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Assignment To Catastrophe. Vol. 1, Prelude To Dunkirk. July 1939-May 1940
Assignment To Catastrophe. Vol. 1, Prelude To Dunkirk. July 1939-May 1940
Assignment To Catastrophe. Vol. 1, Prelude To Dunkirk. July 1939-May 1940
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Assignment To Catastrophe. Vol. 1, Prelude To Dunkirk. July 1939-May 1940

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The German victory in France at the onset of the Second World War was sudden, brutal and brilliant; by contrast the British and French preparations were miserable, faulty, badly carried through and fraught with mistrust. In the midst of these Allied responses was the eminent liaison officer Major-General Sir Edward Louis Spears, sent by the new prime Minister Winston Churchill to be his representative to the French Prime Minister. Spears was very well suited to his role as he had seen much military service and he had served in a senior liaison capacity between the British and French armies during the First World War. Keenly observant, well connected, urbane and respected by many of the French politicians and generals, his two volume memoirs are justly famous.
LanguageEnglish
PublisherLucknow Books
Release dateAug 15, 2014
ISBN9781782896234
Assignment To Catastrophe. Vol. 1, Prelude To Dunkirk. July 1939-May 1940

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    Assignment To Catastrophe. Vol. 1, Prelude To Dunkirk. July 1939-May 1940 - Major-General Sir Edward Louis Spears

     This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

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    Text originally published in 1954 under the same title.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    ASSIGNMENT TO CATASTROPHE

    VOLUME I

    PRELUDE TO DUNKIRK—July 1939 – May 1940

    BY

    Major-General Sir Edward Spears

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

    CHAPTER I—August 1st-23rd, 1939 11

    Luncheon with the Churchills at Chartwell—A visit to France—Reactions of French gens du monde towards war—I introduce Churchill to Georges—Churchill’s views on French plan of defence—His concern at vulnerability of defences about Montmédy—The contradiction in the French strategic conception—Attitude of King of the Belgians—Possibility of a German attack through Switzerland—Visit to the Maginot Line—Meeting with Gamelin—Georges’ concern at lack of depth of Maginot defences—Backwardness in tank construction—The Rhine at Strasbourg—The genesis of Operation Royal Marine—August 17th—Return to Paris—A visit to friends in south-west France—Atmosphere of apprehension—News of the German-Soviet pact—No dream villages for me—Dash back to London for emergency session of Parliament. 11

    CHAPTER II—August 24th-September 2nd, 1939 21

    The emergency session of the House of Commons, August 24/5—Members’ scepticism as to firmness of French Government and Chamberlain—German invasion of Poland—Session of the House on September 1st—Members’ determination we must now stand and fight—September 2nd—A day of suspense—Meeting of the Eden Group—Bad news of French attitude—Roland de Margerie—I warn him of dangers to France of vacillation—Churchill’s anger—His increasing influence—Chamberlain’s statement in the House—Leo Amery—Speak for England—Greenwood makes the speech of his career—A further statement by Chamberlain—Dismay of Members. 21

    CHAPTER III—September 3rd-10th, 1939 29

    September 3rd—Meeting of the Eden Group—Summons to the French Embassy—De Margerie explains reasons for French delay in declaring war—The first air-raid sirens—Chamberlain announces we are at war with Germany—Lloyd George speaks for the nation—The House during the alert—Churchill becomes First Lord—Personal frustration—The Army has no use for dug-outs or Members of Parliament—Anxieties about liaison arrangements and lack of air support for Poland—Count Raczinski—An intervention in the House prevented by Kingsley Wood. 29

    CHAPTER IV—September 11th-October 31st, 1939 37

    The first meeting of the Supreme War Council—Gort’s position—His loyalty to the French Command—The subordination of the B.E.F.—Chamberlain reports to the House and unintentionally misleads it—The limited scope of the ‘French action—Keitel’s evidence at Nuremberg—September 20th the House hears of Russia’s invasion of Poland—The London school children in the country—Carlisle takes things calmly—Activities in Parliament—A delegation of the Anglo-French Parliamentary Committee goes to France—The Maginot Line again—Boredom of the French troops—v Good relations between officers and men—Luncheon with Reynaud—Daladier—Franchet d’Esperey—A meeting in the French Chamber—Plea for an Anglo-French declaration of no separate peace—Taittinger—Herriot—Jeanneney—Giraudoux—A broadcast to France. 37

    CHAPTER V—November 1st, 1939 49

    Visit to Georges at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre—Difficulties due to the division of functions between Georges and Gamelin—Georges explains his plans—An after-luncheon talk at Georges’ H.Q.—A visit to Gamelin at Vincennes—De Kerillis on spies, Communists and the Right—Georges Mandel 49

