The Political Internet

By Hercules Bantas

The growth of communication technologies has raised a host of questions about politics and deliberation in democratic societies. This compilation contains five guides that answer some of the more pressing questions. The compilation is comprised of: Citizen Power and the Internet, The Propaganda Model and the Internet: Smashing the Gateway, Ricoeur's Hermeneutic Arc and the Internet: The Changing Narrative Landscape, Democracy and Postmodern Identity, and Democracy and the Internet.

Citizen Power and the Internet

The rapid adoption of communication technologies, like the Internet, in democratic public spheres has raised the question of whether these new technologies have had a positive or a negative effect upon democratic citizenship. This guide uses Steven Lukes' three-dimensional analysis of power to examine arguments of technological determinism that cast a negative light on the technology, and Castells' positive analysis of mass self-communication.

The Propaganda Model and the Internet

Herman and Chomsky's 'The Propaganda Model', outlined in Manufacturing Consent, describes how they believed the print and broadcast mass media were manipulating information flow into the US public sphere. This ebook begins with a detailed description of the model. It then examines how computer mediated communication, like the Internet, circumvents the information filters and loosens the stranglehold of the mass media.

Ricoeur's Hermeneutic Arc and the Internet

The rise of interactive online games has challenged traditional notions of storytelling, where author tells and audience listens. This ebook uses Ricoeur's concept of a 'hermeneutic arc' to demonstrate how narratives in online games such as World of Warcraft differ from those presented through traditional media such as print and film. The analysis includes the book The Hobbit, the films Apocalypse Now and My Life as a Dog, the graphic novel Watchmen, and the online role-playing game World of Warcraft.

Democracy and Postmodern Identity

The Internet makes it difficult for people to tell exactly whom they are communicating with because online identity can often rely totally upon communicative interactions. Mark Poster argues that this uncertainty- the postmodern identity- can cause difficulties for some democratic public spheres. This guide examines Poster's arguments of the postmodern identity, then applies them to three different deliberative democracy theories- those of Rawls, Habermas, and Dryzek.

Democracy and the Internet

Computer communication technologies, such as the Internet, have become very common in many democratic public spheres throughout the world. The often-asked question is how people can use them for political purposes. Using several real world examples and the deliberative democracy theories of Rawls, Habermas, and Dryzek, this guide answers that question, and shows just what effect they have on the power of citizens.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Hercules Bantas
• Release date: Nov 16, 2010
• ISBN: 9781452314099

Hercules Bantas

Dr Hercules Bantas has been teaching and reading the human sciences for the better part of a decade. It is his opinion that he is too often immersed in some weighty tome or other, the authors of which always use one thousand words where one hundred words would suffice. It was while juggling no less than three weighty tomes by the same author and trying to understand what the fellow was trying to say that the idea of The Reluctant Geek Guides was born. He is well aware that publishing clearly written and unambiguous guides to important ideas in the human sciences is frowned upon in some circles, but he's going to do it anyway. Despite his well documented grumpiness, Hercules claims to like people and can be contacted by email at reluctantgeek[at]tpg.com.au.

Book preview

The Political Internet

Hercules Bantas

A Reluctant Geek Academic Guide

Published by Reluctant Geek

Melbourne, Australia

Copyright Hercules Bantas 2010

Author's Notes

The growth of communication technologies has raised a host of questions about politics and deliberation in democratic societies. This compilation contains five guides that answer some of the more pressing questions. The compilation is comprised of: Citizen Power and the Internet, The Propaganda Model and the Internet: Smashing the Gateway, Ricoeur's Hermeneutic Arc and the Internet: The Changing Narrative Landscape, Democracy and Postmodern Identity, and Democracy and the Internet. Look out for other Reluctant Geek guides including Jürgen Habermas and Deliberative Democracy, John Rawls and Deliberative Democracy, John Dryzek and Deliberative Democracy, Deliberative Democracy Basics, and Deliberative Democracy Essentials.

