Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West with An Economy Smaller than Texas'

By John Ruehl

The Kremlin’s ability to shape global affairs appeared decimated following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Coupled with the internal instability that gripped Russia in the 1990s, Moscow struggled to develop a coherent and effective foreign policy for almost a decade. But under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has steadily reemerged as one of the most significant countries in the world—and one that is increasingly willing to challenge the United States.

In Budget Superpower, geopolitics journalist John P. Ruehl explores how Russia has achieved this feat, despite its relatively limited economic strength. The book is divided into eight chapters, each exploring a tool or approach of the Kremlin’s and how and where it has used this method to maximize Russia’s influence. Each chapter also analyzes the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Russia’s strategies, as well as cautious predictions for how they may evolve in the future.

Russia’s determination to confront the United States has become increasingly apparent over the last decade, culminating in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In addition to demonstrating how Russia has effectively undermined the American-led global order, Budget Superpower will help readers understand why Russia has committed to this policy in the face of increasing push back and globally destabilizing consequences.

• Language: English
• Publisher: RowmanLittlefield
• Release date: Dec 8, 2022
• ISBN: 9780761873396

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List of Illustrations

Figure 0.1: European NATO member states (dark), members of the Eastern Bloc (light), and the fifteen Republics of the Soviet Union (medium) in 1990

Figure 1.1: European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states (dark) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (light)

Figure 3.1: Ethnic Russians in Eurasia

Figure 3.2: Slavic Countries in Europe

Figure 3.3: Dominant Religions in Eurasia

Figure 4.1: Democracy Index

Figure 6.1: Global Energy Consumption in Terawatts by Source

Figure 6.2: Electricity Grids Around the World

Figure 7.1: Member States of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)

Figure 8.1: Russia’s List of Unfriendly Countries, 47 UN Member States and Taiwan

Prologue

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Since the annexation of Crimea and start of the proxy war in Ukraine’s Donbass region eight years ago, repeated Russian troop buildups had caused alarm in Kyiv and Western countries. But early into 2022, weeks after the recognition of the thirty-year anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25, 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin began a massive increase of military personnel and equipment on the border with Ukraine. Despite repeated warnings of an imminent Russian attack by Western intelligence and political leaders, the Russian invasion was launched on February 24, 2022.

In the twenty-two years that he has been in power, Putin has steadily rebuilt Russia from a spent force internationally to arguably the most potent threat to the US-led global order. Putin’s personal and passionate conviction in revamping Russian power, calculated political strategizing, and the use of all available resources have confounded Western efforts to counter his increasingly belligerent foreign policy. The ongoing military offensive is further proof of the Kremlin’s determination to reassert Russia as a world power and to challenge the West. To understand how relations have devolved between the two to their lowest point in decades requires looking at the various tools at the Kremlin’s disposal and Russia’s place in the world since the Soviet collapse.

Sergey Naryshkin, director of Russia’s SVR, or Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki), stated on March 3, 2022, that the invasion had launched the collapse of the unipolar world and the system of international relations based on the right of the strongest, i.e., the United States, to destroy other states in order to prevent the slightest possibility of their transformation into alternative centers of power. . . . Today, Russia is throwing down an open challenge to this system—creating a truly multipolar world, which has never existed before and from which everyone will benefit in the future.¹

The US-led global order (also known as the liberal world order) refers to the alliances, institutions, and global rules the United States created and promoted after World War II, and which gained increasing influence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But over the last fifteen years, the rise of China, growing confrontation with Russia and rogue states, as well as elusive international criminal and militant groups, have all created their own challenges to Washington that have destabilized the global order. Together with the transformative repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, the current Ukraine crisis has rejuvenated claims that the order is coming apart. While talk of the collapse of the liberal world order is nothing new, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks a serious challenge to its legitimacy. The Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive approach to foreign policy, growing partnership with China, and polarized political systems across the West have put further strain on Washington’s ability to manage its affairs.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was unlikely to ever see Russian forces seize the whole of Ukraine—despite the initial efforts to take control of the capital, Kyiv. Instead, the Kremlin’s core interests lie in Ukraine’s east, where a more pro-Russian population will make it easier to subdue once the Ukrainian military is pushed out. The Kremlin indicated before the invasion began that it seeks Ukraine’s neutrality, demilitarization, and denazification. This would likely entail permanently blocking Ukraine from NATO membership, denying foreign militaries from basing troops or weapons in Ukraine, and removing nationalist Ukrainians from positions of power. The Kremlin additionally seeks recognition of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation, and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions recognized as independent republics, likely to also be annexed by Russia. While the Kremlin might prefer to have obtained these objectives through a peace deal, it is clearly willing to use its military to achieve these aims. It will probably also demand more from Ukraine if it achieves a military breakthrough. Ukraine faces a real risk of being forced to cede even more territory, possibly through to Odessa in the south if a more intense phase of the conflict begins. This was ominously hinted at by Putin on March 5, who declared If they continue to do what they are doing, they are calling into question the future of Ukrainian statehood.² This could also leave Ukraine effectively landlocked.

