The Greek State at War, Part IV

By W. Kendrick Pritchett

The volumes of The Greek State at War are an essential reference for the classical scholar. Professor Pritchett has systematically canvassed ancient texts and secondary literature for references to specific topics; each volume explores a unique aspect of Greek military practice.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1986.
The volumes of The Greek State at War are an essential reference for the classical scholar. Professor Pritchett has systematically canvassed ancient texts and secondary literature for references to specific topics; each volume explores a unique aspect of

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of California Press
• Release date: Jul 28, 2023
• ISBN: 9780520341548

W. Kendrick Pritchett

W. Kendrick Pritchett is Professor of Greek, Emeritus, at the University of California, Berkeley. Among his many other works are six volumes of Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, also published by California.

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THE GREEK STATE AT WAR

Part IV

The

Greek State

at War

Part IV

by

W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

BERKELEY · Los ANGELES · LONDON

University of California Press

Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

University of California Press, Ltd.

London, England

© 1985 by

The Regents of the University of California

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

(Revised for vol. 4)

Pritchett, W. Kendrick (William Kendrick), 1909- The Greek state at war.

Vol. 1 first published in 1971 under title:

Ancient Greek military practices.

Vol. 3 has additional title: Religion.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

1. Military art and science—History. 2. Greece

History, Military. 1. Title.

U33p65 355'·ΟΟ938 75-3*2653

ISBN Ο-52Ο-Ο2758-2 (v. 1)

Printed in the United States of America

¹ 23456789

CONTENTS 1

CONTENTS 1

ABBREVIATIONS

PREFACE

CHAPTER I THE PITCHED BATTLE

INTRODUCTION

1. HOMERIC WARFARE

2.WARFARE IN EARLY GREEK POETRY

3.WARFARE IN THE GREEK HISTORIANS

CHAPTER II BURIAL OF GREEK WAR DEAD275

1.ORIGIN OF THE CONVENTION IN MYTH

2.HOMERIC CUSTOMS

3.THE PROTHESIS AND EKPHORA

4.THE ATHENIAN "Αγών Επιτάφιος AND Αόγος Επιτάφιος

5. REPORTS FROM EXCAVATIONS OF MASS BURIALS367

6. CASUALTY-LISTS ON STONE

7. MONUMENTS REPORTED BY PAUSANIAS

8. BURIALS OF WAR DEAD IN HISTORICAL SOURCES, INCLUDING LITERARY EPITAPHS AND INSCRIPTIONS

9. UNBURIED DEAD

10.THE SPARTAN CONVENTIONS

11.THE HERALD

12.BURIALS AT HOME OR ON THE BATTLEFIELD

13.CREMATION vs. INHUMATION

14.CENOTAPHS

INDEX OF ANCIENT AUTHORS CITED

INDEX OF INSCRIPTIONS CITED

INDEX OF SIGNIFICANT GREEK WORDS

ABBREVIATIONS

REFERENCES to periodicals follow the system of Marouzeau. Abbreviations of ancient titles follow Liddell and Scott.

PREFACE

THIS FOURTH VOLUME is offered as part of an ongoing series. In various chapters, I have attempted to present the material relating to different aspects of ancient Greek warfare. There is no particular order of arrangement; the choice of subjects has often arisen from problems posed in my topographical studies. Indeed, the first chapter of this volume is closely tied to a chapter on the topography of Tyrtaios and the Messenian wars now being prepared for the press. Because of the multiplicity of works on military matters, I make no claim that I have missed no piece of evidence—literary, epigraphical, or archaeological—or no modern study, but an attempt has been made to refer to pertinent publications arriving in the Berkeley library before the spring of 1984, when the manuscript was submitted to the University of California Press. Some problems have not been solved, but an effort is made to lay before the reader evidence on which to base further studies. If the series is ever completed, I would hope to offer a general index.

