The Papacy and the Church: A Study of Praxis and Reception in Ecumenical Perspective

By J Robert Dionne

This important study examines the evolution of Catholic ecclesiological doctrine from the time of Pius IX to the end of the Second Vatican Council.
 
First published in 1987, J. Robert Dionne’s The Papacy and the Church was hailed as a major event in Catholic theological scholarship. In it, Dionne examines the perennial controversy surrounding papal infallibility. “With impeccable scholarship and original insight,” he explores whether the questioning of papal authority is compatible with the nature of Catholicism (Bernard McGinn, University of Chicago).

• Language: English
• Publisher: Philosophical Library Open Road
• Release date: Dec 6, 2022
• ISBN: 9781504081283

Book preview

INTRODUCTION

We shall have made no small advance in ecumenical relations once praxis is allowed not only to illumine theory but also to transform it. Though that fact applies to the function of authority in all Christian churches including, in a surprising way, those built on a Free Church model, it surely applies with greater urgency to the Catholic Church, given its immense responsibility in the present ecumenical endeavor. Hence it is with the function of authority in relation to doctrinal and dogmatic development in the Catholic Church, defined herein as the Roman Church and those other local Christian churches in union with it, that the following study is principally concerned. Since, inasmuch as it has to do with doctrine I shall approach the matter within the wider perspective of reception, it will become apparent that certain interconfessional disputes are intimately linked with a persistent malaise within Catholicism.

For it cannot have escaped even the casual observer that more than twenty years after the Second Vatican Council the Catholic Church so defined is still beset by two central problems, the one internal, having to do with its authority structure, the other external, concerned with a slowdown in the ecumenical dialogues. Both problems are at least generically related to the tensions Ernst Troeltsch saw inherent in Christianity. Indeed, if one takes an overall view of its almost two-thousand-year history, one may discern in the Christian movement two very different orientations. In the first, the Church as a universal, sacramental institution takes up in itself secular institutions, groups, and values; the second takes as its specific norm the Sermon on the Mount and is characterized by a tendency either not to recognize or at best quietly to tolerate institutions, groups, and values outside it. Troeltsch called these two ways the Church-type and the sect-type respectively. He saw both rooted in the Christian gospel and therefore, not surprisingly, existing (though in different ways) in Christianity before and after the Reformation. The two differ in many ways. Most directly related to our inquiry are the divergent views on the nature of Christian κοινωία, which become, in turn, the source of divergent views on the function of authority within Christianity:

… in the first instance [the Church-type] it [Christian κοινωία] is conceived as an institution, not dependent on individualism, possessing a depositum of absolute truths and wonderful civilizing sacramental powers; in the second instance [the sect-type] it is conceived as a society whose life is constantly renewed by the deliberate allegiance and personal work of its individual members.

Though Troeltsch was writing of the ways in which Christianity relates itself to the world, his analysis is relevant to the function of authority and its relation to doctrinal and dogmatic development within Catholicism. In that more limited context, it may be said that the Church-type tends to exercise authority from the top down, whereas the sect-type tends to exercise it from the bottom up. For the purpose of the critical and constructive argument advanced below, I shall on the one hand refer to the Church-type as the institutional model and on the other to the sect-type as the associative, asking the reader to bear in mind that no one concrete model manifests perfectly the characteristics of anyone ideal type.

The issue I shall deal with is the exercise of authority in doctrinal and dogmatic matters within the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is here considered as the most fully developed form of the institutional model in that it ultimately concentrates its authority in one bishop. Given the central position it occupies in the contemporary quest for Christian unity, I shall ask whether a revised view of authority within that body may not incorporate more explicitly some of the elements of the associative model, thereby not only resolving the conflict between minimalists and maximalists as described below, but also narrowing the gap between itself and other Christian churches.

