Flawed Commanders and Strategy in the Battles for Italy, 1943–45

By Andrew Sangster and Pier Paolo Battistelli

Wars never run according to plan, perhaps never more so than during the Italian campaign, 1943–45, where necessary coordination between the different armies added additional complexity to Allied plans. Errors in the strategies, tactics, the coalition tensions, and operations at campaign command level can clearly be seen in firsthand accounts of the period. This new account examines the Italian campaign, from Sicily to surrender in 1945, exploring the strategy, intentions, motives, plans, and deeds. It then offers a detailed insight into the five commanders who led the battles in Italy—the two British commanders, Montgomery and Alexander; two American, Patton and Clark; and the leading German commander, Field Marshal Kesselring.

Their personal notes and accounts, taken alongside archival material, provides some surprising conclusions—Montgomery was not quite the master of war he is portrayed as; Patton had serious flaws, exposed by wasting men’s lives to save a relative and overlooking the shooting of prisoners of war; Clark lost lives to bolster his image; Alexander the gentleman was far too vague to be effective as a senior leader. Meanwhile, condemned war criminal Kesselring appears to be the most efficient and also, like Alexander, one of the most popular leaders.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Casemate
• Release date: Mar 2, 2023
• ISBN: 9781636243139

Book preview

Wars never run according to plan, perhaps never more so than during the Italian campaign, 1943–45, where necessary coordination between the different armies added additional complexity to Allied plans. Unlike the Axis relationship between Germany and Italy, the Anglo-American alliance survived the war, but it was at times fragile. There were major differences of view on strategy, and even tactics, and lack of cohesive policy between the British and Americans would cause many problems on the ground in Italy.

While the corps commanders were where the action was, they were obliged to followed orders from the generals, which is why it is instructive to examine the personalities of the five major military leaders in Italy, and address how their prior combat experiences shaped their command.

Historians Andrew Sangster and Pier Paolo Battistelli compare the personal accounts of the generals with other first-hand accounts and archival material in order to offer detailed insights into all five commanders. They draw some surprising conclusions – General Bernard Montgomery was not quite the master of war he is portrayed as; General George Patton had serious flaws, exposed by wasting men’s lives to save a relative and overlooking the shooting of prisoners of war; General Mark Clark lost lives to bolster his image; and General Harold Alexander the gentleman was far too vague to be effective as a senior leader. Field Marshal Alfred Kesselring faced different challenges to the Allied commanders, but benefited from the German system that granted field commanders a large degree of independence. He was later convicted as a war criminal, but emerges in this study as the most competent military leader in Italy.

FLAWED COMMANDERS

AND STRATEGY IN THE

BATTLES FOR ITALY,

1943–45

ANDREW SANGSTER AND

PIER PAOLO BATTISTELLI

Published in the United States of America and Great Britain in 2023 by

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Copyright 2023 © Andrew Sangster and Pier Paolo Battistelli

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Contents

List of Maps

Preface

Introduction

1Strategy

2Operation Husky and Sicily

3Patton

4Italy Invaded

5Montgomery

6To Rome

7Clark

8The D-day Dodgers after Rome

9Alexander

10The End of the War in Italy

11Kesselring

Conclusion

Bibliography

Endnotes

Index

Maps

Allied plan for the invasion of Sicily24

The plan for Operation Husky was simple and unimaginative, envisaging a double frontal attack against the enemy forces in the island by Patton’s Seventh Army and Montgomery’s Eighth Army. The disposition of the German and Italian forces reveals the fear for an assault to the northern part of the island aimed at cutting their retreat. (West Point Atlas Map)

Anzio-Cassino area 194331

After four months of battle and four different attempts to break through the defences of Cassino, in May 1944 Operation Diadem led the Allied armies to Rome. Although eventually successful, the operation was marred by Fifth Army’s switch of the advance from Valmontone to Rome, with the result that the German forces could withdraw unhindered. Clark’s ambitions and his desire to enter Rome at the soonest are the reasons behind this blunder. (West Point Atlas Map)