CHAPTER I

THE PITCHED BATTLE

IN THIS CHAPTER, the focus is on the engagement of the opposing phalanxes, and an attempt is made to assemble the testimonia from the fighting scenes in the ancient sources as to how men fought when the battle was fairly joined, with emphasis on the battle formation. The references are not numerous, because the historians generally record only the results, not the details, of engagements. As part of the study, it is necessary to take up the problem as to whether Greeks before the time of the early lyric poets would have fought battles differently from other nations of the Mediterranean basin, as described in Y. Yadin’s The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of Archaeological Discovery (London and New York 1963). For Assyria and Egypt in the third and second millennia B.C., and later for Etruria and Rome, we seem to have evidence that pitched battles were waged between armed masses much the same as in Greece during the time of the Persian wars. But we have been led to believe by many archaeologists and historians that there was a significant hoplite reform at Sparta during the Messenian wars, a period which they believe marked a change from pre-hoplite warfare of loosely organized units of warriors in scattered formations to one of pitched battles between phalanxes in armor.

Our study is organized under the headings of (1) Homeric Warfare, (2) Warfare in Early Greek Poetry, and (3) Warfare in the Greek Historians.

As an introduction, it may be informative to turn aside and be reminded of the many common elements in battles before the invention of firearms. What is sorely needed in the study of the history of warfare is a thoroughgoing work comparable to Hastings’ Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, which would assemble under general headings (Pay, Booty, Ransom, Treatment of Prisoners, Burial Rites, Communications, Scouts, and numerous other subjects) information about the conventions of various peoples at different times in warfare. Modern classical historians err at times in imposing on the ancients their own evaluation of what is credible.

INTRODUCTION

Possibly the last medieval battle in which the hand weapon, as distinguished from the missile weapon or firearm, played the predominant part and which is sufficiently well documented to allow us to trace the antecedents and the development of the battle in great detail is that of Agincourt, October 25, 1415. To the student of ancient Greek battles, Agincourt is of interest because it affords striking parallels to many particulars which some modern rationalistic historians have queried in ancient accounts, viz. the recognition of omens, the challenge to battle, the lack of reconnaissance, the observance of religious rites, the general’s speech, epiphanies, and the choice of battleground. Moreover, in contrast with the great battles of the Makedonian and Roman armies, the number of combatants at Agincourt is comparable to those at Delion, Mantineia, and other battles between warring Greek states. Finally, since the subject of this chapter is the battle-piece, Agincourt with its records of eyewitness chroniclers affords details which on examination prove to be very similar to those which are only hinted at in ancient sources. It may be said at the least that if the historian today rationalized the accounts of the battle of Agincourt as he does the battle accounts in Herodotos, Xenophon, and others, he would err grievously.

The most recent reconstruction of the battle is that of J. Keegan (The Face of Battle [London 1976] 79— 116), which in accordance with modern interests lays emphasis on the human misery and bestial nature of warfare, but omits elements here considered. There are no references to the documents discussed.

Many competent medievalists have written on the battle of Agincourt. All are agreed that the honors rested with the English archers, who on the English side outnumbered the lances; so details of the actual combat are less instructive. I restrict myself to particulars which afford parallels to conventions reported in ancient warfare.

1. Omens.1 A. In mid-August, 1415, when the fleet of Henry V was preparing to sail from Portsmouth, one ship caught fire and the flames spread to its two neighbors. This was considered such an unpleasant presage that many of Henry’s followers advised him not to proceed.2 But when a flock of swans began to accompany the fleet as it set off, it was realized that Heaven smiled upon the venture after all.3

8. An anecdote is recorded which shows how anxious Henry was to avoid doing anything which the superstition of his soldiers might interpret into a bad omen, and which is characteristic both of himself and of his age. After quitting Bonnieres for Blangy [on October 24], he came to a village where his harbingers intended he should rest, but not being aware of the circumstance he rode beyond it, and when told that he had passed his quarters, he stopped, and said, that as he was habited in his ‘cote d’armes,’ it would be displeasing to God if he should turn back.4

2. Challenge to battle.5 In accordance with the conventions of the Age of Chivalry, the French on October 17 sent three heralds with a formal challenge to the English king, to ask him to name a suitable place at which to fight.6 When they were brought before the king, Henry replied that he was marching to Calais, and if his enemies tried to disturb the English, it would not be without the utmost peril. The heralds were then dismissed after receiving each a hundred gold coins.

