The Diplomatic Struggle over Bessarabia

By Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu

Convention on the definition of aggression signed on 3 July 1933, established the borders of modern Romania. As in the case of its neighbors, Czechoslovakia and Poland, revisionist currents in Europe during the interwar period threatened Romania' s newly established frontiers, one of the most serious threats being posed by the Soviet Union which sought to regain possession of Bessarabia, a Romanian territory that had been occupied by Russia from 1812-1918. This book is a comprehensive account of the efforts of Romanian diplomacy during the interwar period to protect Bessarabia from the Soviet threat and the diplomatic and military events that led to the forcible occupation of the Romanian territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940. The author not only provides an important account of Romanian diplomacy during this period, but also sheds light on the foreign policies of the Western powers, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany in this area of Europe. It is a key work on Romanian foreign policy during the interwar period and a necessary addition to any research library.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Center for Romanian Studies
• Release date: Jan 23, 2024
• ISBN: 9781592113989

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cover-image, The Diplomatic Struggle over Bessarabia

The Diplomatic Struggle over

Bessarabia

Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu

The Diplomatic Struggle over

Bessarabia

Translated from Romanian by

Sorin Pârvu and Kurt W. Treptow



Picture 1

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Contents

Contents

Introduction

Chapter I Romanian Diplomacy and the Union of 1918

Chapter II Romania and the Organization  of European Peace (1918-1938)

Chapter III Romania on the Eve and at the Outbreak of World War II

Chapter IV Romanian-Soviet Relations (1918-1939)

Chapter V The Evacuation of Bessarabia  and Northern Bucovina (June 1940)

Conclusion

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

Before World War II, Romania’s frontiers had been established by the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919-1920, and confirmed by the London Convention on the definition of aggression on 3 July 1933. The borders of the united Romanian national state represented the conclusions of a profound study of the ethnic, geographic, and historical situation in Southeastern Europe. These decisions were made by the committees designated by the Paris Peace Conference, with reference to the right to self-determination of the Romanian populations in the provinces that united with the Old Kingdom and also to the desires of the most important ethnic minorities. These frontiers, however, did not include all of the territories inhabited by Romanian-speaking populations.

The events of 1940 which brought about the dismemberment of the Romanian state were dependent upon on international political context in which Romania had no say whatsoever. The country had to cope, as best it could, with its geographical position at the crossroads of the great empires, confronted with the territorial changes stipulated in the secret annex to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, and with the outbreak of World War II.

The diplomatic struggle in which Romania had been engaged for years on end to defend its historic rights — the endeavors of such illustrious European statesmen as Ion I.C. Brătianu, Take Ionescu, Ion Gheorghe Duca, Nicolae Titulescu, Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, and Grigore Gafencu — reached a critical point. The ultimatum that the Soviet Union sent to Romania on 26 July 1940 deprived it of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, and part of the territory of Herţa, in northern Moldavia — a total of 50,135 square kilometers and 3.5 million people, of whom 2 million were ethnic Romanians.

New claims were soon to be pushed forward by the Axis powers and their satellites. The Diktat of Vienna on 30 August 1940 awarded Northern Transylvania, inhabited by a decidedly Romanian majority, representing 42,243 square kilometers and 2,610,310 inhabitants, to Hungary. This was followed by the Treaty of Craiova, concluded on 6 September 1940, which awarded two districts of southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria, with 7, 412 square kilometers and 378,344 inhabitants (38.3% of them Bulgarians).

These losses, under the threat of impending military intervention and the almost complete international isolation of Romania, both militarily and diplomatically, amounted to roughly one-third of the territory and population of a state that had been strictly on the defensive throughout the inter-war period and remained neutral and faithful to its international agreements. Romania’s tragic plight in 1940 was, with the possible exception of Poland’s ordeal, second to none in Europe.

