Churchill, Hitler, and the Battle of Britain
In July 1934, just a year after Adolf Hitler’s assumption of power, Winston Churchill declared that Germany had created a rudimentary air force, contrary to the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler already possessed some 400 military aircraft, with an aircraft industry capable of producing 100 more each month. Churchill argued that the German air force was already approximately two-thirds the strength of the RAF’s Home Defence Force.
Churchill also emphasised England’s extreme geographical vulnerability to air attack. While Berlin was some 600 miles away, London was just 100 miles from potential enemy bases. As he said in the House, in words that would come to haunt him in 1940: “With our enormous Metropolis here, the greatest target in the world,…a valuable fat cow tied up to attract the beasts of prey…we are in a position…in which no other country in the world is at the present time.”1
The Chancellor, Sir John Simon, had myopically asserted that a strong economy was “the fourth arm of defence,” leaving Britain unprepared for war in 1938. While the Munich accord did at least give Britain breathing space for rearmament, Chamberlain’s message of “peace in our time” was seen as a message of weakness, not strength.
Amongst the most successful pre-war rearmament measures, however, was the “shadow factory” scheme. Several leading motor manufacturers provided redundant capacity for aeroengine/airframe production with the ability to switch production on demand. By April 1940, Britain was already producing more fighters per month than Germany.
The Dowding System
Almost alone amongst senior RAF staff, Air Marshal Sir Hugh “Stuffy” Dowding, one