3. Scouts.7 Although Henry used what the Gesta Henrici Quinti refers to as percursores equites on his march to Agincourt from Harfleur,8 this mounted cavalry seems only to have been a vanguard or a force that was sent on special missions. There were several occasions when Henry was unaware of the location of the French. Thus, after marching to Eu with the intention of crossing the Somme west of Abbeville, it came as a nasty shock for the king to learn from a prisoner that a strong force under Marshal Boucicaut was stationed on the far side.9 There is no evidence in the accounts of a regular force of scouts which kept the enemy under constant surveillance.

4. Choice of battleground. On the day before the battle, Henry deployed the English army in line along the crest of a ridge which rose three hundred feet above the river Ternoise near Blangy. The French commanders, realizing the folly of offering battle to the English army while it occupied so commanding a position, wheeled their long lines into columns again and withdrew a little to the north, where they camped astride the road to Calais. In so doing, the French committed what is regarded as a major blunder. They selected a valley hemmed in by woods on either side, which denied their much larger army any of the freedom of movement that was essential to the successful deployment of their vast hordes of hastily raised troops.

On the morning of the battle, the rival armies formed at the light of dawn at a distance of about one thousand yards.10 Each army could see the other clearly; the cornfield which separated them was almost flat. Then came a period of waiting of about four hours. The ground had been chosen by the French and they could well afford to bide their time, because the English were short on provisions. The English formation consisted of three main bodies of dismounted men-at- arms, standing four deep, with groups of archers on either side. Among the French, the chroniclers report that there was much pushing and jostling of knights, to get into the first line and into the front row of the first line.

5. Priests.11 After the English lines had formed, the priests came to the front of the army and prayed continually until it began to advance. Remember us, O Lord! they shouted. Our enemies are gathered together and boast in their might. Scatter their strength and disperse them, that they may know that there is none other that fighteth for us, but only thou, our God. Then they retired to the baggage-train and celebrated mass and offered unremitting prayer until the fortune of the day was decided.

6. King’s speech. Henry came before his troops dressed for battle, wearing a helmet encircled by a gold crown, and with his sword in hand addressed the English army in a loud, clear voice, saying that he had come into France to recover his lawful inheritance; that they should remember they were born in the kingdom of England, where their parents and wives now dwelt, and therefore they ought to strive to return with great glory and fame; and that England had gained many noble victories over the French. He reminded them that the French had boasted that they would cut off three fingers from the right hand of every archer they might capture. He told them, too, that he would be killed rather than taken prisoner, as he would never charge England with the payment of his ransom.12 I would underscore the fact that Henry is said to have addressed the entire massed formation of about six thousand strong. The speech is not a summary of the random words of a commander traversing the line.

7. Traditional rites before advance. When Henry gave the command, Banners advance! In the name of Jesus, Mary, and St. George! immediately, as always before a battle, each man fell to his knees to make the traditional observance which symbolized the Christian warrior’s recognition that in God’s time he would return to dust. He made the sign of the cross on the ground with his hand and then placed his lips on the earth and kissed it, taking a piece of soil into his mouth.13

8. Advance. When the traditional silent rites were performed, the divisions moved forward. They marched slowly, steadily and firmly, ‘in very fine order,’ shouting ‘St. George!’ repeatedly, and with their trumpets sounding.14

9. Battle. There are many reconstructions of the battle of Agincourt. I extract a few sentences from that of J. H. Wylie because he documents each sentence with references to contemporary sources.15 —At the first staggering shock the heavier numbers of the French told; the English line recoiled a full spear’s length. But the lances rallied while the archers poured a fearful hail into the ranks of the French, and when the arrows were spent they flung away their bows and quivers, and snatched mauls and hatchets from their belts and hacked into the dense medley of heavy-weighted Frenchmen. The very depth of the French formation was the ruin of the mass. They became so jammed together that no one could raise an arm to wield sword or club. The English king fought like the rest, on foot.