Drawing on documents from Romanian and foreign archives and also on various volumes of diplomatic documents published in several countries, this book attempts to describe Romania’s diplomatic and military isolation in 1940 and the way the policies of the Great Powers interfered with the basic interests of the country, making it possible for other countries to occupy substantial portions of its territory. Small nations, if isolated, are hardly ever able to have a policy of their own, they are simply obliged to play by the rules established by the Great Powers. Romania during the inter-war period was no different. With a view to keeping her territory intact and safeguarding her place in Europe, she became involved with the Anglo-French diplomatic initiatives and various Southeast European agreements and remained faithful to its agreements until Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were annihilated, France conquered, and Great Britain driven from the continent. Romania’s security in 1940 — including her non-aggression, friendship, and mutual assistance treaties, and the unilateral Anglo-French guarantees of 13 April 1939 — was precarious, to say the least, especially in light of the stipulations of the secret annex to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

In June-September 1940, under pressure from several concentric forces, Romania was forced to give way to Germany and Italy on the one hand, and her neighbors on the other. There is hardly any other case in world history of a state yielding parts of its territory, three times, to its neighbors, without putting up any resistance. Romania did so, paying heavy costs, despite the unlawful nature of the demands.

The author of this book is grateful to several Romanian and foreign research institutions (in Romania: the State Archives in Bucharest, the Library of the Academy, the Central State Library, the archives of the Ministry of National Defense, and the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; abroad: the British Library and the Public Records Office in Great Britain and the Library of the Congress, the National Archives, and the Hoover Institution in the United States) for their understanding and for permitting access to different documents of vital importance to this study.

I would also like to thank the British Academy and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), who made my research trips to Great Britain and the United States possible, and the Center for Romanian Studies for arranging the publication of the English language version of this book. In addition, I would like to thank Mihaela Moscaliuc, Sorin Pârvu, Kurt W. Treptow, and Alexander Whitney for their work on the English version of the book.

Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu

Chapter I

Romanian Diplomacy

and the Union of 1918

The main problem on the agenda of most political parties and groups in the Old Kingdom of Romania at the outbreak of World War I was the realization of national and state unity. The creation of the united national state at the end of the war was the outcome of a long historical process, within a given geographical space, and a result of the progress that Romanian society had made on the social, economic, political, and cultural planes.

The idea of national self-determination, deeply rooted in the juridical conscience of the Romanian nation, was to bear fruit at the end of the first great conflagration of the twentieth century. The state had not yet been completed as a national entity, and, consequently, the creation of the united national state — as several Romanian territories were under foreign occupation — had become a sine qua non condition for the general progress of Romanian society. At the same time, efforts to complete the unity of the Romanians were part of a general trend of national movements in East Central and Southeastern Europe that ultimately changed the history of the old continent by the end of 1918.¹

In 1914, Romania was diplomatically allied with the Central Powers. Romania’s adherence to the Triple Alliance in 1883 was, at the time, a necessary and realistic policy for the country.² But the Alliance had since lost its motivation.

The Romanians hoped they would not have to take up arms to realize the creation of their united national state. This position stated repeatedly by several politicians, including Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu; this did not mean that Romania would not try to profit from the international political situation. The head of the government in Bucharest stated that "in such a whirlpool of events as the war, with the world map changing, a country like ours, a country with national aspirations, cannot possibly stay neutral to the end of the war without completely ruining her future. As a result, the prime minister went on, we must abandon our neutrality and, with our national unity in mind, we need to work constantly to realize its achievement — God knows if we shall ever be presented with such an opportunity again. That is the reason why we cannot help but join the Allies against the Central Powers."³

The resolution of the Crown Council at Sinaia on 3 August 1914, which decided Romania’s neutrality, with provisions for the defense of her borders,⁴ illustrated the policy of the government in Bucharest, which attempted to achieve national and state unity while also expressing the centuries-old aspirations of the people. On this occasion, Ion I.C. Brătianu stated that the Central Powers could not force a decision on us unless they had counseled us beforehand since our public opinion was very much against fighting a war alongside Germany, Austria, and Hungary.⁵ The note of the Crown Council, as another prominent politician put it, laid the foundations for the national unity of all Romanians,⁶ resulting, as it did, from a careful analysis of the country’s international situation.

