Global Politics

By Kevin Bloor

‘Global Politics’ aims to ensure that students become more engaged with the dynamic character of international relations. In order to achieve this, ‘Global Politics’ explores several relevant and insightful concepts such as sovereignty, global governance and complex independence. The book also recognizes that most concepts are firmly embedded within a theoretical context. In terms of geographical scope; ‘Global Politics’ covers every region of the world from the Americas to Oceania. It also includes theoretical perspectives that move beyond the two dominant paradigms of realism and liberalism (e.g. constructivism, feminism and Marxism). There are also a range of prominent theorists included within ‘Global Politics’ to ensure the reader becomes more informed about the insights available. This essential guide should therefore provide a firm basis for your studies. Created by an experienced teacher, examiner and author; ‘Global Politics’ provides everything you need to comprehend this fascinating subject matter.

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse UK
• Release date: Mar 9, 2023
• ISBN: 9798823080996

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2023 Kevin Bloor. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the written permission of the author.

Published by AuthorHouse 03/07/2023

ISBN: 979-8-8230-8100-9 (sc)

ISBN: 979-8-8230-8099-6 (e)

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DEDICATION

To my cherished magpie … you know who you are.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter 1 The Americas

Chapter 2 Europe

Chapter 3 Africa

Chapter 4 The Middle East

Chapter 5 Russia and Central Asia

Chapter 6 China and the Far East

Chapter 7 South Asia and Oceania

Chapter 8 Theoretical perspectives

Chapter 9 Key thinkers

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

Politics is, at heart; a contest of ideas and personalities. From a humble school election to the grand game on the global stage; politics is shaped by ideologies and people. To understand any event of significance within the global arena (such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine) demands analysis of the clash of characters and worldviews among the key actors. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’s persona gravitates towards a radically different worldview to his opponents ranging from Zelenskyy to the European Union. Although various theoretical perspectives offer a particular nuance towards this; the fundamental observation remains as salient as ever.

I wrote this book with a desire to address a barrier to learning that educators of all forms have surely noted. We increasingly exist in a world in which boundaries are carved out by ‘big tech.’ Those tasked with learning face a multitude of distractions dominated by clickbait, instant gratification and post-truth. A world of ‘butterfly minds’ cries out for an objective and fact-checked source of knowledge. To achieve this goal requires an offline environment characterised by the rigours of careful deliberation and a civilised disagreement with those who challenge us. The cultural critic Marshall McLuhan gave us the phrase global village - and like all villages - it sustains itself on conflated gossip and half-truths. In our tribal world (Chua, 2018) we are increasingly choosing our version of ‘reality’ and shouting our ‘truth’ whilst ignoring all others. We seem to be losing the ability to listen and the reasoning skills that go with it at an alarming rate. Let us recognise the profound truth of having one mouth and two ears. We ultimately need to restore the dignity of difference.

Continuity and transformation

International Relations is a contradictory landscape of continuity and transformation. Given the dynamic character of events, global politics is akin to a game of multi-dimensional chess in which each contestant must make the best of their hand. The ‘winner’ is the player who successfully anticipates the moves of others whilst making optimal use of what they have at their disposal. It is a competition that tests the mind to the full and determined by a combination of brain, brawn and chance. There is a time for nuanced diplomacy and there is a time for brutality. There is a time to make peace and a time to fight.

Changes need time to become embedded within the subject matter and it is my contention that we are currently undergoing a shift in the balance of power away from the West. This inexorable pivot towards China and a number of authoritarian regimes alters the conversation and comprehension of IR. Fortunately, there are theoretical and conceptual frameworks that give context towards our understanding. These are absolutely integral to providing a firm grounding within the subject matter. Equally, there is much that remains constant. Global politics is - and always has been - analogous to a race in which actors jockey for status. There is for instance a recognised degree of hierarchy within the field of international relations mirrored in the classification of powers. In this game of snakes and ladders, those who rise make the best of their lot and those who fall are often beaten by their own culpability.

