The Greek State at War, Part II

By W. Kendrick Pritchett

The volumes of The Greek State at War are an essential reference for the classical scholar. Professor Pritchett has systematically canvassed ancient texts and secondary literature for references to specific topics; each volume explores a unique aspect of Greek military practice.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1975.
The volumes of The Greek State at War are an essential reference for the classical scholar. Professor Pritchett has systematically canvassed ancient texts and secondary literature for references to specific topics; each volume explores a unique aspect of

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of California Press
• Release date: Mar 29, 2024
• ISBN: 9780520342064

W. Kendrick Pritchett

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THE GREEK STATE AT WAR

Part II

The

Greek State

at War

Part II

By

W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT, F.B.A.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

BERKELEY · Los ANGELES · LONDON

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, LTD., LONDON, ENGLAND

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD No.: 74-77991 ISBN: 0-520-02565-2

© 1974 BY THE REGENTS of THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO

EDP

(AGAIN)

CONTENTS 1

CONTENTS 1

ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I TRIALS OF GENERALS

CHAPTER II THE GENERALS AND THE STATE

CHAPTER III THE CONDOTTIERI OF THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

CHAPTER IV IPHIKRATES AND HIS CORINTHIAN PELTASTS

CHAPTER V PROFITS OF GENERALS

CHAPTER VI FORTIFIED CAMPS

CHAPTER VII THE CHALLENGE TO BATTLE

CHAPTER VIII SURPRISE ATTACKS

CHAPTER IX AMBUSCADES

CHAPTER X THE WINGS OF

CHAPTER XI GREEK MILITARY TRAINING

CHAPTER XII GREEK MILITARY DISCIPLINE

CHAPTER XIII THE BATTLEFIELD TROPHY

CHAPTER XIV ARISTEIA IN GREEK WARFARE

INDEX OF ANCIENT AUTHORS CITED

INDEX OF INSCRIPTIONS CITED

INDEX OF IMPORTANT GREEK WORDS

ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

HANS DELBRCCK explained in the Vorwort to the fourth volume of his Geschichte der Kriegskunst that the purpose of his work was to establish the connection between the State on the one hand, and tactics and strategy on the other, and that it was intended not only for the student of the art of war but for the world historian:

Die Erkenntnis der Wechselwirkung zwischen Taktik, Strategic, Staatsverfassung und Politik wirft ihr Licht auf den Zusammenhang der Universalgeschichte und hat Vieles, was bisher im Dunkel lag oder verkannt wurde, aufgehellt. Nicht um der Kriegskunst willen ist dieses Werk geschrieben worden, sondern um der Weltgeschichte willen. Wenn Militars es lesen und darauf Anregungen entnehmen, so kann mir das nur recht sein und ist mir eine Ehre; geschrieben aber ist es fur Geschichtsfreunde von einem Historiker.1

Delbriick commented that before any general conclusions could be drawn from wars of the past, the historian must determine as accurately as possible how these wars had been fought. He must grapple with the trivial happenings and the smallest facts of past warfare.2

Military organization was a typical product of the whole social system of antiquity. The ancient historians, however, generally speaking, interpreted their tasks within narrow limits and wrote, not economic or social histories of war, but strictly military ones. Such is our main mass of material; from this we have to glean what we can about social and economic matters; and hence I have interpreted my title in a general way, and have not hesitated to offer conclusions about economic conditions. The investigations of the trials of Greek generals revealed, for instance, that home authorities maintained throughout the Hellenic period a rigid control over hegemones serving abroad and led me to question in the two chapters following this investigation a prevailing modern theory that the state lost control over the military machine, much as occurred in the period of the condottieri in the history of fifteenth century Italy. The fourth chapter, on Iphikrates and Konon, has to do with the economic revival brought about in Athens, and never fully appreciated, by the pouring in of Persian money.

Other chapters in this second volume treat various aspects of warfare which have not been handled adequately in the modern literature. My practice has been to collect the testimonia about a given topic and present the facts as succinctly as possible, preferably in the form of tables. I hope that this procedure may lead others into further exploration of the subjects treated, as evidence unknown to me may be brought to light. My approach is mainly philological; the interpretation of specific words is the keystone.

In this connection I must deplore the lack of complete concordances for major Greek authors.