The prevailing concern of the Bucharest Government from 1914 to 1916 was to avoid joining the great conflagration prematurely and putting Romania’s national future at risk — hence the final alliance with the Entente in August 1916. In an interview published in Journal de Genève on 1 July 1915, the prime minister felt it necessary to explain:

"In fact, Romania claims only a restitutio in integrum, she has no plans whatsoever of making any conquests. Romania takes up arms with the sole purpose of setting her brethren free — we have always been closely united in thought… For the future peace in Europe, for the installation of the new order it is therefore necessary that the principle of nationalities should prevail for all of the states interested, Romania included. Greater Romania, bringing together her sons so long estranged from her, will be a proper guarantee of peace and understanding in the East."⁷

This interview is indicative of the way Romanian diplomacy envisioned the future of Europe; the new political and territorial order following the war must be based on the principle of nationalities.

In favor of an alliance with the Entente since the outbreak of the conflict, Romania began secret negotiations with Russia, France, and England in the spring of 1915. Romanian diplomacy had three main things in view: 1) recognition of the right to national and state unity; 2) a declaration of war at a moment desired by the Romanian politicians; 3) representation at the future peace conference on an equal footing.⁸ In the opinion of the prime minister, Romania’s joining World War I had one and only purpose: the liberation of Transylvania, Bucovina and Banat. Charles de Saint Aulaire, the French minister in Bucharest, informed Quai d’Orsay that Brătianu wishes to give the war a national character and thus ensure the unanimity of public opinion.⁹ Sir George Barclay, the British minister, and Colonel Christopher Birdward Thomson¹⁰ described Brătianu’s attitude in similar terms. As a result of their many diplomatic contacts, the former came to the conclusion that the Romanian prime minister was well-meaning in his negotiations with the Entente, and that his claims were in the national interest of Romania.¹¹ Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith and the Foreign Office State Secretary, Lord Edward Grey, consequently informed the Romanian Government that Britain was not indifferent to Romanian claims.¹² Thus, on 17 July 1915, London agreed, in principle, to Romania’s claims.

The Romanian Government asked for formal recognition, under the guarantee of all the Allies, of its national claims — for without such guarantees Romania would not join the war. Ion I.C. Brătianu informed Blondel, the new French minister in Bucharest, on 20 May 1915 that the claims presented by his country correspond not only to Romania’s eternal national aspirations but also to well-considered requirements to avoid, through the creation of just natural and political frontiers, conflicts between nationalities.… I simply cannot involve my country in the war without making provisions for her future.¹³

During the years of neutrality, Ion I.C. Brătianu was the leading voice when it came to Romania’s foreign policy or any steps with respect to achieving the national ideal.¹⁴ He was still a child, a contemporary of his put it, when he discovered the dream of Greater Romania. In his mature years, especially, he came to be haunted by this image. He had often experienced, in his mind, the blessed moment of his country’s liberation. Driven by this lifelong dream, he decided on war, thus assuming the responsibility of the most difficult situations, ready to face all hardships, and never losing hope even while on the brink of ruin.¹⁵ Nicolae Iorga and his generation contributed decisively to Romania’s spiritual unity — a necessary step for political unity — and now it was Ion I.C. Brătianu’s turn to perform the role that would earn him, deservedly, the title of the founder of Great Romania.¹⁶

Romania was of two minds about joining the war earlier for material, strategic, and moral reasons.¹⁷ Ion I.C. Brătianu agreed that a state in Romania’s position could not afford to overlook them.

