The Polish Resettlement Corps 1946-1949: Britain's Polish Forces

By Wiesław Rogalski

At the end of the Second World War, the Polish Allied Forces under British Command refused to stand down when America, the Soviet Union and Britain decided that Poland would be part of Russia’s new sphere of interest in Europe. This defiant gesture became known as the ‘Polish problem’ and was extremely symbolic, for it threatened to embarrass Britain’s entry into the War on behalf of Polish independence. To resolve the issue Britain established the Polish Resettlement Corps, under the country’s first ever mass immigration legislation. The initiative was just as much a face saving exercise, as it was a noble act of one ally on behalf of another. This book describes the methods and the legacy of the resettlement program, which not only required the support of the Trade Unions, Professional Associations and the Departments of Employment, Health and Pensions amongst others, but also the lobbying of the Vatican City, the governments of Argentina, Brazil and southern Africa, as well as the Commonwealth countries. Britain’s solution to the Polish problem eventually became a heroic, as well as a tragic act; often referred to but rarely explained.

The book contains three sections and comprises 33 chapters which are fully referenced. Numerous images and photographs are included to illustrate this history.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: Jul 15, 2019
• ISBN: 9781804515099

Wiesław Rogalski

Wiesław Rogalski was born in Britain and is the child of Nicholas and Stanisława. During the Second World War his parents served in the Polish Allied Forces under British operational command and were invited to settle in Britain after the War. They arrived in 1947 and were demobilised by British authorities. They eventually settled in London. Wiesław studied the history of Curriculum Development Projects at London University where he was awarded a higher degree. He is currently the Vice Chairman of the Third Carpathian Infantry Division Ex- Servicemen Association and a museum trustee at the Rural Life Centre, Tilford near Farnham in Surrey. The picture shows Wiesław visiting London whilst researching the book.

Book preview

Part I

The Dismantling of Polish Military Authority under British Command

No man has a right to lead such a life of contemplation as to forget in his ease the service due to his neighbour.

(Augustine, City of God, XIX, 19)

1

The Eastern Ally

Britain’s and Poland’s destiny in the Second World War became intimately intertwined during the early months of 1939. By this time, Britain’s policy of appeasing Hitler, so energetically championed by Neville Chamberlain,¹ was known to have failed. The German Fuhrer’s casual approach to the Munich Agreement (signed in September 1938 and sometimes considered to be the high point of the appeasement policy), had demonstrated that it would be unlikely to bring ‘peace in our time’ as expected. The iconic picture of a relieved, but tense Chamberlain, brandishing Hitler’s note above his head,² soon turned into an image of sad betrayal when the German Fuhrer returned to his old ways of challenging the status quo in Europe, demanding the return of the ‘Polish Corridor’³ and the transfer of the Free City of Gdansk (Danzig) to the Third Reich. The realisation in London that a new approach was required regarding the German Chancellor was not long in coming.

During the early months of 1939, the policy of appeasement was quietly replaced with a new strategy, sometimes referred to as the ‘Encirclement Plan’. The rationale behind this idea, which was Britain’s last throw of the dice to avoid war, was deceptively simple and involved establishing a ring of allied countries around Germany in order to corral her ambitions and bellicosity. However, if the policy was to succeed, an ally in the east would have to be found to complete the ‘circle’ around the country – the two most obvious candidates being the Soviet Union and Poland. Winston Churchill⁴ argued for the Soviets, for he not only coveted the immense military potential of the Red Army, but was informed by Vyacheslav Molotov⁵ that if Britain approached the Soviet Government with an offer of an alliance, she would receive a very favourable response. Churchill was soon overlooking his fervent anti-communist feelings and pressed the British Government to make the formal approach. However, he lost the argument when Chamberlain rejected this advice, arguing that the Red Army was incapable of waging effective warfare at the time, on account of Stalin’s recent purges of the Soviet High Command, which saw the removal of experienced front line officers whom he deemed to be politically unreliable. Józef Beck⁶ hurried to London in order to beat the drum for Poland and, to reinforce his message, made it clear that his Government would not allow the Red Army to cross Polish territory in order to reach Germany’s eastern border. His message was clear; the Polish Army, some 1,000,000 strong, would be more than adequate at fulfilling the role of Britain’s eastern ally. Despite the country’s outdated military equipment, Chamberlain settled for the Poles and in March 1939 announced to the House of Commons,

In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in its power. May I add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in the matter, as do His Majesty’s Government.