10. Epiphanies.16 C. Hibbert (Agincourt [London 1964] 134) writes, There were those of his soldiers who had beheld a vision of St George in the sky above their heads.17 Henry had never doubted that St George would be there. This saint was The special patron and protector of the English nation. In the spring of 1416, an image of St. George in gold and also his heart were presented to Henry by Emperor Sigismund. Earlier in the same year, the Southern Convocation in recognition of the help accorded to English arms by Saint George decreed that his feast day (April 25) was to be observed as one of the double feasts on which all work should cease and people should attend their parish churches as they would at Christmas.18 October 25, the anniversary of the battle, was made the Feast of the Translation of the bones of St John of Beverley who, from his minster in the north, where he had been buried some 800 years before, had given, or was said to have given, a premonition of the victory by sweating out some clear drops of oil from his shrine at the very time that the battle was raging in Picardy.19 It is not without interest that at the time the saint’s day was given greater recognition than the anniversary date.20

11. Contrast in casualties. As with many ancient battles, the loss of life was predominantly among the defeated. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1 ith ed. [1910]) article on Agincourt, the total loss of the English is stated at thirteen men-at-arms, including the duke of York, who was suffocated when others fell on top of him,21 and about one hundred of the foot. The French lost five thousand of noble birth killed, most of whom died without even striking a blow, and one thousand more were taken prisoner.22

In connection with casualties, a word is in order about the treatment of the dead and dying, for which on the Greek side we have a considerable literature on the Homeric practice, which differs only in degree from that at Agincourt. Although Homer emerges at the end with only three casualties among his major characters, Sarpedon, Patroklos, and Hektor, the poem is full of detailed accounts of the moment of death of many warriors. Homer avoids any description of men being gravely wounded, but not dying; a wounded man either dies quickly or recovers and fights again.23 Bassett (TAPA 64 [1933] 54) has written, It was entirely in accord with the Homeric code of honor to outrage the body of a foeman. … It would be absurd to think that Homer intended to represent the Greeks as more brutally ferocious than the standards of the time permitted. Bassett’s position is challenged by C. Segal in his The Theme of the Mutilation of the Corpse in the Iliad (Mnemosyne Suppl. 17 [1971]; see esp. p. 14), who attempts to find censure on the part of the poet of Achilleus’ abuse of the dead Hektor: The aura of Christian purity attaching to the warrior of me dieval chivalry can mislead us into a blind defense of Homer’s very different type of hero. But J. H. Wylie (The Reign of Henry the Fifth 2 [Cambridge 1919] 176) writes of the Christian troops of Henry V after Agincourt, Any [of the French] that were found to be still alive they kept as prisoners, or if badly injured they despatched them as they lay, scarring and gashing their faces with nails and iron picks till they were past all recognition. He adds, Out of 500 or 600 Breton dead only 18 could be recognized. I may add that, as one who was stationed in the Gilbert Islands in the Second World War, I know that the conduct of the Japanese and American marines after the battles in the jungles of Guadalcanal and later at Tarawa differed only in degree from such treatment.

1 Cf. War 3 chap. 4. Throughout I refer to my The Greek State at War 1 (Berkeley 1971), 2 (1974), and 3 (1979) as War.

2 H. Nicolas, History of the Battle of Agincourt (London 1832) 50.

3 A. H. Burne, The Agincourt War (London 1956) 37.

4 H. Nicolas, History of the Battle of Agincourt (London 1832) 102.

5 Cf. War 2 chap. 7.

6 C. Hibbert, Agincourt (London 1964) 96-97. Hibbert (p. 100) notes in passing that chivalrous leaders did not carry on war at night.

7 Cf. War 1 chap. 10.

8 The Gesta is edited by F. Taylor and J. S. Roskell (Oxford 1975).

9 A. H. Burne, The Agincourt War (London 1956) 55.

10 The figure is that of A. H. Burne, ibid. 79.

11 For the role of the mantis in Greek warfare, see War 3 chap. 3.

12 See C. Hibbert, Agincourt (London 1964) 110.

13 The history of this rite is discussed with various explanations by J. H. Wylie, The Reign of Henry the Fifth 2 (Cambridge 1919) 155-156. For Greek rites before advance, see War 1 chap. 8.

14 C. Hibbert, Agincourt (London 1964) 114.

15 The Reign of Henry the Fifth 2 (Cambridge 1919) 161-162.

16 Cf. War 3 chap. 2.

17 For ample documentation of this statement of Hibbert’s, see J. H. Wylie, The Reign of Henry the Fifth 2 (Cambridge 1919) 190 notes 2 and 3:

Saynt George was sene over our hoste, Of very trouthe this syght men dyde se, Downe was he sente by the holy goste, To give our Kynge the victory.

and

The Frenschmen seyde al be dene, Seynt George all over our Kyng they se.