After Brusilov’s offensive from May to July 1916, the Entente increased pressure on Romania. The diplomatic maneuvering involving proposals and counterproposals was soon underway. Eager to stop the German offensive at Verdun and relieve pressure along the Somme, France was increasingly interested in the involvement of Romania in the war. Russia, already a victor in Galicia, was in no hurry — tsarist diplomacy had a tradition of never being generous while on the offensive. Brusilov’s troops, advancing on Transylvania, entered Romanian territory on 11 June, an action intended to drive Romania into the war. But Brătianu would not take sides and protested against the Russians’ infringement of Romanian territory. He informed the French Minister in Bucharest that: Russia never missed its chance to give us further reasons to abstain. Our distrust, of a nature to be enhanced by such actions, is the main reason why we are still hesitating. You know only too well that we deserve the guarantees that all the Allies, France included, must give us…. Would you like me to join the war, to help Russia lay its hands on Constantinople and thus encircle us? We are being treated as an enemy or, at best, we are under suspicion so that we might just as well be enemies.¹⁸ As for Britain and Italy, they were content to follow in the path of Quai d’Orsay.¹⁹

The talks with the Entente, hindered by the attitude of Tsarist Russia²⁰ and sometimes of Great Britain,²¹ brought into bold relief the determination of Romanian politicians to realize the formation of a united national state. In exchange for the country’s entry into the war, they asked for guarantees that any small state with a painful historical experience would seek. Repeatedly outspoken against opportunism in policy-making, Ion I.C. Brătianu nonetheless stated, on 8 August 1916, that: opportunism was often a means used by others. But there must be something loftier, there must be a greater ideal beyond the vacillations of an opportunistic policy. We have no way of knowing how it will all end; we might just as well be on the winning side and suffer the fate of Serbia…. But in all events and through all our efforts we shall have confirmed our inalienable right to our own land.²²

Romanian diplomacy, following the relentless tradition of the previous generation, considered the great problems facing the country sub specie aeternitatis, more important than any daily troubles and concerns. Whatever the circumstances, their policies had to be consistent with the underlying principle of achieving a national state."²³

The political convention with the Entente, supplemented by a military protocol, was signed on 17 August 1916.²⁴ Almost all of the Romanian demands were accepted. The Romanian Government thus scored a great diplomatic victory, attaining recognition of Romania’s right to complete its national unity. The convention was also the Entente’s first diplomatic success in Southeastern Europe; it confirmed Romania’s collaboration with the Entente and officials in Bucharest were optimistic about the support that their country would receive from the Allies for international sanctioning of the clauses stipulated in the political agreement. Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu put forth in the Crown Council at the Cotroceni Palace that the conventions with the Entente went so far as to guarantee Romanian interests²⁵ and recognize the creation of a united national state.

According to the convention of August 1916 Romania’s military action was expected to be part of a system of operations carefully coordinated in time and space. But the very next day Romania was left — from a military standpoint — isolated and with no support. Romanian leaders, including Ion I.C. Brătianu, were not completely taken by surprise as they had not ignored the possibility that the Allies would not live up to their promises.²⁶ Such suspicions, unfortunately, came true.

Two years of negotiations revealed the controversies among the Allies regarding Romania’s destiny. The British Foreign Office thought that Greater Romania would be able to put an end to Russia’s steady penetration into the Balkans. The Quai d’Orsay thought that Romania could stop Germany’s expansionist tendencies. Italy saw the possibility that Romania could be an ally against the Slavs who were destined to become a power to reckon with after the defeat of Austria-Hungary. Russian diplomacy considered Romania to be outside of the economic sphere of Germany and thus in a position to make it easier for the Russians to advance deeper into the Balkans. But apart from all these political arguments, the Entente recognized the Romanians’ right to national unity, which could only be achieved through the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy. Ion I.C. Brătianu’s diplomatic activity from 1914 to 1916 was directed at the achievement of the ideal of national unity. Industrious, uncompromising, and far-seeing, true to the progressive-minded traditions of modern Romanian diplomats, Ion I.C. Brătianu was undoubtedly the leading politician responsible for the creation of Greater Romania.