Structure

Each Chapter considers the various regions within the realm of international relations beginning with the Americas. Having said this, the delineation of the geographical boundaries is not an exact science. In such cases, there has been a conscious decision to place each country in the relevant sphere of regional politics. For instance, Türkiye is located within the section on the Middle East because 97% of its territory lies outside of Europe. In order to counterbalance this, the tensions between Türkiye and Greece over the Cypriot dispute is included within the European section. Equally, the Arab Republic of Egypt is placed within the Middle East due to the orientation of its foreign policy. Whilst the country lies in north Africa, Egypt has been and remains a player within the political dynamics of the Middle East. There is also the need to distinguish certain sections of a continent. Over a quarter of all countries within the world are African and this inevitably requires a geographical distinction to be made within the ‘mother continent.’ It is hoped these and other distinctions are viewed as necessary and do not detract from the overall themes.

Secondly, each section seeks to consider a relevant case study given its overall political salience. The opening section on the Americas considers the extent to which Washington satisfies the criterion of a hegemonic power. Subsequent Chapters attempt to analyse the mindset of policy-makers within countries of significance like Russia and China. There are also a number of case studies that warrant our attention including the European Union, the conflict in Kashmir and tensions between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. The penultimate Chapter seeks to place such events in an appropriate theoretical context. Although the main focus is rightly on the dichotomy between liberalism and realism, a number of alternative theories are also considered. The final Chapter considers the key thinkers within IR.

Shift in the balance of power

The dividing line in global politics exists between liberal democracy and authoritarianism. The former encompasses a broad (rather than literal) litany of Westernised countries with the United States as their indispensable leader. The latter consists of nuclear powers such as members of the P5 alongside a group of middle-ranking powers. The ideological contest that shapes global politics is essentially that between a liberal-democratic approach and an autocratic path. The former champions values in the external realm such as intervention on humanitarian grounds. Autocracies however seek to concentrate power into the hands of an elite with little respect for liberal values. The world is becoming an increasingly binary place with two competing ideologies fighting it out for ascendancy. Although the vast majority of people live in the democratic world, the momentum is very much behind authoritarian politics. The inexorable rise of China and the resurgence of the Taliban provide weighty evidence for this argument. The penchant for populism also suggests the winds of change are firmly on the side of the latter (Rachman, 2022).

If the West was a patient visiting a doctor, it might be diagnosed with early signs of physical decline. Its willingness to fight for its beliefs (however vaguely defined) and the certainty of its posture no longer defines it. The concept of democracy so synonymous with the West is in decline. We are shifting away from a world dominated by American unipolarity and western-dominated institutions towards a system based on multilateralism. The whole landscape of global affairs is built on shifting sands. Whilst this has always been the case academia and its broader narrative can often be slow to catch-up. The westernised focus has yet to properly reflect the shift away from liberal rationality and the falsehoods implicit within it. This perceptible shift in the balance of power away from the West holds profound implications for international relations and International Relations.

CHAPTER 1

THE AMERICAS

Introduction

D espite mounting claims to have lost its title as global hegemon, the United States remains the most significant actor in international relations. In military terms, this is very much a given as the commander-in-chief has the capacity to impose fire and fury like the world has never seen (Woolf, 2018). Whilst the ‘war on terror’ exposed the limitations of its military might, all actors need to be mindful of what the United States has at its disposal. Even the implicit threat of military action is enough to exert decisive pressure on those that might be tempted to stray from the line favoured by Washington. Similarly, the United States is capable of throwing its financial muscle around like no other. Economic sanctions, import tariffs and trade embargoes can cause serious lasting damage to a rogue state.

In diplomatic circles, the voice of Washington lies at the apex of global governance and for now at least is the loudest in global affairs. For instance, the United States is the dominant partner in NATO and holds a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Moreover, in cultural terms the US provides the dominant lens via which the world around us is interpreted. In terms of hard power and soft power, the United States has a global reach unmatched in world politics. Its presence can be felt in all areas of the world, and whilst China is undoubtedly making massive strides (notably via the belt and road initiative); it is the United States that has an undisputed claim to the title indispensable nation. In short, no other country can pursue its own agenda to quite the same degree as Washington. This can be achieved on a unilateral basis (such as withdrawal from the Paris agreement and the World Health Organisation) or via the process of multilateralism. In terms of the latter, America can often get its own way through working within international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.