It has taken hours of patient labor to amass the material. It is in the nature of things that when one embarks on a large project of this sort, one has only a vague notion of what the conclusions will be, and it is only in the advanced stage of research that one begins to form a clear idea of what the approach should have been; the conclusions force themselves upon one gradually as the material piles up. There is inevitably some overlapping and some repetition, as subjects are successively examined; the same ground may have to be gone over a number of times from different points of view, and new insights may be revealed at each turn. In some chapters I have had cut-off dates; for instance the battle of Chaironeia, after which the Greek world changed so much. But for other subjects for which evidence is sparse, I have collected data as late as Lucian. Absolute consistency has not been possible, or perhaps even desirable. Ideally, one should spend fifteen or twenty years collecting all the material and, only then, sit down and sift it and present it with maximum effectiveness. This volume marks the halfway point in an investigation which I would hope would permit a more accurate appraisal of the νόμιμα of ancient warfare. I hope ultimately to correlate the present study with my topographical investigations, and to conclude with some personal appraisals of the relative reliability of the various Greek historians, not only in the battle accounts proper, but in their general treatment of military matters.

The innumerable references have been checked by four graduate students in the Department of Classics at Berkeley, Miss Barbara Saylor, Mrs. Helena Miller, Mr. W. Batstone, and Mr. Joseph Breslin. The first draft of the manuscript was carefully typed by Miss Marcia Toy; when she was unable to continue, Miss Saylor kindly completed the task. Some chapters have been read by Professors I. M. Linforth, R. Sealey, R. Stroud, and F. Stone, and I have appreciated their criticisms. I am indebted to Hugh Lloyd-Jones for clarification of one point about the trophy. My particular thanks go to August Fruge, Director, and Susan Peters, of the Editorial Department, of the University of California Press for their help while the manuscript was in their hands. Three of the chapters were written while in residence at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, and I wish to thank the authorities at the School for granting me every facility. Some financial assistance has come from the Committee on Research and the Work Studies Program of the University of California. A former volume was dedicated to my wife. Now I can only renew the dedication with still deeper feeling for all that she has done for me in the course of thirty years.

The manuscript was completed in April, 1973.

The first part of this study was originally published in the University of California Publications in Classical Studies as volume 7, under the title Ancient Greek Military Practices, Part I. It is now reissued as a companion volume to this present one under the changed title The Greek State at War, Part I.

1 Geschichte der Kriegskunst 4 (Berlin 1920) ii-iii.

2 Cf. also the Vorrede to the first volume: I² (Berlin 1920) vi-xi.

CHAPTER I

TRIALS OF GENERALS

DEMOSTHENES (4 First Philippic 47) says that Athenian generals die like malefactors by sentence of the law and not on the field of battle: "How then is all this to be stopped? As soon as you, men of Athens, definitely appoint the same men as soldiers and as eyewitnesses of the campaign, and, on their return, as jurymen at the audit (ευθυναί) of your generals. In this way you will not merely learn about your affairs by hearsay, but you will be witnesses on the spot. So scandalous is our present system that every general is tried two or three times for his life in your courts" (Loeb). The context of this statement, delivered in the spring of 351, is the claim, which will be discussed later, that Athenian armies were mercenary ones, lacking any force of citizens. The speech of Demosthenes was ineffectual, and not until October did the Athenians send an armament against Philip; and even then it was the mercenary commander Charidemos who was dispatched to the Chersonesos with only ten triremes and five talents in money.1 Similarly, the orator Hypereides begins his speech in Defense of Euxenippos with an expression of surprise that the jury was not tired of impeachments. Some, he says, were accused of betraying ships, others of giving up Athenian cities, and another, an orator, of speaking against the people’s interests.2 Finally, Demosthenes speaks of the number of indictments, audits, impeachments, and the like (γραφάς, ενθύνας, εισαγγελίας, πάντα ταΰτα), which took place in the period which followed Chaironeia.3

Attested examples of the trials of Greek hegemones are presented in Table I.4 There are seventy of these.5 With one exception, the collection includes examples down to 354 B.C. when it becomes difficult to unravel the evidence in the Attic Orators. An example of our difficulty occurs in Demosthenes 19 De false legatione 180, where the speaker refers to sentences of death or fine upon hegemones who had failed in Thrake. Four of the names can be identified as Athenian strategoi; but about the fifth, Dionysios, we can only speculate that he is the same as the naval leader mentioned in Xenophon Hell. 5.1.26. Bribery was included in the charges.

