The Diplomacy of Impartiality: Canada and Israel, 1958-1968

By Zachariah Kay

The Diplomacy of Impartiality is an analysis of a major decade in Canadian–Israeli relations, dealing with significant events that led to the Six-Day War of 1967 and its aftermath. Using primary documentation from the National Archives of Canada and the Israeli State Archives, Zachariah Kay shows that although Canada was committed to Israel’s existence, its foreign policy was governed by the scrupulous impartiality that had become a principle guideline when dealing with Israel and the Middle East.

The first section of the book deals with the Progressive Conservative government headed by John Diefenbaker in the first part of the decade and his Israeli counterpart, David Ben Gurion. The second section considers the latter part of the decade, with reference to Lester Pearson’s Liberal government and the Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol. The book shows that in spite of political differences between the leaders and their parties, the Canadian bureaucracy maintained a policy of impartiality, following the lines of non-commitment and prudence practiced prior to the re-establishment of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine with the State of Israel. Issues such as the Arab–Israeli conflict, nuclear power, governments and parliaments, and the pre- and post-Six-Day War are dealt with in detail. The assessed evidence proves that impartiality as a quasi-bureaucratic ordinance kept Canada on the path it maintained in subsequent decades into the twenty-first century.

The Diplomacy of Impartiality provides an essential understanding of events surrounding today’s Canadian relationship with Israel and the Arab–Israeli conflict.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Wilfrid Laurier University Press
• Release date: Apr 14, 2010
• ISBN: 9781554582839

Zachariah Kay

Zachariah Kay has taught at several universities across Canada and was an elected member of the Executive of the Canadian Political Science Association. He served as Chief, Liaison and Research, Education Support Branch, Department of the Secretary of State, Ottawa, and latterly as a consultant to the Departments of Secretary of State, National Health and Welfare, and External Affairs. Prior to retirement he was a fellow and senior research associate at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a founding member of the Israel Association for Canadian Studies. He is the author of many publications for the federal government, academia, and newspapers in Canada and Israel. His major academic works include Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment and The Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948-1958.

Book preview

THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPARTIALITY

THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPARTIALITY

CANADA AND ISRAEL, 1958–1968

Zachariah Kay

This book is published under the auspices of the Israel Association for Canadian Studies, thanks to a grant from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Wilfrid Laurier University Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program for its publishing activities.

---

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Kay, Zachariah

    The diplomacy of impartiality: Canada and Israel, 1958–1968 / Zachariah

Kay.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Also available in electronic format.

ISBN 978-1-55458-187-0 (bound)

    1. Canada—Foreign relations—Israel. 2. Israel—Foreign relations—Canada.

I. Title.

FC251.I7K38 2010     327.7105694′09046     C2010-900365-9

ISBN 978-1-55458-202-0

Electronic format.

    1. Canada—Foreign relations—Israel. 2. Israel—Foreign relations—Canada.

I. Title.

FC251.I7K38 2010a     327.7105694′09046     C2010-900366-7

---

Cover design by Sandra Friesen. Cover photo of John Diefenbaker (top left) by Paul Horsdal/Library and Archives Canada/PA-130070; of David Ben Gurion (top right) by David Eldan, courtesy Israeli Government Press Office; of Levi Eshkol (bottom left) by David Eldan, courtesy Israeli Government Press Office; and of Lester B. Pearson (bottom right), from Library and Archives Canada/Photographs of miscellaneous events and activities throughout Canada collection/C-010435, by Ashley and Crippen Photography. Text design by Catharine Bonas-Taylor.

© 2010 Wilfrid Laurier University Press

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

www.wlupress.wlu.ca

This book is printed on FSC recycled paper and is certified Ecologo. It is made from 100% postconsumer fibre, processed chlorine free, and manufactured using biogas energy.

Printed in Canada

Every reasonable effort has been made to acquire permission for copyright material used in this text, and to acknowledge all such indebtedness accurately. Any errors and omissions called to the publisher’s attention will be corrected in future printings.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior written consent of the publisher or a licence from The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright). For an Access Copyright licence, visit www.accesscopyright.ca or call toll free to 1-800-893-5777.

