Lesotho 1970: An African Coup under the Microscope

By B.M. Khaketla

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1972.

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of California Press
• Release date: Nov 15, 2023
• ISBN: 9780520334496

B.M. Khaketla

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LESOTHO 1970

LESOTHO

1970

An African Coup under the Microscope

by

B. M. KHAKETLA

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

BERKELEY AND LOS ANGELES

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley and Los Angeles

© 1972, by B. M. Khaketla

ISBN: 0-520-02168-1

LC: 76-182278

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

CHAPTER I BACKGROUND

King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho

CHAPTER II AUTHOR OF THE CRISIS

Chief Leabua Jonathan

CHAPTER III PREMIER IN CHAINS

CHAPTER IV PREPARATION FOR INDEPENDENCE

CHAPTER V INDEPENDENCE CONFERENCE

CHAPTER VI THE GREAT BETRAYAL

CHAPTER VII OUR FEARS

CHAPTER VIII AFTERMATH OF TALKS

CHAPTER IX THE TRAGEDY OF THABA-BOSIU

CHAPTER X THE SUICIDE CLAUSE

CHAPTER XI POST-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS

CHAPTER XII REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

CHAPTER XIII EMERGENCY DECLARED

CHAPTER XIV GAGGING THE PRESS

CHAPTER XV THE KING IS MALIGNED

CHAPTER XVI THE REIGN OF TERROR

CHAPTER XVII THE CHURCH SPEAKS OUT

CHAPTER XVIII POLITICAL LEADERS TALK

ADDENDUM THE CHURCH SPEAKS OUT (continued)

GENEALOGY OF THE ROYAL HOUSE OF MOSHOESHOE

RESOLUTION AMENDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL REPORT OF 1963

INDEX

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

Lesotho is a small mountainous country, entirely surrounded by the territory of the Republic of South Africa, with an area of 11,716 square miles, and a population of about one million. Its capital is Maseru, a mile or two from the border with the Orange Free State. As its name implies, it is the land of the Basotho: unlike most African nations, it has no serious internal tribal or linguistic divisions. By 1831 most of the Basotho recognised as their paramount chief the great Moshoeshoe, who had fought against Zulu invasions and united his people. It was in the 1830s that they first encountered Boer trekkers, and lost land and people to the newcomers. Moshoeshoe appealed without success to the Cape Government for help, and fought off the Free State Boers till protection was finally granted by Queen Victoria in 1868.

To restore the authority of the chiefs, especially the Paramount Chief, the British formed a chiefs’ council in 1903. This was integrated into the government machinery in 1938, and in 1955 the Basutoland Council was given power to pass laws approved by the Paramount Chief. The first constitution came into being in 1960; a constitutional conference in London in April-May 1964 resulted in a new transitional constitution being approved by royal decree in January 1965, leaving control over defence, foreign affairs, finance and public services in the hands of Great Britain. Independence came on October 4, 1966. The first post-independence elections were held in January 1970, and would probably have resulted in a victory for the chief opposition party, the Basutoland Congress Party, led by Ntsu Mokhelhle, and defeat for the ruling Basutoland National Party, led by Chief Leabua Jonathan. However, Chief Leabua stopped the counting of the votes, declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution, arresting the King, Moshoeshoe II, and the opposition leaders.

Before the events of early 1970, Lesotho was a consti- tutional monarchy under a descendant of the great Paramount Chief Moshoeshoe (see genealogical table in Appendix A), yet there were important differences of interpretation of this term. There was a National Assembly with sixty members elected by universal suffrage, and a Senate of thirty- three members to re-examine legislation. There were three parties with seats in the National Assembly; the third party, besides the two principal ones already mentioned, was the Marematlou Freedom Party, of which the author of this book was Secretary-General.

Lesotho has the highest literacy rate in Africa, due in great part to the presence of missionaries for over a century: the French Protestant Church (now known as the Church of Lesotho or the Lesotho Evangelical Church), the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England. Today 90 per cent of the costs of education are borne by the Government, but schooling is not yet free and compulsory. The University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (formerly Pius XII College) is at Roma, near Maseru.