The fog of war has made it difficult to discern who is winning and what the costs have been so far. Russia has clearly faced significant setbacks, including the loss of its flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, as well as a dozen generals, thousands of soldiers, and the destruction of vehicles and weaponry. But the Second Chechen War, which was launched in 1999, also featured a similarly determined resistance against the Russian military. Over the next ten years, however, the Russian armed forces, intelligence agencies, local allies, and other methods subdued the region and brought it back under the control of the Kremlin. Putin has also threatened the use of nuclear weapons and a wider war if Russia’s aims are not achieved, or if it is challenged directly by the West.

Russia is likely to enter a recession this year, and its economic recovery will be hampered by the ongoing effects of sanctions and supply chain issues affecting the wider global economy. However, Russia had been preparing for conflict since 2014, and its self-sufficiency in food, energy, and other vital resources is relatively high. In comparison to other countries, including many of those in the West, Russia can endure the current spike in prices and disruptions to supply chains affecting the global economy caused by the war and effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Putin should also be expected to double down. With sanctions already implemented, his domestic position would be severely weakened if he orders a retreat.

The willingness to go to war against Ukraine was further proof of the Kremlin’s determination to reassert Russia as a world power and challenge Washington. The Kremlin’s disregard for international law and Western warnings was the culmination of thirty years of tension with the United States after the Soviet collapse in 1991. Since coming to power in December 1999, Putin had steadily escalated his confrontation with the West. But until the 2022 invasion, the Western response to various instances of Russian political interference and territorial aggression beyond its borders had remained relatively muted—including the 2014 military action against Ukraine. The invasion of Ukraine dramatically changed that equation as Europe and the US abruptly came together to confront Putin’s attempt to change Ukraine’s borders and further annex parts of it. This book will explain how relations between Russia and the West are at their lowest level since the height of the Cold War, and why Putin was determined to invade Ukraine despite the heavy consequences he knew Russia would face.

But even though military power has been essential to Russia’s modern influence operations, it has typically been used as a last resort for the Kremlin. Instead, as it will become increasingly obvious throughout this book, the Kremlin has typically preferred more discrete methods to ensure long term influence. The invasion of Ukraine came after years of attempts by the Kremlin to weaken Ukraine as much as possible before Russian forces began to cross the border. The invasion will no doubt bring more scrutiny on the Kremlin’s toolkit for influence abroad and Russia has already been damaged by sanctions. But while greater attention may result in some effective pushback, Russia’s multisector approach will likely effectively adapt and help maintain the Kremlin’s ability to influence other countries and societies.

The triumphalism that has permeated Washington for the last thirty years since the end of the Cold War meant that Russia was treated as a defeated nation. Little attention has therefore been paid to dissecting Russia’s modern interests and what shapes its behavior. Putin’s belief that the United States and West currently lack the energy for sustained confrontation with Russia amid the rise of China, terrorism, rogue states, climate change, domestic issues, the Covid-19 pandemic, and other issues, have obviously influenced his decision-making. While the Russian president has exploited these distractions to drastically increase Russia’s influence over Ukraine, ignoring the Kremlin’s more global ambitions and capabilities will continue to undermine the West’s response to Russia’s foreign policy.

Notes

1. Sergei Naryshkin, quoted in Françoise Thom, The Post-war World Seen from Russia, Desk-Russie, March 11, 2022, https://en.desk-russie.eu/2022/03/11/the-post-war-world.html (accessed April 25th, 2022)

2. Vladimir Putin, quoted in NPR, Putin says Ukraine’s future is in doubt as cease-fires collapse, NPR, March 6, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/03/06/1084794295/putin-says-ukraines-future-is-in-doubt-as-cease-fires-collapse (accessed April 25, 2022)

Acknowledgments

I would like to dedicate this book to my family for their support, as they endured almost three years of hearing me say just a few more months until it was ready. I would particularly like to thank my mum for her help, as well as my editor Sam Brawand, for helping revise my book into its current readable form. And, of course, to all the researchers, journalists, and other people from whom I was able to learn a lot from while writing it.

Introduction

Crimea, Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1991

On the afternoon of August 18, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR), or the Soviet Union, sat nervously in his Crimean dacha. Five unexpected visitors, including his chief of staff, had interrupted the end of his summer vacation, and were requesting his presence. Gorbachev could only suspect why. In just a few days, the Soviet leader intended to fly back to Moscow to sign a treaty that would officially replace the Soviet Union with the Union of Sovereign States—a far more decentralized confederation that would give greater autonomy to each of the fifteen Soviet Republics. The act would be the hallmark achievement of Gorbachev’s bold liberalization reforms that he had proposed after becoming leader in 1985.