I shall attempt to ground an affirmative answer to that question. At this point let me simply remark in passing that I fully agree with Giuseppe Alberigo who some years ago pointed out that history should not be pursued for purely ecumenical concerns. Such an endeavor can lead to an unsatisfactory reconstruction of historical events wherein doctrine is watered down in the name of ecumenism. While this constitutes a danger to be avoided at all costs, nothing, I believe, can or should prevent the theologian and/or historian from presenting his colleagues with those findings he deems relevant to the ecumenical cul-de-sac in which the Christian churches presently find themselves. Before proceeding further, however, let me describe in more detail what I take to be Catholicism’s internal and external problems, state my central argument more precisely, and indicate the method I shall employ. I shall then clarify the meaning of certain terms, acknowledge some fundamental methodological assumptions and sketch the perspective both from which the reader might approach this study as well as that from which I shall proceed.

Unresolved Difficulties

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The tensions that Troeltsch saw as inherent in Christianity resurface in Catholicism in another form, for Catholicism’s internal problem seems to be the result of a tension between Church as institution and Church as association. On the one hand, there are those—let us call them maximalists—who argue that the ordinary papal magisterium (the way the Roman Bishop goes about his work in the day-to-day shuffle of events) may, under certain circumstances, enjoy the charism of infallibility; on the other, there are those—let us call them minimalists—who maintain that modification, change and/or subsequent rejection of papal teaching is an argument against papal infallibility. This latter group sees authority anchored not simply in papal primacy (which some minimalists acknowledge to be of divine design) but much more broadly based. Quite clearly, while maximalists accentuate Church as institution, minimalists stress Church as association. Both tendencies should be considered in greater detail.

The Minimalists

With the excommunication of Johannes Joseph Ignaz von Dollinger in 1871 and with the Old Catholic schism resulting from Pastor Aeternus (q.v.), minimalist tendencies seemed until recently to have died out within Catholicism. Their resurgence was antedated slightly by the revival of conciliarism some twenty years ago. Perhaps the most widely read among those I have called minimalists is Hans Küng, who in his book Infallible? An Inquiry, wrote:

The assertion of an infallibility of the teaching office in the Catholic Church has always been unacceptable to non-Christians and to Christians outside that Church. In recent times, however, it has become to a surprising extent at least questionable even within the Catholic Church …

It is easy to understand why the question is urgent. The errors of the ecclesiastical teaching office are numerous and serious: today, when frank discussion can no longer be forbidden, they may not be denied even by the more conservative theologians and Church leaders. What might be called classical errors of the ecclesiastical teaching office, now largely admitted, may be listed as follows: the excommunication of Photius.… the prohibition of interest at the beginning of modern times.… the condemnation of Galileo and the measures adopted as a consequence of this action…

Küng cites other instances, e.g., the condemnation of new forms of worship in the Chinese Rites Controversy and much earlier the case of Pope Honorius I, a question much discussed by the Fathers of the First Vatican Council. Despite the sometimes devastating criticism to which it has occasionally been subjected, Küng’s position remains unchanged in the 1983 edition of his book, and it had earlier enjoyed a favorable reception among some Catholics. Thus in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies:

Perhaps even more damaging than the arguments in the areas of philosophy and Scripture have been the arguments against infallibility in the area of history. Just the plain facts of history have proved to be the most intractable obstacles to calm acceptance of infallibility by many sincere Catholics. The facts are that fully authoritative papal definitions and condemnations have often been reversed. And it is appropriate to use here the word reversed rather than developed.

Among the examples given by the author as illustrative of his thesis are the doctrinal positions taken by Gregory XVI and Pius IX in the context of religious freedom. I shall address this issue in some detail in Chap. IV. For the moment, it may be remarked in passing that none of the examples given by Küng and his followers have to do with what since the latter part of the nineteenth century came to be called with increasing frequency the extraordinary papal magisterium. As in the case of those I have called maximalists, so in that of the minimalists I am concerned not so much with these theologians and/or historians as I am with those who in the postconciliar Church tend to identify with their views.