    CHAPTER VI—November 2nd, 1939, to end January, 1940 61

    Churchill in Paris—Campinchi—Darlan—Churchill’s optimism—Luncheon with Giraudoux—He talks of French morale—Dautry—Greetings from a blind French ex-Air Force officer—Return to London—A contrast in atmosphere—Renewed efforts for a joint Anglo-French declaration—The B.B.C. does not want anti-German broadcasters—Chamberlain’s speech to Conservative M.P.s—December—Problems of the phony war—January—French Deputies pay us a visit—January 19th—German invasion plan captured—Genuine or false?—Broadcasting to France—German propaganda. 61

    CHAPTER VII—February, 1940 69

    Return to France on a mission for Churchill—My wife’s ambulance—Royal Marine—A lecture at the Théâtre Marigny—Georges’ admiration for Churchill—Daladier and Royal Marine—No improvement in relations between Georges and Gamelin—A tedious luncheon party at Vincennes—Gamelin on the command of the B.E.F.—A visit to the front—General de la Laurencie—A drive through the British zone—St. Omer—General Fagalde—The Fourth Corps front line—Fagalde after the war—Paris again—Reynaud’s drastic decree laws—Reynaud as Minister of Finance—His poster campaign—We shall win because we are the strongest—He tells me of Colonel de Gaulle—Deficiencies in aircraft production—The war in Finland—The importance of Swedish iron ore to Germany—An adventure in a rat run—De Kerillis on the defeatists in high places—It is necessary to drain the abscess—Louis Gillet—A visit to General Réquin and to my wife’s ambulance—Report to Churchill—He talks to boys refused admission to Navy—His anger at Naval snobbery. 69

    CHAPTER VIII—March, 1940 81

    Talks with Churchill—The morale of the French Army—The decision to send two British divisions to Finland—Misgivings about the Chamberlain Government—Churchill’s loyalty to the Prime Minister—March 12th, Finland capitulates—Reactions in France—Reynaud succeeds Daladier as Prime Minister—His difficulties with the Chamber—Two rival Egerias—Madame de Portes’ influence on appointments—Palewski—March 27th—Reynaud in London—The Supreme War Council executes the undertaking to sign no separate peace—Reynaud and the French military leaders press for mining of Norwegian waters—British Ministers prefer Royal Marine—Reynaud makes conditions. 81

    CHAPTER IX—April 4th-9th, 1940 89

    A dash to Paris with Churchill—Royal Marine rejected by the French Cabinet—Churchill’s letter to Daladier: No Royal Marine t no mining of Norwegian waters—Daladier’s hostile attitude to Reynaud—He refuses to dine at the British Embassy—I arrange for Georges to lunch with Churchill—Churchill on Royal MarineWe are going to miss the bus—Georges tells us several classes of the French Army are to be sent home—Poor morale of the older men—Churchill’s pleasure in Georges’ company—and troubles with Daladier—French insistence on WilfredRoyal Marine postponed—Mrs. Churchill gives me good advice—War liaison through diplomatic channels—Need for a Supreme War Council Secretariat—Chamberlain’s Government under fire—April 8th, the German invasion of Norway—Jan Masaryk—April 9th, the Supreme War Council Meeting in London. 89

    CHAPTER X—April 11th-May 7th, 1940 98

    Churchill’s statement to the House on Norway—A meeting of the Salisbury Committee—Churchill’s impossible new task—The Norwegian fiasco—Disquieting news from France—The Supreme War Council on April 27th—Reynaud’s illness—Chamberlain’s report to the House on May 2nd—Its reception by Members. My friends come to a decision—The Prime Minister’s failure—Fears that Churchill’s loyalty will prevent his taking over"—French Communist anti-war activities—A Communist pamphlet—May 5th, the Norwegian Government flees to England—Keyes’ criticism of the campaign—Amery on the conduct of the war—May 6th, another new function for Churchill—An inept conception—Growing dissatisfaction with the Government—Press criticism—The back-benchers’ revolt—An angry House on May 7th—The debate—A sensational speech by Keyes—Amery smashes the Government—Oliver Stanley—Arnold Wilson s swan song—We feel the old gang must go—A National Government essential—But what of Churchill? 98

    CHAPTER XI—May 8th, 1940 110

    The House of Commons debate on Norway—The Opposition’s attitude to Churchill—An impressive speech by Lloyd George—Chamberlain’s error—Heart-searchings amongst Conservatives—Stafford Cripps’ attack—Duff Cooper—Churchill winds up—The Division—Chamberlain in defeat—Rumour in the lobbies—Brendan Bracken intervenes. 110