European NATO member states (dark), members of the Eastern Bloc (light), and the fifteen Republics of the Soviet Union (medium) in 1990

Gorbachev’s multi-year liberalization agenda had done little to assuage pressure from the United States. US President Ronald Reagan had entered office in 1981 promising to confront communism everywhere and made no exception for Gorbachev’s lighter brand of it. Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, continued to maintain US pressure on the USSR after he was elected in 1988. By that time, Gorbachev could no longer pretend to be negotiating with Washington from a position of strength. After ten years of conflict, the Soviet premier had ordered the last of the country’s armed forces to depart from Afghanistan in defeat in early 1989. Having beat back the Nazi war machine just decades before, the Soviet military’s failure to defeat tribal insurgents across its southern border had decimated its once-fearsome reputation. The Kremlin had also lost its grip over its sphere of influence, the Eastern Bloc. Public protests throughout 1989 had brought down Soviet-allied communist governments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany. The Berlin Wall, a symbol of the Cold War divide, had also crumbled to popular protest. The enlarged German state that emerged in 1990 chose to remain in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), bringing the military alliance 150 miles closer to the Soviet Union. And due to financial and logistical constraints, the Kremlin had also been forced to significantly reduce Soviet aid to communist countries as well as to groups in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

With Soviet power in retreat across the globe, Gorbachev’s proposal aimed to stave off the complete collapse of the country itself. By August 1991, nationalist and extremist sentiments were erupting across the Soviet Union, with violent clashes and armed skirmishes growing more common. The Estonian and Latvian Soviet Republics had even declared their independence, which the Kremlin had refused to recognize. In addition, four other Soviet Republics—Lithuania, Moldavia, Georgia, and Armenia—indicated they would not be signing Gorbachev’s new treaty. In the face of this resistance, the Soviet leader ploughed ahead with his vision to radically alter the country. But the real threat to Gorbachev’s plans came from within the halls of the Kremlin itself. Hardliner elements within the Communist Party, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), and other parts of the Soviet bureaucracy had watched Gorbachev’s actions over the past few years with increasing frustration. Sensing their ability to hold the country together slipping away, a secret group of conspirators, led by Vice President Gennady Yanayev, had hatched a desperate plan to preserve the Soviet Union and reverse Gorbachev’s legacy entirely. After Gorbachev’s surprise visitors failed to convince the Soviet leader to halt his plans, he was placed under house arrest and cut off from communication with the outside world. Soviet media broadcasts indicated that Gorbachev had suddenly fallen ill, and a state of emergency was imposed. Vice President Yanayev immediately flew to Moscow and assumed the Soviet leadership, calling for calm and for the military to support the coup as it became publicized the next morning.

Around the world, reactions ranged from confusion to condemnation. The veil of secrecy that hung over the USSR meant even fewer outside the country knew what was truly occurring. US President Bush and other world leaders spoke out in support of Gorbachev, who, because of his confinement in Crimea, was largely powerless. Back in Moscow, however, there was significant resistance. Boris Yeltsin, leader of the Russian Soviet Republic, the largest and most populous Soviet Republic, was directing the pushback. Yeltsin’s career had skyrocketed in the late 1980s, and he was elected leader of Russian Soviet Republic in 1990 amid a wave of nationalist Russian sentiment. A staunch critic of Gorbachev, Yeltsin was still supportive of any measure which would give the Russian Soviet Republic more maneuverability within the federation—including the proposed Union of Sovereign States. In front of national and international television cameras, his calls for civil resistance received widespread support, while many Soviet military personnel who were sent to quell the protestors joined them instead. Sensing their coup was beginning to fail, its organizers flew to Crimea to hold discussions with Gorbachev, but he refused to meet with them. On August 21, 1991, the coup was called off and Gorbachev flew to Moscow to retake the reigns of the teetering superpower the next day.

Despite having emerged victorious, however, Gorbachev’s grip on power had been irreversibly weakened. Several more Soviet Republics had declared their independence during the coup, and though the United States had publicly shown support toward Gorbachev, Washington began to tilt its support toward Yeltsin in the weeks and months that followed. As confusion steadily consumed the country, Yeltsin and the leaders of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics met secretly in Belarus in early December. There, they signed the Belavezha Accords,¹ declaring the end of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its place. Designed primarily to coordinate immigration, law enforcement, and foreign and economic policies between the post-Soviet states, the CIS was a much watered-down version of Gorbachev’s original reformation plan. In defiance of his attempts to derail it, the other Soviet Republics signed on within weeks. With the fate of the country set in stone, the enormous Soviet bureaucracy prepared for dissolution. On Christmas Day 1991, the Soviet flag was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time and at midnight on the December 31, the superpower that had competed with the United States in world affairs for half a century officially ceased to exist.

