Deficits of Trust: The Rodgers Brief Report on the April 18-19, 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Shooting and the Commission of Inquiry That Followed

By Adam Rodgers

This project is intended to be a report of what went wrong with the both the response, and later the investigation, of the terrible events of April 18-19, 2020 in Portapique and other areas of central Nova Scotia. There were 22 people (plus an unborn child) killed over the course of 13 hours, over half of whom could still be alive had there been a series of better decisions made by police.
The Mass Casualty Commission that investigated the police shortcomings developed and used an experimental process which ended up fostering confusion and frustration. The MCC had at least as many problems as the police/emergency response they were examining, and has become a warning sign of how a public inquiry can go astray.
There was much to be examined, with thousands of pages of disclosure and 75 days of inquiry proceedings. This Rodgers Brief Report is an attempt to distill that into its essential elements. That requires first a look back at some parts of the life of the killer, Gabriel Wortman, some of his interactions with police, and things he did over the years that should have attracted police attention, including how he amassed such a fortune in cash, property, and personal possessions.
Then, I go through the events themselves, constructing the most plausible narrative of what happened, based on all that we now know, identifying key turning points, and where better decisions could have been made that would have saved lives. There were several very clear such points, and others that were perhaps more subtle.
After reviewing the events, I will outline the after-event scrambling by the RCMP to explain what they did, while also trying to hide what they really did. I will review the way Wortman’s spouse, Lisa Banfield, has been treated and perceived, and how the RCMP’s early manipulation of her has robbed us all of a valuable opportunity to learn more about what happened.
Eventually, the Mass Casualty Commission called to examine the events would face its own criticisms. It was with a significant degree of irony that much of this criticism related to the MCC being secretive, having a closed off communications strategy, and an overly opaque and bureaucratic structure. In such ways, the MCC took on the flawed characteristics of the RCMP it was tasked with investigating.
There were many flaws in the development of the MCC, and then the way the inquiry unfolded. Primarily, however, the criticism was generated from the MCC’s seeming unwillingness to address the core questions around the performance and culture of the RCMP, and how those things affected the police’s dealing with the killer.
The MCC proceedings are over now, and the Commissioners’ report, which was due to be delivered on November 1, 2022, has been delayed (without compelling reasons) for five months. I followed the MCC throughout, doing daily summaries and analysis for the general public. I also committed to preparing this alternative report, which I think (and hope) will contribute just as much to the formation of public opinion as the official version.
From all of the information that emerged in the MCC, and with additional details and circumstantial evidence from other sources, I have attempted to construct what really took place over the 13-hours of the killing spree(s). I will start with the killer, his background, and what was known to police. Then, I will detail what happened and where the police made mistakes of consequence. Finally, I will review the MCC process as it unfolded, in the hopes that future public inquires can learn from the costly errors that have been undermining the credibility of this inquiry since the beginning.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Adam Rodgers
• Release date: Oct 19, 2022
• ISBN: 9781778104206

Adam Rodgers

This is my first self-publishing effort, though I have always enjoyed writing. I have also been someone who thinks it is important to be a contributor to public life and debate. Some of that has been in the course of my 17-year legal career, during which I have had the privilege to represent clients on some ground-breaking and prominent cases, as well as many successful non-profit, business, and municipal entities. In so doing, I have tried to be an asset, and a leader in the Strait Area where I live and work, as well as across the Province in matters of business, law, and politics.

