In the first part of this two-part episode of The Idealcast, Gene Kim speaks with Dr. Ron Westrum, Emeritus Professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University. His work on organizational culture and his contribution of the Westrum organizational typology model have been instrumental in understanding what makes a high-performing organization across industries. For decades, he has studied complex organizations from medicine to aviation to the nuclear industry.
 
In part one of their conversation, Kim and Westrum talk about the stark contrast between NASA’s highly experimental culture of the Apollo space program versus the highly compliance-driven culture of the US Space Shuttle program, and Westrum’s opinions on how to bring that experimental culture back. They also discuss the origins of the Westrum organizational typology model and some of the insights that led to it. Finally, Westrum shares what organizations should do when things go wrong in complex systems.
 
ABOUT THE GUEST
Dr. Ron Westrum is Emeritus Professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University. He holds a B.A. (honors) from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Chicago.
 
Dr. Westrum is a specialist in the sociology of science and technology and complex organizations. He has written three books, Complex Organizations: Growth, Development and Change; Technologies and Society: The Shaping of People and Things, and Sidewinder: Creative Missile Design at China Lake. He has also written about fifty articles and book chapters. His work on organizational culture has been valuable for the aviation industry and to medical safety, as well as to other areas of endeavor. He has been a consultant to NASA, the National Research Council, and the Resilience Core Group. He is currently at work on a book on information flow cultures.
 
YOU’LL LEARN ABOUT
 
Why much of the body of knowledge around safety culture came from sociology as opposed to psychology.
How Westrum views the stark contrast in NASA between the highly experimental culture of the Apollo space program versus what has been characterized as a highly compliance-driven culture of the US Space Shuttle program.
Insightful and useful opinions on what would be required to bring that experimental culture back in NASA.
The origins of the Westrum organization typology model and some of the insights that led to it.
Why Westrum views the notion of a technical maestro important to get the desired outcomes.
What Westrum thinks should ideally happen when things go wrong in complex systems.

 
RESOURCES
 
State of DevOps Reports
Westrum organizational culture
The study of information flow: A personal journey by Ron Westrum
Sidewinder: Creative Missile Design at China Lake by Ron Westrum
Complex Organizations: Growth, Development and Change by Ron Westrum
Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies by Charles Perrow
Crew resource management or cockpit resource management (CRM)
The Human Factor in Aircraft Accidents by David Beaty
Naked Pilot: The Human Factor in Aircraft Accidents by David Beaty
United Airlines Flight 232
Cockpit Voice Recorder Database
Captain Al Haynes' 1991 lecture at NASA Ames Research Center
It's Your Ship: Management Techniques from the Best Damn Ship in the Navy by Michael Abrashoff
Apollo 13
Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
Space Shuttle Columbia disaster
CBS News article: "Readdy says 'no rationale' for spy satellite inspection"
Apollo 13 (1995) - Square Peg in a Round Hole Scene
Health inequalities among British civil servants: the Whitehall II study by Jane Ferrie, Martin J Shipley, George Davey Smith, Stephen A Stansfeld and Michael G Marmot
Facing Ambiguous Threats by Michael Roberto, Richard M.J. Bohmer, and Amy C. Edmondson
DevOps Enterprise Summit Virtual
Nasa Cut or Delayed Safety Spending by Stuart Diamond
Mars Curiosity Rover Landing Space 2015
How Apple Is Organized for Innovation by Joel M. Podolny and Morten T. Hansen
Arthur Squires
The Tender Ship: Go