The Russian Federation

To underline the chaos and rapidness of the Soviet dissolution, Russian cosmonaut Sergei Krikalev, who was sent to the Mir space station months before the Soviet collapse, was stuck in space for 311 days, twice as long as he was scheduled. Because government officials could not afford to bring him home (and because the country he left no longer existed), Krikalev remained in space limbo, orbiting the earth, until March 25, 1992.

Had the coup seven months before never occurred, something resembling the Soviet Union may have still been around today. Instead, fifteen new states lay across its former territory, many of them outside of Russia’s control for the first time in decades, centuries, or ever. The Russian Federation, the Soviet Union’s smaller, legally recognized successor state, led attempts to bind the new countries together, most notably through the CIS. However, animosity between member states and suspicion of Russian intentions meant several post-Soviet countries refused to join the institution at all. Several more member states would be lost in coming years, while other issues hindered the ability of the CIS to carry out its mandate. Four former Soviet Republics—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia—signed the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, alongside the United Kingdom and the United States.² In return for giving their nuclear weapons to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were given security guarantees safeguarding their sovereignty.

The Soviet collapse fundamentally altered international relations in a way not felt since World War II. Western Europe and the United States were left unopposed to promote their visions of liberal democracy and of free market capitalism across the post-Soviet space and beyond. The Western world, previously limited to the liberal democracies of western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, began to spread into eastern and southern Europe. The joining of new European states into the West was formalized by their entry into NATO, the European Union (EU), or both. Apart from NATO member Turkey, which straddles both Europe and Asia and has increasingly pursued its own independent foreign policy, all member states of either organization form the core of the Western world. Far from being in any position to resist the West’s growth, the Kremlin’s more immediate concern was keeping the even smaller Russian Federation together. As a result of the First Chechen War, which broke out shortly after the Soviet collapse, the Russian military was forced to withdraw from its Chechen region in 1996. Even after Soviet failures in Afghanistan, this was a critical blow to Russian military morale and the reputation of the armed forces. With its focus on Chechnya, the Russian military failed to play a decisive role in the various post-Soviet conflicts or in the Yugoslav Wars, let alone maintain or repair the global role it had enjoyed for centuries. Russia’s reduced status on the world stage was exemplified further after several outstanding territorial disputes with China began to be settled almost entirely in Beijing’s favor in the 1990s.

The well-being of Russian citizens had also decreased sharply. Life expectancies, incomes, and general living standards dropped, matched by rising rates of suicide, alcoholism, drug abuse, and crime. Shock therapy economic reforms allowed a class of ultra-rich oligarchs (many of whom were well-connected members of the decayed Soviet bureaucracy) to monopolize emerging private industries and to corrupt the country’s new political structure. Perhaps the most humiliating was Russia’s growing dependency on Western food imports and financial aid. The woeful incompetence of Russia’s new leadership also did little to improve the country’s situation. Though Yeltsin initially received praise for his handling of the Soviet coup, the new Russian president failed to live up to his admirers’ expectations. Another attempted coup in Russia in 1993 shook his already fragile administration, which failed to react effectively to domestic and international developments. In a 2009 book written by former President Bill Clinton, the former US president recounted how during a three-day visit to the United States in 1994, Yeltsin was found outside the presidential guest house in the early hours of the morning, in his underwear, trying to hail a taxi to get pizza.³ Yeltsin tried to sneak out again the next night but was caught by security guards before he could do any more damage. The affair was far from a one-off. The same year, Yeltsin’s presidential plane was forced to circle Ireland’s Shannon airport for over an hour because the Russian leader was too drunk to appear before the press. After landing, Yeltsin still failed to disembark and chose to decline a meeting with the Irish president. After a very humble Russian foreign minister was sent out to explain the situation, Yeltsin’s plane returned shortly afterward to Moscow. Following several other public and private incidents involving diplomacy and alcohol,⁴ the Russian president’s antics became a running joke in the international community and a source of embarrassment at home.

Putin

Yeltsin’s flawed attempts to govern the remains of a former superpower stirred reactionary sentiment within Russia’s fractured intelligence community. Among various attempts to gain control of the Kremlin, it was the former KGB lieutenant colonel Vladimir Putin who ultimately emerged victorious. Putin began his political career in St. Petersburg after being selected for the deputy mayor position by mayor Anatoly Sobchak in 1991. After Sobchak’s re-election defeat in 1996, Putin moved to Moscow and joined the Yeltsin Administration, beginning a remarkably rapid rise in Russia’s political apparatus that resulted in his appointment to Prime Minister in August 1999. Soon after, he announced his intention to run for President in the upcoming 2000 election. As Putin leaned into the national spotlight, the Russian military began an extensive military assault against Chechen militants, marking the beginning of the Second Chechen War. Putin became the face of the campaign, while Yeltsin himself began touting him as his successor.