TABLE 1

Trials of Hegemones

continued

continued

TABLE 1—Continued

continued

TABLE 1—Continued

a The dates are in several cases disputed. The ones given in the table frequently follow the dates used in Der Kleine Pauly. Where a single reference will establish the fact of a trial, this frequently is the only one given.

b Nepos (Milt. 7.5) and Justin (2.15.19) allege that the charge was bribery.

c See A. W. Gomme, HCT 2, 182.

d See Gomme, ibid.

θ Thucydides uses the verb ὲπαιτιάομαι, which probably means not a formal charge, but blame.

f For the date, see V. Ehrenberg, AJP 66 (1945) 123-127.

S’ Cf. Plutarch Aristeides 26.5, Anth. Pal. 7.614 and Gomme, HCT 2, 332.

h Marcellinus (55) asserts that the charge was προδοσία and this is implied by Aristophanes Vespae 288. Thucydides’s own expression (5.26.5: ξννέβη μοι φζύγαν) admits the view that he withdrew by voluntary exile; and the trials of hegemones could be held in absentia, as was the case, for example, with Hermokrates (Xenophon Hell. 1.1.28-29) and Pasippidas (Hell. 1.1.32) in 410 B.C. The precise statement of Pausanias (1.23.9) that Thucydides was recalled on the motion of Oinobios implies that he did not return with the rest under the general amnesty of 404. For various solutions, none conclusive, see Andrewes HCT 4, 14-15.

1 Since Ergokles appointed a tamias (Lysias 29.3), I follow A. Krause (Attische Strategenlisten [Weimar 1914]) and F. Kiechle (Der Kleine Pauly 2 [1967] 355) in assuming that he was strategos. Grote (History 9.194) writes of him as a citizen.

k I follow Kirchner (PJ 4092) in assuming that the Dionysios of the Hellenika is the same hegemon reported by Demosthenes as tried and condemned. The three other hegemones grouped by Xenophon with Dionysios may have incurred the same fate. The fact that Xenophon goes to the trouble to name all four suggests a degree of notoriety.

6 For Kallistratos’ generalship, see A. Krause, Attische Strategenlisten (Weimar 1914) 18 and 53.

m I give the dates of Cawkwell, Class, et Med. 23 (1962) 45—49.

Again, Deinarchos (1 Against Demosthenes 747 ) writes that the three Theban commanders at Chaironeia were guilty of taking bribes; but there is no way to tell whether these were popular charges or the consequence of legal decisions. Finally, there were trials in the 360’s and 350’s, a period of many Athenian failures, for which even approximate dates cannot be determined. Thus, scholars conclude from Demosthenes 19 De falsa legatione 332 that Chares was repeatedly brought to trial and acquitted; but no dates can be assigned, except to the impeachment by Kephisodotos in the Olynthian war in 348 (Aristotle Rhet, 3.10.7).

Cases of acquittal in the table do not tell the whole story, because it is clear, for example, from Aischines 2 De falsa legatione 70-71, Demosthenes 19 De falsa legatione 332, and Aristotle Rhetoric 1.15.15.1376a, that Chares was accused in the courts (ep τοΐς άγώσιν act τοΐς Χάρητος oi κατήγοροι) for his conduct in Thrake and during the Social War; but we know that he was continued in office until the battle of Chaironeia. Similarly, according to Thucydides, two Spartan polemarchs were convicted of malakia, but other commanders were characterized as μαλακός by the historian and incurred no penalty.8 Major defeats were suffered in the field, but there is no evidence that the hegemones were prosecuted. Sometimes, of course, the general was killed in the battle, like Hippokrates at Delion,9 and could not be made a scapegoat. Furthermore, when we are told that generals were deposed from office, it is not always clear that any formal charges were lodged. After the battle of Notion in 407, Xenophon says that the Athenians were angry with Alkibiades and chose ten new generals.10 Since Alkibiades sailed away to his refuge in the Chersonese, it is possible that no formal charges were lodged against the others; but we have no record.

It may be noted that the actual occurrence of some trials has been called into question. Thus, there is a large bibliography about the trial of Epameinondas. The problem has been studied most recently by H. Bcister, Untersuchungen zu der £eit der thebanischen Hegemonic (Munich 1970) 75-105, with bibliography. See, however, Cawkwell, CQ (1972) 276-278. The collection in the table presents the ancient evidence without modern theorizing.