    CHAPTER XII—May 9th-13th, 1940 117

    The debate continues—Richard Law sums up for the dissidents-~May 10th, Germany invades Belgium and Holland—Churchill becomes Prime Minister—Cabinet crisis in France—The Dutch Government comes to London—The German advance—British suspects to be rounded up—May 11th-12th-13th, the military situation—The new Prime Minister inspires the House—The rape of Holland. 117

    CHAPTER XIII—May 13th-19th, 1940 129

    Anxious days—The House adjourns until May 21st—A great tank battle in Belgium—Defeat of Corap’s Army—The divebomber terror—May 14th—Sedan evacuated—Collapse of the French Ninth Army—My wife telephones from Lorraine—May 16th—How the Germans captured Eben-Emael—Dinner with Léon Blum—Reynaud addresses the Chamber—Morale of Huntziger’s Army—And Corap’s—Giraud captured by the Germans—May 17th—Churchill returns from Paris—The German advance through the Sedan gap—The French Foreign Office burns its archives—May 17th—An optimistic communiqué—Where are the reserves?—May 18th, Gamelin’s order of the day—A French Territorial Guard instituted—The German attack in the pocket—May 19th—French counter-attacks—Reynaud becomes Minister of Defence at last—Pétain joins the Government—Mandel takes over the interior—Weygand Commander-in-Chief—Reynaud’s broadcast—Hitler announces war will end by August 15th. 129

    CHAPTER XIV—May 20th-22nd, 1940 137

    A broadcast Jo France—The Germans at Laon—May 21st, the House reassembles—Reynaud’s speech to the Senate—Brendan Bracken gives me a summons from Churchill—May 22nd, appointment at the Admiralty—Churchill gives me a liaison mission. 137

    CHAPTER XV—Thursday, May 23rd, 1940 141

    Ismay on the French disaster—Weygand’s plan of attack—The Guards land at Boulogne—Blanchard succeeds Billotte—No news of Gort’s plans—The French press for air support—Liaison breaks down—Ismay’s Paris staff—My instructions—The Foreign Office and the Ambassador—Portrait of Pug—The paralysis of the French Command. 141

    CHAPTER XVI—Friday, May 24th, 1940 147

    The Prime Minister in the map-room—Gort’s character—Churchill looks on the bright side—But is concerned about French lack of command—Reynaud telegraphs to complain that British have evacuated Arras, and removed heavy material from Havre—Ismay continues my briefing—My apprehensions about Weygand’s attitude to my appointment relieved by Churchill—He explains Gort’s orders—Evacuation by sea the only alternative to Weygand’s plan—His reply to Reynaud—Final briefing from Churchill—British determination to fight on to the end—Two Most Secret telegrams—A sombre outlook for my mission. 147

    CHAPTER XVII—Saturday, May 25th, 1940 (1) 156

    Flight to France—First contact with the Ambassador—Sir Ronald Campbell’s personality—Malise Graham—A friendly welcome from Reynaud—He complains of Gort’s withdrawal—I deplore recriminations—Reynaud’s cordiality and courage—I tell him of Churchill’s belief in him—Further discussion about Gort ‘s plans—My first meeting with the French War Committee—Memories of an historic room—Pétain s greeting—And Weygand’s—Darlan—Baudouin—The Committee in session—I defend Gort—Weygand apologises—His confidence in Blanchard—Reynaud’s telephone rings—A curious conversation—Commandant Fauvelle—I believe in a very early capitulation—Weygand’s pessimism—But he says he will fight on—First doubts of Weygand—French and British attitudes towards the sea contrasted—Weygand’s doubts concerning the attack from the south—Fauvelle confirms that the B.E.F. has had no orders from Blanchard—Weygand dictates a telegram to Churchill—Churchill’s suggestions for stopping the German armour—Pétain’s abstraction. 156

    CHAPTER XVIII—Saturday, May 25th, 1940 (2) 172

    More defeatism from Fauvelle—My first despatch to London—Colonel Redman—Report to the Ambassador—Diplomacy and military liaison—Relations between Pétain and Weygand—More doubts of Weygand—Reynaud’s handicaps—My office in the Embassy—Lord Bertie—The puzzle of the French defeat—Callers at the Ritz—Mandel gives me a telephone—And an interview—His analysis of French morale—His opinion of his ministerial colleagues—Churchill’s telegram to Reynaud about Gort’s position—A telephone conversation with my wife—Maurice Petherick—What really happened at Arras—I try to assess the military situation. 172

    CHAPTER XIX—Sunday, May 26th, 1940 (1) 185

    Reynaud’s unexpected journey to London—I seek an explanation from Campinchi—The essential object of my mission to proclaim British determination—Wax pellets and wooden gags the answer to the dive-bomber?—Suggestions to Dautry—General Colson—The demobilisation of the older classes—Colson on French losses—He suggests action in the north—Ismay tells me the attempt to break through has been abandoned. 185