Still, the Russian public and global community were left stunned with Yeltsin’s sudden resignation on New Year’s Eve 1999, which established Putin as acting Russian President. Months later, Putin won the Presidential election and secured his first term. He quickly appointed friends and allies to powerful government and economic positions, firing or jailing those who opposed him. Blessed by a rapid increase in the price of natural resources shortly before Putin took office, Russia’s economy began to recover and enjoy strong growth. Naturally, this resulted in increased defense spending, allowing Russian forces to begin to steadily re-establish control over Chechnya. Living standards also began to increase and stricter law and order policies began to eradicate some of the crime and corruption that plagued the country. Not long into Putin’s first term, Russia’s internal chaos had diminished significantly, and the Kremlin was able to claw its way back from the brink of another collapse.

The West had been somewhat wary of Russia’s new President ever since he had emerged as a serious contender for the Russian leadership. For one, Putin did not drink, suggesting a more formidable disposition than Yeltsin. US President Clinton, in his last year in office, was unable to establish a close personal relationship with Putin. Though far from the dream of a liberal democracy that Westerners had hoped for in the early 1990s, Russia finally had working democratic and quasi-capitalist economic systems by the early 2000s. Clinton’s successor (and son of former President George H. W. Bush), George W. Bush, declared he had looked into Putin’s eye during their now famous first meeting in 2001, and was able to get a sense of his soul.⁵ There was even renewed optimism in the West that Russia would become a functioning and cooperative actor within the US-led global order. And, even if it did not, there was little apparent reason to be truly worried about Russia’s capabilities by the dawn of the twenty-first century. Few policymakers in Washington envisioned the Russian Federation capable of challenging US power ever again. NATO and the European Union (EU) had begun integrating former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries into the Western alliance system. Major financial international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank remained dominated by Western figures and driven by Western interests. Liberal ideas regarding human rights, civil liberties, democratic governance, and free market capitalism had come to dominate international discourse and to drive globalization in the West’s image. In fact, it was non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and the threat of terrorism that had emerged as the greatest threats to the global order. But antagonism toward that order had been brewing in the Kremlin since the Soviet collapse. With Russia’s domestic position more secure, Putin could finally afford to look outward again by the mid-2000s. Putin’s first noteworthy indication that he sought to challenge the US-led order came at the 2007 International Munich Security Conferences in Munich, Germany, where the Russian president declared Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential.⁶

Putin went on to rebuke the power of the United States and Western power in international affairs, and conveyed Russia would no longer subject itself to it. His speech was mostly belittled in the Western press, yet it marked a clear distinction from the Russia that the West had grown accustomed to since the early 1990s. In April, just a few months later, Russia targeted former Soviet Republic, and now NATO and EU member state, Estonia as a testing ground for its modern warfare strategy. Lingering tensions between Russia and Estonia culminated in Estonia’s decision in to remove a Soviet statue from the capital of Tallinn and move it to a cemetery outside the city. The consequences, among others, included Russian-backed cyberattacks, an aggressive media campaign that distorted reality on the ground, and encouragement of Estonia’s ethnic Russian minority to instigate and to participate in protests and riots. In addition, the Kremlin ordered economic sanctions and disrupted natural resource flows to Estonia. The serious provocation against a NATO and EU member state was met with little effective pushback by either institution, despite Estonia’s attempts to have the events labeled as an official attack. Emboldened, the Kremlin observed that surprise, aggression, and a multifaceted approach were key to effectively punishing adversarial states.

After Georgia and Ukraine were granted NATO membership action plans in April 2008, as well as the announcement of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Program with these two countries and other-Soviet states a month later, Russia radically enhanced its confrontation with the West, notably thorough the use of military force. Following weeks of similar Russian attempts to foment unrest as they did in Estonia a year before, Russian forces suddenly invaded Georgia in August 2008. Within days, they had attacked the capital of Tbilisi and partitioned two of Georgia’s separatist territories. The outgoing Bush Administration was caught off guard, and was too preoccupied with the War on Terror to make major adjustments to the US relationship with Russia. The Barak Obama Administration then attempted an official reset⁷ between the United States and Russia months into his first term. But the 2010 Russian spy revelations and Russian accusations of US meddling in its affairs in the 2010 to 2011 anti-Putin protests prevented any constructive dialogue between the two countries. By 2014, the tug of war between the West and Russia over Ukraine led to protests and a revolution that removed Ukraine’s more pro-Kremlin leadership. Russian forces then quickly annexed the Crimean Peninsula and launched a civil conflict in the country’s east. Barely a year and a half after attacking Ukraine, the Russian military began operations in Syria, turning the tide of an international proxy war consisting of most of the world’s major and regional powers. Allegations of Russian meddling in the US elections in 2016 and afterward, followed by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, have since served to further undermine US–Russian relations.