Book preview

Deficits of Trust

The Rodgers Brief Report on the April 18-19, 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Shooting and the Commission of Inquiry That Followed

Adam Rodgers

Copyright 2022 Adam Rodgers

Licence Statement

This ebook is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This ebook may not be resold or given away to other people. If you would like to share this book with another person, please purchase an additional copy for each recipient. If you are reading this book and did not purchase it, or it was not purchased for your enjoyment only, please return to your favourite ebook retailer and purchase your own copy. Thank you for respecting the hard work of this author.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Part 1 - A History of Violence, Ignored

Wealth Accumulation

Domestic Assault Investigation/Privilege

Police Connections

Psychology of a Killer

Part 2 - What Really Happened

Lisa Banfield’s Account of the Early Moments

MCC Evidence of Portapique Killings

Wortman Escapes Portapique

Specialized Resources Un/Misused

Critical Incident Command, Unstructured

Overnight Uncertainty

Revelations at Dawn - Still No Warnings

Communications Analysis Paralysis, 2nd Escape, and Two More Dead

(Neither) Alert (Nor Quite) Ready

Plains Road and Plain Language

Bad Aim at Onslow Belmont

EMO Tries to Help

Truro Kept in the Dark

Tragic Misunderstanding and Deadly Exchanges at Shubie

The Big Stop

Post-takedown Misinformation and Political Calculations

Manipulating, Then Overprotecting, Lisa Banfield

Part 3 - Traumatically Misinformed - The Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission

Calls For an Inquiry

Inquiry is Political and Legal

The Commissioners

Elasticity of Trauma Informed

Pausing Before Starting - Delay for Narrative Formation

Marginalization of MCC Participants

Early Outlook for the MCC and Police Intelligence Questioning

Disorienting, Not Trauma Informed, Approach to Evidence

Attending the MCC In Person - More Like a Seminar

Withholding Big Stop Videos

Unnecessary Accommodations for Senior RCMP Officers Leads to Participant Boycotts

Critical Incident Experts Not Permitted to Criticize Incident

Lisa Banfield Answers No Real Questions, Avoids Criminal Charges

The MCC Really Wants You to Know It Cares About Domestic Violence

The Future of Policing is Not Present

Ending Without Closing

Summary of Recommendations

About the Author

Introduction

This project is intended to be a report of what went wrong with the both the response, and later the investigation, of the terrible events of April 18-19, 2020 in Portapique and other areas of central Nova Scotia. There were 22 people (plus an unborn child) killed over the course of 13 hours, over half of whom could still be alive had there been a series of better decisions made by police.

The Mass Casualty Commission that investigated the police shortcomings developed and used an experimental process which ended up fostering confusion and frustration. The MCC had at least as many problems as the police/emergency response they were examining, and has become a warning sign of how a public inquiry can go astray.

There was much to be examined, with thousands of pages of disclosure and 75 days of inquiry proceedings. This Rodgers Brief Report is an attempt to distill that into its essential elements. That requires first a look back at some parts of the life of the killer, Gabriel Wortman, some of his interactions with police, and things he did over the years that should have attracted police attention, including how he amassed such a fortune in cash, property, and personal possessions.

Then, I go through the events themselves, constructing the most plausible narrative of what happened, based on all that we now know, identifying key turning points, and where better decisions could have been made that would have saved lives. There were several very clear such points, and others that were perhaps more subtle.

After reviewing the events, I will outline the after-event scrambling by the RCMP to explain what they did, while also trying to hide what they really did. I will review the way Wortman’s spouse, Lisa Banfield, has been treated and perceived, and how the RCMP’s early manipulation of her has robbed us all of a valuable opportunity to learn more about what happened.

The scale of the killing spree may have, in itself, been sufficient to justify an inquiry, but if not, the unwillingness on the part of the RCMP during those early press conferences to be upfront with the families and the public as to what they knew sparked a movement to call for one.

The RCMP opposed an inquiry from the start, and were actively hostile to the idea. They resisted disclosure at every turn, from the seconds after Wortman was killed to the last days of the Mass Casualty Commission proceedings.

This reticence to provide information to the public has been the main reason for the proliferation of theories as to what may really have taken place at various points in the shooting rampage, and to theories about Wortman’s possible connection to the police. Those espousing these theories have been called conspiracy minded, but (with some exceptions, certainly) the reason these ideas have persisted has been the refusal of the RCMP (and later the MCC itself) to be forthcoming with information or to allow officers and witnesses to be questioned.