The Maximalists

The counter-current to the minimalist is characterized, as I have said, by an exaggerated concept of papal infallibility. Apparently still or almost motionless for a few years after the First Vatican Council (which, in the promulgated Pastor Aeternus, spoke of papal infallibility only in the context of ex cathedra definitions), maximalist tendencies seem to have been initially revived by Alfred Vacant, one of the co-founders of the justly famed Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique, and received fresh impetus after the Second World War at least partially as a consequence of a complaint by Pius XII in Humani generis, Although it is not entirely clear whether the maximalist thesis should have been considered refuted as a result of Pastor Aeternus, certain factors suggest an affirmative response to this question. I am referring to two important paragraphs in a speech given on July 11, 1870, by Vincenz Ferrer Gasser, bishop at Brixen and a member of the Committee on Faith (Deputatio de rebus adfidem pertinentibus) at the Council:

In the Mansi-Petit-Martin edition of the council documents, Text B follows immediately upon Text A, a fact which serves to highlight an important point frequently overlooked by those who would identify Gasser’s view with the maximalist. Text B suggests that Gasser’s solummodo tunc; as expressed in Text A, had to do with a solemn judgment (hence with what in the promulgated Pastor Aeternus is referred to as an ex cathedra definition), not with the exercise of the ordinary papal magisterium. Within the limits of the caution I have suggested below, it may be said it was Gasser’s view that carried the day at the First Vatican Council, not that, say, of Bartolomeo d’Avanzo, bishop at Calvi and Teano (Italy) or that of the counter-current represented by Félix-Antoine-Philibert Dupanloup, bishop at Orléans (France). But the promulgated Pastor Aeternus did not expressly state that the Popes in the exercise of their ordinary papal magisterium were not unerring or not infallible in doctrinal matters. These lacunae left open the possibility of an unfortunate development—beginning with Vacant and followed by theologians of no less stature than the Marist, Edmond Dublanchy and the Jesuits, Louis Billot and Joaquín Salaverri de la Torre. As there are various currents that flow into the stream of maximalist thinking, attention will be focused on three which have been more widespread during the past generation or so: those represented by Salaverri, Paul Nau together with Fidelis Gallati, and Arthur Peiffer.

Joaquín Salaverri de la Torre

Salaverri’s position seems to have gone through at least two phases, the first being that expressed in a well-known treatise on the Church published in the early 1950s. At that time, he held that the ordinary papal magisterium is infallibly exercised whenever the Roman Bishop in a doctrinal matter makes known his intention to bind the whole Church to absolute assent, an example subsequently given as illustrative of this thesis being that of Pius IX in Quanta cura and its accompanying Syllabus. Salaverri derived this view from speculative theological reasoning based on what he saw implied in the documents of the First Vatican Council. Thus, if the Roman Pontiff possesses that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer wishes his Church to be endowed, and if that Church is endowed with an infallibility which it exercises in an ordinary as well as an extraordinary manner, then the Roman Pontiff must be likewise endowed. Or again, so Salaverri argued, if one maintains that the ordinary universal magisterium of the Church can be infallibly exercised under certain circumstances but that the ordinary papal magisterium cannot be, then the supreme power of infallibility, at least in its exercise, is more restricted in the Roman Pontiff who holds the primacy over the whole Church than it is in the whole Church over which he holds the primacy. Though he differentiated his position from those advanced by Vacant and Billot, Salaverri’s earlier view paralleled at least in part that propounded by the Marist, Dublanchy.

It is not surprising that Salaverri’s thesis was subjected to intense criticism by fellow Catholic theologians. Nonetheless, it remained essentially unchanged as late as the fifth edition of his treatise (1962). For reasons that are not entirely clear, there seems to have been a shift in his stance as it entered what I have called its second phase. Thus, in an article in the English edition of Sacramentum Mundi, he stated:

The doctrine of an encyclical is ultimately an authentic pronouncement of the magisterium. In theory, the Pope could use an encyclical for his infallible magisterium. Four conditions would then have to be verified: a) the Pope would have to speak as supreme teacher of the Church, b) in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, c) on a matter of faith or morals, d) pronouncing a final and binding definition. An encyclical does not normally fulfill the fourth condition, but could do so if the Pope clearly expressed his intention of defining ex cathedra. The Pope decides at his discretion whether to give a solemn definition, as at canonizations and at the proclamation of the dogma of Mary’s bodily assumption into heaven, or a simple one, as is customary in encyclicals.