In the light of the British Prime Minister’s decision, secret meetings were arranged between military planners from the two countries whilst the Soviet Union, not wishing to be left isolated, looked to others for friendship. In May, British General Staff met with their Polish counterparts in Warsaw. The British were represented by General Clayton, Naval Commander Rawlings and Lieutenant Davidson of the RAF.⁷ The Poles were represented by General Wacław Stachiewicz, Chief of the General Polish Staff. The result of the meeting was a defence plan which eventually formed the basis of a formal agreement. In order to assist its success, the plan was kept as simple as possible. If it was the case that German forces would be thrown westward, that is towards France and the Low Countries, the French and British would move to confront them, leaving the Polish forces to open up a front on Germany’s eastern border. If, on the other hand, German forces were to attack Poland (which was the more likely scenario according to incoming secret information from Berlin), Polish forces would resist, leaving France and Britain to open up a front on Germany’s western border. The rationale was quite clear; whichever direction German forces were sent, they would be split by the existence of two fronts. The plan sounded logical and feasible, but much work was needed to be done in order to work out the details. In subsequent meetings the Poles were keen to learn about the kind of help they could expect from their allies. For example, would it include army, naval and air operations and what was meant by the phrase ‘immediate British help’? General Clayton informed the Poles that the use of Britain’s land army would depend on French permission, since intervention would require operations being launched from French territory. Commander Rawlings explained that naval assistance would be limited, as the priority would be the protection of Atlantic shipping lanes and British interests in the Mediterranean. General Stachiewicz, therefore, presumed that what the British really meant by ‘help’ was RAF bombing of German targets. This did not worry the Poles unduly, for it was RAF help that they coveted most. General Stachiewicz pressed the British to clarify what types of targets the RAF would attack. Lieutenant Davidson said that all military targets would be considered, if it was decided that their destruction would help the war effort. General Stachiewicz enquired about civilian targets. The answer was that the RAF did not bomb civilians but, if it was known that the Polish population was being targeted by the Luftwaffe, then civilian targets in Germany would be considered as legitimate. Regarding what was meant by the phrase ‘immediate response’, Davidson explained that the RAF would respond just as soon as the British Government declared war on Germany, after having received an alarm message by radio communication from Warsaw. He also added that this would be done, even if British territory was not being threatened directly. He then proceeded to give the Poles a breakdown of the aircraft prepared for action: 524 bombers, 500 fighters, 96 support planes and 184 reconnaissance aircraft.

In the plenary session, General Stachiewicz confirmed that it was the policy of the Polish Government to resist German aggression against Polish territory, but went out of his way to remind London (and Paris) that Poland could not fight on her own for long – an estimate in terms of weeks rather than months – without the military assistance of Britain and France. The resulting formal guarantee made to Poland also reassured London that Poland would not ally with Germany and that there would be no Polish equivalent to the ‘English Right Club’ in Warsaw. The understanding between Britain and Poland was the last piece of the jigsaw required for the policy of encirclement. The British contingent left Warsaw with General Clayton wishing the Poles good fortune. The meetings between London and Warsaw were peculiar in that one side was attempting to gain as much as possible from the agreement, whilst the other was endeavouring to give as little as it could. The Polish Foreign Minister was buoyed by the arrangements and felt emboldened to address the Polish Parliament saying,

Peace is a precious and desirable thing. Our generation, bloodied by war, certainly deserves peace. But peace, like almost all things in this life, has its price, a high but measurable one. We in Poland do not know the concept of peace at any price. There is only one thing in the lives of men, nations and countries that is without price and that thing is honour.⁸

The document between London and Warsaw was signed by the Right Honourable Viscount Halifax on behalf of the British and by His Excellency Count Edward Raczynski⁹ on behalf of the Poles.

The significant elements of the document read as follows:

Article 1

Should one of the contracting parties become engaged in hostilities with a European power, in consequence of aggression by the latter against that contracting party, the contracting party will at once give the contracting power engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.

Article 2

1) The provision of Article 1 will also apply to the event of any action by a European Power which clearly threatens, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of the contracting powers and is of such a nature that the party in question considers it vital to resist it with armed force.

2) Should one of the contracting powers become engaged in hostilities with a European power in consequence of action by that power which threatened the independence or neutrality of another European state in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that contracting power, the provision of Article 1 will apply without prejudice.

Article 4

The method of applying the understanding of mutual assistance provided for by the competent naval, military and air authorities by the contracting powers.¹⁰

The existence of a formal agreement between London and Warsaw was finally announced on 25 August, when it was clear that there was no hope of persuading Hitler to settle his issues with Europe without reverting to war.