This educational maturity co-exists with chronic economic backwardness. The country is overcrowded and suffers from periodic drought, accompanied by soil erosion. Mohair and wool are the only stable exports (yet even the famous Basotho blankets are imported). Gross National Product in 1967/8 (the latest available at the time of writing) was R5o,ooo,ooo; Gross Domestic Product was R46,350,000, and per capita income was R56. Some 40 per cent of Lesotho’s male population find work outside the country, mostly in South Africa — thus underlining the country’s economic dependence on the Republic, but providing invaluable foreign exchange earnings. The number of Basotho labourers recruited for the mines in South Africa was 83,053 in 1969 and 87,389 in 1970. The earnings from these recruited labourers in 1970 were as follows: voluntary deferred pay (representing the sum which the labourers decide voluntarily not to receive, but which is paid out to them by the recruiting agents when they return home at the end of then- contracts) was R2,376,181; remittances from the labourers to their families while still serving their contracts in the mines were R2,o61,581. Figures for labour employed on the farms and in industry in South Africa are not recorded; the labourers go on their own. In common with Botswana and Swaziland, Lesotho has a currency agreement with South Africa, and uses South African currency.

Lesotho has very few natural resources, and up till the present no industry of note. However, in 1968 there was agreement to go ahead with the ambitious Malibamatso hydroelectric scheme (formerly known as the Oxbow scheme) centred on dams in the mountains of Lesotho bordering Natal and the Orange Free State, and power stations in Lesotho and South Africa; the scheme is especially vital for the industrial development of the Southern Transvaal. The Five-Year Development Plan allocates R.70,000,000 to the scheme. Other important items from the Plan are: Diamond Exploration, R.500,000; Agricultural Development, R 1,2 00,000; Road Development, R6,000,000; and a National Teachers’ College to accommodate 500 students, and Lerotholi Artisan Training Centre (to be upgraded to a full-fledged technical college), for which amounts are not specified. The Lesotho Development Corporation was recently established, under the management of a South African. The British Government has promised the Corporation substantial backing, and offers of technical assistance and aid have been forthcoming from continental European and North American sources.

It is appropriate to end this note with a brief record of the author’s career. Bennett Makalo Khaketla was born in 1913 at Qacha’s Nek, in south-east Lesotho, of a peasant family. After being educated at Matatiele in the then Union of South Africa he qualified in 1932 as a teacher at Mariazell Training College. Studying privately, he gained his B.A. degree in politics and Sesotho from the University of South Africa, having taken the normal three years to complete the course.

Khaketla began his teaching career in July 1933 at St. Patrick’s Anglican School in Bloemfontein, where he remained until June 1939. Thereafter he taught at several other schools in South Africa and Lesotho, including Basutoland High School (1946-50), becoming Principal of Charterston High School at Nigel, Transvaal, in 1951-2. Because of his strong urge to be back in Lesotho, he gave up this lucrative post and rejoined the staff of the Basutoland High School, where Ntsu Mokhehle became his colleague. With Mokhehle and two

A* others he started Mohlabani (The Warrior), becoming editor. The paper regularly criticised British rule and the colour bar in the Protectorate, and soon wielded enormous influence. The launching of this paper led to his and Mokhehle’s expulsion from the Basutoland High School in 1955, after which he was able to devote all his time to Mohlabani and engage in active politics.

In 1958 he was elected to the Executive Committee of the Basutoland African Congress (which became the Basutoland Congress Party in 1959) as Deputy Leader of the Party. In 1960 he was elected to the Legislative Council; in the same year he became a Member of the Executive Council, with responsibility for Education and Health. At the end of 1960, however, he resigned from the B.G.P., launching the Basutoland Freedom Party (later the Marematlou Freedom Party) in 1961. After the 1965 elections, B. M. Khaketla became Privy Councillor to King Moshoeshoe II, a position he held until the beginning of 1970. He has been Secretary-General of the Marematlou Freedom Party since 1965.

In 1946 he married Miss NtSeliseng Ramolahloane, a graduate of Fort Hare University College, and they have a family of three sons and two daughters.

He has written, in Sesotho, novels, poetry, plays and linguistic works. For five years the University of South Africa appointed him examiner for its Sesotho examination. Also interested in music, he has conducted choirs and won several trophies in choral singing competitions.

From 1955 to 1969 he was a member of the Provincial Synod of the Anglican Church of the Province of South Africa, representing the Diocese of Lesotho. He was elected to the Standing Committee of the Provincial Synod, and to the General Purposes Committee. His association with all these bodies was terminated when he was declared a prohibited immigrant by the South African Government, thus making it impossible for him to attend these meetings which are generally held in Cape Town.

During February 1971 he was detained incommunicado for a period of twelve days.