My purpose in making the collection was to see, if possible, how extensive was the miscarriage of justice in these cases, to study the relation of failure in military leadership to political disgrace, to ascertain what the charges were, to determine how widespread in the Greek world was the practice of indictment of hegemones, and to collect any explicit evidence about the injurious effect which the fear of accusation had on hegemones in the conduct of their campaigns.

1. Trials vis-a-vis justice. No unanimity of opinion, probably, will ever be reached about the justice of the verdicts in many of the trials.11 But the words of the ancients themselves reveal various clues, and it will be useful to pass in review selected cases where some judgment can be made.

Thucydides says in his excursus on the fate of Pausanias (1.132.5) that the Lakedaimonians were "not over-hasty, in the case of a Spartan, in adopting an inviolable decision unless they had indisputable proofs [vev αναμφισβήτητων τεκμηρίων]." On his first recall from Byzantion, the main charge against Pausanias was Medism, and Thucydides adds, It seemed to be perfectly clear [κατηγορεΐτο δέ αύτοϋ ούχ ήκιστα μηδισμός και εδόκει σαφεστατον είναι: 1.95.5]. Similarly, after the second recall Thucydides recorded that the Lakedaimonians found out that Pausanias was intriguing with the helots and adds and so it was [επυνθάνοντο δε και ες τούς Είλωτας πράσσειν τι αυτόν, και ην δε ούτως: 1.132.4]. Plutarch (Perikles 22) records the corruption of Pleistoanax by bribery in 445 as a fact. Thucydides’ language is more guarded: "since he was thought to have been bribed to retreat [αύτώ δόζαντι χρημασι πεισθήναι την άναχώ- ρησιν]."12 According to Ephoros, as quoted in the scholia on Aristophanes Nubes 859, Perikles used public money to bribe Pleistoanax and when asked to account for it, refused to say more than that it was expended for a necessary purpose. Jokes upon the subject in the comedies of the time are very revealing. In Nubes 859, a spendthrift son asks his half-crazed father what has become of his shoes, and the answer is: "Like Perikles once, I laid them out ‘for sundry needs’ (εις τό δέον)." There is presumptive evidence for the guilt of Pleistoanax.

As to the trial of Perikles in 430, the explicit testimony of Thucydides to his probity,13 and his reinstatement as soon as the anger of the Athenians had passed, clear his character. In only one case, however, does Thucydides expressly say that a charge was false (διαβάλλειν: 8.54.3). Peisander obtained from the assembly a vote deposing Phrynichos from his command under the accusation of having traitorously caused the loss of lasos and the capture of Amorges after the battle of Miletos, but the deposition was made with the real certainty that he would prove an insuperable bar to all negotiations with Alkibiades. In this displacement of Phrynichos and his colleague Skironides, Peisander received the support of various political clubs.

The trial of Phormio in 428 shows that even victorious generals might be condemned, in this case on a charge of peculation. Aristotle Ath. Pol. 54.2 proves that any official might be tried on a charge of financial irregularities. In spite of his successes at Naupaktos, the career of Phormio as a war leader was ended.14

After the defeat at Kyzikos, a sentence of banishment was passed at Syrakuse against Hermokrates and his colleagues in Asia. Xenophon gives to Hermokrates in his address to the soldiers words which emphasize the injustice and illegality of the punishment: ως αδίκως φεύγουν άπαντες παρά τον νόμον.15 Indeed, Hermokrates in his subsequent conduct proved to be personally incorruptible. But the expedition had been a complete failure, and Hermokrates’ original assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but disappointment.16 The sentence of banishment was undeserved, but there was ample cause for the discontent of the Syrakusans.

In 406 in Sikily, after the victory of the Syrakusan Daphnaios over the Athenians, the people of Akragas watched from their walls the flight of the vanquished and urged their generals to lead them forth for immediate attack. But the generals, possibly fearing that Akragas might be stripped of its defenders and that Himilkon might seize the occasion for assaulting it, resisted the demand. When Daphnaios of Syrakuse reached Akragas, a public assembly was held and the generals were put under accusation for allowing the defeated Iberians to escape. Four out of five were stoned to death on the spot.17