The Soviet Union, smarting from the fact that Britain and France had been less than enthusiastic in securing an understanding in 1938–9, looked for friends elsewhere and in order to avoid Soviet isolation, signed a pact with Berlin. This became known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement.¹¹ The pact between the two countries renewed the anti-Polish arrangements, which had bound together the Hohenzollerns and Romanovs, in imperial times and had precipitated the destruction of Poland. The understanding between Germany and Russia meant that neither of them would interfere with the other’s expansionist plans. Article One of the agreement stated,

‘The two Contracting Parties bind themselves to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive action and any attack on one another, both singly and also jointly with other Powers.’¹²

Following the German-Soviet agreement, Hitler knew that Stalin would not oppose Germany’s operations in Poland; whilst Stalin was reassured that Hitler would refrain from interfering in Soviet operations in eastern Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland. The two leaders also compromised on the terms governing the occupation of Poland, agreeing to share the territory between themselves. Stalin, however, was deeply troubled by the existence of the Anglo-Polish Agreement, which threatened allied retaliation if Poland was attacked. Hitler reassured Stalin that it was highly unlikely that Britain and France would go to war over Poland and the pact that they had signed was no more than a hollow threat. In August 1939, Hitler called Britain’s bluff and made a final demand on the Polish government. The headlines in the Daily Express proclaimed, ‘Hitler rejects peace offer and makes a clear demand. I must have Danzig and the Corridor’.¹³ Poland resisted and refused to cede any of her territory to Nazi Germany with the words, ‘We value peace, but not at any price’. Hitler responded by ordering his troops to cross the Polish border on 1 September,¹⁴ without officially declaring war. A shrill headline appeared in the Star newspaper, ‘Poland invaded. Warsaw and other towns bombed’.¹⁵ The article continued saying that the Polish ambassador in London had called on Lord Halifax to invoke the treaty.

The first shots of the Second World War were fired by the German battle cruiser, Schleswig-Holstein, which had previously entered Danzig Harbour (Port Gdanski) on what Berlin had called a ‘courtesy visit’. Despite the harbour being a demilitarised zone, the ship’s turrets were silently turned onto a small Polish garrison (protecting Polish interests in the region) on the Westerplatte peninsula, at the tip of the Polish corridor. Following a disingenuous accusation that Polish Forces had crossed the German border, Hitler unleashed ‘Case White’, the code name for the invasion of Poland. He justified the attack by arguing that all he was doing was defending his country from Polish aggression. A comprehensive land invasion ensued, with armour pouring into Poland from the west, the north and the south. The Poles rushed to meet the German advance, but soon made a costly, tactical error by deciding to protect the full length of the country’s border with Germany, thereby stretching her defence line into a narrow corridor. This tactic was no answer to Blitzkrieg and soon saw German mechanised armour break through and wreak havoc behind the Polish lines. Following the rejection of a final demand for the removal of German troops from Polish territory, Britain and France declared war on 4 September. Polish jubilation erupted in Warsaw. The Daily Telegraph published an article describing the euphoria in the Polish capital on the news;

News of Britain’s declaration caused a tremendous outburst of joy in Warsaw. A crowd numbering tens of thousands marched to the British Embassy on Nowy Swiat Street, shouting, ‘long live King George’ and ‘long live England’. Colonel Beck appeared on the balcony of the embassy building with the British ambassador Sir Howard Kennard. Raising his hand to hush the crowd Colonel Beck said, ‘We never doubted that England would fight alongside Poland’. There were moving scenes outside the French Embassy too. The crowd sang patriotic songs with two fingers of the right hand raised, ‘Never shall the German foe tread on our soil’. A French military attaché, who appeared, was lifted into the air by cheering students.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Stalin stood fast trying to gauge whether the British and French forces would come to Poland’s aid. Just as soon it was clear that they would not¹⁷ and that Hitler had been correct in predicting that neither would open up a front on Germany’s western border, he sent the Red Army into eastern Poland, as had been secretly agreed in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement. This Russian move on 17 September disorientated the Polish High Command, as it was unsure whether Russia had entered Polish territory as an ally,¹⁸ or as the country’s next occupier. The confusion was further exacerbated when Moscow signalled that the Red Army had entered Polish territory ‘simply’ to protect fellow Slavs from German aggression. However, as the dual invasion progressed with the Germans and the Soviets driving relentlessly towards Warsaw, it soon became obvious to the Polish authorities that the two invaders were colluding to partition the country. It was decided that further resistance from Polish territory was futile and that the fight for independence would have to continue from exile. Once it was certain that France and Britain would remain passive, the Poles opted for total withdrawal. This took them via Lithuania, Hungary and Romania to the West (France and Britain). Bucharest had had a long-standing agreement with Poland assuring safe passage for Poles responding to a national emergency.