October igyj

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

A great avalanche suddenly slides down a mountainside and sweeps away everything in its path. It destroys homesteads and kills unsuspecting men, women and children in their sleep. The world is overawed and stands aghast. The resultant shock numbs the intellect. No one pauses to contemplate the number of factors responsible for this irresistible movement of the snow. Everybody has temporarily forgotten that a host of natural phenomena, unobtrusively working over many decades, have contributed — each in its own way, no matter how small — to its engulfing movement. As it is in nature, so it is in the political affairs of men.

When a devastating war suddenly bursts upon an unsuspecting world, and the first angry shots which mark the beginning of many battles are fired by the opposing sides, the tendency of men is to look for the immediate cause (which in some cases may seem small and trivial) whereas to understand the true nature and purpose of the war one must delve into the past history of the relations between the states concerned. Only by collecting relevant information, sifting fact from fiction and piecing the facts together in a logical fashion and interpreting them, will it be possible to arrive at the real cause or causes — perhaps remote and seemingly far-fetched — of the catastrophe.

In the following pages I have attempted to identify to the best of my knowledge the factors, immediate and remote, which contributed to the crisis into which Lesotho was plunged in 1970. This unfortunate event has tarnished the good name of Lesotho. It is a scandal that will take the country many generations to live down, and is bound to leave the Basotho people with an unenviable legacy of bitter hatred and suspicion. It is all the more tragic because it descended upon a people who are not plagued by tribalism because they are racially homo-

King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho

geneous; they speak the same language, owe allegiance to one King, and are bound by the same customs and traditions.

To understand the nature of this crisis, it is therefore necessary to examine events which preceded the granting of independence on October 4, 1966. Before and after independence it had become fashionable for journalists to refer to the abrasions which existed between the King and the Prime Minister as emanating from the King’s insatiable lust for power — power which would corrupt him and make a virtual dictator of him. This was so particularly after the Thaba-Bosiu incident of December 27, 1966, details of which I shall give in Chapter IX.

But the fact of the matter is that King Moshoeshoe II never sought for himself extraordinary executive powers to use according to his whims and fancies, as has been suggested by Chief Leabua and his Government plus the white press which has always stood four-square behind him. That it has never been the King’s desire to be given such powers is borne out by what he said on September 11, 1961, when he opened the session of the Legislative Council in which a motion was to be discussed requesting the British Government to grant Lesotho a responsible form of government; the King (then the Paramount Chief of Basutoland) said:

Tt is evident from public statements that there is a general desire for the introduction of Responsible Government. … I desire to make it very clear (perhaps publicly here for the first time) that if Responsible Government and all that it involves (but at the same time preserving our good, old traditions true and characteristic of the Basotho Nation) is the wish of my people, I will not only welcome it, but will use my position as Paramount Chief of Basutoland to see that the people’s desires are accomplished. … The whole Administration of the country — the Government of Basutoland — would fall under Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II as Head of State, and would be carried out in his name and on his behalf. The laws of Basutoland would be enacted by him with the advice and consent of this Parliament. … And I, as Head of State, would wish, of course, to be advised by a Government responsive to the desires of my people. … Our internal institutions of Government would develop in a natural way, true to the Basotho Nation and tradition.’

If Chief Leabua’s later allegation that the King sought for himself extraordinary executive powers is true, how does he explain the King’s words that the laws should be ‘enacted by him with the advice and consent of this Parliament’? No one bent on becoming a dictator would ever seek anybody’s ‘advice and consent’; indeed no totalitarian ruler has ever had any use for Parliament. All the laws emanate from himself and from no one else; he is the embodiment of all the laws he believes are good for the people, for to him the people have no mind but his mind.

At this historic session of the Legislative Council, which the King opened with the words referred to above, Chief S. S. Mátete moved the Self-Government motion, and was seconded by me. After some discussion the motion was approved unanimously.

The King then set up a Constitutional Commission to collect evidence from the people regarding the form the new Constitution should take, with particular reference, among other things, to the position and status of the Paramount Chief. It is necessary to stress that, although the King set up the Constitutional Commission as the motion required, its entire terms of reference were drawn up by the Executive Council; he himself had no hand in them.

The members of the Commission toured the whole country and held twenty-four public meetings where people gave evidence orally. Hundreds of written memoranda were also submitted to the Secretary to the Commission. In this way the Commission was able to get a good cross-section of public opinion on this all-important matter. At the end of its tour, it invited Professor D. V. Cowen to join it as Constitutional Adviser. The evidence was considered, sifted and collated, and a report embodying proposals for a new Constitution was worked out.