18 F. Taylor and J. S. Roskell, Gesta Henrici Quinti (Oxford 1975) 132-133. The battle was fought on the day of St. Crispin, the martyr cobbler of Soissons; cf. Shakespeare, Henry V Act IV.3, lines 4 off.

19 J. H. Wylie, The Reign of Henry the Fifth 2 (Cambridge 1919) 240.

20 Cf. War 3.171-177.

21 Some authorities give the weight of the armor at ninety pounds apiece; others at not less than sixty pounds.

22 For a detailed study of the numbers of the dead, see J. H. Wylie, The Reign of Henry the Fifth 2 (Cambridge 1919) chap. 35. For enormous losses of the defeated in other battles of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see his pages 184-185. For Wylie’s denunciation of H. Delbriick’s purely fanciful theories of the battle, see his page 216; cf. Pritchett, War 3.1-2.

23 J. Griffin, Homer on Life and Death (Oxford 1980) 92.

1. HOMERIC WARFARE

As a poet (or singer), not a military historian, Homer dwells on the prowess of individuals in single combat, or on the struggle of one hero against a group of assailants, rather than analyzing the long encounters of marshalled lines. Our interest is in the scenes of mass fighting, armies preparing or moving against each other, slowly and inexorably, packed tight like stones in a wall,1 2 or armies in panic and pursuit like deer before a ravening lion. Such generic scenes are used sparingly; they are synoptic glances at the whole battlefield,25 which after a few lines (cf. 4.446ff.) lead to accounts of individual fighting.3

Andrew Lang (The World of Homer [London 1910]) devoted a chapter to Homer’s Tactics (pp. 51—59), in which he maintained that Homeric formations and fighting differed little from those of historic times, or, we may now add, of Biblical lands hundreds of years earlier. The clash of marshalled lines of heavy dismounted men-at-arms ends in the breaking of the phalanxes, and in the single combats, or combats of small knots of heroes, in which the poet and his audience take special delight. Citing examples of later battles, he concluded, It was always thus that men fought, before the invention of modern projectiles.4 Lammert, in the RE article on Schlachtordnung (1921), also stressed the element of mass fighting, concluding (col. 444), Die eigentliche und letzte Entscheidung hing von Kampfe der Massen ab. Recently, J. Latacz (Kampfparanese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampf- wirklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios = Zetemata 66 [Munich 1977]), collecting the testimonia for the words for military formations, including πρόμαχοί, φάΚαγξ, στίξ, πύργος, etc.,5 has concluded that the Homeric picture is one of two armies, drawn up in a series of ranks (φάλαγγες), which approach each other within throwing range and start a series of missile bombardments. The warriors in the front row (πρόμαχοι), he believes, make forays forward and attempt to open gaps in the opposing line. Presently, closing ranks, the two sides thrust forward and fight in a mass until one of the fronts breaks.6

In keeping with Lang’s view about phalanx fighting in field warfare, we may look briefly at practices in Biblical lands, Etruria, and early Rome.

For the Stele of Vultures of the third millennium B.C., illustrated in Y. Yadin, AWBL 134—135, the author gives the following interpretation, A heavily armed phalanx of soldiers in a column of six files (indicated by the six tiers of spears and six metal studs on the shields). The troops wearing metal helmets and heavy rectangular shields, and armed with heavy spears which they hold with both hands, charge over the bodies of their fallen enemies. Each file was eleven men deep. On page 50, Yadin explains that the phalanx went into action in the immediate wake of the chariot charge. Thus, in the third millennium B.C. in Mesopotamia, we have the fundamental ingredients of a battle in open terrain. To the Accadians, Yadin states, we owe the integration of the archers; and a thousand years later in the battle between the Hittites and Egyptians, chariots, a phalanx of infantry armed with spears and swords, and long-range archers operate together in full coordination. In the battle of Kadesh on the Orontes in the thirteenth century B.C., the phalanxes were ten deep (AWBL 1.112).

Early warfare in Etruria has now been studied by P. F. Stary, Zur eisenzeitlichen Bewaffnung und Kampfesweise in Mittelitalien (= Marburger Studien zur Vor- und Friihgeschichte 3 [1981]). (See also Germania 59 [1981] 287 — 306.) The earliest warriors are shown with round shield.