Italo-German counterattack and Allied advance42

After the initial counterattack at Gela, the Sicilian campaign turned into a race for Messina which had in Patton and Montgomery its contenders. While Montgomery’s frontal attacks in the Catania plain proceeded slowly, Patton’s forces made a swift advance to Palermo which was soon slowed down by the German resistance. (West Point Atlas Map)

The invasion of Italy74

Albeit incomplete as it doesn’t show the German forces under Rommel’s command in northern Italy, this map clarifies the strategic situation of summer 1943. An Allied landing in the Rome area would have effectively cut off Kesselring’s troops, compelling the Germans to withdraw north to the Apennines leaving thus most of Italy into the hands of the Allies.

Attempts to cross Rapido and Garigliano River109

The solution to the stalemate in the Allied advance at Cassino was the Anzio landing, which resulted in a major blunder for the Allied military leadership. What was supposed to be a lightning advance towards Rome became a cul-de-sac which the Germans repeatedly counterattacked, albeit without success. US VI Corps’ commander, General Lucas, got the bucket in his hands and was the only one to be blamed for the failure. (West Point Atlas Map)

Allied invasion of Italy and operations to 25 September 1943111

After gaining the first foothold in Europe with the conquest of Sicily, the next step for the Allied generals was to set foot in the Italian mainland. Montgomery’s Eighth Army was the first to cross the strait of Messina and start its advance along Italy’s boot, followed by the unopposed landing at Taranto. The landing at Salerno threatened to turn into a disaster, casting its shadow on the entire campaign in Italy. (West Point Atlas Map)

Allied advance to Volturno River147

Following the advance from the Salerno bridgehead the Allied commanders, Eisenhower and Alexander in the lead, reckoned to reach Rome in a matter of weeks. It did not take long for the German resistance to stiffen, slowing down the pace of the advance. In December 1943 Montgomery was halted at Ortona, on the Adriatic coast. Clark’s Fifth Army slowly advanced after breaking through the Bernhardt Line only to face the Cassino stronghold. (West Point Atlas Map)

Allied plan of attack, 1 April and situations 20 April 1944, northern Italy161

Between August 1944 and January 1945, the Fifth and the Eighth Army attempted to break through into the Po River valley, while changes at the top of the Allied leadership took place. The final phase of the Italian campaign started in April 1945, as the Allied forces swept through northern Italy and reached Trieste only to find Tito’s partisans already in the town. (West Point Atlas Map)

Allied Advance to the Gothic Line168

Following the entry of the Allied forces in Rome and the landing in Normandy, the Italian theatre of war became secondary, though this did not stop the fighting. By mid-August the Allied advance had reached Florence and the eastern wing of the Gothic Line, where the decisive blow was to be launched with the aim of reaching the gate to Yugoslavia. (West Point Atlas Map)

Preface

It is easy to criticise military leaders from behind a desk, but that is the role of the historian who, working with the benefit of hindsight, has a duty to expose the mistakes and the errors of the past. World War II was one of the very few examples when a war had to be fought, and one British and one Italian historian decided to explore errors and successes in one part of the global war, namely the campaign in Italy. Archives in Britain, Germany, and Italy were all plundered as were some American archives, with much gained by the growing ‘digital progress’.

The intentions, motives, plans, and actions of the protagonists are examined, and the leading military figures explored. The views of many experts are considered along with the thinking of those who participated in the events of the day. Wars never run according to plan, and in coalition with other nations the situation is made even more complex. The errors in the strategies, the tactics, and operations at campaign command level were not just gleaned with the benefit of hindsight, but from opinions expressed at the time.

A major part of this study also included the exploration of the nature of some of the now well-known commanders of the day who led the battles in Italy. Two British, two Americans, and the leading German field marshal who opposed them were selected for study. The eccentricities of human behaviour and reaction soon emerged for better and for worse, which therefore demanded an overview of these prominent figures, virtually mini biographies to explain how they developed and what they did before and after the Italian campaign to understand them. It is easy later to be critical, but we have avoided moral judgement and every attempt has been made to be as objective as possible, but with the constant reminder that hundreds of thousands of lives were at stake.