In the same year (406), after the Athenian naval victory off the islands of Arginousai,18 the Athenians in their grief over the loss of their men, deposed the generals with the exception of Konon, who was blockaded in the harbor of Mytilene, and ordered them to report. Only six obeyed the summons. Immediately after the battle, the general Erasinades had proposed to go at once to the relief of the blockaded squadron, but Diomedon made a counter proposal to detach some ships to recover the crews of the disabled ships. The rescue work was assigned to two trierarchs, Theramenes and Thrasyboulos. But after some unaccountable delay, a violent storm arose, and it was no longer possible to visit the wrecks. Theramenes became the chief accuser on a charge of betrayal of the naval forces of the city. He took advantage of the fact that before the boule acted on the motion of Timokrates the Apatouria was celebrated. Like our Christmas, this was an occasion of family reunions, and the grief of bereaved relatives must have been great. As brought out by R. J. Bonner and G. Smith,19 there were many injustices in the procedure. The generals were denied separate trials, and time for defense. The case was turned over to the assembly rather than a court. The advocate of the generals, Euryptolemos, warned the people that if they persisted in their illegal course they would surely regret it. And they did.20 R. J. Bonner concludes that the trial resulted in a flagrant miscarriage of justice.21

One trial, which has been characterized as iniquitous and a sad travesty of justice,22 had to do with Ismenias, the leader of the anti-Sparta party at Thebes in 382.23 When Agesilaos obtained the right to garrison the Kadmeia and to support Leontiades in the government of Thebes, the boiotarch Ismenias was brought to trial. The court consisted of three Spartan commissioners and one from each allied city.24 The real motive of the Spartans is thought to have been revenge upon a distinguished Theban who had opposed them in the war of 395-387. At least the alleged charge of conspiring with the Persian king was hardly one which will bear scrutiny,25 since the Spartans themselves had acted a few years before, not merely as allies, but as instruments of the king.26 The most interesting feature about the trial is the procedure of a court of the Spartan League condemning a political antagonist.27

In this same period of Spartan-Theban relations, our impression of the justice of the verdict against the three Spartan leaders who surrendered the Kadmeia in 379 or 378,28 depends on which source we follow. Probably, there is no event in fourth-century history where our sources are more contradictory than in the account of the revolution at Thebes. According to Diodoros (15.25-27), the Lakedaimonian officers did everything which brave men could do. They resisted a long time, repelled many attacks, and were only prevented from holding out by a mutiny among the members of their garrison. By this account, the sentence must be regarded as excessive. According to Xenophon (Hell. 5.4), on the other hand, the commander of the Spartan garrison lost his nerve and agreed to evacuate his post without even standing an assault and without waiting for a relief expedition. The vote of condemnation by the Spartans was deserved. Modern historians seem to follow the account in Xenophon in spite of his recognized philo-Lakonian partialities. The more credible narrative of Xenophon leaves small wonder that the Spartans condemned the man to death.29

In the following year, after the daring coup de main of Pelopidas and Melon against the Spartan-controlled government of Thebes, the two Athenian generals who had aided the enterprise were condemned.30 The Athenians presumably wished to avoid giving offense to Sparta after Lakedaimonian envoys arrived in Athens to demand satisfaction. The two generals had acted without consulting the state, and, Grote says, were unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse of their official functions.31

The action which resulted in the trial of Sphodrias (in Diodoros Sphodriades) took place in 378 at the very time the three Spartan envoys were in Athens to negotiate. This Spartan officer, commander at Thcspiai, appeared suddenly in the Thriasian plain between Eleusis and Athens, pillaged the houses, and retired. His intention had been to seize the Peiraieus. The Spartan envoys assured the Athenians that his action was irresponsible and that he would be executed. Indeed, Sphodrias disobeyed the subsequent summons to present himself for trial at Sparta. Our sources leave no doubt about his guilt. Diodoros calls this a miscarriage of justice (αδίκως απελυθη) 32 Xenophon says that to some the case was the most unjust ever known in Lakedaimon (καί πολλοί? εδοξεν αΰτη δη άδικώτατα εν Λακεδαίμονι η δίκη κριθήνοα),33 Conditions attending the peculiar intimacy between the son of Sphodrias and the son of Agesilaos induced Agesilaos to put aside his judicial convictions and vote for acquittal. Xenophon attributes to him the statement, To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty, upon that there can be no doubt. But we cannot put to death a man who as a child, boy, and young man has performed all the duties of a Spartan. Sparta has need of such soldiers.34 The support of Agesilaos, leader of the party opposing Kleombrotos and Sphodrias, insured a favorable verdict.35 This remarkable incident comes to us from an historian who was not only philo-Lakonian but personally intimate with Agesilaos, and the account has all the air of being derived from personal knowledge.36

Thus, in the same campaigning season, and possibly within a few days of each other, Athens and Sparta had tried cases against clear misconduct in office. Both hegemones had abused their official functions. On the one hand, kingly influence brought about acquittal in a case where the guilt of the accused was conceded by his absence. The Athenians, on the other hand, enforced the law against misconduct in a case where their sympathies must have been with the act, though their fear of war with Sparta was doubtless a factor.