With Polish resistance collapsing, it was only a matter of time until Poland was defeated and wiped from the European map. Using a classic pincer movement, it had taken the dual invaders one month to complete the task. Whilst the Polish Government – alongside approximately 60,000 retreating Polish servicemen – regrouped in Paris, the territory of the Second Polish Republic was bisected and shared out between the two new conquerors. The order to withdraw also saw Polish airmen flying directly to Britain and France, with the Polish Navy sailing to Rosyth in Scotland. The Polish Government – now exiled in Paris – did not give itself the luxury to ponder why its defence plan had gone so horribly wrong. Preferring to return to the issue after the war, it concentrated on planning resistance from exile.

---

1British Prime Minister, May 1937–May 1940.

2Taken on the 30 September 1938 at Heston Aerodrome on his return from Germany.

3A strip of Polish territory through Germany connecting Poland and the Baltic Sea.

4British First Sea Lord, 1939–1940.

5Soviet Foreign Minister, 1939–1949.

6Polish Foreign Minister, November 1932–September 1939.

7Royal Air Force.

8Józef Beck , Polish Foreign Minister speaking to the Polish Parliament, May 1939.

9Polish Ambassador to Britain.

10 The Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Agreement, 1939.

11 Signed in Moscow, August 1939.

12 Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1939.

13 The Polish Corridor was Polish territory located in the region of Pomerania, formerly East Prussia, which provided Poland with access to the Baltic Sea via a land corridor. Approved at the Versailles Conference after the First World War.

14 Case White.

15 The Star Newspaper Publishers , 1 September 1939.

16 The Daily Telegraph , 4 September 1939.

17 See the ‘Phoney War’.

18 Poland had a non-aggression pact with Russia at the time.

2

The Defeat of Poland

With the Germans We Risk Losing Our Liberty, but with the Russians Our Soul.

¹

Despite Great Britain and France declaring that they were inflexible in their determination to fulfil their promise to the utmost, the inactivity of the Allied Forces on Germany’s western border in September 1939 was a bitter and catastrophic blow to Poland’s defence plan. Warsaw had never planned to confront the Nazi Forces alone and certainly not to deal with the dual invasion, which emerged when the Soviet Union joined Germany in dismembering the country. Even today, the allied torpidity on Germany’s western border, often referred to as the ‘Phoney War’, remains a controversial topic amongst academics. It is also unclear why Britain failed to declare war on the Soviet Union when she attacked Poland in September 1939, as the Anglo-Polish Pact had required. Were the Poles naïve about the possibility of allied help arriving in 1939 or were Poland’s allies disingenuous in promising immediate help, knowing full well that the likelihood of this happening was highly improbable? The answer to this question is probably somewhere in between.

News of Poland’s defeat erupted in western newspapers with a vengeance, and it finally dawned on people in Britain that the war would last far longer than had been predicted. However, the first victims of the war in Britain were not fighting men, but children who were evacuated from densely populated urban areas to the relative safety of the countryside, where life was continuing relatively unaffected by the conflict. In rural areas, children continued to attend school, farms continued to operate and churches remained open; however, those involved in the evacuation experienced social and personal trauma. Host families had to readjust to a sudden influx of ‘alien’ children from suburbia, whilst parents were expected to hand over their offspring to strangers. The social divide that existed between the working classes from the cities and the landed gentry is well illustrated in a 1940s cartoon, which shows child evacuees arriving at the door of a country estate with the matron saying, ‘Now I want you to promise me you’re all going to be really good little evacuees and not worry his Lordship’.²

On 23 September, News Chronicle published an article describing how Poland, on the other side of Europe, had been dismembered by the regimes in Berlin and Moscow. It announced alarmingly, ‘Russia to control half of Poland. Stalin gets oil and Hitler gets the steel’.³ Russia gained 96,467 square miles of Polish territory and 16,000,000 people. Germany gained a similar number of people and 52,584 square miles of territory. The demarcation line between the two zones of occupation ran along the rivers Pisa, Narew, Vistula and San. The industrial gains for Russia amounted to extensive agriculture, timber production and 27 refineries, whilst Germany received industrial plant, coal mines and the textile industry, as well as crude oil production (at that time calculated to be 141,000 tons per year). Polish timber exports were estimated to amount to 1,689,422 tons per year, with farming yield being recorded as 2,171,000 tons of wheat, 7,000,000 tons of rye, 300,000 tons of barley and 34,000,000 tons of potatoes. The principal coal mines were in Kielce and Silesia, with metallurgical factories located in Warsaw, Lódź, Bydgoszcz and Poznan. Iron and steel production amounted to 724,000 metric tons of pig iron, 1,145,000 metric tons of steel and 1,047,000 metric tons of rolled