Having said all this, the United States is not the only player within North America. Canada is a member of the G7 whereas Mexico is an emerging economy moving slowly towards democratisation. Central America contains numerous states that are impactful on international relations in terms of territorial disputes and ideology. In contrast, the politics of the Caribbean do not warrant as much attention within the study of international relations. With the notable exception of Cuba, the Caribbean lies at the periphery of international relations. There are no failed states, great powers or known sources of terrorism. In South America, Brazil presents a fascinating case study in terms of how populism can mix with economic development. Until recently, Jair Bolsonaro adopted the same post-truth rhetoric of Donald Trump with the same disastrous results in dealing with the pandemic (Ball, 2017; d’Ancona, 2017). South America also presents several border disputes and internal tensions that threaten political stability within the region. However, the trend towards democracy has made these tensions markedly more peaceful. It is remarkable just how many countries within the region have progressed from military rule towards a stable democratic regime.

A consideration of the Americas inevitably demands a consideration of American hegemony. There are those who maintain that the US remains a global hegemon, although this must be weighed against persuasive evidence that it over-reached in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It is increasingly clear that the Biden administration will continue to adopt a different approach to its predecessor. There is however evidence to suggest that Joe Biden shares some policies to those which characterised his bellicose predecessor. It must also be noted that Biden was elected to end wars, not start them.

American hegemony

In theoretical terms, hegemony denotes a situation in which there is overwhelming material asymmetry in favour of one particular state. The hegemon therefore holds enough military prowess to defeat any potential challenger or rival. A hegemon also controls access to valuable scarce resources to others within the international arena. In ideological terms, a hegemon promotes a particular mindset consistent with the status quo (such as the promotion of capitalism). Finally, a hegemon functions differently from others in that it is expected to provide stability (Schenoni, 2018). A dominant state within global (or even regional) politics is seen by both allies and opponents alike in such a manner. States, non-state and sub-state actors understand that they are dealing with a hegemonic state and will therefore alter their behaviour accordingly. With a hegemon, there is little ambiguity in the matter.

Hegemony is a multi-dimensional concept that combines the economic, military, political and cultural. In economic terms a hegemon may be said to be predominant on the basis of national income and economic development. Its economic resources enable that particular state to impose sanctions on a rogue state such as Russia or Iran. Equally, it can also lift sanctions in order to reward those that comply with the hegemon’s wishes. An economic hegemon can also ensure that international institutions implement an agenda that favours their own. In an era shaped by the forces of globalisation, the Washington consensus is upheld by a trio of institutions located within the American capital (Serra, 2008).

A military hegemon possesses an overwhelming advantage over others. Their naval, air, army and nuclear resources are both more numerous and more effective than any other nation. They can impose a ‘shock and awe’ strategy that other states simply cannot hope to match, and if a rival state conducted a simulated wargame they would face heavy losses. In contrast, a hegemon in the political sense is recognised by others as the alpha male. For instance, a hegemon can exercise the power of veto within the UN Security Council. For humanitarian intervention on behalf of the ‘international community’ to be effective, it must at least have the approval (and preferably involvement) of a hegemonic power.

A hegemonic state can also shape the rules and behavioural norms of global governance. It provides significant levels of funding for these institutions, and any withdrawal of those funds would have a major political fall-out. A hegemonic state can also use its diplomatic power in a unilateral sense in order to pursue its own interests. Finally, a state may be said to be hegemonic in the cultural sense if it is able to impose its own values and worldview on others. Cultural predominance is associated with soft power and can be promoted via numerous sources (Nye, 1990).