Introduction

This introductory chapter outlines the nature of this study, but as the contents page has indicated, five chapters are devoted to the profiles of five leading military commanders, while interspersed with an outline of the Italian campaign, with detailed observations on strategies, tactics, and the critical movement of the manoeuvres and battles.

The central focus of this book is the command leadership at all levels in Italy during World War II. Such a task demands a brief survey of the strategy and the major campaigns, which can be split into various phases. These phases were the occupation of Sicily, followed by the mainland attack at Salerno and the southern area in Operation Baytown, the move north towards Rome, the attack on the German defence lines with the battle of Monte Cassino, the Anzio beachhead to assist the drive north and the taking of Rome, and the attempted thrust into northern Italy where the leg of that country changes into a vast and complex area. This book is not a detailed study of the military campaigns, but provides a sketch of the individual battles, the German defence, overall leadership, and the general strategy, so the study of the military leadership can be given its appropriate context and backdrop. The natures of the individual commanders remain central to this exploration, and they appear at various stages throughout the book.

There are many aspects of leadership, from the political oversight of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill with their advisers, to the commanders of armies and the corps leaders. In the Allied political camp, there were major differences of views on strategy and even tactics, which were prominent at the top of the political and military stages and permeated all levels of command. Some historians have noted that when decisions were made, they were limited by strategic qualifications which would hinder operational aims which often appeared obscure, and claimed it was ‘a campaign with inadequate means, with no strategic goal and with no political bottom’.¹ It has been noted that ‘the Italian Campaign was a vessel which held endless disappointment: opportunities were squandered, blunders committed. From which every position it is scrutinised, this negative attitude is encountered’.² Many of these problems were caused by the lack of a cohesive policy between the British and Americans, sometimes brought about by lengthy arguments, hesitation, nationalistic undertones, decisions made hastily, and too often further complicated by the commanders in the field.

Unlike the Axis relationship between Germany and Italy, despite the problems and tensions the Anglo-American alliance survived – because there was no choice – but at times it was fragile. At army command level the nationalistic differences seemed to increase, and the atmosphere of British superiority added fuel to the sometimes-rampant Anglophobia which increased as the Allies fought side-by-side and at times proved detrimental. This book’s central focus will scrutinise, in this massive jigsaw, the Allied generals George Patton, Bernard Montgomery, Mark Clark, and Harold Alexander, and their German opponent, Albert Kesselring, measure their competence in command and how far their personalities helped or hindered the campaign. Their personal relationships and attitudes towards one another were crucial, as were their relationships with the layers of corps commanders. The corps commanders were where the action was taking place, but they were obliged to follow advice from their generals in distant headquarters which often led to more internal conflict. The leading generals are the critical components under scrutiny, which entails exploring their backgrounds, with some of them being overly competitive, others motivated by seeking glory through public acclaim, occasionally at the expense of their soldiers, and exploring their personalities, which have left their mark on the campaign but not always for the best reasons. The question the book raises is how these generals affected the campaign with their differing and often conflicting personalities, sometimes creating major blunders and unnecessary loss of life. In exploring these five major military leaders it is often necessary to trace their lives before and after Italy in order to understand them; Montgomery is explored when fighting in mainland Europe, Alexander in Burma, Patton in Mexico, Clark in North Africa, and Kesselring in the Battle of Britain. Such leaders must be seen in the wider context to know what sort of leaders they were. To understand the natures of these critical leaders, it is necessary to explore their personalities, background, attitudes, and military expertise. This creates a conundrum as opinions about the men vary among historians, biographers, and their contemporaries. It is known that memoirs can be self-serving, and some biographies are worthless because they are simply hagiographies.