He concludes (1.129—130), Entsprechende bildliche Darstellungen, die Hopliten in phalanxmassigem Aufmarsch (wann auch im Kampf) zeigen, seit dem ausgehenden 7. Jh. vereinzelt in der etruskischen Kunst belegt, wie auf der Oinochoe von Tragliatella, auf einem Straussenei und einer Olpe aus Vulci. Damit ist mit der Einfuhrung der geschlossenen Phalanx bei den Etruskern spatestens um 625 v. Chr. zu rechnen. In note 775 (1.353—355), Stary gives an extensive bibliography on oriental warfare. However, the fact that the earliest representation, that of two warriors with round shields, swords, and helmets on a fibula from Vulci (pl. 4.2), shows single combat does not prove that there was an early pre-hoplite phase restricted to man-toman fighting, as Stary (1.128) deduces. Stary writes under the influence of current interpreters of the Greek material. The helmet and sword were essential in the close-in fighting of the phalanx. Many Greek archaeologists regard the hollow round shield as sure evidence for a hoplite. For early Etruscan armor, see P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London 1981) 91 —97.

The Etruscans used the hoplite phalanx, which was borrowed by the Romans: Athenaios 6.273E-F (= Jacoby, FGrH 87 [Poseidonios] frg. 59, ελαβον δέ καί παρά Ύυρρηνών την σταδίαν μάχην φαλ- λαγγηδόιv έπ ιόντων. Diodoros (23 2.1) says that in ancient times, when the Romans were using oblong shields, the Etruscans, who fought with round shields of bronze and in phalanx formation, impelled them to adopt similar arms and were in consequence defeated (TO μεν γάρ παλαιόν αυτών ΰυρεοίς τετραγώνου χρωμένων, Τυρρηνοί χαλ- καί,ς άσπίσι φαΚαγγομαχοϋντες καί προτρεψάμενοι τον δμοιον άναλαβεϊν οπλισμόν ήττη&ησαν). In our oldest account of the Roman army, the Servian constitution describes a phalanx: Livy 1.43; cf. E. L. Wheeler, Chiron 9 (1979) 305. Diodoros (12.64.3), writing under the year 425 B.C., tells the story of the dictator Aulus Postumius Tubertus, who, observing the ancient custom (τηροΰντα το πάτριον εϑος, put his son to death because he sprang forward from the line and engaged in a victorious duel with an enemy. Cf. Livy 4.29.5 and 8.7.15. For early Roman hoplites, see also R. Thomsen, King Servius Tullius (Copenhagen 1980) 162—163. Herodotos (7.158) tells us that the early Sikilian army was brigaded into hoplites, cavalry, archers, slingers, and hippodromoi.

Granted that illustrations of warfare in open terrain are sparse, and disregarding sieges of fortified cities, we find no evidence in Yadin, Stary, and the bibliography cited by these two scholars that would disprove Lang’s generalization.

In the Greek archaeological literature, where so much attention has been devoted to the equipment of Homer’s combatants,7 a distinction has been drawn between hoplite and pre-hoplite warfare which can be traced back at least to Miss Lorimer’s article, The Hoplite Phalanx, BSA 42 (1947) 76-138. By this definition the hoplite was one who fought with a circular shield fixed in position by a band on the arm, the thrusting-spear, and complete panoply.8 T. B. L. Webster (From Mycenae to Homer [London 1958] 214—220) believes that the hoplite passages are the work of the latest singer. D. Gray states, Virtually there are no hoplites in Homer.9 The problem of armor is also treated by A. Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour and Weapons (Edinburgh 1964) 170—179, with special reference to H. L. Lorimer’s massive Homer and the Monuments (London 1950), and in his article The Hoplite Reform in History, JHS 85 (1965) 110-122.10 He assembles ten passages which he regards as implying knowledge of hoplite warfare. Finally, we have the definitive study of early Kriegswesen by H.-G. Buchholz and his collaborators in Archaeologia Homerica i:E i (1977) and 1:E2 (198ο),11 where we are assured (E 316), Die genannte Iliasstellen weisen also nicht auf Hopliten hin.12