From this it seems one may conclude that in its second phase Salaverri’s view is functionally equivalent to that expressed much earlier by J. Bellamy; that is, that the Roman Bishops can speak ex cathedra on two levels, that of their ordinary and extraordinary magisteria. The difference between Salaverri’s opinion in its first and second phases comes down, then, to this: In the former, it was sufficient that in the exercise of his ordinary magisterium the Pope intend to bind the whole Church to absolute assent and so express that intent, whereas in the latter he must manifest his intention of speaking ex cathedra, the actual form in which that intention is expressed being somewhat flexible. Short of that, the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium is merely authentic. Though the second phase may not be germane to the problem posed by maximalists in the context of some of the issues discussed in this book, I have come upon no evidence that Salaverri has explicitly modified his judgment that in Quanta cura and the Syllabus (q.v.) the charism of infallibility was operative, a matter especially pertinent to the questions explored in Chaps. III and IV. There are, to be sure, additional reasons why his earlier view is still pertinent to the issues I intend to examine. For despite what happened at Vatican II, some have continued to uphold the infallibility of the ordinary papal magisterium in a sense very much similar to Salaverri in the early 1950s. And though direct reference to the Spanish theologian is not always made, some writers continue to advance arguments that presuppose that Salaverri’s thesis in its first phase remains viable, while still others have embraced (and as far as I have been able to ascertain, never explicitly abandoned) a position which, despite difference of language, is ideologically reducible to that propounded by Salaverri in 1950. Thus though Salaverri has since changed perspective, the question raised by Vacant almost a hundred years ago paradoxically still finds an affirmative answer along the lines suggested by Salaverri in his first phase.

Paul Nau and Fidelis Gallati

The perspective from which the Dominican, Fidelis Gallati, approached the matter is similar to an earlier view embraced by the Benedictine, Paul Nau. That is to say, the teaching of a series of Roman Bishops expounding the same doctrine on faith and morals to the universal Church is infallibly true. Though Gallati may have arrived at his conclusions independently of Nau, the former’s thesis, ideologically speaking, may be regarded as a more developed version of Nau’s initial argument. For Gallati, the ordinary like the extraordinary papal magisterium is included in the primacy of the Apostolic See and is a component in papal jurisdiction. Gallati was at pains to point out that, as such, it can make even non-definitive doctrinal decisions binding in conscience. Hence, for him, these decisions must have special reliability (Wahrheitsbürgschaft.) Because they are not definitive, they are not infallible taken individually, but they have a high degree of truth that in general surpasses the certainty offered by purely human disciplines. Nevertheless, one must distinguish degrees of reliability. Assent to doctrinal pronouncements of this kind is not an assent of faith (q.v.). Indeed, it can happen that for weighty reasons the believer may legitimately withhold it. Very different however are those doctrinal pronouncements which, in contrast to an individual occurrence, begin to form a chain. Here Gallati advanced his central thesis:

But when several Popes constantly over a longer period of time make non-definitive doctrinal pronouncements [nicht-endgültige Lehrkundgebungen] which from their matter and content proclaim the same teaching, a tradition of the Apostolic See begins [entsteht]; this is a clear rule for the faith of the whole Church. Such a tradition has therefore the unconditioned pledge of truth and is infallibly true. Thus under the stated conditions not only the extraordinary but also the ordinary magisterium of the Apostolic See is equipped with the charism of infallibility.

Though doctrinal pronouncements by the Roman Bishops may be binding in the sense that they are to be obeyed, they do not necessarily command the assent of faith, for in making such pronouncements, the Roman Bishops do not necessarily possess the charism of infallibility. Thus Gallati emphatically disassociated himself from Vacant, Dublanchy and Salaverri. He saw infallibility coming into play only when the teaching of the Popes on a particular doctrinal matter has been of long standing, a perspective which, from a Catholic point of view, is not without initial plausibility.