The use of armed force is just one tactic of the Kremlin’s that it uses to influence the behavior of other states. Like Estonia in 2007, Georgia and Ukraine have suffered from Russian attempts to destabilize their entire societies. Other countries across the former Soviet Union and beyond, including the United States, have experienced similar attacks. And even with increasing pressure from the United States and its allies, Russia, with its own comparative weaknesses and the more obvious threat from China, has remained resolute in its enigmatic pursuit and consolidation of power.

Methodology

So how has Russia managed to increase its international prestige and undermine the US-led order despite its glaring obstacles, not least its limited economic power? Furthermore, why has Russia pursued this path and what should we expect from it going forward? This book is a case study of these questions, using a variety of analysis methods to construct an accurate map of Russian actions, intentions, and capabilities. While most of Russia’s antagonistic efforts are directed toward the former USSR and NATO/EU member states, Russia’s power across the world is also widespread. While the book is generally light on theory, Liberalist, Realist, and Constructivist theories on international affairs are used sparingly to analyze Russia’s actions and behavior, as well as the reactions to it.

Divided into eight chapters, each explores how Russia uses a particular tool or tactic to enhance its influence in international affairs and to undermine the US-led global order:

Chapter 1, Firepower and Force Projection, compares Russian and US military strategies in recent conflicts; examines the role of Russia’s weapons in the international arms trade; and discusses Russia’s enormous size and growing network of foreign military bases.

Chapter 2, The Special Services, explores the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and its espionage networks run through Russian embassies; the Federal Security Service (FSB) and its influence across post-Soviet states and Russia’s border regions; and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), focused on high-risk operations in Europe and Russian conflict zones.

Chapter 3, The Russian World, shows how the Kremlin advances Russian nationalism among ethnic Russian minorities living abroad; the cultivation of a pan-Slavic identity across Slavic states and Slavic minorities; and the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the global Orthodox community.

Chapter 4, Political and Information Warfare, explores Russia’s political and ideological influence in Europe and around the world; the power of its regional and global media outlets, together with disinformation and its social media activities; and its global cyberwarfare operations and influence over the communications infrastructure in some post-Soviet states

Chapter 5, Irregular Actors, details the Kremlin’s use of organized crime and militant groups in the former Soviet Union; the similar use of these groups around the world; and its growing deployment of private military and security companies.

Chapter 6, Energy and Resource Politics, shows Russia’s role in global oil markets; Russia’s dominance of natural gas markets; and Russia’s influence in coal, renewables, miscellaneous commodities, and particularly nuclear power.

Chapter 7, Economic Influence, clarifies the opaque size and strengths of the Russian economy; Russia’s economic influence in its near abroad; and its financial targeting of Western elites and wider role in global finance.

Chapter 8, Russia and the United Stated Order, reveals the US’ relationship with other major powers and their role in upholding the US-led world order; the origins and development of Russian antagonism toward that order; and Russia’s developing plan to destabilize and maximize discontent within the order as well as the United States.

Each chapter is broken down into geographic regions or by country, detailing how, where, and why Russia is exploiting its power and influence. Following the body of the chapter, Russia’s associated risks and weaknesses with each approach are outlined before cautious predictions for the future are presented.

Russian War

In the post-Cold War world, the only country seemingly capable of challenging the US-led global order is China. With the second-largest military budget, China is building new military bases in disputed territories in the South China Sea. Global economic projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), massive state-run corporations, and companies such as Huawei and Alibaba all play an increasingly prominent role in the global economy. By the end of this decade, China is likely to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy, having already become the world’s largest creditor. Yet for fifteen years, Russia has escalated a complex and, in many ways, a successful campaign to expand its global influence and undermine the US order. Curiously, leading US political figures have given wildly contrasting public statements regarding the threat level from Russia over the last decade. During his 2012 Presidential campaign, for example, US Senator Mitt Romney declared Russia as the United States number one geopolitical foe. The remark was roundly criticized in the media and prompted US President Barack Obama to reply with the 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, US politicians were forced to reevaluate the threat from Russia. Obama stated that Russia was merely a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham insisted that that Russia has an economy the size of Italy (it has since slid below that of Texas), and that Putin was playing a poker game with a pair of twos and winning. Yet after Russia’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War and involvement in the 2016 US Presidential election, many American politicians, including US President Joe Biden, have since declared Russia as the greatest threat to US national security.⁸ The war in Ukraine, including Putin’s threat of nuclear weapons, has cemented that view for now despite the longer-term challenge of China and the possibility of military confrontation over Taiwan.

Simultaneously, Russia has been seen as a weak, declining power on its last legs and the greatest threat to the liberal world order—with similar intentions and abilities to the USSR. Russia is neither; yet because it is both underestimated and overestimated, misunderstanding Russia has complicated an effective US response to it. Nonetheless, there are ways to explain how Russia has managed to maximize its power to its greatest extent in three decades, a result stemming from both Russian strengths and Western errors. Understanding Russia’s strengths, weaknesses, and intentions will help form the best policy toward managing its abilities and ambitions in the future, as well as reducing its burden on US foreign policy.