To family and friends who have passed on

CONTENTS

Preface

Note on Sources

Introduction

PART ONE THE DIEFENBAKER REGNUM

1 Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose

2 Diefenbaker’s Helmsmanship

3 Caution in a Nuclear Minefield

PART TWO THE PEARSON ERA

4 The Pearson Primeministership

5 Commons and Crisis: A Case Study

6 War and a Wary Ottawa

7 Post Conflict and Compromise

8 Closing the Pearson Era

Summary and Conclusions

Epilogue

Notes

Index

PREFACE

This volume is the last in my trilogy on the history of Canada–Israel diplomatic relations. The first, Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press), covered the period leading up to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and its recognition. The second, The Diplomacy of Prudence: Canada and Israel, 1948–1958 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press), highlighted the Sinai–Suez War of 1956 and its aftermath. The following study deals with the Diefenbaker–Pearson era with details of the pre- and post–Six Day War period of 1967.

First and foremost, I want to express my sincere gratitude to David H. Goldberg, an expert in this area. David’s advice and assistance throughout the extent of this work enhanced the product immeasurably. He was always available and provided objective comments in an amiable manner no matter how busy he might have been. Second, I want to thank the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations of the Hebrew University, where I have been a Fellow and Senior Research Associate for a number of years, for two research grants enabling the continuation of my research; the Government of Canada for a Faculty Research Programme Grant; and, last but not least, the Israel Association for Canadian Studies for its travel and publication assistance throughout the years; finally, thanks to the staffs of the National Archives in Ottawa, the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem, the Library staff at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa (formerly the Department of External Affairs), as well as the editors at Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Needless to say what follows is my sole responsibility.

NOTE ON SOURCES

This work is based on primary sources from the files of the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa (NA), the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem (ISA), official publications of the Canadian and Israeli governments, and the House of Commons debates (HCD). Secondary sources are cited in the notes.

The reader should note that the Diefenbaker papers which are housed in the Diefenbaker Centre at the University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon were used as they were available and later at the National Archives. The Pearson papers contain Department of External Affairs documents but the citations are usually from the papers unless otherwise noted. All the Israeli files are from the State Archives save for the one from YAD (Memorial) Levi Eshkol Papers. Most of the documents were in English and those that appeared in Hebrew have been duly translated.

Canada, Ottawa, House of Commons Debates, 1957–1968

Department of External Affairs, publications, statements, and speeches

National Archives of Canada; files of the Department of External Affairs, RG 25 series

Privy Council files, RG 2 series

Papers of John G. Diefenbaker, MG 26

Papers of Lester B. Pearson, MG 26

Israel, Israel State Archives, Foreign Office files

INTRODUCTION

Canada has a quasi-respectable status in the international arena that is in itself something of an achievement given the atmosphere within the realm of international relations during the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. Canada might be admired, or even loved, and at worst simply not disliked. Canadians have been generally careful to not step on sensitive toes. This type of careful and impartial behaviour does not erode a country’s reputation, but more often than not enhances its international stature. Many polities would settle for that particular status within the international community.

The evidence garnered in this study provides a definition of scrupulous impartiality: a bureaucratically engendered guideline in foreign policy formulation. Scrupulous impartiality can also be regarded as synonymous with genuine impartiality. The prime instance of this bureaucratic stance is exemplified by the position Canada took in its relationship to Israel in the context of the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict.

Within a global context, the period of 1958 TO1968 was marked by an ongoing, tense cold war generated by the competition between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America which had resulted in a fairly well-arranged bipolar world. It came on the heels of the Hungarian revolution, crushed by the Soviets in November 1956, and the Sinai–Suez war of the autumn of 1956, begun by Israel and involving Britain and France. The peril of a hot war, which almost became a reality in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, threatened to upset the balance of power between the superpowers, the USSR and USA. The so-called non-aligned nations such as Marshall Tito’s Yugoslavia, Pandit Nehru’s India, and Gamal Nasser’s United Arab Republic of Egypt attempted to avoid involvement and conflict. Yet Egypt had been moving increasingly into the Soviet sphere since the arms buildup of 1955, while Israel was predominantly regarded as part of the Western world. By the outbreak of the Six Day War, Nasser’s Egypt had become firmly dependent on the USSR. The eventual defeat of the United Arab Republic of Egypt, combined with Syria’s forces, as well as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, was a considerable blow to the Soviets as well.

During this decade, Canada had become known as an open supporter of the United Nations, and as an active participant in the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and most importantly the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), a peacekeeping force established to ensure a safe conclusion to the 1956 Suez crisis. The emergency force was regarded as a prominent feather in Canada’s diplomatic cap as it was initiated by then Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson. Canada was viewed as largely impartial throughout the crisis and was able to sustain its position in the Arab–Israeli conflict with a reputation for fairness

Canada’s reputation was garnered in the course of a political history and diplomacy predicated on non-involvement in matters beyond British imperial and Commonwealth affairs. Where there were non-existential issues, the prime minister avoided the limelight and even shunned the international arena.