Thus far it may be said that the positions of Nau and Gallati are virtually indistinguishable. A fact that should not be overlooked is that Nau’s reflections subsequently published in book form seem to have been favorably but cautiously received by one of the greatest Catholic ecclesiologists of the century. But Nau was to refine his view even more. Made in response to a dissertation defended at Louvain by Marc Caudron (who, basing himself on an analysis of Dei Filius [q.v.] and the debates surrounding it, had argued that the Fathers of the First Vatican Council seem to have expressly intended to exclude as theologically viable the thesis that the ordinary magisterium can be personally exercised infallibly by the Roman Bishop), Nau attempted to ground his stance on a closer study of the relevant conciliar documents. He now claimed that his 1962 analysis was in harmony with what Gasser had meant when, in response to the question of whether the Roman Bishop, prior to a definition, is dogmatically obliged to consult the rest of the Catholic Church, Gasser replied that the Roman Bishop had other ways of ascertaining the faith of the Church, among which ways is "… illa traditio ecclesiae romanae … ad quam perfidia non habet accessum.…" Gasser was paraphrasing Irenaeus and clearly meant the local Roman Church. Nau interpreted Gasser as having held the same opinion as that of a fellow member of the same committee, Bishop Bartolomeo d’Avanzo, who in a speech on June 20, 1870, had in effect argued that in the exercise of his ordinary magisterium the Pope is infallible. Nau concluded this phase of his article:

Their conclusion is also the same: If the Pope may and must sometimes have recourse to consulting the bishops, this consultation cannot be made a condition for the exercise of infallibility on the part of the sovereign magisterium. One criterion is sufficient and it is always at the disposition of the Pope, Bishop Gasser reminded the Council Fathers … the sole of tradition of the Church of Rome.

Nau distinguished between an infallible judgment and a teaching faithful to revelation, suggesting that the former is more appropriately used of an ex cathedra definition while the latter describes more accurately what is (or at least can be) involved in the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium. The two terms, however, are functionally equivalent in Nau’s exposition. His conclusion from all this was that (1) d’Avanzo and Gasser meant the same thing, that (2) what they meant was that the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium could be infallibly exercised under certain circumstances, that (3) though the promulgated Pastor Aeternus refers only to ex cathedra definitions, the thinking of d’Avanzo and Gasser was typical of a considerable number of the Council Fathers, and that (4) according to this opinion the teaching of a series of Roman Bishops in proclaiming a particular doctrine pertaining to faith and morals was to be judged as certainly faithful to revelation and hence functionally equivalent to being infallibly true.

However tendentious Nau’s interpretation of Gasser may have been, if Nau’s position was substantially correct in its main thrust, then Caudron’s, of course, was wrong. The fact that as late as 1969 Nau’s 1962 article along with Caudron’s was included in an important collection of monographs meant to prepare for the one-hundredth anniversary of the First Vatican Council is illustrative of the seriousness with which his thesis was still being taken in the years immediately after the Second Vatican Council. Despite the nuance that Nau’s later writing on this subject comprises, his view remains essentially unchanged from his first sally on these controversial waters. We have seen that Gallati’s is fundamentally the same. I shall henceforth refer to this current of maximalist thinking as the Nau-Gallati position.

Arthur Peiffer

Another contributory to the maximalist stream is the monograph by Arthur Peiffer presented (1962) to the Theological Faculty at the University of Freiburg (Switzerland). Unfortunately, Peiffer’s dissertation was not published until 1968 and seems to have been neglected in the aftermath of Humanae vitae. He envisages the situation where p, having been taught by the majority of Catholic bishops over some time, is subsequently declared by the Roman Bishop to be doctrina catholica in Scheeben’s sense. As in the case of the aforementioned, it seems best to allow the author to speak for himself:

In this testimonium of the teaching office lies the particular [and] thus so eminently important significance of the Encyclicals for knowledge about the Faith and theology insofar as they make what is a material dogma clearly and plainly recognizable as a formal dogma and authentically attest [to the fact] that a definite teaching is grounded in revelation and through the living teaching office is unanimously [übereinstimmend] proclaimed to the whole Church. In this more declarative transmission of doctrine, it is naturally not yet a question of a genuine [eigentliche] and specific decision of Faith. Yet one may say that with it the last phase of dogmatic development antecedent to a definition is closed …

We have a very recent example of such a knowledge of the Faith deepened through an Encyclical in that of Mystici corporis of Pius XII.…

There can be no doubt that for Peiffer, in this last phase prior to a definition, infallibility comes into play, for he states that such teaching in encyclicals is a more sure theological source and possesses an absolute degree of certainty. The example to which he subsequently points is the teaching of Pius XII that the Mystical Body of Christ and the (Roman) Catholic Church are one and the same thing. To paraphrase Peiffer’s position more precisely: It is not a question of the majority of Catholicism’s magisterial officers teaching p as, say, probable, and the Roman Bishop teaching it as doctrina catholica in Scheeben’s sense (q.v.), thereby making the doctrine de fide (but not de fide definita). Rather what was materially a dogma becomes formally so from the confluence of two circumstances; namely, (1) the vast majority of the world-wide episcopate teaching p as doctrina catholica (in Scheeben’s sense) and (2) the Roman Bishop concurring with them, so expressing himself to the whole Church, clearly stating that p is indeed the teaching of the Church. Peiffer’s view is thus quite distinct from Salaverri’s position (in its first phase) on the one hand and that of Nau-Gallati on the other, both of which Peiffer rejects. In the former case, it may be one particular Roman Bishop who clearly teaches p with the manifest intent of binding the rest of the Catholic Church to absolute assent; in the second, it is a question of a series of Popes who teach the same doctrine, but in each instance there is not necessarily an intent of binding the rest of the Catholic Church. The effect is simply cumulative. What both the Salaverri and the Nau-Gallati views have in common is the fact that initially only the Roman Bishop(s) are involved. The case proposed by Peiffer differs in that the whole episcopacy comes into play when the movement flows from the bishops to the Roman Bishop and thence from the Roman Bishop to the rest of the Catholic Church. The proper theological note is henceforth de fide, Though one might question whether the circumstances envisaged by Peiffer might not more properly be considered an exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium (q.v.), it is obvious from the very title of his book that he was thinking in terms of the ordinary papal magisterium. I shall return to this point in Chap. IX.

Finally, as with the minimalists, I am concerned not so much with individual thinkers as I am with those currents of thought which, within contemporary Catholicism, tend to be sympathetic to maximalist thinking. For the waters have by no means settled. And one sometimes comes upon what appears to be a maximalist tendency where one least expects to find it. Thus, if one may judge from the internal logic of his thought, Heinrich Stirnimann, one of Salaverri’s severest critics, may have been open to a view similar to that propounded by Nau-Gallati.

Previous criticism of maximalist claims seems to have been limited primarily to analyses of the Dogmatic Constitutions of the First Vatican Council. It is certain that not a few of those who voted for Pastor Aeternus were at heart maximalists (for example, Bartolomeo d’Avanzo) and that they may have voted for it as a pis-aller. Therefore all that can be maintained from a study of the documentation presently accessible is that, while the officially promulgated texts do not support the thesis that the ordinary papal magisterium is infallibly exercised, nothing rules out the possibility that many Council Fathers thought it was—but settled for leaving the matter open for discussion. Garibaldi’s troops were, after all, advancing, and under the circumstances some Council Fathers may have thought half a loaf of bread was better than none. But those who sided with what Gasser actually said on July 11, 1870 (as distinguished from the internal logic of some of his statements, which could be interpreted in the sense of Nau-Gallati) may be supposed to have thought that the judgment of the Roman Bishop in the exercise of his ordinary magisterium is not infallible. I shall return in Chap. VIII to other aspects of Gasser’s important contribution. In the meantime, while I do not wish to anticipate here the detailed conclusions which—on this and other matters—I shall draw in Chaps. VII and IX, nothing, I suggest (pace Caudron), can be definitively settled on the basis of documentation so far emanating from the First Vatican Council. The ultimate test for the maximalist (and, as we shall see, mutatis mutandis, for the minimalist) will be whether any current of maximalist thinking can continue to flow once it comes up against Catholicism’s praxis.