So, what does the Kremlin ultimately aim to achieve? Official Russian white papers call for increasing the country’s clout on the world stage. Putin and others have stated that the annual May Decrees provide a limited look into the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. Nationalist Russian politicians are more vocal in their opposition to Western institutions re-encroaching on the post-Soviet space. Other figures, such as Russian scholar Alexander Dugin, call for the rebirth of a Eurasian empire that resembles Russia’s Soviet and Imperial past, including the annexation of countries like Ukraine. Others from the most politically extreme elements within Russian society, also call for the collapse of the United States, the European Union, and the Western alliance system—and with it, the entire liberal world order. But the broadest, all-encompassing goals of Russia’s grand strategy are threefold. First, the Kremlin aims to reclaim and consolidate Russian influence over the former Soviet states and prevent further expansion of NATO and the EU here and elsewhere in Europe. In addition, the Kremlin aims to reclaim its status as a great power that is both a reliable and respectable international actor and a key powerbroker. Finally, Russia aims to alter the liberal rules and norms that govern the US-led global order, that it sees as far too favorable toward the West, and create a multipolar world absent of US hegemony. Causing division within the Western alliance system (and within Western countries themselves), pushing pro-Russian policies in other countries, and allying with China and other hostile states will help the Kremlin cause enough shocks to the US-led order to disrupt it accordingly. Russia has also poured considerable resources into developing its own international institutions outside the Commonwealth of Independent States. These include the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance, the Union State with Belarus, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). While not aiming to revive the Soviet Union, the Kremlin intends to legitimize and expand these institutions, as well as others, to help the Kremlin coordinate with other post-Soviet states and allow Russia punch ever more above its weight in international affairs in the twenty-first century.

Due to the United States’ and the West’s objective economic, political, cultural, and military superiority over Russia, the Kremlin’s approach has been based on indirectly undercutting these advantages. Commonly referred to as hybrid or asymmetric warfare, Russia’s approach is far from a recent phenomenon, and it builds on policies adopted by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Russian writers such as Igor Panarin, Dugin, Sergey Moshkin, and others have referenced classical Russian/Soviet military strategists such as Alexander Svechin, Soviet military thinker and professor at the Academy of General Staff, and Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of the General Staff of the USSR (1977–1984) Nikolai Ogarkov.⁹ Both envisioned non-conventional forms of warfare as the backbone of future conflicts, a sentiment echoed by official modern Russian government figures in the twenty-first entury. In 2003, president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, Makhmut Gareyev, described how

in recent decades we have become witnesses to how entire nations and coalitions of nations have come to be destroyed in the course of confrontation in the international arena without the direct use of armed force. . . . The correlation of political, diplomatic, economic, information, psychological, and military means of fighting in the international arena have changed markedly in contemporary times. The significance and proportionate share of nonmilitary means have increased significantly.¹⁰

Arguably the most famous rendition of Russian strategy is the account of Valery Gerasimov, Russian Chief of the General Staff, 2013. In The Value of Science in Prediction, he examines and outlines the current and future operational environment from his perspective.¹¹ Gerasimov placed these non-military tools into five categories: political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures, supported by coordinated popular protest and information warfare. . . . These in turn were supported by covert military operations and Special Forces operations.¹² While the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine should not be considered the ironclad Russian approach to world affairs, as it has sometimes been dubbed, it does provide insight into the view of the most powerful minds in the Kremlin and their understanding of confrontation in international relations. Gerasimov’s six phases—Hidden Genesis, Escalation, Beginning of Conflict Actions, Crisis, Resolution, and finally, Restoration—share significant similarities with the four phases of the Soviet Union’s Active Measures—Long-term Demoralization, Medium-term Destabilization, Immediate Bringing to Crisis and Sustaining Renormalization. In both frameworks, emphasis is placed on long-term preparation and non-military means. In the twenty-first century, Gerasimov noted how a perfectly thriving state, can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into am arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.¹³

Since the Gerasimov Doctrine was published, Russian whitepapers have shown the Kremlin’s adoption of this view. Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine hinted at possible peaceful coexistence between it and the West, but this was replaced by stressing the inevitability of long-term conflict with the West from 2014.¹⁴ This was again stressed in Russia’s 2020 Military Doctrine. These doctrines have identified the first characteristic of contemporary military conflict as the integration of military and non-military tools and the integrated use of military force, political, economic, informational and other measures of non-military character implemented with a wide use of the protest potential of the population and of Special operations forces. In addition to the Military Doctrine, two other documents have been identified as proving important context for understanding Contemporary Russian Conflict against the West.¹⁵ Russia’s 2016 Foreign Policy Concept promotes similar concepts to the Military Doctrine and underlines its rejection of the West’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The other is Russia’s National Security Strategy, which has increasingly argued that the West is responsible for global destabilization and has attempted to contain Russia using an entire spectrum of political, financial, economic, and information tools.