Originally, the Department of External Affairs devolved from the prime minister’s portfolio into the hands of a separate minister during the mid-twentieth century. In the interim, departmental bureaucrats guided Canada’s foreign policy along the path of general prudence. Norman Robertson, who could be regarded as the bureaucrat’s bureaucrat, indeed a unique mandarin, served for several decades as the department’s undersecretary; the position was also known as deputy minister, senior ambassador, and Clerk of the Privy Council (cabinet secretary) during the department’s growth from Mackenzie King’s through to Pearson’s 1968 government. Robertson exemplified the department’s nature and its culture of scrupulous impartiality.

The evolution of such characteristics as caution, scrupulous care, and impartiality were apparent from the time that Mackenzie King became prime minister in 1921 until his retirement in 1948, save for a five-year period.¹ Mackenzie King was a former civil servant who had founded the Department of Labour. He was generally known for his caution and scrupulous behaviour, which accounted for his success as a politician and affected the administrative personality of External Affairs. This mode of international relations was exemplified early on in the months following his assumption of the primeministership.

In 1922, a crisis erupted between Britain and Turkey at the Chanak British outpost on the Dardanelles. The British call for imperial support was answered by the Australians and New Zealanders who sent troops; Mackenzie King, however, was not prepared to say Ready, Aye Ready as the Conservative opposition urged. He demurred and stated that only parliament could authorize such military action. In September 1939, Mackenzie King summoned parliament prior to a declaration of war and military involvement. Even in 1947, during the post–World War II period, Mackenzie King generally shunned involvement at the United Nations and thought that then undersecretary of state for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson had been too active on the Palestine issue.

Mackenzie King retired as Canada’s prime minister before Israel was accorded de facto recognition in late 1948. King set a cautious and scrupulous tone in international relations during his political tenure. The implicit and, occasionally, explicit guidelines continued to carry weight beyond the conclusion of the second decade, 1958–1968, in Canadian–Israeli relations.

Canada welcomed affiliation with the League of Nations and then the United Nations. Through the formation, growth, and governance of these political organizations it was hoped that tragedies like World War II could be avoided. Department of External Affairs personnel were attuned to the optimism that the United Nations could foster, but were fully aware that the reality of the Cold War and a bipolar world necessitated caution and prudence. Moreover, any prospects for progress toward the resolution of seemingly insoluble problems meant that scrupulous assessments along impartial lines would remain the inevitable guidelines. This mode of international relations was certainly operative in the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict. Whatever the sentiments harboured by individual bureaucrats, the guidelines were used as the decisive factor. As noted in my earlier studies, External Affairs resident Arabist Elizabeth MacCallum maintained the department’s impartial role despite her sentiments favouring the Arab side.

As an exercise in unearthing diplomatic history, this study examines how Canada’s scrupulous impartiality in foreign relations follows along the path created in previous international interactions. The diplomatic history of Canadian government policies and practices of non-commitment and prudence evolved into a scrupulous impartiality as far as the Levant was concerned. In the first volume of this trilogy,² which examines the period prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, the theme of non-commitment to a sovereign Jewish state and non-involvement are shown to be the hallmarks of the twenty-two years of Mackenzie King governments. King’s congenital shyness was reflected in keeping out of avoidable predicaments and abiding by Britain’s policy in Palestine. Mackenzie King was not buffeted by domestic pressure from Zionist or other interest groups. The second study in Canadian–Israeli relations, 1948–1958, deals with the governments led by King’s successor Louis S. St. Laurent and, subsequently, John G. Diefenbaker in 1957.³

The permanence of a civil service vouchsafes a guided tradition and prevents turbulence in policy execution without hindering beneficial initiatives. The atmosphere in External Affairs was key in the spring of 1947 as the Canadian representative was able to work through a procedural knot at the United Nations. This enabled the UN to establish the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to make recommendations and investigate solutions to the continually burgeoning Arab–Jewish fighting in Palestine. When Canada was asked to provide a member for the committee, caution and impartiality led to the appointment of a respected Supreme Court justice. In retrospect, the choice was regarded as in accord with impartiality, since a respected judge exemplifies this quality. Nevertheless, the overly cautious Mackenzie King was not pleased because even this seemed too active an international role. His successor, Louis St. Laurent, was less inhibited.

In the Sinai–Suez conflict of the autumn of 1956, the guided tradition in External Affairs allowed for imagination in the formulation of UNEF