In due course the Commission presented its report to the King who ordered that it should be tabled in the Legislative Council for discussion. The debate began on November 25, 1963, and ended on February 11, 1964; there had only been a short Christmas recess.

The motion seeking the approval of the report as a basis for negotiation with the British Government was as follows:

‘That this Council, having taken note of the Report of the Basutoland Constitutional Commission laid on its Table in pursuance of Motion No. 62 of September 19, 1961:

(1) Thanks His Highness Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II for having referred the Report to this House for debate;

(2) Considers that the Report is an acceptable basis for an approach to be made to Her Majesty’s Government before the end of the life of this Council;

(3) Unanimously agrees that His Highness Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II be invited to accompany the Negotiatory Committee to London or elsewhere; and

(4) Fervently urges Her Majesty’s Government to implement all the final recommendations in a manner that will demonstrate Her Majesty’s Government’s oft-repeated desire and willingness to advance dependent territories to complete independence.’

I moved the motion amidst a lot of noise and heckling. Finally the President of the Council managed to bring the House to order, and I resumed my speech.

I moved this motion as a member of the Constitutional Commission and not, as some suggested, as Deputy Leader of the Marematlou Freedom Party (M.F.P.)¹ or as a member of the Executive Council. What I said, therefore, reflected not my personal opinion but the collective view of the Commission — a view which had been arrived at through compromise. For my part, I had certain strong feelings and reservations on the recommendations relating to the King’s position but these I had to refrain from expressing because as a Commission we did not wish any member to present a minority report. And I made it clear to the Legislative Council that the Report was the result of compromise when I told the House:

cYour Commission, though composed of representatives of Political Parties whose views on a number of issues are diametrically opposed, was able to achieve unanimity on all points in the Report, in spite of their differences in political outlook.’

It is vital to make this distinction because the speech I made on that occasion has been taken by many as reflecting M.F.P. policy on the report in general, and the position of the King in particular. The policy of M.F.P., which had always been clearcut as the memorandum the party submitted to the Commission showed, was expressed in the speeches and amendments of councillors who spoke on behalf of M.F.P.

I should, at this point, mention that, on November 12, 1963, thirteen days before the debate was due to begin in the Legislative Council, Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, issued a statement expressing his views on the report. Copies of his statement were made available to members of the Legislative Council by the British Resident Commissioner in Maseru, Sir Alexander Giles. In part the statement said:

‘The British Government make it clear that they could not accept continued responsibilities for internal security, defence, external affairs and financial support, unless they are assured of the constitutional means to discharge them. It does not appear that the recommendations of the Commission as they stand would assure this.’

A storm of protest from among members of the Legislative Council was provoked by this statement; there was a very strong feeling that Duncan Sandys had issued it at that time in order to influence the debate. This supposition was supported by a report in the London Times: ‘The Colonial Office comments are intended to influence the debate in the Basutoland Legislature when the Report is debated later this month.’²

An extract from the speech I made in the course of my address to the House is typical of the mood of the Council:

T have always been under the impression that the British people have so much talent that only the very best brains out of several millions are able to find their way to Ministerial desks. If that is, in fact, so in the case of Mr. Sandys, how can he suggest that our Report does not assure them the constitutional means for the effective discharge of these obligations? We have stated plainly … and nothing could be plainer, unless the English words we used in compiling the Report have acquired new connotations since its compilation.

‘We have stated, Mr. President, that our desire is that in the fields of defence, external affairs and internal security there should be a sharing of responsibility, with the proviso that where there is disagreement as to what policy should be followed, the British should have the last and overriding say. I do not know whether Mr. Sandys wanted us to write out the details, as they would appear in an order-in-council, in this Report. But I should like to imagine that a man of Mr. Sandys’ intelligence could not think that way. … What further guarantee does Mr. Sandys require to enable the British Government to discharge these obligations in the three fields mentioned? We know that Mr. Sandys is much more intelligent than his statement would make us believe, and it is for some other motive that he has chosen to play the dunce that he is not. We see through it all!’

The issue of The Times referred to above contained this further remark:

‘One main anxiety which the British officials foresee is that such a virtually independent Basutoland government during pre-independence could engineer or permit incidents with South Africa which could provoke action which would enable the Basotho to claim British defence which could not be given.’