Given these multiple dimensions, it seems reasonable to assume that a state could be hegemonic in one area but not necessarily another. Whilst the United States thoroughly warrants the label superpower within the military field, this does not necessarily apply in the economic sphere. It could also be argued that its cultural dominance far exceeds its political presence. In diplomatic circles, the US has to bargain with others and is constrained accordingly. In contrast, the technological giants within the global marketplace (the so-called FAANGs) are all based in the US whilst the film and television industry are slanted heavily towards an Americanised worldview. Within the media, our understanding of the world is influenced via an American gaze.

A hegemonic power can also be categorised in terms of their motivation. A benevolent hegemon can be thought of as one that promotes fairness in the global system of governance. The US routinely claims to promote worthy goals such as freedom, democracy and security. Washington therefore seeks to justify its actions as a benevolent leader of the ‘free’ world. A coercive hegemony however exerts their economic or military power to pursue its own narrow interests. This criticism has often been applied to the United States. Indeed, according to William Blum the US should be classed as a rogue state (2000). Along similar lines, an exploitative hegemon extracts resources from other countries (Snidal, 1985). An exploitative hegemon is often an imperial or colonial power. It is entirely plausible that a hegemon may view itself as benevolent but match the criteria of being coercive (and even exploitative) by others. There are undoubtedly states within Central and South America who have good reason to hold that interpretation of the United States. Regardless of the categorisation, hegemony refers to the ability of an actor to shape the international system via coercive force and non-coercive means (Norrlof, 2019).

The concept of hegemony can also be located within a wider theoretical debate. The hegemonic stability theory stipulates that the larger the concentration of power into the hands of the pre-eminent state, the more peaceful the international order will be. It is built on the premise that a hegemonic power is an essential ingredient to the development and maintenance of a stable international order (Gilpin, 1975). The global system requires a world policeman in order to maintain stability within international relations.

Since the end of the cold war, the United States has often acted in a manner concomitant with this unofficial title. Within the confines of a unipolar system, states and other international actors face the dire consequences of acting in a particular manner. A hegemon can for instance impose tough sanctions against a rogue state either unilaterally or via global institutions in which it has a considerable voice. It is also at liberty to impose its own double standards in terms of who should be defined as a rogue state (Chomsky, 2015). As Franklin Delano Roosevelt is supposed to have said about a Nicaraguan dictator Somoza may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he’s our son-of-a-bitch. This inevitably serves to entrench the power of an existing global hegemon.

Given the in-built incentive to maximise power and enhance status within the international system, a dominant power will face repeated and numerous challenges from others. This is underpinned by an assumption that global politics is an inherently competitive environment in which status equates to rewards. In the modern era, the challenge facing the hegemon can take many forms including cyberwarfare. If history teaches us anything, it’s that the hegemon will lose out at some point. Even the Pax Britannica of the 19th century gradually gave way to a system based on Pax Americana.

According to some scholars, the decline of a hegemon causes disruption because it undermines the stability of the system. In the short-term at least, a loss of hegemonic status inevitably creates a power vacuum (Kindleberger, 1981). In applying this argument to the contemporary era, the transfer of hegemonic status from the US has the potential to undermine stability (including the Russian invasion of Ukraine). The behavioural norms that govern the society of states will therefore experience a state of flux until a new hegemon is established.

Alternatively, it could be argued that some form of cooperation will continue to persist. Various institutions exist under the umbrella of global governance to ensure that the international system continues to function smoothly even during an era of hegemonic decline (Keohane, 1984). According to liberal ideology, a multitude of institutions generate a habit of cooperation and facilitate a more peaceful global order (Keohane and Martin, 1995). There is also the potential for an enhanced contribution from various non-hegemonic powers (Snidal, 1985). There is also nothing inevitable about a change in the balance of power resulting in a form of instability.

Hegemony and polarity

An understanding of hegemony is tied into an awareness of polarity and its wider implications. There are three main types of polarity to consider although scholars are divided as to which system is likely to provide the highest level of security. In addition, there is a related debate concerning the sources and stability of American unipolarity (Huntington, 1999). Realists claim that unipolarity is rooted in the material superiority of the United States (Norrlof, 2010) whilst liberal voices such as John Ilkenberry claim that American hegemony is established through international institutions like the UN, NATO and the World Bank.