    CHAPTER XX—Sunday, May 26th, 1940 (2) 193

    An interview with Marshal Pétain—His pessimism—Major Archdale—A refreshing contrast to Fauvelle—His account of the situation of the Northern Armies—I take him to see Pétain—Visit from a political gossip—Churchill’s telegram to Reynaud on Italy. 193

    CHAPTER XXI—Monday, May 27th, 1940 202

    Vain efforts to re-create ‘my old mission—Baudouin’s attitude of appeasement—Rumours of Pétain’s defeatism—Weygand blames Gort for the disaster to the Northern Armies—Talk of the French Government leaving Paris—Anxiety in London for the B.E.F.—Archdale`s negative impression of Georges—A letter from the Prime Minister—I convey it to Reynaud—Our discussion on the Italian question and on the conflicting figures of French losses and German strength—Reynaud on threat to Paris—/ press for large-scale laying of minefields—General Koeltz’s mission—Need for anti-tank columns—And organised popular resistance to the Germans—Reynaud complains of lack of British air support—His doubts concerning King Leopold—He hints that a future French Government may treat with the Germans—The British attitude of no surrender—Duff Cooper’s broadcast—A useful talk—Margerie’s depression—I report to Churchill—How a French village received the Germans—A summons from Reynaud—King Leopold’s surrender—Reynaud’s indignation—Weygand’s instructions to the French Liaison Officer to King Leopold and to Blanchard—Churchill’s telegram to Gort—I ask about the Dunkirk bridgehead—Churchill’s pleasure at the French reaction to the Belgian defection. 202

    CHAPTER XXII—Tuesday, May 28th, 1940 216

    Reynaud’s broadcast on King Leopold—He consults the Ambassador and me about an appeal to Roosevelt—Likelihood of unfavourable reactions in England—He urges an offer to Italy—Churchill opposes any appeasement of Mussolini—Dautry plans minefields and anti-tank columns—He asks for a Supreme War Council meeting on rearmament—Malise Graham and I compare notes on the military situation—Talk of a moral collapse of the French people—I pray for a new Joan of Arc—My report to Ismay—Another talk with Reynaud—His surprise at British attitude to Leopold—He questions me about British criticism of France—/ point out danger of blaming British for the defeat—Calm French attitude to Belgian surrender—Reynaud’s relief at respite for Paris—Speculation on German intentions—Possibility of an invasion of Britain?—Georges Mandel on the Belgian problem and the French defeatists—He tells me of Vuillemin’s complaints of inadequate British air support—The B.E.F.’s fighting retreat—Blanchard’s meeting with Pownall—Why the French reached Dunkirk so late. 216

    CHAPTER XXIII—Wednesday, May 29th, 1940 226

    My work takes shape—The Military Attaché finds me a secretary—Colonel Redman’s trinity—Margerie is more cheerful—Charles-Roux on an appeal to Roosevelt—His views on Munich—And on folly of appeasing Italy—Margerie stresses French criticism of Duff Cooper’s broadcast on King Leopold and Keyes’ interview—Dautry on French lack of armaments—His tireless efforts to fill the need—His information on the defeatists—Reynaud’s concern about the French divisions in the north—He produces a new criticism by Weygand of the B.E.F.—I complain of Weygand’s attitude to Gort—Reynaud’s anxiety about British reinforcements and air support—His difficulties—His intention of calling up the young classes—He is firm about Mussolini—Strength of French defences against Italy—French aircraft losses—Indiscipline amongst German pilots—A heartening telegram from Churchill—His doubts of Margerie—An evening with St. Exupéry—Le Petit Prince. 226

    CHAPTER XXIV—Thursday, May 30th, 1940 235

    An early morning call on Reynaud—Churchill’s telegram on the beginning of the Dunkirk evacuation—His plans to reconstitute the B.E.F.—Reynaud’s dissatisfaction—He complains again about Churchill’s attitude to Leopold—A lesson from Foch—His conversation with the Ambassador—His intention to fight on in Brittany if the Somme line does not hold—No arms or uniforms for the young classes—The meeting of the French War Committee—Weygand’s report—His appeal for immediate return to France of British troops evacuated from Dunkirk—I point out uselessness of this—Weygand repeats there can be no organised resistance if the Germans cross the Somme—Reynaud and Weygand renew the appeal for British support—The German attack on Huntziger’s Army—Weygand fears an attack through Basle—An intervention by Darlan—Weygand takes up the question of British air support—His assurances that British forces will be allotted their own sector of the front—Vain efforts to understand French lack of reserves—Dautry makes progress—Campinchi kept in the dark by Darlan—Reynaud relaxes—Campinchi tells me of Daladier s pressure on Reynaud to approach Italy—A telegram from the War Office about the British forces remaining in France—Air Commodore Colyer on the French Air Force—His report to the Ambassador—A British Officer’s account of German brutalities and poor French morale—The mystery of the French Army—Daladier’s efforts to get an offer of Gibraltar and Malta to Mussolini—Reynaud stands firm—A watered-down note—A dinner at Vincennes. 235