But perhaps the most attention should be placed on the Primakov Doctrine, created by former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in 1996.¹⁶ In it, he advocated for a multipolar world order, where Russia would dominate the post-Soviet space, lead integration efforts, and oppose NATO expansion. The use of Russian military power, backed by its nuclear arsenal, would always remain a possibility, though non-military force was emphasized. Primakov also recognized that Russia could not (and should not) compete with the United States, but constrain it instead, in coordination with other powers. This would allow Russia to become one of many indispensable major powers and whose blessing would be necessary to resolve any global issue.

One of the most obvious reasons explaining the friction between the West and Russia lies in their contrasting portrayal of foreign policy. Western efforts to promote ideas associated with liberalism, where international cooperation is possible and sustainable, complement the Grotian tradition of global affairs where states are bound by rules and by common objectives. This has clashed with Russia’s more Machiavellian and realist interpretation of international relations, where conflict and competition are the norm, and the relative power supersedes mutual gains. In Small Wars Journal, Christopher Paul describes how many in the West view peace and war as binary.¹⁷ Other states, notably Russia, however, see the two on a spectrum and international relations as constant struggle and competition. By blending soft and hard power, Russia has acted with a sense that it is in a state of permanent conflict that has challenged traditional perceptions of peace and war. Importantly, adversaries, including Russia, are aware of the Western interpretation and seek to use it to their advantage. While the Kremlin continues to place significant emphasis on military power, it intends to win most of its confrontations without ever firing a shot. Applying specific and calculated actions to undermine the US-led global order will help Russia continue increasing its global influence in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds.

Naturally, the restoration of Russian power is most pronounced in the former Soviet Union. In particular, Russia always placed great efforts into bringing Ukraine firmly back into its sphere of influence due to its historical connections and its view of geopolitical necessity. Russia’s decision to disregard the Minsk I Agreement of 2014 and the Minsk II Agreement of 2015 that attempted to hold the peace in Ukraine showed it had little faith in negotiating with the West. After Putin concluded that Ukraine’s government was leaning inevitably and perhaps irreparably toward NATO and the EU, his strategy became to annex parts of Ukraine so that it no longer existed as a united independent country. Legitimizing this decision just prior to the 2022 Ukrainian invasion, Putin restated his claim that modern Ukraine was entirely and fully created by Russia.¹⁸

But this book also explores how much Putin has leveraged Russia’s political, energy, military, and other resources to dramatically increase the country’s influence around the world over the last two decades. Additionally, a growing mutual animosity toward the United States has brought Moscow and Beijing closer together, complementing Russian ambitions. After decades of acrimonious relations with China, Putin has developed a status of mutual accommodation and understanding with China’s Xi Jinping to confront the West. While trust between the two remains low, Russia and China have forged a modern partnership characterized by trade ties, diplomatic support, and cautious military coordination. This was exemplified by what became known as the no limits agreement between China and Russia on the opening day of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics—just ahead of Russia’s invasion. While Russia’s ability to compete with the United States and China remains limited, the Kremlin has increasingly been adapting to a strategy of coordinating with Beijing to undermine the United States and to leverage its ability to play kingmaker in global affairs.

Putin has relied on an inner circle of men serving in important positions or those with great wealth to help him enforce his rule. Putin also used men from the former KGB—like himself—to break the power of those business leaders who had dominated and plundered the country during the Yeltsin era and who attempted to defy him. Most have been targeted by Western sanctions and can be largely broken down into three groups. The first is members of Ozero, a St. Petersburg summerhouse community Putin joined in the early 1990s. Its members, including, Andrei Fursenko, Yury Kovalchuk, brothers Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg, Nikolai Shalamov, and Vladimir Yakunin, would go onto become successful businessmen and oligarchs. The second group is the long-term contacts of Putin, mostly connected to his political career in St. Petersburg in the 1990s, who now dominate some of the most important Russian companies and government positions. This includes Herman Gref (CEO of Sberbank), Dmitry Kozak (Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff and previous Deputy Prime Minister), Alexei Kudrin (Chairman of the Accounts Chamber and former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), Dmitry Medvedev (Security Council Deputy Chairman, former President and Prime Minister), Alexei Miller (CEO of Gazprom), and Igor Sechin (CEO of Rosneft and former Deputy Prime Minister), as well as oligarch Gennady Timchenko. Additionally, Putin relies on current and former members of the intelligence community to cement his rule. This includes Nikolai Patrushev (Security Council Secretary), Alexander Bortnikov (Federal Security Service [FSB] Chief), Sergey Naryshkin (Foreign Intelligence Service [SVR] Chief), and Sergei Ivanov (Special Representative of the President, former Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense). And outside Putin’s inner circle, oligarchs such as Konstantin Malofeev and Oleg Deripaska, or politicians