The distribution of power is described as unipolar when a state is said to be a hegemon (such as the British Empire between 1815 and 1914). In a bipolar system, there are two main superpowers who dominate their geographical sphere of influence. William Wohlforth (1999) claims that the most stable system is unipolarity whilst neo-realists such as John Mearsheimer favour bipolarity (2001). In a multipolar system there are various states that have the capacity to influence events. However, there is no dominant force within a multipolar system. Historical research undertaken by Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer concludes that multipolarity is the most stable structure (Deutsch and Singer, 1964).

At the very end of the ‘American century’ the French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine described the US as a hyperpower. It alone had the ability to act and impose its own agenda on a unilateral basis. Its naval, air and military arsenal projected an unrivalled global reach (Cohen, 2004). However, the term has fallen out of favour since then. In contrast, Madeline Albright’s depiction of her homeland as an indispensable nation has retained its relevance. There are of course various markers in the demise of the United States, and each one forms part of a broader narrative charting its long-term decline (Layne, 2006). If the US is no longer to be classed as a truly hegemonic power, then the evidence would rest on a series of misguided foreign policy interventions (Phares, 2014).

The primary focus of American foreign policy has been the ‘war on terror.’ According to the image broadcast to the world, America was not in the business of selfish gain. Instead, it was firmly committed to a campaign against global terrorism. Unlike previous wars, this was not a conflict against a clearly-defined enemy. The inherent ambiguity of the phrase enabled the United States to define such interventions and actions on their own terms. As the global hegemon, the term left sufficient ‘wiggle room’ in terms of how discourse would be utilised. It also provides a useful veneer over actions such as pre-emptive strikes which would otherwise be considered illegal if undertaken by a rogue state. In Orwellian terms, the language used serves a deliberate purpose which suits the powerful and the status quo. Only a predominant state could launch a war free from the confines of convention couched in metaphorical terms. As Orwell himself perceptively observed political language … is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.

The war on terror was primarily concerned with interventions led by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. In terms of the former, troops were sent in order to defeat the Taliban. Without providing any hard evidence to support an ultimatum to hand over Osama bin Laden, the US launched a full-scale intervention. Whilst Washington possessed the military capacity to act in a unilateral manner, the Bush administration forged a widespread coalition of states. This cooperative approach was embedded further via NATO’s ISAF (International Stability Assistance Force) and by working closely with the Afghan transitional administration. Initially, the US-led coalition managed to force the Taliban into retreat. However, the group reformed and is now the de facto government of Afghanistan.

After twenty years of military presence, it has to be said that the United States failed to achieve its long-term objectives. In terms of the human cost over 2,300 US military personnel have died and over 20,000 have been wounded. Although in no sense comparable, the financial burden of military operations stands at US$ 824 billion. Afghanistan has been a damaging body blow to American prestige and raises doubts amongst its allies and hopes among its enemies. Given the passage of time, the withdrawal of troops may well signal a key moment in the decline of American power. What is certain is that it provides a salient illustration of what military coercion can realistically achieve. The power vacuum has been filled by the Taliban who will surely forge relations with authoritarian countries such as Iran, Russia and China. It can be said with some certainty that the Taliban will continue to portray the United States and the ‘West’ as yet another in a long line of occupying forces.

American intervention in Iraq also provides evidence of a decline in the status of the United States. The Iraq war began in March 2003 and - as was the case in Afghanistan - the US sought international cooperation from its allies. American intervention was also justified to some extent via a literal interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441. With the benefit of hindsight, the US-led intervention in Iraq offers a textbook illustration of hubris. On the 1st May 2003, George W. Bush trumpeted ‘mission accomplished’ in a stage-managed photo opportunity. Even now, it seems an extraordinary instance of overconfidence to declare any military mission accomplished after such a short period of time. As time progressed, the US-led intervention became bogged down in the conflict. Guerrilla warfare increased during the Iraqi insurgency and the majority of casualties occurred after his (in)famous speech. Troops finally left in 2011 with America’s reputation tarnished by the President’s empty words.