    CHAPTER XXV—Friday, May 31st, 1940 247

    Churchill comes to Paris—Late arrival at Villacoublay—Luncheon at the Embassy—The Supreme War Council meets to discuss Narvik, Dunkirk and Italy—Agreement on evacuation of Narvik—The progress of the Dunkirk evacuation—British loss of equipment—The achievement of the R.A.F.—Reynaud on German superiority—His plea for R.A.F. support on the Somme—Churchill explains British plans to build up B.E.F.—Reynaud’s plans to call up two young classes—Churchill explains the limitations of what the R.A.F. can do—Troops from the Empire for France—A draft telegram to Admiral Abrial—Churchill insists Britain will provide the rear-guard at Dunkirk—Dills objections to Abrial’s commanding the evacuation—The Council discusses Italy—Churchill proposes British Ministers should meet their French colleagues—Agreement on occupation of Crete and Melos—Tangier—Fini l’Agenda—A magnificent oration by Churchill moves his hearers—The text of the telegram to Abrial—A conversation with Pétain after the Conference—A drive with Attlee—Churchill tries to stimulate French resistance—Carlisle learns what has become of its Member. 247

    HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT (Formed by the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, May 1940) 272

    War Cabinet: 272

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 274

    CHAPTER I—August 1st-23rd, 1939

    Luncheon with the Churchills at Chartwell—A visit to France—Reactions of French gens du monde towards war—I introduce Churchill to Georges—Churchill’s views on French plan of defence—His concern at vulnerability of defences about Montmédy—The contradiction in the French strategic conception—Attitude of King of the Belgians—Possibility of a German attack through Switzerland—Visit to the Maginot Line—Meeting with Gamelin—Georges’ concern at lack of depth of Maginot defences—Backwardness in tank construction—The Rhine at Strasbourg—The genesis of Operation Royal Marine—August 17th—Return to Paris—A visit to friends in south-west France—Atmosphere of apprehension—News of the German-Soviet pact—No dream villages for me—Dash back to London for emergency session of Parliament.

    This story begins with a luncheon at Chartwell on August 1st, 1939. Winston Churchill had asked me to come down to discuss my book, Prelude to Victory, which was about to be published, He had read the proofs, made one or two suggestions, and promised, after condoling with me on the ill-fortune which led to my having just finished a book on one war when another appeared to be on the point of breaking out, to write an introduction, I was so pleased that he liked what I had written that I was even happier than usual at finding myself in those pleasant surroundings. There is never a dull moment in the Churchill household, where wit and intelligent discussion of people and affairs combine with a background of peculiar charm into an expression of the best that English civilisation in our time can produce.

    The host was happy and relaxed as he always is with his family, in spite of having just lost an argument with Mrs. Churchill on the propriety of water glasses being filled before the meal was served. Winston had held not, but I observed nevertheless when we sat down that there was water in the glasses. The meal was gay; remarks, comments, sometimes caustic, never unkind or inconsiderate, bubbled from Winston’s lips. On occasion he ground his words like coffee in a mill before releasing them. When expressing an idea he deems important, or confuting one he disapproves of, his voice suddenly has the incisiveness and resonance of a clarion note.

    After luncheon Winston took me upstairs to the lovely long sunny room where he works. After discussing one or two of the passages in my book, he spoke of the visit he had asked me to arrange for him to the Maginot Line. He had visited a section of it already but did not know the Rhine defences north of Strasbourg. I much looked forward to this trip. He and I were to be the guests of General Georges, which would give me the opportunity I had long sought of bringing the General and Winston together. I told Winston that Georges particularly wished him to see how the French intended to meet a German attack from the direction of Basle, for their General Staff thought it possible, indeed likely, that if there were to be war, the Germans would violate Swiss territory and attack that way, ‘

    Georges had been wounded at Marseilles in October 1934, when the King of Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou were assassinated, and Winston asked me if he had completely recovered. I said that I thought he had perhaps aged as a result. He now invariably wore a woollen glove on one hand, and had been told he must not fly but he was as alert, as alive, as he had ever been.

    Winston thought war imminent, but he was certain the German General Staff would try to dissuade Hitler from becoming involved in a war on two fronts. What was the real attitude of Russia? Although an Anglo-French Military Mission was discussing plans in Moscow, he felt grave doubts concerning Stalin’s policy. He thought, as I did, that we had deeply, perhaps irretrievably, offended the Russians at the time of Munich, and that they would not hesitate to turn the tables on us, as they considered we then had on them, if they considered it to their advantage to do so.