In 373, Timotheos was invested with the generalship to relieve the besieged Kerkyra. Athenian generals were now experiencing terrible difficulties in procuring money for the maintenance of the army. In the summer, Iphikrates had maintained his seamen by finding work for them on the farms of the Kerkyraians. Timotheos appears first to have made futile recruiting cruises in the Aegean, while the Kerkyraians were being all but starved out. Timotheos was recalled and tried for his self-originated cruise.37 Although he was acquitted, his military treasurer Antimachos was condemned to death, the court apparently believing, on what evidence we do not know, that he had been guilty of fraud in dealing with the public money.

In the Theban campaign of 370/69, marked by a series of successes, Epameinondas, after liberating all western Lakonia, founded the new city of Messene and invited all refugees abroad to become citizens of the new commonwealth. The Thebans remained four months beyond the legal duration of command. By the law of Thebes, any general who retained his office longer than the fixed period was called worthy of death.38 Before an elated army, returning with their achievements and proud of their commanders, Epameinondas came forward to justify himself and colleagues.39 He and the other hegemones were acquitted by acclamation without even the formality of a vote.40 To judge from Cicero De inventione 1.33.55-56 and 38.69, the trial became a model case in the schools for argumentation over whether one is bound to forget the letter of the law and to consider the intent of the lawmaker.

In 368/7, the Boiotian generals were condemned to fines and deposition from office for their unskillful management of a retreat from Thessaly before the army of Alexander aided by Athenians under the command of Autokies.41 The entire army was saved from destruction by Epameinondas, at the time a hoplite in the ranks. To judge from Diodoros (15.71.6), the army deposed their generals and appointed Epameinondas as strategos.42 This seems to be a clear case where there were no charges of bribery: the disgrace of the unsuccessful boiotarchs resulted from their incompetence in the field.

In 363, after the Theban commander at Tegea (with three hundred hoplites of the Boiotians, and in fear of being called to account for misappropriation of the temple treasures) closed the gates and seized the aristocrats (τούς βέλτιστους), he was brought to trial by the Arkadians but acquitted, with the recommendation, however, that he be retried at Thebes. Xenophon says that the Arkadians knew that he spoke falsely (κα,ίπερ γιγνώσκοντες otl εψεύδετο).43

In the campaign against Byzantion in 354, a plan of attack was agreed upon by Chares and the other commanders of the Athenian fleet, Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Menestheus. Chares persisted in the attack; but the others abandoned the plan because of a storm. Chares was defeated in the battle of Embata, and on return to Athens charged his colleagues with corruption. Timotheos was sentenced to a fine of 100 talents and left Athens.44

One gathers from Aristotle (Rhet. 2.3.13-14) that little more was involved in the trials of the mid-fourth century than the wrath of the demos against an unsuccessful general. When Philokrates was asked why he did not defend himself, he replied that he would wait until someone else was under accusation. For men recover their calmness as soon as they have expended their anger upon another object, as happened in the case of Ergophilos. For though they were more indignant with him than with Kallisthenes, they let him off, because they had condemned Kallisthenes to death the day before.

G. Grote has written (History 10.164): A defeated general in Greece, if he survived his defeat, was not infrequently banished, even where there seems neither proof nor probability that he had been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgement, or omission. In appreciating the manner in which the Greek city-states, both democratical and oligarchical, dealt with the hegemon, we must recognize that this was contemporary practice. When the Karthaginians were defeated at Himera, they banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal, and condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. The entire family was dishonored. As Grote remarks, Those who censure the Greeks, will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review the proceedings of the Carthaginians.

There are two other bits of evidence which shed light on the problem of whether the verdicts were just: the relative infrequency of acquittal, and the fact that so many who were accused did not wait to stand trial.