We felt we knew why there was such a feeling, unfounded though it was. It was an open secret that some British officials in Lesotho were unhappy with the recommendations of the Commission. These officials, in an attempt to put the clock of progress back, had taken it upon themselves to deceive some members of the Legislative Council and the Chiefs with these false arguments, which had been used so often as to become threadbare. If they could thus delay constitutional development, they would lengthen their stay in this country. (In fairness I must add that not all the officials were of the same mind.)

Duncan Sandys had, therefore, thrown a bone among the fierce dogs of the Lesotho Legislative Council, and he waited to see them tear one another apart. If this happened, and we failed to pass the report unanimously, then he would have room to manoeuvre. He would always tell the delegation to remember that there was no unanimity in the Council, and therefore the views of the minority should not be lost sight of in working out the Constitution.

Godfrey M. Kolisang, who seconded the motion, like many other speakers who later joined in the debate, took Duncan Sandys to task for his statement:

‘I certainly do not think that this document emanates from the Colonial Office because, if the Colonial Office had read this Report, as I think they have, they should be aware that in Section 163 (a) the Commission points out that draft instruments will be drawn later. And I would like to show that the Wardens, the Southeys and the Jouberts³ that are trying to create mischief in Basutoland should desist from that practice.’

He then quoted Section 163 (a) which showed that it was the wish of the Commission that Professor Cowen should be entrusted with the task of drawing up constitutional instruments to give effect to these recommendations, and then added:

‘This Report gives the assurance that these constitutional provisions will be provided. Why, then, should the Colonial Secretary be so mischievous? … The Commission is to meet the Secretary of State at some future date, and it is at such a meeting that many of the questions that the Colonial Secretary is perhaps in difficulty about will be answered.’

As the debate got well under way, several amendments designed to give certain powers to the King were proposed. A long and bitter debate ensued on these amendments. In particular, amendment 2 (e) (ii) raised temperatures to boilingpoint. This amendment, that the Head of State should be ‘Head of the Armed Forces of Lesotho’, was proposed by Chief Mohlalefi Bereng, Principal Chief of Rothe, on behalf of the Marematlou Freedom Party (M.F.P.) of which he was a staunch member. But the Basutoland Congress Party (B.C.P.) speakers strenuously opposed it because, they felt, it did not emanate from the people but expressed the views of the person who moved it. Ntsu Mokhehle, Leader of the B.C.P., showed by means of figures collected at various meetings held by his supporters and himself throughout the country that the people did not support that amendment. More B.C.P. speakers insisted that the Armed Forces of Lesotho should be under the direct control of the Prime Minister. This, they contended, was because the Prime Minister would be an elected representative of the people, whereas the King is an hereditary monarch who is not answerable to anybody for his actions, and so could, in theory, thwart the wishes of the people. We do not know about this, but what we do know for certain is that he would have thwarted Leabua’s seizure of power, which certainly did not represent the wishes of the people.

Chief Leabua Jonathan, leader of the Basutoland National Party (B.N.P.), strongly supported the M.F.P. point of view. On February 2, 1964, he took part in the debate. He said:

CZ similarly cannot agree that the Head of the Armed Forces should be the Prime Minister. In the memorandum of our Party we have specifically stated that this power should be invested in the Head of State.’*

In spite of B.C.P. opposition to this amendment, when the vote was taken it was passed by a large majority. This debate and the amendments resulted in a split in the ranks of the B.C.P.;,Meshack Poola, Nathaniel Qhobela, Nqhae Selebalo, Lephethasang Mathealira, Robert Matji, Mpiti Sekake, Phakiso Letumanyane, Nettle T. Ranyali and others hived off and ultimately found a political home in the ranks of M.F.P.

The debate dragged on until eighteen amendments had been moved and adopted by the Council. It is true that some of them introduced nothing new, but they were intended to leave no doubt in the minds of the British Government as to what the Basotho people wanted. The Council, therefore, was very indulgent; the matter under discussion was of such importance that it was felt no one should be denied the opportunity to state his views on the form the new Constitution should take. For this reason the debate lasted almost two months. The motion as finally approved and presented to the Secretary of State appears in the Appendix.

