Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states have no effect on anything. The feeling of pain, counterintuitively, does not cause your aversion, mentally or physically. Beliefs don’t cause behavior. None of our actions occur in virtue of our thoughts, feelings, or sensations.

Inspired by Matthew Adelstein’s post defending epiphenomenalism, I want to explain my opposition to the view. A few times, he referenced a podcast episode / blog post of mine from 2020, which I hadn’t read since it was first posted. I found a few things to disagree with in my own episode, so I thought I’d respond to Matthew and try to offer an updated critique of epiphenomenalism in the process. While epiphenomenalism is probably less wrong than physicalism, the causal efficacy of our mental states is as evident as anything, so the view should still be rejected in favor of panpsychism or interactionist dualism. As Paul Draper once put it, “wild ideas are needed” to explain consciousness, but I don’t think epiphenomenalism is the right wild idea.

After responding to a few key points from Matthew, I offer a few reasons to reject epiphenomenalism:




Epiphenomenalism is self-defeating.
The evidence that supports the causal influence of mental states is the exact same kind of evidence for causal influence in other cases. This not only supports mental causation, but also raises the threat of undermining the epiphenomenalist’s claim that the physical has causal powers.
The phenomenal powers view as defended by Mørch (2017, 2020) is plausible and entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. In short, there are plausible examples of causal necessity in the mind.
Among metaphysical theories of consciousness, epiphenomenalism is the most vulnerable to the problem of psychophysical harmony.




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