Of the eight examples of acquittal at Athens (Miltiades [493], Kimon, Laches [?], Anytos, Chabrias and Kallistratos, Ergophilos, Aristophon, Iphikrates, and Menesthenes), Anytos is said to have saved himself from condemnation by bribing the dikastery, being the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption.45 Chabrias and Kallistratos were acquitted apparently as the result of a memorable harangue by Kallistratos, which Demosthenes heard as a youth with such admiration.46

Hypereides begins his defense of Euxenippos (4.2) with these words:

και ούτε τούτων πεντε οντων ονδεις νπεμεινε τον αγώνα, αλλ’ αυτοί ωχοντο φεύγοντας εκ της πόλεως, οντ άλλοι πολλοί των εισαγγελλομενων, άλλ’ ην σπάνιον ιδεΐν απ’ εισαγγελίας τινά κρινόμενον νπακουσαντα εις το δικαστηρίου [Although there were five men impeached, no one waited to be tried. They left the city and went into exile. The same is true of many others who were impeached. It was a rare thing to see anyone accused under eisangelia appearing in court.]

Timomachos,47 Leosthenes,48 Kallistratos,49 Philon, and Theotimos fled from Athens, rather than be tried. Kallistratos together with Chabrias was acquitted as a result of a masterly speech, but he did not test a second time the power of his eloquence and, being accused, went into voluntary exile.50 When he did return to Athens, he was immediately executed.51 Philokrates was indicted by Hypereides in 343 and went into exile without standing trial.52 In the fifth century, Alkibiades,53 Demosthenes,54 Gylon,55 maternal grandfather of the orator Demosthenes, and Konon were afraid to return home and stand trial. The case of Konon is the most interesting, because he put forth his utmost effort to get his fleet manned and in some condition for resistance at Aigospotamoi in 405;56 but plainly he did not expect to receive a fair hearing at Athens. He took shelter with Evagoras, prince of Salamis in the island of Kypros, and later inspired the program of reviving Persian sea-power. Not until after his great victory at Knidos in 394 did he return to Athens as deliverer of his country with funds from Pharnabazos for rebuilding the Long Walls.57 Konon was clearly a patriot and an able admiral; but Aigospotamoi would have cost him his life if he had returned.

Parenthetically, it may be noted that the passage of time did not relieve a soldier from being accused. When Leokrates returned home seven years after the battle of Chaironeia he was impeached by an εΙσαγγελία προδοσίας, instituted by Lykourgos.58 In the battle of Corinth, many Athenians behaved in a cowardly way;59 and it was only after many years that Theomnestos was brought to trial for ρίψασπις. Both Leokrates and Theomnestos60 were acquitted, the former by obtaining an equal division of the vote of the dikasts. We may speculate that Demosthenes in 426 may have delayed his return until the initial impact of his defeat had worn off, when he, like Leokrates and Theomnestos, might stand a better chance for acquittal.

A reasonable conclusion to draw from the available facts seems to be that any general who demonstrated incompetence in the field or suffered a major defeat was likely to be brought to trial. Unless he had confidence in his power of eloquence, he might well hesitate to return; and even Antiphon, who Thucydides says made the most magnificent defense against a capital charge,61 was condemned to death.

R. J. Bonner says that the notoriety of this trial [of the generals after Arginousai] shows that such patent miscarriages of justice were the exception and not the rule.62 This trial does illustrate an important feature of the administration of justice at Athens, namely, the law holding speakers responsible for deceiving the boule, ekklesia, or dikasterion. Belated action is of no benefit to the victims of injustice, especially in capital cases; but the condemnation of the five speakers who had deceived the ekklesia into condemning the generals of Arginousai stood as a salutary warning for the future.

One gains the impression, however, from study of the seventy examples that when the mob spirit was aroused and the people cast off judicial restraints, as the Athenian demos did in 406 or the Argives in 418, grave injustice was done. But when a legal trial was held with the tribunal under oath and the defendants having a fixed time for their defense, justice tended to prevail, that is, a justice lacking any popular sense of compassion,63 but focusing on the reality of military failure.