The US intervention in Iraq illustrates the limitations of what a hegemon can ever hope to realistically achieve. The Bush administration failed to address sectarian tensions within the country, forgot to outline an exit strategy and flunked the ‘pottery barn’ test (‘you break it, you remake it’). Heightened use of hard power (such as the surge of 2007) could not provide the pathway to victory. Moreover, actions taken by the United States undermined its standing within the Muslim world. Its reputation as a leader of the free world was also damaged by the use of waterboarding, torture and humiliation of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. American intentions within Iraq were also criticised for being driven by ‘big oil’ whilst its botched attempt at large-scale regime change seems to match the category of a coercive (even exploitative) hegemon.

In a historical context, the war on terror may well mark the beginning of the end of American hegemony. As with previous imperial powers, the wounds were largely self-inflicted. There is perhaps a degree of arrogance and overreach that comes with being the dominant power. A toxic combination of rhetoric (‘the sun never sets on the British Empire’) and false expectations can potentially defeat a hegemon. Equally, there is only one possible direction to go once a state is the world’s most powerful. Eventually a hegemonic state will take on one foreign entanglement too far. There is a particularly poignant parallel to America’s experience in Afghanistan and the damage done by the same country to the British Empire and the Soviet Union.

The concepts of hegemony and polarity bear an overt relationship to the hierarchy of states within global affairs. Within a unipolar system the preeminent state is able to play the role of world’s policeman. Order and stability within international relations demands a determining role for the hegemonic state. Without a decisive role from the hegemonic power, it is improbable that the international community could ever hope to secure lasting stability. This is shown most acutely within the realm of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000). The effectiveness of global governance demands support (or at least tacit acceptance) from a hegemon. Upholding liberal values requires a determination from the global hegemon to deal with violations of human rights.

Within a bipolar system, the two superpowers have a clearly-defined sphere of influence. Countries that lie within that particular sphere acknowledge that a hegemonic power shapes the norms and conventions of inter-state relations. There is little ambiguity as to which state predominates and any challenge to the interests of the superpower is likely to be met with a decisive and overwhelming response. Subordinate states must always consider any potential reprisals from the greater power. In the contemporary era, relations between Washington and Beijing might also be described as a form of bipolarity in the political and economic sense (Ross et al, 2020). However, tensions are of a different hue to that which defined the cold war between the US and the USSR. Most notably, Washington and Beijing are both firmly committed to capitalism and the level of trade between them is of another league to that which existed between America and the Soviets. The two countries also engage in a greater level of dialogue than was the case at the height of the cold war.

There is of course a lengthy pedigree in terms of debate over the potential decline in American hegemony. During the 1950s the US appeared to be losing out on the space race to the Soviets due to a worrying missile gap. As the 60s rolled into the 70s, America experienced a number of setbacks such as the abject humiliation of Vietnam. By the 1980s, there were predictions that Japan would overtake the United States on the basis of economic development and technical prowess. Any discussion of American hegemony and its potential decline must therefore be placed in the context of a long-standing debate within political discourse. There is also a heated debate concerning the extent to which America should still be classed as a global hegemon. Theorists from both ends of the realist-liberal paradigm claim that Washington no longer meets the criteria of a hegemon. According to the realist academic John Mearsheimer (2001) and the liberal Joseph Nye (1993); the US lacks the financial or military resources required to impose a global order.

From the opposing angle, it could be claimed the US is still a hegemon. Whilst no agreed definition exists, a superpower will be evident via dimensions of state power including geography, population, economy, resources, military, diplomacy and national identity (Kennedy, 1987). The United States is the largest importer in the world, the second-largest exporter of goods and represents a quarter of global GDP. It also constitutes a third of global military spending (Cohen, 2004) and in terms of soft power, the US is one of the world’s leading states according to one highly respected source.