The most prominent of the ‘conspiracy’ theories was (or perhaps ‘is’) that Wortman was a confidential informant for the RCMP. This idea emerged very early in the hours and days after RCMP officers shot Wortman dead at the Irving Big Stop in Enfield. Curiously, rather than seeking help from local municipal police forces, the RCMP had called in other RCMP members from Fredericton, Yarmouth, and Antigonish, seemingly trying to keep their mess in-house.

Wortman had known criminal connections, had been a cross-border smuggler most of his adult life, had been able to stay ahead of the RCMP throughout his rampage, and seemed to be targeting the force, by way of exposing their vulnerabilities, as much as he was targeting any particular individual. Stories emerged of a particular undercover operation targeting biker gangs, which seemed, circumstantially, to be tied to Wortman. Finally, the shooting of Wortman at the Big Stop had the look of an execution, designed to keep Wortman from revealing any secrets.

It was by their own obfuscation that the RCMP fostered very reasonable questions, including whether Wortman was a confidential informant or police agent. There seemed to be two possible explanations, both of which called for an in-depth inquiry. Either Wortman was working with the police and it turned out badly, or else through police incompetence they missed the many signs of danger emitting from Wortman, and then got outmanoeuvered by him numerous times over the course of his 13-hour killing spree.

Reports and evidence eventually would provide at least somewhat compelling (though still incomplete) reasons why it was unlikely that Wortman was connected to the police. These came in the form of bank records, mostly, along with the absence of any hard proof of linkages.

The most compelling argument against there being a police conspiracy to keep Wortman’s connection secret, however, came from listening to the senior RCMP officers from the Nova Scotia and national command structures testify. They revealed a ‘House of Cards’ level of political infighting, backstabbing, and posturing at the upper levels of our national police force that would make it seemingly impossible to keep any big secrets.

The instinct to criticize and undermine fellow senior officers, seemingly in bids to boost one’s own stock, was pervasively demonstrated throughout the testimony of the various ‘white shirts’ who appeared at the MCC. This all seems inconsistent with an organization that could keep a big secret like a mass killer being a police agent. Someone would have leaped at the opportunity to pin the responsibility for such a situation on a more senior officer, as a way to make themselves look virtuous by comparison.

At the same time, and with few exceptions, these senior officers also demonstrated (and generated) a culture of institutional secrecy in the RCMP that persisted throughout the events of the mass casualty and the inquiry. The first thing the police did after the shootings was assemble a strategic communications team, which promptly drafted misleading and false information for their initial press conferences. Then, they tried to enlist other police forces in their efforts to undermine the utility of the Alert Ready emergency alerting system. They tried to get the Truro Police to hold back from disclosing a 2011 criminal intelligence bulletin relating to Wortman. They opposed the calling of an inquiry, and when one was announced took a slow and reluctant approach to disclosure, then appointed the spouses of senior officers to work on it.

In addition to upset citizens, expert views on policing are also calling for change. Our police training and reputational legitimacy falls well short of other jurisdictions, such as Finland (where police officers undergo three years of training, rather than six months at RCMP Depot in Regina). Research discussed during the MCC has shown that there is very little civilian police oversight in Nova Scotia, and no accessible complaints process for individuals, particularly if they are from marginalized communities or circumstances.

A mistrust of the police has been building since April, 2020, and we have heard from experts through the MCC how difficult (if not impossible) such trust is to regain once it is lost.

It is not only citizens who have lost trust in the RCMP. They have also been removed as a full member of the Nova Scotia Chiefs of Police Association by their municipal police counterparts, and from what we have heard, have not tried particularly hard to be reinstated.

It also became clear that the RCMP does not trust the people it is tasked with policing. This was demonstrated during the killing spree, when the RCMP refused to issue any warnings to the public, on the erroneous thinking that members of the public would start flooding 911 with calls, or would start shooting at legitimate police officers. In reality, citizens reacted appropriately throughout the shootings when they had information for the police, and experts called by the MCC repeatedly said that the public can, and should, be trusted with ongoing critical information during a crisis.