All was now set. In April the Lesotho delegation flew to London. It was composed of representatives of the B.C.P., the B.N.P., the M.F.P. and the Chieftainship. There were also nonparty members: Joas Tseliso Mapetla, an attorney-at-law, who was chairman of the Delegation; Brian O’Leary of the Lesotho Law Office; Walter Stanford, President of the Legislative Council who had been chairman of the Commission; and Professor D. V. Cowen, constitutional adviser. Colin Shum was Secretary first to the Commission and now to the delegation. His Highness Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II, accompanied by Tśepo Mohaleroe and Chief Leshoboro Majara, was also present during the talks; he did not actually take part, but had come in case it should be necessary to consult with him.

Duncan Sandys’ reaction to the amendments was not unexpected. He told the delegation that as Lesotho was to be granted internal self-government and not sovereign independence, he could not agree that the powers which the Legislative Council sought for the King should be transferred to him forthwith. Among these powers was the control of the Police and Armed Forces. He said they should remain with the British Government for the period of internal self-rule, which we agreed should be one year; the appropriate moment to say on whom they should devolve was when we came back for our final round of talks, and not before.

This attitude of Duncan Sandys appeared to be the rock upon which the talks would founder. We knew what the people wanted. They had given us a clear mandate to strive for the implementation of their wishes as embodied in the amendments. To compromise or not to compromise was now our problem. If the former, the people would feel we had sold them down the river. If the latter, the talks would break down, and we would return to Maseru without a Constitution. Finally, after Duncan Sandys’ assurance that the door for accommodating the expressed wishes of the Basotho remained open, the Lesotho delegation agreed to compromise. We felt there was no point in prolonging the argument as that would certainly have resulted in a complete deadlock. This would have had the effect of delaying self-government for which everybody yearned. Reluctantly and with heavy hearts on the part of those of us who supported the amendments, we signed the final document granting us internal self-rule. The powers which really mattered were still left in the hands of the British Government; but we felt we had taken a step forward.

I should now explain why the M.F.P. insisted with so much tenacity that the King should be given certain powers, particularly the power of control over the Police and the Armed Forces. Our critics and detractors said we were insisting that the King should have control of this powerful arm of government because he was a member of our party, and the fear was that the King would use these Forces to crush the parties opposed to us, in particular the B.C.P. which was totally opposed to the institution of Chieftainship. The King, however, was not and has never been a member of our party. He was not even, as far as we knew, a sympathiser. But it was M.F.P. policy to support the Monarchy. We felt that armed with these powers, the King would be an insurance policy against abuse of power by selfseeking and power-hungry politicians. We were further convinced that this would make for stability and ensure that democracy became firmly rooted in Lesotho.

This conviction of ours was supported by what had happened in Ghana and other independent African States. We had watched with dismay the governing parties in these states make use of the Police and the Army to destroy all forms of legitimate, democratic opposition and entrench themselves in power for all time. Opposition elements, finding themselves unable to change the government by democratic means, resorted to assassination and coups d’état. These manifestations in many African States had been an object lesson to us, and we had no desire to see such political upheavals occurring in Lesotho. The solution, as we saw it, was that no political leader (including our own) should be tempted to do these things by being given control of the gun.

Because of the mutual confidence which had been established among the members of the Lesotho delegation after their discussions lasting nearly three weeks, and also because the same confidence existed between our delegation and the British delegation, we did not insist that Duncan Sandys’ assurance about the powers of the King should be recorded in our daily minutes. In the light of what was to happen later, I realise now that it would have been the wisest thing to have insisted.

On our return to Lesotho we reported to the people at public meetings, and all seemed well. For the remainder of the year the various political parties were busy gearing up their election machinery.

On April 29, 1965, the voters of Lesotho went to the polls. According to the new Constitution we had hammered out in London, the country had been divided into sixty constituencies. Each of the three political parties which had been involved in working out a self-government constitution contested all the sixty seats. The results gave the B.N.P. a narrow lead of thirty-one seats, while the B.C.P. came a close second with twenty-five seats, and the M.F.P. managed only four seats.

Although the B.N.P. had gained a majority of seats in the National Assembly, it had received only 41-63 per cent of the popular vote, while the Opposition parties between them polled 58-37 per cent. Chief Leabua himself failed to win his seat, so Chief Sekhonyana ’Maseribane, deputy leader of the B.N.P., became the first Prime Minister of Lesotho. Leabua was thus left in the cold for some time until a safe seat could be found for him. John Mothepu, the B.N.P. candidate who had been returned in the Mpharane constituency with a majority of 2,106 in a three-cornered contest, resigned his seat to make way for Chief Leabua, who fought and won a by-election, but his majority in a straight fight with the B.C.P. was reduced to 1,818.