This archaeological distinction beclouds the issue of mass fighting in Homer; it clearly was not made in antiquity. At the battle of Kounaxa Xenophon (Anabasis 1.8.9) calls οπλίτοα Egyptians who had wooden shields reaching to their feet,13 and each oriental division was marshalled in a tight formation. We may approach the Homeric battlescenes, therefore, freed of any preconception about pre-hoplite warfare or that a great shelter shield was not portable.14

There are four days of battle described in the Iliad. The first consumes Books 3 — 7, inclusive. The opposing armies are marshalled (3.1), each company under its hegemon.15 The Trojans advance with a sound as of a flight of cranes, the Achaians silently, breathing courage, determined to help one another. But before the armies meet, Paris challenges Menelaos to a single combat which would decide the war, a forerunner of the Battle of Champions between the Spartans and Argives on Mount Zavitsa,16 and of various monomachiai discussed below; but Aphrodite snatches up her Trojan favorite after he is dis abled by Menelaos, and the truce is broken when a Lykian archer sends an arrow at Menelaos. Agamemnon reviews the forces (στρατός), going on foot from group to group (4.208—422). The poet then gives us his first picture of a general battle (4.446—449):

ol δ’ ότε δη p ές χώρον ένα ξυνώντες ΐκοντο, σύν ρ έβαλον ρίνούς, συν δ’ έγχεα καί μένε’ άνδρών χαλκεοΰωρήκων’ άτάρ άσπίδες όμφαλόεσσαυ έπληντ’ άλλήλρσΊ, πολύς δ’ ορυμαγδός όρώρει.

The earth flows with blood and there is a great battle din. The description then lapses into accounts of individual combats, with most of Book 5 devoted to the deeds of Diomedes. When Ares enters the fight, we are told that the Achaians ever gave ground backwards (αίέν όπίσσω χάζονύΡ, 6.2). The coming of night (7.293) puts a stop to a single combat between Hektor and Ajax, and the armies strike a truce for one day for the burial of the dead, during which time the Greeks build new defenses, a wall about their camp.

The eighth book tells of a brief day of battle in which the gods often interfered. The beginning of the fight (8.60—63) is described in the same four lines used in 4.446—449. At 8.336 the Trojans push the Achaians toward the deep ditch (ol δ’ Ιΰύς τάφρο to βαύείης ωσάν ’Αχαιούς). The hindmost are slain as they are driven in rout. The approach of night (8.489) affords relief from attack. The Trojans bivouac on the plain and are confident of annihilating their enemies on the morrow.

The third day of battle involves the great struggle for the Acha- ian ships. It begins with Book 11 and continues to the middle of Book 18. The Achaians start by giving their chariots to the charioteers (11.47—49) and themselves on foot ranged swiftly forward. Meanwhile, Hektor arrays the Trojans, being now with the front and now with the rear ranks (11.59—66). The two forces advance like two bands of reapers shearing the grain of a field from either end, and meeting in the center (11.67 — 69). The fight starts: ίσας δ’ ύσμίνη κεφαλάς έχεν (equal heads had the battle, 11.72). The melee holds the two fronts in equilibrium. This steady fight of lines of dismounted men-at-arms lasts from dawn to mid-day, till, at noon, the Danaans by their valor broke the battalions (αρετή Δαναοί ρηξαντο φάλαγγας, 11.90). Agamemnon, on foot, rushes into the broken ranks of the Trojans and slays many of them in their chariots, which they would naturally mount for the sake of speedier flight. Footmen were ever slaying footmen as they fled, and horsemen horsemen" (πεζοί μεν πεζούς όλεσκον φεύγοντας άνάγκγι I ιππείς δ’ ίππηας, 11.150—151). Finally, Agamemnon is wounded and retires. By command of Zeus, Hektor rallies the Trojans at the Skaian gate and leads a chariot charge among the scattered Achaians, who are driven to their own fortifications, where there is a confused melee at the ditch and under the wall (μάχοντο όμιλαδόν, 12.3). The dismounted Trojans now form five columns (πένταχα κοσμηύέντες) of attack (12.86—107). The Teichomachy takes up all of Book 12 and continues into Book 13. Hektor breaks down a gate (12.442—end), and the Trojans climb over the wall in their multitude (13.87). Poseidon rallies the battalions (φάλαγγες) of Achaians to take a stand in close array with spears deployed (? πτύσσονται 13.134). Shield touches shield, the plumes of the helmets meet.