    Nothing, he thought, was better calculated to encourage the Germans, and for that matter the Russians, in the belief that as always we inclined to a policy of laissez-faire, than that the House should adjourn for the long summer recess as the Prime Minister planned.

    He read me the speech he intended to deliver next day asking that the House should reassemble on August 22nd or 25th instead of October 3rd.

    What worried Winston most, apart from fearing the Government would run out over Poland as it had over Czechoslovakia, was our weakness in the air. He came back to this again and again. He spoke of the French Air Force, but about this I had no information save that it was notoriously poor. On the other hand, we were both full of admiration for the French Army. The review at Versailles in honour of our King’s visit had epitomised in a magnificent display all the traditions of a force that was, I thought, the very embodiment of the essential virtues of France. I could not recall that occasion without pleasure and confidence. I was very fond of the French Army and shared in the martial pride of its officers and men. I had spent much of the last war with them and acquired that spirit of comradeship which comes of enduring good and bad days with men one likes and respects. I was always flattered when the French said I knew their Army better than they did themselves.

    That afternoon I asserted that the French soldiers, sons of the bighearted, patient, brave men I had known in 1914, were worthy of their fathers.

    Then we spoke of the immense advantage which had accrued to Germany by her seizure of Czechoslovakia. Neither of us doubted that in the year that had since elapsed Germany had armed infinitely faster than had either the French or ourselves,

    I knew Czechoslovakia well. There was no doubt that the already vast German arms industry, driven at furious pace, had gained an enormous accession of strength by the possession of the Skoda and Witkowitz works.

    A few days after this visit to Chartwell I was in France with my car. Being convinced we should be at war in a few weeks and that this was likely to be my last holiday for years, I crossed the Channel on the day after the House adjourned for the recess.

    The French friends I stayed with were of the sort, so I thought at the time, that nothing could alter. They were hospitable and kind as always, but I found a perceptible change amongst their friends and relations. These belonged to the class known in France as gens du monde. The shadow of war hung over the land, and they hated and resented it. They made no attempt to conceal their belief that England was bent on using France as a shield in a war she was seeking against Hitler’s Germany. I could sense hostility amongst people I had known quite well, and it was very unpleasant.

    French people can change quickly and are adepts at conveying the fact by nuances of manner and tone, I was made to feel I was a member of a race against whom latent prejudice always exists in France, Here was perfidious Albion at it again. I argued with myself that these people represented no one but themselves, but I was saddened that they should adopt an attitude that took so little account of what we deemed to be not only a matter of national honour to both our countries, but one which involved their continued independence. Self-appointed guardians of the good taste if not of the culture of their race, these people hated the Front Populaire and all that it stood for. They pointed to the setback in orderly progress that upheaval had brought about, which was true, but failed to take into account that the very violence of the Socialist reaction was due to the selfish, the merciless attitude of the property-owning, in particular of the industrial, classes, the Patrons. With the pleasant, mundane, rich people I met on this occasion there could be no argument. They thought, and did not hesitate to say, that anything, absolutely anything, was better than the re-emergence of the Popular Front and of its leader, the man they hated above all others, Léon v Blum. That war would place power in the hands of the Left made it doubly hateful. It was all nonsense anyway, argued these self-assured men and superbly-dressed women, the latter a little shrill, with an output of words per minute comparable only to the trills of an electric bell: France was too weak even to defend herself, let alone launch forth into adventures at the other end of Europe. The Czechs, upstart successors of a Great Power, were of but little interest, and the Poles?—some of them were agreeable no doubt, but they were for ever in trouble. It would be demented to allow their ill-planned and ill-constructed country to lead us all into war. Hitler was no doubt odious, but he hated Communism, and at least stood for order. The high-pitched voices of the ladies invited no reply.

    I left Normandy preoccupied and less happy than usual after being with people I liked so much. The widening gulf between the French and British points of view was too discernible to be evaded, but these painful impressions were soon effaced by the thoughts of the journey that lay ahead.

    It began on August 14th, 1939, when Winston Churchill and I became the guests of General Georges. We met for lunch at a restaurant in the Bois de Boulogne. The place was empty, for the world of fashion had deserted Paris a month ago. Four of us sat in a shady comer, General Georges, his A.D.C., Winston Churchill and myself. It gave me great pleasure that my two old friends so evidently liked each other. Indeed, I felt a kind of proprietary satisfaction in Georges as he explained why we should visit this point and that during the tour of the Rhine defences we were to begin next day. Lucid, forceful and clear as always, he obviously impressed Churchill. Looking at him with the eyes of deep affection, I believed him still the embodiment of energy he had been 20 years earlier. The hair was a little thinner and greyer, but his dark skin, tanned to the colour of leather by many years of African sun, was hardly more lined than when I first knew him. He was squarely built, and his face was square; the bare tine of a sparse moustache emphasised the firm mouth and powerful chin, which, together with his short, wide nose, made up a stern very military face, enlivened by dark brown eyes that were intensely alive, understanding and honest.