Table of Contents

Citizen Power and the Internet

The Propaganda Model and the Internet

Ricoeur's Arc and the Internet

Democracy and Postmodern Identity

Democracy and the Internet

Citizen Power and the Internet

Computer mediated communication (CMC) systems, such as the Internet, have changed the way that citizens in democratic societies communicate with one another and with the institutions of their government. The question is, are these changes to communication technology a positive or negative development for democratic citizenship? Because politics is fundamentally about power, the best way to answer this question is to test how CMC has affected citizen power. To this end, I will use Lukes' (1974, 2005) three-dimensional analysis of power as a base point for the discussion as well as a fourth dimension provided by Hindess (1996), to test two arguments on how CMC has affected citizen in democratic societies. The first argument, based on technological determinism, contends that the rapid growth in communication technologies has robbed citizens of choice. However, Web 2.0 technologies coupled with the way that citizens have been adapting CMC to suit themselves strongly suggest otherwise. The second is Castells' argument that CMC systems better equip citizens to resist power through mass self-communication in networked societies. The discussion will begin with an analysis of Lukes and Hindess' arguments on power, before examining the arguments of technical determinism and Castells' networked societies.

Power as a Capacity – Steven Lukes

In his influential book, Power: A Radical View, Steven Lukes defines three dimensions of political power. Each of the dimensions is concerned with the relationship between the wielder of power and the person or people subjected to that power, and they try to explain how the wielder of power manipulates the subject of power in order to make the subject behave as the wielder wants. The one-dimensional view of power, associated with pluralist thinkers such as Dahl, focuses on direct conflict between actors. Lukes argues that the one-dimensional view is necessary (but not sufficient) to decide who does and does not have power (Lukes, 2005, p. 19). Decision-making is at the heart of identifying one-dimensional power. This limits the political agenda to areas where conflict is overt and observable. In one-dimensional power, actor A and actor B are in conflict, actor A decides on a course of action, and actor B complies with the decision. An example of this is when a police officer stands in the middle of a road and diverts the traffic. The motorists obey and deviate from the route they otherwise would have taken but for the police officer’s actions.

Lukes derives two-dimensional power from a critique by Bachrach and Baratz of one-dimensional power, in which a decision made by actor A is followed by actor B. In their critique, Bachrach and Baratz reject the need for decision making in order to analyse power (2005, p. 21). Following their lead, Lukes argues that, in power relationships between actors A and B, coercion is at work when B complies with the wishes of A because of a threat of deprivation. A exercises influence when A is able to change the course of action pursued by B without any tacit or overt threat of deprivation. A exercises authority when B complies with A because B recognises that A’s command ‘...is reasonable in terms of his own values’. A exercises force when A removes B’s choice of compliance or non-compliance. Finally, A manipulates B when B complies with A but is unaware of the exact nature of the source or demand made of him (2005, p. 21). A common feature of both one and two-dimensional power is the need for an observable conflict, either overt or covert, to make an analysis of power possible. In essence, Bachrach and Baratz extend the political agenda to areas where no decision was necessary in order to exercise power. An example of two-dimensional power is the way poverty in the fourth world of slums in developed countries never gets to the top of the political agenda in local or regional governments. The problems are clear but nothing is ever done about them.

In formulating the three-dimensional view of power, Lukes argues that the critique of Dahl is inadequate on a number of fronts, beginning with the extent to which Bachrach and Baratz reject behaviourism. He argues that despite rejecting decision making as the only necessary indicator of power, they retain a commitment to observable behaviour in the pluralist conception of power, which means they keep a focus on the individual. Lukes claims that ‘...the power to control the agenda of politics and exclude potential issues cannot be adequately analysed unless it is seen as a function of collective forces and social arrangements’ (2005, p. 26). He also takes issue with the need for observable conflict, and argues that it is possible to exercise power without observable conflict by arranging matters so that the dominated entity has the same agenda as the dominator. A may exercise power over B by getting B to do as A directs, but also by shaping the very desires, needs and wants of B, so that they coincide with those of A. Therefore, observable conflict may not be present in situations where the dominator is able to shape the preferences of the dominated (2005, p. 27). Finally, Lukes argues that the two-dimensional view of power is inadequate because non-decisional power can only exist if grievances cannot gain entry into the public arena. This is problematic for two reasons. First, the notion of a grievance is too vague and imprecise. Second, it is possible that prevailing social conditions within the group mask grievances or make some actors totally unaware that they are the subject of an exercise of power,

...is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (2005, p. 28)

The three-dimensional view of power is, therefore, a thorough critique of the pluralist view of power, as expressed in the one-dimensional view. It takes the focus from the individual to the collective, and rejects the need for observable conflict, either covert or overt. Examples of three-dimensional power in operation might include capitalist work places, Indian castes, and patriarchal societies.