The Trojans drive forward in close throng (Τρώες δέ προϋτυψαν άολλέες, 13136), but are arrested by the close-set batallions (πυκίνής φάλαγξί, 13.145; πυργηδόν, 13.152). Idomeneus has his day of valor on the left of the Achaian fortified position. The arrows of the Lokrians are showered on the Trojans (13.712 — 722). Polydamos advises Hektor to retreat, but he tries again to break through the array of the Achaians, and the two forces clash with an outcry from both sides (13.833 — 837).

After the lulling of Zeus by Hera’s wiles (14.153—362), Poseidon bids the Achaians to give their best warriors the best weapons and their longest spears; so Agamemnon goes through the host making exchange of battle-gear (14.361—382), an extraordinary passage,17 18 partly athetized by Aristarchos.19 Hektor marshals the Trojans, and the strife becomes more terrible than before. Hektor, however, is put out of action, hit by a boulder from the hand of Ajax (14.405—420). With that incident, the Trojans break and fly (14.508 — 522). They run as far as the trench and over it. Outside they stop at their chariots in confusion (15.1—4). And Zeus wakes (15.5). Hektor is revived, turns back the Greeks, and reforms the Trojans in a firm line of resistance (15.269—301). Apollo causes panic among the Greeks, and their line is broken. Man fell upon man when the close fight was scattered (15.328). Apollo levelled the banks of the trench and cast down the wall (15.352—366), and the Trojans swept across and at last were fighting at the ships, having their greatest success in setting fire to the ship of Protesilaos. Achilleus, who had vowed to fight if Hektor approached the ships of the Myrmidons (9.653—656), now arms Patroklos (Book 16). There are 2,500 Myrmidons (16.168-170), who are marshalled by Achilleus in five στίχες (16.173), each with its own divisional commander. They form a mass, as well made as a strong wall, spear close to spear, helmet to helmet (16.212-217). Achilleus bids Patroklos do no more than save the camp, lest too complete a victory rob him of atonement; but Patroklos and the Greeks pursue the Trojans to the very gates of the city, where Patroklos is slain by Hektor. There follows an account of the struggle for the body of Patroklos (Book 17), taking up 761 lines, which the Greeks with great difficulty secure; but they are hard pressed by the enemy. Night puts an end to the battle (18.241).

The fourth of the battles of the Iliad begins with Book 20. Achilleus proceeds to slaughter the Trojans with incidents which occupy two books. The first encounter is in the middle space between the two armies, ές μέσον άμφοτέρων (20.159). The flight of the Trojans is vividly depicted in two similes (20.490—497). The Trojans are first driven as far as the Skamander river (Book 21), then all but Hektor are either slain or have fled within the walls of the city.

Such is a brief summary of the ebb and flow of the battle-tide, setting aside the prowess of favorite heroes and the interference of gods. The dismounted men-at-arms are the heavy infantry, the λαός are fighting men, while the archery of light-armed bowmen is not without its effect.20 Chariots are used primarily in flight and pursuit.21 Battle lines are broken, resulting in single combats, or combats of small knots of heroes, in describing which the poet takes special delight. The most informative passage is 13.125-205,22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 where the two armies are formed in mass array and the Trojan charge is checked by the hedge of spears. The density of the infantry is brought out in passages such as 13.131-133 and 16.215-217,36 where the closely pressed throng of combatants is described in these words:

άσπίς άρ’ άσπίδ’ ερείδε, κόρυς κόρυν, άνέρα δ’ άνηρ- ψαϋου δ’ ίππόκομοι κόρυ&ες λαμπρόίσι φάλοΜπ νευόντων, ώς πυκνοί έφέστασαν αλλήλοισιρ.

As in the first of these verses is depicted the closeness of their array as they stood side by side, so it is evident from νευόντων that by the second verse is indicated how near they stood behind each other, inasmuch as when one stooped his head forward, he touched with his φάλος the helmet of the one before him.

As to the many duels in the Iliad, it is often overlooked that mono- machy appears to have been an ancient military practice common to all the peoples around the Mediterranean basin. There are examples in the Old Testament from the 11th and