A warning of this biographical minefield arose in reading one of the earliest biographies on Alexander, written in 1952, which painted a picture of the subject as above criticism and heaped adulation on his career.³ One of the most common criticisms directed at Alexander were his vague orders, however his biographer wrote that Alexander ‘believed in giving clear and unmistakeable orders’.⁴ Another criticism of Alexander was his reliance on other people’s views, which was described in the biography as ‘his great receptiveness’, turning a criticism into praise.⁵ General Clark occupied Rome with the American Fifth Army against Alexander’s orders, but his biographer wrote that on hearing of Rome it ‘reverberated throughout the world and General Alexander and his men were the heroes of the hour’, while another chapter’s title described him as ‘The Planner of El Alamein’, which would raise a few eyebrows.⁶ This book will explore Alexander’s relationship with Montgomery, which created Anglo-American tensions in Sicily and in the early attack on Italy; these events are not mentioned in Hillson’s biography, but Alexander is painted as a total triumph on every page. Not all biographies are like this, but it demonstrates how biographies must be treated with care in looking for a sense of objectivity, and some of them can be valuable with their insights.

Nevertheless, to evaluate a commander’s efficiency, it becomes a matter of looking at the facts and trying not to be enveloped by a biographer’s adoration of the subject. All the commanders studied had their admirers and detractors – Kesselring was the master of defence, but also a war criminal; Patton was a man of drive, but too impetuous; Montgomery the victor was a self-seeking egotist; Clark was affable and brave, but a paranoid Anglophobe; Alexander was a thorough gentleman but one who failed to take a necessary grip of a situation. It is not a matter of passing moral or any other form of judgment, that is a decision for the reader as their actions and personalities are explored.

Clues were sought from the observations of those who knew them well during the campaigns. Some views are more honest than others, which tends to depend on the time when the comment was made. General Brooke’s acerbic diary notes, as with Clark’s diary, were written at the time, and some other observations come from cables, letters, and messages also written at the time. Some memoirs are more honest than others – Montgomery’s post-war literary effort tends to justify his own actions; Clark’s post-war comments are more polite and cautious than during the war; Eisenhower’s works are more like a careful commentary; and for these writers General Bradley’s work seems reliable and sincere. But these are all subjective feelings, which demand a knowledge of the events in order to understand the remarks and when to read between the lines for the innuendo.

When it comes to exploring the views of those historians who have studied the Italian campaign, it is noticeable that nearly 90 per cent tend to agree in their viewpoints, and like all historians often quote one another. Historians try, not always successfully, to be as objective as possible. Some are slightly more sympathetic than others, a few are quite brutal, but they hold in common their search for the facts and precisely what happened, and why. The Italian campaign was not the dominant theatre of war after D-day at Normandy, and many at the time and since have questioned the whole concept of invading Italy, especially as it cost countless thousands of lives both amongst the wide multi-national force of the Allies, and amongst the Italians and Germans. What struck the two writers of this work was the question of the strategy of the campaign and the leading commanders, which at the time and today, with the benefit of hindsight, appear to have had serious flaws.

Postscript

This also raises questions of what we expect from commanders in war. Various leadership papers were read, and they had much in common, one starting with the demand that any leader such as a general must help others to achieve a common goal which demands inner drive and vision of what can be accomplished. A good general must be selfless when looking after the interests of his troops – they need courage and a moral stance knowing what is right and wrong, which demands self-confidence, education, and experience, so they can be assured of the decisions they make. These qualities can of course apply to many forms of leadership especially in the political world where failure can be even more dangerous.

Another paper simplified it to 11 headings: strategic vision, being decisive, courage (physical and moral), accountable by praising subordinates on success and accepting responsibility when they fail, a non-negotiable integrity, a sense of drive, team building, recognising a need for change, setting personal and corporate standards, a sense of poise, and being diplomatic.⁷

Part of the conclusion of this book, after having explored the generals with their strategies, will be an attempt to evaluate them along these guidelines. This has been helped by many historians and others who we asked to participate in an opinion poll in order to provide an overall public impression. The results are evaluated in the final chapter.

CHAPTER 1

Strategy

Western Allied Strategy

Introduction

This chapter has two distinct parts, the first dealing with a brief overview of the Anglo-American decision to launch by air and sea from North Africa into Sicily and onto the Italian mainland. There were deep tensions between the Americans and the British over the Italian campaign which were to last for most of the war, both in matters of strategy, tactics, and the nature of command during operations. It was one of the factors that led to a degree of animosity between the two allies, with marked signs of Anglophobia often originating from the pervading sense of British superiority. Nevertheless, the Western coalition managed to hold firm until the end of the war.

