Anzio Nettuno: A Battle of Leadership Mistakes

By Jörg Staiger and Matthias Strohn

"...an excellent primer about the operations in and around the Anzio beachhead. Students of operational art, multinational operations, and amphibious warfare will find Staiger’s narrative interesting and thought-provoking." — Military Review

The Allied amphibious operation codenamed Shingle was launched in late January 1944. It was opposed by German forces in the area of Anzio and Nettuno. Success depended on the element of surprise, and the speed with which the invaders could build up strength and move inland. This was understood by General Mark Clark, commander of the US Fifth Army, but not fully understood by his subordinate commanders.

This German account focuses on the landing at Anzio as it was the only one that failed to achieve its objective of smashing the German defense and achieving operational freedom of movement. The battle lasted over six weeks, with mistakes made by leadership on both sides, and consequently also great sacrifice by soldiers on both sides. But the operation was not a German success either, and attempts to prevent the creation of a strong bridgehead failed. Ultimately the Allies would reach Rome, and the Allies applied lessons from this battle to facilitate the success of Overlord, launched five months later.

While not complete, as the author did not have access to some of the war diaries of higher levels of German command, this is still one of the best German accounts of Operation Shingle and is here translated into English for the first time.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Casemate
• Release date: Jan 18, 2024
• ISBN: 9781636241920

Book preview

Introduction

The author takes the view that a landing operation is subject to the fundamental principles that underpin the conduct of an attack. The German Army field manual, Truppenführung, published on 17 October 1933, stated, among other things, the following:

1. ‘The attack is launched against the enemy in order to defeat him. The attacker holds the initiative.’ (Paragraph 39)

2. ‘An operation with multiple tasks is easily diverted from the main objective.’ (Paragraph 36)

3. ‘In the vicissitudes of war, it can be a mistake to hold rigidly to an initial decision.’ (Paragraph 37)

4. ‘Taking the enemy by surprise is a decisive factor in bringing about success. Actions based on the element of surprise can only be successful if the enemy is denied the opportunity to take effective counter-measures.’ (Paragraph 32)

5. ‘An envelopment of one or both hostile flanks which involves lunging deep into the enemy rear area can lead to the annihilation of the enemy. … The envelopment must seek to strike the main hostile forces in a decisive direction.’ (Paragraph 316)

6. ‘The envelopment requires that the enemy front be pinned down.’ (Paragraph 317)

7. ‘Against an enemy who is conducting delaying action, the attacker will reach his objective more quickly if he concentrates his forces at one location. An attack that is pushed through and achieves considerable depth will compel the enemy to evacuate the front as soon as possible.’ (Paragraph 409)

Truppenführung did not contain any instructions specifically for the conduct of defence against landing operations. The defensive measures taken at Anzio and Nettuno were therefore based on guiding principles for mobile warfare, defence along rivers and other stretches of water, and defence in general. It is not known to the author whether at any stage during the war the Wehrmacht developed and issued principles for the destruction of landing forces.

CHAPTER 1

Birth of Operation Shingle

In 1943, the Allies took the decision that Germany was to be brought its knees by carrying out an invasion across the English Channel. The planning required for what would be Operation Overlord meant that the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean became of secondary importance. However, until the commencement of Overlord in June 1944, the entire burden of the war against Germany could not be borne by Russia alone, so it was necessary that the Mediterranean maintain its significance for the Western Allies as a theatre of operations against Germany for the time being. As to the military value of this theatre of operations for the eventual subjugation of Germany, the views of the British and the Americans diverged considerably.

It was believed by the British that a strong concentration of forces in the Mediterranean and a rapid conquest of Italy as far as the Pisa–Rimini line would wear down the military strength of Germany so much that Overlord, while not being abandoned completely, might only need to be carried out as a final mopping-up operation. The British hoped above all that the employment of the Allied air forces against southern Germany from airfields in northern Italy would bring about the collapse of the German state. Furthermore, it was anticipated that the seizure of Rome before the commencement of Overlord would have significant political repercussions and would ultimately be of great benefit to the Allies. The British leadership therefore sought never to neglect the Mediterranean theatre of operations.

The Americans thought differently. After the decision had been taken to proceed with Overlord, the Americans directed all their military efforts towards the assembly of an invasion army in England. They drew on any soldiers, ships, and supplies that were not urgently needed elsewhere. The American leadership saw the Mediterranean as a secondary theatre of operations whose purpose was to tie down German troops. It regarded as misguided any hopes that German forces in Italy would be quickly defeated, either by a capitulation of Italy or by a major Allied offensive on the Italian peninsula.¹ Despite the vast resources at the disposal of the Allies, a rapid advance in Italy would require, unlike Overlord, such forces and materiel to a degree which was simply not yet available. Indeed, since the landings at Salerno and the capture of the port of Naples, the 15th Army Group, with the US Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army under its command, had to struggle forward bit by bit towards Rome in a series of frontal assaults against fierce German resistance and in terrain which increasingly favoured the defender. At the beginning of October 1943, with the offensive proceeding at a snail’s pace, the prospects of Rome being taken that year and of any associated political success being chalked up receded into the distance.

By the end of October 1943, the US Fifth Army on the Mediterranean side of the Italian peninsula, and the British Eighth Army on the Adriatic side, had pushed forward as far as the Garigliano–Volturno–Sangro line. However, this line ran through what were only the outpost areas of the German Winter Line (see map 1).