    Georges was convinced war was almost upon us, and that the Germans, unless given all they wanted, were prepared to launch it. It went without saying that if Poland gave way, they would present other demands which would be insisted upon the more arrogantly because their might and confidence would have grown.

    As we ate wood strawberries soaked in white wine, it emerged that there was no more doubt in General Georges’ mind than in ours that it was the Germans rather than we who had benefited by the time gained at Munich, always supposing they had really intended fighting then, which he doubted. He thought Hitler had been bluffing. He pointed out, as proof of the good use the Germans had made of the time granted them, that a year ago they had no defences facing France. Now they had the Western Wall, a formidable obstacle built according to modem ideas, in great depth, whereas the Maginot Line was linear. And another thing: a year ago the French artillery was incomparably superior to the German, but now? And Georges lamented, as a major disaster, the gain by Hitler of Skoda, one of the greatest armament firms in the world.

    And the air? All agreed that the Germans had forged ahead and that the results were very serious; all we could do now was to build and build, and place the largest possible orders in the United States.

    This led me to put a question to which I did not receive a satisfactory answer then or at any other time. If the Germans had air superiority, would they not in fact be able virtually to besiege the Maginot Line with its garrison of hundreds of thousands of men? Could not even a weaker air force do this? A vast number of trains were required daily to supply the garrison. Supposing this point or that on the line was attacked day after day and night after night, would not the result be to weaken the garrison as if it were effectively besieged?

    Was it possible for motor transport to replace trains over a long period, and would they not be subject to the same disabilities as rail transport, even though in mitigated form? There must be railheads somewhere.

    It was interesting to observe how Churchill and Georges, two men who without doubt must bear heavy responsibility in the conflict they both thought to be near, faced up to it easily, naturally. Responsibility was their portion, and they accepted it. Undismayed, they gave no thought to regrets, the one that his countrymen had paid such scant heed to his warnings, the other that he had not had much say in the fashioning of the army he was to handle or of the strategy it was tied to.

    Churchill, who can jump from one subject to another with the agility of a grasshopper, has nevertheless the same power of concentration that was so characteristic of Napoleon. He can pull out one drawer of his mind and then another with great rapidity, yet nothing can deflect him from the subject in the drawer he is dealing with at any particular moment. Every question appertaining to it is carefully sorted out and catalogued, nothing is forgotten or mislaid and everything flashes back to his memory in orderly array when required.

    For the moment he was concentrating on the French plan of defence, and his knowledge and prescience delighted Georges, who became ever more animated in the glow of Churchill’s all-illuminating mind.

    One question in particular, I remember, preoccupied Churchill. It was the shoulder of the Maginot Line, the point where it came to an end about Montmédy and was thence prolonged by field works opposite the Ardennes, and on to the sea. I have no note of what Georges answered. He doubtless said what I had many times heard, that the nature of the subsoil from Montmédy onwards did not lend itself to the deep excavations required by the Maginot plan of fortifications; he may also have said they were too expensive, but I am not sure.

    What I do remember, for I recalled it a few months later with great vividness, was Churchill’s pursed mouth, his look centred on the fruit on the table as if he were crystal-gazing. His face had ceased smiling, and the shake of his head was ominous when he observed that he hoped these field works were strong, that it would be very unwise to think the Ardennes were impassable to strong forces, as he understood Marshal Pétain had held in his time. Remember, he said, that we are faced with a new weapon, armour in great strength, on which the Germans are no doubt concentrating, and that forests will be particularly tempting to such forces since they will offer concealment from the air.

    Churchill was I knew, for we had discussed it, aware of a contradiction in the French strategic plan. If the French intended to wage a purely defensive war, then presumably they would have fortified their whole frontier, including that facing Belgium, perhaps the most likely one the Germans would select for their onslaught. But this would mean holding a line running through France’s richest industrial areas, that is, condemning them to destruction, or one behind the industrial area, abandoning it to the enemy without fighting, which was inconceivable.

    Fears concerning what the King of the Belgians would do in case of war were apparent in what Georges told us of the French plans. Leopold was reputed to be much under German influence. He apparently intended standing alone, holding the Western Allies at arm’s length, relying on his coolness toward them to obtain German indulgence.

    The Belgian attitude was all the more important now that the French were considering an offensive policy, that is, not only a rush through Belgium, as soon as that country’s permission was obtained, so as to line up on its eastern frontier, but an actual offensive aimed at turning the German attacking armies and the unfinished Siegfried Line. But was the French Army, so long trained to the defensive, and presumably equipped for it, capable of offensive action against so powerful and aggressive an opponent as the Germans?