In August 1916, when Romania entered World War I, the fight was hanging in the balance. The battles at Verdun, the Somme, and Isonzo, as well as Brusilov’s offensive, proved that neither side could win a decisive victory. Everyone considered that Romania could play a decisive role. Paul von Hindenburg wrote: Judging from the military situation, it is to be expected that Romania’s intervention should be decisive to the outcome of the war.²⁷

Romania’s declaration of war brought many new troubles to the Central Powers,²⁸ aggravating the internal problems of the Dual Monarchy and aggravating the old tension between the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians.²⁹

Romania fulfilled the clauses of the military convention, mobilizing 833, 601 people — i.e., 11% of the country’s population, 20% of its male population.³⁰ But the Allies failed to follow ad literam the content of Articles 1, 2, and 3. General Sarrail’s action was far from being a proper offensive and it did not come at the appointed time. The Russian armies stopped short, allowing the Austro-Hungarian troops in Bucovina and Galicia to easily pass south to the Romanian front. The promised weapons and munitions — 300 tons daily — never arrived. Under such circumstances, the Military Headquarters of the Central Powers called up large numbers of men and artillery, making matters worse for Romania. On the other hand, the military missions to Paris and London — mention must be made of the missions headed by Colonel Vasile Rudeanu³¹ and Division General Georgescu³² — did little to change things for the better.

Far from being well-prepared, and failing to get the promised military support,³³ Romania was bound to be on the losing side from the beginning and suffered early defeats and losses.

Her military actions and the ensuing defeats disappointed the Entente greatly and created new military and diplomatic problems, with serious consequences for the three Great Powers: Russia, France, and Great Britain. The complaints made by Romanian leaders that the Allies, namely Russia and the French-English Eastern Army at Salonika, did not provide the promised support were accurate and to the point.³⁴ Being geographically closer to Romania, Russia was supposed to provide the bulk of Allied assistance, but the Tsarist Military Headquarters came to the aid of Romania only when defeat was imminent. This failure, to be sure, did not make the Russians any happier, for their main objective (control over the Dardanelle Straits) was thus jeopardized.³⁵

The repeated request of France that the Eastern army should be strengthened so as to assist Romania was not received favorably in London, where the War Cabinet engaged in a fierce dispute over his issue — it seems to have been, as Jan Karl Tanenbaum described it, one of the sharpest military-civil confrontations in England during the War.³⁶ Romania’s intervention occurred at an unfavorable moment for the Romanian army, but at one that was quite favorable to the Allied Powers, who had come to the end of their resources following the battles at Verdun and along the Somme and in Galicia.

Romanian problems were on the agenda of Entente diplomats in 1917. Lloyd George, the newly elected prime minister of Great Britain, was of the opinion that Romania had every right to her territorial claims. In January 1917, he told Nicolae Mişu, the Romanian Minister to London, that Britain considered Romania to be an important ally and as such would do everything in its power to help it efficiently,³⁷ especially with munitions. Lloyd George was positive that the Romanians would again become masters of their own country and they would achieve their national idea; Britain, he put it, was the sincere protector of the small countries.³⁸ Some other British personalities, such as Lord Hugh Cecil, Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts, and Alexander A.W. Leeper, dealt with the Romanian problem in their speeches and writings — specifically, its liberation from foreign occupation. Leeper’s and Mitrany’s books were quite popular in Europe and America — the former, in his Rights and Ways of the Romanian Race, stated that Romania had chosen the way of justice and, to illustrate this idea, he dedicated most of its pages to the Transylvanians’ fight for national unity; the latter remarked that more than half of Romanians were under foreign occupation, Transylvania being, in this context, a permanent source of Romania’s vitality.³⁹

Thanks to the numerous contributions by Robert Seton-Watson⁴⁰ and Henry Wickham Steed, especially to The New Europe, Review of Reviews, and the Times, and also owing to The Anglo-Romanian Society founded in 1917⁴¹ — which included Foreign Office officers and House of Commons members — British public opinion learned of and commended Romanians’ national claims. The New Europe also published articles by Romanian personalities who had become prominent in the fight for the long-cherished national ideal — mention should be made of Nicolae Iorga, Take Ionescu, Octavian Goga, Nicolae Lupu, Dumitru Drăghicescu, and Ion Pelivan. In 1918, George Mironescu, Dr. Nicolae Lupu, Octavian Goga,⁴² Sever Bocu, Avram Imbroane, George Moroianu,⁴³ Take Ionescu,