There was no lack of planning at the headquarters of the 15th Army Group to alleviate the difficulties being encountered by both armies in their forward struggle. It was suggested that a landing far to the rear of the German front could be carried out and could thereby lend momentum to the frontal offensive. However, it would be impossible to conduct such a landing on the magnitude required for a successful outcome, as the ships needed for it were insufficient in number. This was especially the case with landing ships. At best, there were only enough for the transportation of one division. To land just one division far to the rear of the German front would be senseless, as such an operation would be ineffective and lead only to the total loss of the division. Alternatively, the plans of Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harold Alexander for landings behind the German front could go ahead by being carried out in closer proximity and thus allowing the forces in the beachhead to be united with those along the main front within approximately 48 hours. Yet such a weak flank attack could not be expected to result in a fundamental change in the rate of advance. All plans therefore remained up in the air for the time being.

There were many in the political circles of the Western Allies who were highly critical of the conduct of operations in the Mediterranean. It appeared to them as if it consumed men and materiel without attaining any success whatsoever. Even so, Prime Minister Winston Churchill never gave up on his pet idea of ‘the exposure of the underbelly of the Axis, especially Italy, to heavy attack’, and so his sharp criticism was directed towards the military leadership.² It is therefore of no surprise that he immediately approved of any plan designed to hasten the offensive in Italy, especially if it might lead to the rapid capture of Rome. So it came to be that the 15th Army Group soon enjoyed in the form of Churchill a strong supporter for the execution of a major landing operation.

Through his skilful and unrelenting negotiation tactics at both conferences with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Cairo and at the conference between the Big Three in Tehran, Churchill managed to see to it that enough ships remain in the Mediterranean or that so many more be sent there such that, even before the commencement of Overlord, it would be possible for a landing operation to be carried out in which the first wave could be made up of two reinforced infantry divisions. One factor that certainly helped Churchill get his way was that the chiefs of staff in Washington, in agreement with the politicians there, had already decided that a landing on the southern French coast would be conducted with at least two divisions at the same time as the execution of Overlord.

At any rate, the haggle over the quantity of ships and the security of supplies in the Mediterranean lasted from the beginning of November 1943 until 24 December. On that day, the chief of staff responsible for the Mediterranean theatre requested of his colleagues in Washington that, first, the remaining tank landing ships that were intended to be employed for the capture of the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean be sent with other vessels to the Mediterranean and that, second, all materiel that arrived in the central Mediterranean in time be utilised by the Allied commander in chief in the Mediterranean for a landing operation whose strength would amount to two divisions and whose objective would be to conquer Rome and facilitate the advance of the Allied armies to the Pisa–Rimini line.³

Roosevelt gave his approval on 28 December, with the express proviso that Overlord could not be allowed to be delayed under any circumstances. The ships in the Mediterranean that would be needed for Overlord would have to set sail for England by 15 January at the latest. However, the departure of ships from the Mediterranean would entail the risk that the beachhead, depending on the development of the situation there, might not continue to be adequately supplied. The Americans therefore had reservations about conducting a landing to the rear of the German front in Italy, but Churchill ignored anything that was said to him in relation to this. As a result, Churchill can today quite justifiably claim to have been the midwife for the landing operation in the Anzio–Nettuno area.

The struggle over whether this operation ought to proceed ultimately served to increase the enthusiasm for it. Rather like in the umpteenth round of a boxing match, the operation was expected to result in an ‘eight, nine, ten, you’re out!’ for the German forces. The real military experts, however, were much more cautious in their expectations, as the operation would require time and resources and might therefore have an impact on other plans.

Meanwhile, the headquarters of the 15th Army Group had not remained idle. It had issued the order to the US Fifth Army on 8 November to make plans, taking into account the ships that were available, for a landing on the west coast of the Italian peninsula in the Anzio–Nettuno area, 60 kilometres to the south-east of Rome. The codename for this operation was Shingle.⁴

To prepare for the operation, which was to be conducted as a combined land, sea, and air effort under the direct command of the US Fifth Army, a planning headquarters was immediately set up in Caserta, and part of its task would be to gather all available intelligence on the landing area. The US 3rd Infantry Division, as the formation designated for the landing, was withdrawn from the front so that it could be made ready in good time for its new task.

Operation Shingle was to form the third phase of a new major offensive against the German positions, the objective of which would be to march into Rome in January 1944. The first phase envisaged an attack by the British Eighth Army against the German positions along the Sangro River with the objective of interdicting Highway No. 5, which was the most important link for the German forces between the Adriatic front and Rome. While this attack was underway, the US Fifth Army was to initiate the second phase at the end of November with an advance across the Rapido River, pushing beyond Cassino to the valley of the Liri and beyond Frosinone to Rome. Once this advance was approaching Frosinone, the third phase, Shingle, would begin. Its objective was to take possession of the Alban Hills and thereby help forward the US Fifth Army in its push towards Rome.

According to this plan, the landing would be fully dependent on the success of a frontal attack along the southern front. Great hopes could not be pinned on this operation, and it was clear to those at the headquarters of the US 3rd Infantry Division that it could very well lead to the destruction of their formation. The date set for the commencement of Shingle was 15 December, and, provided everything proceeded according to plan, it was possible that Rome might still be taken before the end of 1943.

On 25 November, the headquarters of the 15th Army Group approved the plan for the landing that