From Trump to Biden

The shift from Donald J. Trump to Joseph R. Biden has completely changed the tone of United States foreign policy. The Trump administration adopted an idiosyncratic and colourful approach to international relations. At times, it was difficult to predict exactly what the ‘Twitter-in-chief’ would say next. In contrast, the Biden administration offers a more diplomatic and conventional approach. It is easy for supporters and opponents alike to emphasise the differences between the two men. Given the ideological polarisation that shapes American politics, this is a comforting trap for political commentators to escape into. In reality, American interests have not drastically changed since January 2021.

On the day Biden took office he adopted tighter controls over drone strikes in areas with small numbers of American troops such as Somalia, Libya and Yemen. This represents a reversal from the Trump-era policy that provided military officials with greater scope to launch counter-terrorism attacks without the oversight of the White House. This undoubtedly represents a point of departure from his predecessor. Another key distinction lies in terms of engagement with external actors with Biden seeking to restore America’s position as a trusted leader. In order to achieve this, Joe Biden has sought to repair the transatlantic relationship. For instance, Biden has avoided stoking anxiety amongst NATO allies and worked closely with them in response to the Ukrainian crisis. In addition, there is a sharp distinction between the two men over the issue of climate change. The Biden administration adopts a polar opposite view to Trump’s depiction of our environmental emergency as a hoax. Instead, the issue is being addressed in a multilateral manner consistent with how Biden operated as vice-President within the Obama administration. On his very first day in office, Biden reversed Trump’s policy and rejoined the Paris agreement. This was a pledge made during the presidential campaign and came as little surprise.

As with many of the previous holders, the occupant of the White House is likely to be judged by his legacy within the Middle East. In regards to Israel, Biden describes himself as a Zionist and has depicted American aid to Israel as an investment. In policy terms, Antony Blinken conceded during his Senate confirmation hearing that the Biden administration would continue to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. They will also keep the American embassy in Jerusalem after Trump’s controversial and calculated move. The US has also reaffirmed its commitment to a negotiated two-state solution and its opposition to an expansion of Israeli settlements. Biden also supports the continued normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab world. On a point of departure with the Trump administration, Biden restored diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority and resumed the provision of aid. In addition, Biden must listen attentively to voices within his own party that take a more sympathetic tone towards the Palestinians.

The Biden administration has also adopted a firmer stance against the Saudis. In February 2021, Biden implemented a campaign pledge to end diplomatic support for the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. From an American perspective, the Saudis have failed to defeat the Houthis and not done enough to avert a humanitarian crisis. Biden has also adopted a more critical stance over its treatment of journalists and placed a temporary freeze on arms sales to Saudi Arabia. In response to diplomatic pressure from Washington, the Riyadh government has undergone incremental reforms such as releasing political prisoners and enhancing the level of judicial independence. Having said this, the Biden administration will continue to cooperate with the Saudi government on military issues and counter-terrorism. Frankly, both sides of the relationship need to work with each other due to economic and political factors.

Although the US position with the Saudis has modified slightly, Iran remains an implacable enemy of the United States. The newly-elected President has indicated that sanctions will only be lifted when Iran stops enriching uranium. The Biden administration also seeks a renewed engagement with the rogue state after the Trump administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In relation to the Yemeni civil war, the Biden administration has reversed the stance adopted by their predecessor. In a decision made during the final days of his presidency, Donald Trump placed the Houthis on the list of foreign terrorist organisations (the Biden administration has since removed them from that list). There are also figures within the Democratic Party who are opposed to the arms deal with the UAE, although the broader goal of normalising links with Israel will always take precedence.

In regards to the Syrian quagmire, the position adopted by the United States remains unchanged. In the first military action undertaken by the new administration, Washington retaliated against an Iranian-backed missile attack with an airstrike in an area of eastern Syria in which Hezbollah operates. There have been subsequent airstrikes since then against operational and arms storage facilities in the Syria-Iraq border area. The Biden administration has also sought to end the former strategy