Lukes also argues that in assessing the overall power of an actor, two judgements are necessary (2005, p. 72). First, the ‘scope’ of the power one is assessing, which essentially refers to what the observer defines as power. Before any assessment is possible, an assessor must answer the question ‘what counts as power?’ The wider the scope, the greater the number of incidents of power use that will be observed. Second, the weight of the outcomes will have a bearing on the assessment of power. The example he uses is particularly illuminating; a judge that can give a death penalty has more power than one who cannot. If a Judge in the state of Texas in the USA can sentence individuals to death for committing murder, while a Judge in New York cannot, then the Judge in Texas has more power that the Judge in New York because the Texan can impose a harsher penalty than the New Yorker can for the same crime.

Lukes’ definition of power allows a judgement about greater power among citizens in a democracy where CMC forums and channels have integrated into the public sphere. Attempting to use the definitions on a large scale, such as an entire nation state, will prove difficult because the more people who are involved in the analysis, the greater the proliferation of power, and the more complex the relationships. The many influences on power relationships in such a large-scale analysis complicate any attempt to determine whether the use of CMC forums and channels have led to a change in citizen power. Smaller scale analysis, with fewer power relationships, would be more appropriate for this type of examination. The examples used in the analysis, therefore, will be restricted in size wherever possible in order to minimise the number of power relationships involved.

Lukes’ three dimensions of power provide the tools to identify any changes in power due to CMC media in the public sphere. One-dimensional power is associated with open conflict between the actors and one or more of the actors makes a decision that the others follow. Two-dimensional power does not require an actor to make a decision for the others to follow, but like one-dimensional power, observable overt or covert conflict is necessary. Three-dimensional power does not require observable conflict between the actors, and the subject of the power may be unaware that they are not acting in their own interest.

Dowding, amongst others (Hindess, 1996), has identified a relativistic problem in Lukes’ three dimensions of power, where actors are unaware of forces that govern their behaviour. The ‘Foucaultian trap’ as he labels it is ‘... where all social relations are seen in the same relativistic light and where all - dominated and dominant alike - are subject to the same power of structural relations and so all are subject to the same moral opprobrium’ (Dowding, 2006, p. 136) . However, Dowding argues that Lukes’ conception of three-dimensional power can avoid the relativistic problems of this Foucaultian trap by adopting an externalist viewpoint, where it is possible to analyse the reasons behind an actor’s actions, even if the actor never invokes those reasons, or is unconscious of their existence. Therefore, the structural forces that may play a part in the actor’s actions are also visible to the observer, and their influence included in the analysis.

Perhaps the most important reason for the widespread acceptance of Lukes' argument about three dimensions of power is that in power as a capacity to act he found a common ground between American debates about the political power of individuals and European debates about the power of collective actors. Upon this common ground he constructed his three dimensions of power as a capacity to change behaviour, as a capacity to shape agendas, and as a capacity to dominate. More importantly, this common ground in power as a capacity offered an antidote to the risks of relativism that arise with any critique of the hope that it is possible to view power as an unaffected and politically unengaged outsider (2006, p. 136). At the same time, this great strength of Lukes’ argument comes at the cost of ignoring the moral aspects of power, legitimacy, and credit and blame for the consequences of how power is deployed. Hindess expands on this shortcoming in Lukes’ argument about the three dimensions of power as a capacity.

Power as a Right – Barry Hindess

According to Hindess (1996, p. 10), Lukes' three dimensions of power as a capacity are problematic for two reasons. First, a conception of power resting on consent has been central to modern Western political and social thought. Second, Lukes dismisses alternative conceptions of power out of hand. An analysis using a conception of power based on consent is necessary for two reasons. First, while power as a capacity does not require communication between actors, power based upon consent does. Second, while power as a capacity aspires to apply to any individual or collective actor at