Chief Leabua was sworn in as Prime Minister and assumed control of the administration of Lesotho. He was at the head of a minority government, which had an overall majority of two.

After the elections the B.C.P. filed a number of petitions in which they contested the validity of results in some constituencies. Chief Leabua was aware that if the High Court of Lesotho found in favour of the B.C.P. his government would fall.

The petition relating to the constituency of’Masemousu was heard, and the B.N.P. member for that constituency was unseated. Chief Leabua now had an overall majority of one in the National Assembly. The facts of the ’Masemousu case were not very different from those of Qaqatu, where the hearing was still pending. There were now definite danger signals in the sky, and the Prime Minister realised he had to do something in order to avoid disaster if he should lose. The National Assembly was still in session when the member for ’Masemousu was unseated. Chief Leabua was advised by someone to adjourn the sitting of the Assembly sine die, and he did so.

The High Court again found in favour of the B.C.P. in the petition against the member for Qaqatu. But as the Assembly was not in session, nothing happened.

Some have blamed the King for not having dissolved Parliament then, on the ground that there was no government, because Chief Leabua now had only twenty-nine seats in the Assembly, and the combined Opposition also had twenty-nine. This the King could not have done because, had he done so, Chief Leabua would have argued that there was no evidence that he did not command the confidence of the Assembly as it was not in session, and no confidence motion had been debated. Chief Leabua would also have used this as proof — with the scales in his favour — that the King was against him, and was actively working for the downfall of his government.

Ntsu Mokhehle was one of those who had strong views on this point. He felt that the King ought to declare that there was no government. In a letter to the King in his capacity as the Queen’s Representative, he said:

‘We maintain that the National Party members of Parliament and their leaders clearly admitted their loss of power by their unceremoniously closing of the second parliamentary sitting on July 28. This was done to conceal that their majority was soon to disappear as also were their powers. We consider that it would be neglect of duty and failure to protect the Constitution if we did not put it before Your Highness that the National Party Government, which has no more parliamentary majority, has in effect collapsed. This has been so since July 29 up to the present day.’⁵

Another factor which came to the rescue of Chief Leabua was that Chief Setenane Habofanoe Mapheleba, a Member of Parliament who had been elected under M.F.P. colours in the constituency of Matela, crossed over to the Government benches, and declared his support for Chief Leabua’s policies. Justice Thabo Mokotso, who had been Secretary-General of the M.F.P., had already defected to the National Party, and Mapheleba’s crossing caused some confusion because Mokotso, purporting to speak on behalf of the M.F.P., gave the press the impression that the M.F.P., as a whole, had decided to throw in their lot with the National Party, despite the fact that Chief Leabua had spurned them and said he would ‘go it alone’. To try and put the record straight, Mapheleba issued a press statement in which he said:

‘It seems that the stand I have taken to support the Government is still not clearly understood by Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle, Leader of the Basutoland Congress Party, and others. This was made clear by the Basutoland Congress Party letter dated August 17, to the Paramount Chief, Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II, and signed by Mr. Mokhehle on behalf of his National Executive. The letter suggests to Motlotlehi that there is no parliamentary government in Lesotho because the strength of the Opposition of which Mr. Mokhehle is the recognised Leader, is 29 to 29 in relation to Government strength. Motlotlehi is therefore requested by the Congress Party to form a caretaker Government pending the outcome of the ’Masemousu and Qaqatu by-elections. In the midst of this misleading propaganda and the misapprehension about my position in the National Assembly, I must once more emphatically declare that I most firmly and unshakably support the National Party Government. It is therefore malicious of Mr. Mokhehle to suggest anything to Motlotlehi, except that the true position in the National Assembly is: Government 30, and his (Mokhehle’s) Opposition 28. My support for the Government will not only be in Parliament, but also outside it.’⁶

This, as might have been expected, was hailed by the supporters of Chief Leabua as a great breakthrough. The white press regarded this as a sure sign that Chief Leabua was gaining substantial support among the people. In reality these substantial gains existed only in his imagination. But for purposes of his majority in Parliament this defection placed him in a much better position than when he began.

After the two by-elections, which had been caused by the unseating of two B.N.P. Members of Parliament, had been fought and won by the B.N.P., there was further jubilation and drumbeating in B.N.P. circles and in the white press.

At the beginning of 1968, however, three vacancies