Because of its lack of previous exploration, the second part of the chapter explores in depth the German-Italian Axis alliance, and to understand its nature it is necessary to outline the situation well before the Italian campaign. Little has been written on German strategy and viewpoints, but it is critical for understanding the nature of the German perceptions. It becomes evident that from 1943 onwards German strategy was not well-defined, at times bewildering, mainly reactive, and there were frequently differing opinions between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy where Mussolini appeared to have next to no strategy. The state of Italian politics needs some overview because the diverging opinions soon grew into persistent clashes between the two Axis powers over questions of the overall strategy, lack of Italian commitment, shortage of resources, and an inability to reach any form of agreement, even with the knowledge that the Allies were about to attack the Italian homeland. A rift between the two Axis powers soon became apparent leading to Italy’s surrender and occupation by Germany. This was perceived as a political victory for the Allies, but it was not a resolution in the military sphere.

Trident and the Consequences

From the moment that Britain and America united as Allies against Nazi Germany and Japan there were tensions within the coalition. Politically, they ranged from the American suspicion that Britain retained colonial ambitions, to British concerns that the Americans had to be distracted from the Japanese threat, were somewhat naïve about international war, and underestimated the military strength of Nazi Germany. As the historian Weinberg wrote:

‘When strategy fails civilians suffer’. The destruction brought to an Italian town shows how the protracted campaign ended up involving the civilian population who had to suffer the consequences of war. (Wikimedia Commons)

Washington was concerned about British Imperial interests, minimising casualties, and not retroactively validating the Gallipoli operation of World War One. Invading Sicily and then mainland Italy were seen as causing pinpricks rather than serious trouble for the Germans and might possibly provoke the Soviet Union into making a separate peace with Germany.¹

The British were apprehensive that the Americans would give excessive allocation of resources to the Pacific, and it was a time of bristling tension between American and British views on strategy. British and Commonwealth troops had succeeded at El Alamein, and Operation Torch was widely considered the first American encounter against German troops. However, the Americans were somewhat bemused by Churchill’s seeming obsession with North Africa, and they wanted to land directly in Europe and head for Berlin. The British believed more time was needed for such a major project and did their best to divert American attention to Africa. This was assisted by Roosevelt who was concerned that American soldiers had to experience fighting the Germans before mainland Europe was invaded, and he was persuaded by Churchill that the Mediterranean was the best scenario for tactical and strategic reasons.

The Operation Torch landings were a success, but the Americans soon discovered that the Germans were militarily highly professional whereas they were somewhat inexperienced. This lack of familiarity was exposed at the battle of the Kasserine Pass, which was a disaster for the Americans. Eisenhower admitted his troops were unprepared, and he even discovered that engineers had been ordered to dig into rock to give cover for senior officers; ‘it was the only time, during the war, that I saw a divisional or higher headquarters so concerned over its own safety that it dug itself underground shelters’.² The commander Fredendall was sacked and replaced by George Patton, but the British commander Alexander became suspicious of American fighting ability which strained Anglo-American relationships.

The British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Alan Brooke, had constantly and annoyingly warned the Americans that it would be a mistake to invade across the English Channel too early. The American General Omar Bradley later inferred this in his memoirs relating to this time, and he had the grace to realise that Brooke had been correct, writing: ‘I came to the conclusion that it was fortunate that the British view prevailed, that the US Army first met the enemy on the periphery, in Africa rather than on the beaches of France. In Africa we learnt to crawl, to walk, and then to run. Had that learning process been launched in France it would surely have, as Alan Brooke argued, resulted in an unthinkable disaster’.³