    I gained the impression that this question worried Churchill, but the matter in hand, and therefore the one on which he was concentrating, was the Maginot Line and the possibility, which Georges considered very great, of a violation of Swiss territory and an attack through Basle.

    We saw some of the amazing forts of the Maginot Line with their underground railways, their garrisons that could remain for months hundreds of feet below the surface. We saw miles of tank obstacles, turned-up rails with sharpened points as if the countryside had been sown with dragon’s teeth. We gazed across the Rhine at the immense Black Forest which, the French told us, was full of ammunition dumps. Loaded convoys were for ever driving into its depths and coming out empty. We drove through enchanting Alsatian villages bathed in sunshine, their little crooked houses painted robin’s-egg blue, with cherry-coloured shutters, all ablaze with flowers in their window-boxes. I remember a wonderful little medieval town, Riquewihr, where if Faust and Marguerite did not live, they should have; and a ceremonial lunch given in honour of Churchill by General Frère, the Military Governor of Strasbourg, where the Guard of Honour in the courtyard, mounted by red-cloaked Spahis, was infinitely picturesque. General Frère, a grand blessé de la grande guerre and a fine figure of a man, was most courteous and interesting.

    We visited the strong points on the Rhine, the line of defence running through the Haguenau forest and the great barrage of Kembs and the power station built well into the river. As it furnished electricity over a wide area and was within rifle-range of the Germans, we wondered what would happen in case of war. In the upshot they were careful not to damage it.

    We saw the great guns sited to shell the passages at Basle if the Germans came that way. Field works were being constructed whilst peasants reaped the golden harvest with immense scythes having a basket attachment.

    We also visited the organisations of Glaserberg which were the hinge of the Vosges and Jura defences.

    It was all very remarkable and, at the moment, comforting, but nothing the French could show us impressed me more than Winston Churchill’s own piece of organisation whereby, miraculously, he received each evening all the London morning papers.

    On the 16th we met General Gamelin, who was supervising some manœuvres in southern Alsace. He was very friendly and informative. I had known him since the very first days of 1914 when, a highly trained, imperturbable and very young-looking Staff Officer, he followed General Joffre like a shadow, and played his part in the great events leading up to the Battle of the Marne. Now he was chubby-faced no longer, the enormous moustache of earlier days had disappeared; he was more urbane and his short stature had gained in poise. Always used to dealing with men in high positions, his post as Chief of the General Staff and Commander-in-Chief elect had made him an adept at handling such gentry, and he certainly gave an impression of self-possessed dignity. His immensely responsible position made his easy affability the more agreeable to his guests.

    I was glad to see him again. In April I had organised a dinner in the House of Commons at which he had spoken of the gravity of the situation and the danger of losing time.{1} He spent some time with us and gave us a wonderful lunch at the Hotel de la Cigogne at Ferette. A touch of the eighteenth-century wars which had so often been waged in these parts was given to the occasion by the appearance of Madame Gamelin and other ladies.

    The trip tore to shreds any illusion that it was not Germany’s intention to wage war and to wage it soon. There was no mistaking the grim, relentless and barely concealed preparations she was making, in spite of the fact that silence and secretiveness characterised the right bank of the Rhine. Every commander had tales to tell and they all led to the same conclusion.

    Winston Churchill was pleased with the aspect of the men, who greatly liked being inspected by him. He knew how to look every man in the eyes as he passed him, thus convincing him he had been recognised by someone already known, even in France, to be a very important person.

    The nightly discussions had borne on the efficacy of the tank obstacles, the danger from parachutists, and attacks in a fog or under cover of artificial fog, which Churchill strongly emphasised. Georges was certainly worried about the lack of depth of the Maginot Line, for he referred to it again, saying it must be doubled by field works and that nothing could dispense with the necessity of having powerful reserves behind it. Our backwardness in tank construction was deplored, and the consensus of opinion certainly favoured the heaviest type that bridges could carry, unless indeed means could be found of lightening a tank for river-crossings or devising machines capable of crossing river-beds. As I listened I remembered how in 1915 I had heard this same Winston developing his theory of land cruisers to a French General and his staff on the Vimy Ridge, and how heartily they had laughed, after he had gone, at this absurd idea. Your politicians are even funnier than ours, they had exclaimed.

    At Strasbourg, looking at the Rhine flowing under the Kehl Bridge, on which French and German posts stood watch within pistol-shot of each other, and remembering that later the river passed through German territory on either side and under bridges of all kinds vital to their mobilisation, I suggested that mines should be launched in the stream on the declaration of war. It seemed to me that mines linked by cables and urged on by

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