Questions were asked during the MCC about the RCMP practice (as compared to local forces) of moving members around to new detachments every few years, and whether that is appropriate. The RCMP answer amounts to saying that officers should not be too close to the people they police, because people cannot be trusted to police their friends.

With its origins as a colonial force, the RCMP was perhaps conditioned to see those they policed as others. Rotating around, rather than remaining in communities, means there will always be a degree of distance between the officer and the people. Certainly more so than with a local force. The transient nature of it ensures that psychological distance will always be a feature. Such a distance may, in part, explain the lack of trust the RCMP had in the people of Nova Scotia.

The RCMP did not trust Nova Scotians to react properly to urgent, safety-related information during the crisis, and then did not trust us with information afterwards. We learned that senior RCMP officers knowingly gave us false information, withheld important details, and then stopped providing it entirely. It all demonstrates a lack of trust.

Contrast that approach to communications with another potential one, one more or less deployed by Texas officials after the school shootings in Uvalde, and one that may have occurred to people here after watching some of the lower ranking RCMP officers testify at the MCC. Rather than having senior officers who were not directly involved in any real action giving answers, imagine if members such as the first officer into Portapique, the head of the Emergency Response Team, a Staff Sergeant who was in a car chasing the killer, and a local constable who had dealt with Wortman not long before the killings had been put in front of microphones to tell us what had happened and what they knew.

Such a forthright approach may have precluded the calls for, or the need for, a public inquiry. As it stood, there were public calls for an inquiry in the days following the disastrous press conferences the RCMP held in the aftermath of events. The RCMP has continued to face criticism since that time.

Eventually, the Mass Casualty Commission called to examine the events would face its own criticisms. It was with a significant degree of irony that much of this criticism related to the MCC being secretive, having a closed off communications strategy, and an overly opaque and bureaucratic structure. In such ways, the MCC took on the flawed characteristics of the RCMP it was tasked with investigating.

There were many flaws in the development of the MCC, and then the way the inquiry unfolded. Primarily, however, the criticism was generated from the MCC’s seeming unwillingness to address the core questions around the performance and culture of the RCMP, and how those things affected the police’s dealing with the killer.

Rather than addressing policing, the MCC seemed to have determined (in advance and without hearing the evidence) that the most important issue they were to confront was domestic violence, as though that were the most important causal element of the killings, and an area where the most meaningful change can occur. Neither of those are obvious to those who have watched the proceedings unfold.

It is difficult to generate significant change to engrained systems within society, and our policing structures and cultures are very deeply engrained. There is a natural inertia holding such things in place, which require a tremendous injection of public opinion force to dislodge. Time delays (we are now two and a half years past the events) tend to quell outrage, the police fight back at every turn, and often our governments want to be seen as pro-police and do not want to try anything too complicated or potentially expensive (not to mention outside their election platforms) unless there is a (very obvious) political benefit in doing so. So, often things do not change, even though it seems clear that they should.

Responsibility for policing is within provincial government jurisdiction in Canada, but in Nova Scotia there is a patchwork of different municipal police forces, along with the RCMP, which has contracts with most rural areas to provide policing services. Though the Police Act of Nova Scotia contemplates a provincial police force, and has the provincial Minister of Justice in charge of policing, it was clear from the Department of Justice officials who spoke at the MCC that the Province does not want to be responsible for establishing or running a police force.

Another issue with the MCC has been that it was seemingly, actively, and deliberately trying to limit the size of its audience (and thus its impact) through a disorienting approach to presenting both the evidence and its collection of expert opinions. Rather than having witnesses tell us what happened, we had dull, seminar-like presentations from MCC lawyers. Then, rather than having experts discuss what had taken place (as would happen in any criminal or civil trial), the MCC had a rule that no expert could even mention the critical events to which their expertise was supposed to relate.