The question was the next move after North Africa, resulting in fraught discussions between the British who wanted to land in Sicily followed by mainland Italy, and the Americans who wanted to go straight for the German heart of Berlin. ‘There was no plan, no grand strategy, no consensus on what to do with the immense Allied army now concentrating in the Mediterranean’.⁴ Some historians and commentators post-war have been critical about the British demand of invading Italy and delaying crossing the channel, some blaming it on Churchill, others pointing out that it was General Brooke’s influence.⁵ It meant postponing the crossing (with Churchill at times thinking 1943 would work), but by operating in the Mediterranean it convinced the Germans that the cross-channel prospects were minimal, and although Italy might surrender, the ‘Balkans and more than half of Italy passed under Germany’s exclusive control’.⁶ It has been claimed that ‘the occupation of Italian territory was, in more than one sense, a strategic folly. It imposed upon the Allies the responsibility for sustaining a large population whose contribution to the war effort would never be significant, while at the same time, of course, it relieved the Germans of the burden’.⁷ It is an unresolvable debate with opinions still divided and often changing one way or the other. Some argue that Allied soldiers would have been more effective elsewhere as there was a major demand on shipping, while others argue that it drew German forces from the Eastern Front, as there were in Italy some 18 German divisions and 21 in the Balkans monitoring any possible insurgency.

Meanwhile the British, who followed Churchill’s or Brooke’s strategy of wanting not just Sicily but Italy occupied, had to persuade the Americans into some form of agreed common policy. The Americans were wary of the British, believing they had lost the argument at Casablanca and decided that the next round of Anglo-American talks should be held in Washington, known as the Trident Conference, where they were not going to be bullied or smooth-talked by their coalition partner. Churchill had already been influencing Roosevelt to go ‘beyond Sicily’ but many American military elements for a variety of reasons, military and political, were not going to let the British lead the way. Roosevelt acknowledged the need to knock Italy out of the war and knew that the American military had to go into action, but he pondered whether a concentrated air campaign launched from an occupied Sicily would be just as effective as a mainland offensive.

Churchill had recognised the importance of American support, as had the Americans. During the 1930s, America’s army and military in general had stayed at peacetime levels, and by European standards their army was small. As war seemed possible, their army was dramatically increased in size, reaching between five and six million men, and money and resources were being poured into the growing American military machine. America had the industrial resources for weapons, ships, and planes, all of which could be produced at a staggering rate. However, the American public were perplexed over fighting Germany or Japan, especially having been attacked by Japan with American newspapers using slogans such as ‘bury a Jap with scrap’ and asking what was going to happen next.⁸

Before the Trident Conference opened, both sides of the coalition were preparing reams of arguments to support their viewpoints. Churchill was already pointing out that the Russians were facing 185 divisions and the West nothing, and it would take nearly a year to prepare for what would be called Operation Overlord, the Normandy D-day incursion into mainland Europe. It was argued by the British that in the meantime, while the Russians were fighting, the West had idle troops. Stalin had been demanding that the West open a second front to ease the pressure in the East, and there was a fear that the Soviet leader might just make some form of peace overture with the Nazis. The British believed that by invading the Italian mainland it would not only bring down Germany’s Axis partner, but also detract German troops from the Eastern Front, which bolstered Churchill’s focus on the Mediterranean as the primary strategic area while neglecting the invasion of western Europe.

The Americans were less certain, with the American Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, claiming that invading Italy would ‘create a vacuum’ in the Mediterranean, and Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, wanting to focus on Japan, while others believed that the British had no intention of crossing the channel. It would be Marshall who ‘led the chorus arguing the Allies must stick to their game plan to move rapidly to pierce the heart of the Axis’.⁹ Marshall also noted that a few German troops in North Africa had caused serious problems and it could be even more difficult in Italy, and certainly time consuming.

As an overall view, this third Trident Conference was underlined by a deep sense of mistrust between the Americans and the British, many of the Americans feeling they had been dealt a poor hand at Casablanca, and they had no intention of repeating this implied failure again. Churchill took with him a massive team, which even King George VI’s secretary Alan Lascelles commented on with raised eyebrows.¹⁰ Trident was ‘regarded as one of the most ill-tempered and rancorous of all the wartime summits’, not least because the Americans were not going to allow themselves to be dictated to by the British.¹¹ Although the Americans eventually started to accept the British Mediterranean plans, the British faced considerable American suspicion regarding the mention of the Greek islands and the Balkan area. When General Alan Brooke heard they were heading for America for this conference he was unhappy about the oncoming confrontation even though he knew it was essential, writing that ‘I don’t feel too hopeful … Casablanca had taught me too much. Agreement after agreement may be secured on paper, but if their hearts are not in it, they soon drift away again’.¹² Brooke knew the main task fell to him to convince the Americans that the war had to continue into the Italian mainland, and there were many logistical issues to be discussed, not least the allocation of shipping.

