light infantry companies in each regiment that served the functions of reconnaissance and security in tactical operations. Eventually, these light companies were grouped together separate from their parent unit and given specialized missions. The role of tactical reconnaissance and security fell to detachments from the line units themselves, organized on a mission-by-mission basis.{5}
In the age of massed infantry, foot soldiers marched in columns and fought in lines shoulder to shoulder armed with rifled muskets fired in volleys. Local reconnaissance and security below the brigade level were a unit responsibility. To conduct these missions, commanders took forces out of hide. Depending on the level directing the mission, part or whole units could be devoted to these tasks. Offensively, these reconnaissance elements were known as skirmishers. Skirmishers advanced in front of the infantry line, found the enemy position, and defeated the enemy advance elements (that is, pickets) before falling back to the main infantry line as the opposing forces closed with each other. Skirmishers were spread thinner than the main infantry line and used cover and concealment to aid in completing their mission.
Pickets were the defensive equivalent of skirmishers. They spread out similar to skirmishers, but the forces they were protecting were usually stationary and either on the defensive or encamped. The picket force provided early warning for its parent unit of any enemy actions on the unit’s front. This role was most important at night-time. As with skirmishers, pickets were assembled from within the unit itself.
Summary
Before World War I, operational-level reconnaissance and security missions were the role of horse cavalry. Tactical-level reconnaissance missions were assumed by the unit itself. World War I, with its massive fortifications, firepower, and eventual rise of air power and mechanization, changed all this. From 1918 to the present, various ground forces at both the operational and tactical levels have designed reconnaissance units using different combinations of weaponry and mechanized and motorized vehicles. This special study examines these developments chronologically, analyzes trends, and develops logical conclusions about the utility and composition of reconnaissance forces based on the