It appeared from the beginning that the MCC had their final report narrative already drafted, and that each of the (few as possible) witnesses and selected experts were there as something of a performative exercise in furtherance of that pre-set narrative. None of the three commissioners were sitting judges, used to the fluid dynamics of a trial, and the family participants were marginalized throughout the proceedings, so as not to disrupt the narrative flow that the MCC had established.

This was most prominently displayed in the MCC’s refusal to allow any kind of normal cross-examination of witnesses or experts. Questions from participants (when they were allowed to ask any) were pre-screened by MCC lawyers, and limited in scope. The Commissioners attempted to justify this exclusion by emphasizing the ‘public interest’ duties of the MCC lawyers, though this theoretical stance was too often betrayed in practice during proceedings, beginning with their recommendation to the Commissioners during the first week that no witnesses at all need be called to supplement (or dispute) the information in the pre-scripted Foundational Documents.

In fact, later on in the proceedings, when we heard from Chief Superintendent Chris Leather, (who was the second ranking RCMP officer in Nova Scotia at the time of the events of the April 18-19, 2020 mass shooting) I noticed that in her introduction to the day, Commissioner Leanne Fitch would not even say the words cross examination, even though that is what she was describing, but rather stated that MCC lawyer Rachel Young would facilitate questions from participants’ counsel.

Nothing really turned on that characterization, but it was another subtle example of participants’ lawyers (and thus, the families) being marginalized by the MCC. All Ms. Young was actually called upon to do that day was state the order in which the other lawyers would be speaking, and rough time estimates for them to do so.

All of the Commissioners’ daily introductions were read by them off of pieces of paper, no doubt carefully crafted by the plethora of communications staff employed by the MCC, so it is unlikely that the choice of words was inadvertent.

Not incidentally, it was during the cross examination of C/Supt. Leather that we learned about his unease at being told by his own lawyers at the Federal Department of Justice to not proactively disclose documents to the MCC. This was an extraordinary (and all too rare) scene, and provided an example both of the federal government’s minimalist approach to disclosure, and the benefits of allowing cross examination of witnesses.

Michael Scott from Patterson Law was the first lawyer to cross examine C/Supt. Leather. He started by picking up on a comment that C/Supt. Leather made during direct questioning that he did not want to answer a question without speaking to legal counsel. I was watching the questioning the day before when C/Supt. Leather stated something to that effect, and thought that Ms. Young (as an MCC lawyer acting in the public interest) should have followed up on that statement. She did not. The next day, C/Supt. Leather was prepared to speak further, and it was a significant exchange.

What C/Supt. Leather was trying to discuss was a recorded wellness interview he gave (with a private company brought in by the RCMP to talk to senior officers) in which he discussed the (now infamous, in the MCC context) conference call where RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki expressed her disappointment with the NS RCMP’s failure to publicly reveal the makes and models of the guns Wortman used.

The very fact of the interview, let alone its contents, had not been disclosed to the MCC, and C/Supt. Leather testified that he had questions for the DOJ lawyers about what he should say, if anything, about that interview when he was getting ready to be questioned by the MCC in advance of his testimony.

He started his answer by saying that he waived solicitor-client privilege. This means that he wished to discuss advice he had sought or received from legal counsel. (It is up to the client, not the lawyer, to waive privilege.) C/Supt. Leather said that he was told by Federal DOJ lawyers Lori Ward and Patricia MacPhee not to proactively disclose the fact that he had given that interview, but only mention it if he was asked about it.

It was highly unlikely that he would be asked about it, as the MCC had no notice that such an interview had even been set up, so it amounts to the DOJ telling C/Supt. Leather to withhold the information. This important moment only happened because of cross examination.

Not being allowed to effectively question witnesses was just one way families were marginalized. Amazingly, none of the family members were called as witnesses during the proceedings (aside from Richard Ellison, who was called for other reasons). In the Desmond Inquiry, many family members testified, and were able to provide important emotional weight to the proceedings. Testifying also allowed those family members to process their own trauma by speaking about their loved ones, and telling us their experiences of the