This contentious meeting had continued with social breaks, side-conferences, and continuous cantankerous debates. Admiral King still aimed to make the Pacific theatre the main subject of primary focus, but the most annoying aspect for Brooke was that he had the impression that the ‘Americans think we led them down the garden path taking them to North Africa’, and ‘they are not going to allow themselves to be led astray again’.¹³

It was Marshall who led the American argument that the Allies must move rapidly to ‘pierce the heart of the Axis’, with the British favouring the opportunity to exploit the Mediterranean.¹⁴ This meant comprehending the complex geography and the politics of the Mediterranean, which offered an abundance of options, each with its strengths and weaknesses, all of which found their champions in the debate. The rapidly unfolding political and armed situation in the Mediterranean during the summer of 1943 was difficult to predict with any degree of certainty as to which military options would have to be utilised for the greatest strategic benefit. It was known that after El Alamein, Mussolini’s options were limited and there were hints emanating from some sources that the Italian Fascist leader would prefer to end the war, and there were further indicators of internal political dissent within Italy. The Germans in Italy were officially under Italian overall command, but as far as Hitler was concerned, they were under the orders of Field Marshal Kesselring, and this was rapidly becoming a reality. Kesselring was to become a major figure in the Italian campaign, and he was one of the few not to be fooled by the British Operation Mincemeat to deceive the Germans into thinking that the Allies were intending to head towards the Balkans. When Kesselring visited Sicily in early May 1943, he was shocked by the poor state of the defences. In the light of his criticisms, the Italian General Ambrosio agreed to accept more German divisions, bringing the total in Italy to six, two of which, the Hermann Göring Panzer and the 15th Panzergrenadier, were sent as well as a significant increase in Luftwaffe deployment in Italy. As the Allies debated the issue, the Germans had started to speculate on the Allied decisions.

Meanwhile, the British chiefs of staff suggested that after Sicily, troops should land in Calabria from where anti-German and communist resistance movements in Greece and Yugoslavia could be supported, and Italy should be occupied as far north as Rome. Even over whether Sicily should be the landing area there was heated debate, some preferring Sardinia, with Mountbatten irritating his British colleagues by siding with the American arguments for Sardinia.

Wednesday, 19 May, was the most difficult day of the conference with the clash of opposing views; Marshall suggested the room should be cleared and only the chiefs of staff remained, and by so doing General Brooke said they found ‘a bridge we could cross’.* They later returned to the combined meeting to present their resolutions, which were based on preparing 29 divisions to invade France in early 1944, and to continue the pressure on Italy. This helped clear the air.

Basically, the Americans ultimately recognised the validity of the arguments that building on their momentum would enable taking advantage of both timing and location.¹⁵ The Americans had been and remained sceptical about Italy and hedged the agreement with their own demands. The British were forced to agree that the invasion of France would occur in May 1944, but they succeeded in persuading the American that the Italian invasion would probably cause the overthrow of Mussolini and might be the first step toward Italy switching sides in the conflict. Operation Husky was also to be the first Allied offensive which might impact on the Eastern Front, and it worked because the Germans were obliged to pause their Operation Citadel which was the Third Reich’s last major offensive in Russia. From the German perspective, Hitler regarded the Mediterranean theatre as secondary, and during the Nuremberg trial Keitel referred to Erwin Rommel’s ‘little shooting match in North Africa’, but it undeniably created a strain on German military resources. Hitler’s main preoccupation in the Mediterranean arena was keeping Italy safe and onside.

It has been suggested that the Casablanca conference was

significant because it was almost the last