The ancient strategos must have entered upon his command in the sort of frank acceptance of risk well expressed in a statement of Marshal Ferdinand Foch: Great results in war are due to the commander. History is therefore right in making generals responsible for victories—in which case they are glorified; and for defeats—in which case they are disgraced.⁶⁴

2. Trials vis-a-vis politics. To examine the extent to which politics entered into military trials, a distinction must be made between the orators, or προστάται, 65 on the one hand, and the generals on the other, at least for the fourth century. Isokrates (8 On the Peace 54-55) says: So far are we different from our ancestors that whereas they chose the same men to preside over the city and to be generals in the field, … we do the very opposite; for the men whose counsels we follow in matters of the greatest importance—these we do not see fit to elect as our generals … but men whose counsel no one would seek either on his own business or on that of the state 66 —these we send into the field as autokratores. The orator Aristophon is said to have been indicted seventy-five times by graphe paranomon;67 and Demosthenes asserts that for a time he was arraigned every day on some accusation preferred by members of the opposing party.68 Now the graphe paranomon was the favorite weapon of party warfare.69 During one year after the passage of a new law the mover was liable to indictment and punishment for unconstitutional legislation. If the foreign policy of the προστάτης turned sour, the graphe paranomon was used by his political opponents. But the generals were not the objects of the graphe paranomon.70 They were officials elected annually, and furthermore they could be recalled, and frequently were, while in office.71 Classes, families, parties, and clubs were doubtless active politically in connection with generals. The chief example on the broad canvas is the shift in Athens from the policy of defensive war in the tradition of Periklean strategy to such leaders as Kleon, Lysikles, and Eukrates who are thought to have been elected by the sailors, craftsmen, and traders to whom the war brought profit and little danger so long as the naval power of Athens stood above serious challenge.72 The violence of factional conflict was considerably mitigated by annual elections. In the able chapter of G. M. Calhoun, The Clubs in the Political Field (97-147), in his Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (Austin 1913), the only truly military cases which he studies as revealing the political activities of the clubs, are the trials of Perikles, Alkibiades, and of the generals who won at Arginousai.

There are three other cases where, to judge from our sources, a general’s political opponents are said to have been responsible for his trial. Hero- dotos says that Miltiades in 493 was met by his enemies who hailed him before a court: to vOerv μιν ol εχθροί ύποόεζάμενοϋ υπό όίκαστηρίον αυτόν άγαγόντες έδιωξαν τυραννίδος της εν Χερσονησω.73 Macan comments on this sentence: ‘If we may suppose that the enemies who prosecuted him on this occasion were the same as those who prosecuted him, more successfully, on a later occasion, then, this prosecution was the work of a circle or clique to which Xanthippos belonged, i.e. presumably the Alkmaionid party. Plutarch is our authority for the statement that the enemies of Kimon formed a coalition to bring him to trial in 463: των εχθρών συστάντων έπ αυτόν74 Finally, the charges against Phrynichos in 411 are said by Thucydides to have been due to the activity of the clubs.75

If we ask the question, Were the hegemones guilty of culpable neglect or were their trials the stock in trade of opposing politicians? there is no all- inclusive answer.76 Men such as Perikies and Alkibiades were προστάται, and their military activity was only one phase of their political careers. The Greek city-state was ever honeycombed with intrigue and the existence of traitors within the walls is frequently attested, as well as of εταφεΐαι, on occasions revolutionary.77

S. Perlman has devoted an article to the separation of activity between the strategoi and political orators in the fourth century.78 Virtually every organization at Athens was connected in some way with politics and litigation as Calhoun has shown, but there was in Athens no permanent political division according to social class of the kind that many have supposed, no organized parties.⁷⁹

The only safe inference that we can draw from the trials of the generals is that the overwhelming majority were connected with military failure.80 Throughout all history, defeat and embarrassment in foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of changes in internal government. R. J. Bonner has remarked, only prominent orators were impeached for giving bad advice.81 So with generals, it was military failure which led to their deposition. The holding of any office in the Greek city-state carried with it the possibility of formidable punishment for failure.82 No one in a position of leadership was immune from retribution.83 As the historian Theopompos wrote in explanation of Chabrias’ sojourn away from Athens: απασι γάρ εισι χαλεποί [The Athenians are harsh on everybody].84

The Greek attitude toward the hegemon, military and otherwise, is well expressed by the orator Deinarchos (Against Demosthenes 74): ού γάρ ψεΰδός εστιν άλλα και λίαν αληθές το τους ηγεμόνας αίτιους άπάντων γίγνεσθαι και των αγαθών και των εναντίων τοΐς ττολίταις [Far from being false it is only too true that hegemones are responsible for all the citizens’ good fortunes and for the reverse]. This attitude toward responsibility for failure is a fixed feature of the Greek political landscape, common to all citystates.

P. Cloche