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While maximalist and minimalist tendencies constitute Catholicism’s internal problem, a primary factor in the external is, as in the case of maximalists and minimalists, a certain tension between Church as institution and Church as association. This tension manifests itself in apparent authoritarianism on the part of the Roman Bishop:

A third area of controversy centers on the practical consequences drawn from these prior disagreements. Roman Catholics have tended to think of most aspects of papal structure and function as divinely authorized. The need or possibility of significant change, renewal, or reform has generally been ignored. Most important, it has been argued that all ministry concerned with fostering unity among the churches is subject—at least in crisis situations—to the supervision of the bishop of Rome. His jurisdiction over the universal Church is … supreme, full, ordinary, and immediate. This authority is not subject to any higher human jurisdiction.… This view of the exercise of papal power has been vehemently repudiated by Lutherans and viewed by them as leading to intolerable ecclesiastical tyranny.

In an important address to Jesuit ecumenists given a few years ago, Karl Rahner highlighted Roman authoritarianism as one of the reasons why ecumenically oriented Protestants hesitate about eventual reunion with the Roman Church. And though Anglican members of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission acknowledge that, in any future union, a universal primacy such as that described in their joint statement should be held by the Roman See, they express the fear that papal claim to universal, immediate jurisdiction might lead to its illegitimate or uncontrolled use.

A secondary but nonetheless important cause of the block to further ecumenical progress is substantially the same as the minimalist charge. In the address mentioned above, Karl Rahner alluded to this problem when he said that Protestant Christians find the Catholic concentration of the sure charism of truth in a specific papal act an example of the temptation to objectify and juridicize that charism. One of the reasons why Protestants find this emphasis unworthy of belief is the fact that … the ordinary teaching office of the pope; at least in its authentic decisions, often contains errors, even up to our own day.… Nonetheless, not a few ecumenically minded Protestants and Orthodox Christians will recognize Catholicism’s external problem as in some sense their own and thus, while external to them, as somehow internal to Christianity. However, if relevant conclusions stated below have been adequately grounded, careful study of Catholicism’s praxis, will be seen to dissipate the illusions of both maximalists and minimalists, and paradoxically to suggest that, within Catholicism, Church as association is part of Church as institution. Thus it may be possible to contribute both to a new perspective on the papal magisterium and to a partial removal of anxiety expressed by non-Catholic Christians seeking Christian unity.

The Argument

I shall claim that the Catholic Church can best face its responsibility by settling its internal problem relative to the role, status, and authority of its Petrine minister, the Roman Bishop. From a revised view of authority as exercised within itself, it should then make certain deductions conducive to the at least partial solution of its external problem. These considerations will lead to the following conclusions, which constitute my central argument:

I. The way doctrine has developed within the Catholic Church beginning with the Petrine ministry of Pius IX (1846) up to the end of the Second Vatican Council (1965) requires a correction of the understanding of how the ordinary papal magisterium functions within Catholicism.

II. Associative elements present in the process that culminated in the definition of the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption may provide a partial solution to the ecumenical impasse brought about by the common understanding of so-called papal infallibility.

The first and second parts of the argument have to do with doctrine and dogma respectively, but I shall be more concerned with the former than with the latter. Hence, except for Chap. IX wherein the cumulative results of my inquiry are stated, matter pertaining to dogma will be limited chiefly to Chap. VIII, whereas considerations pertaining to doctrine will comprise Chaps. I-VII. As the additional findings indicated in Chap. IX attest, these two principal conclusions do not exhaust my total argument. They do, however, form its nucleus. As I proceed, I shall occasionally touch upon matters (e.g., pertaining to the ordinary universal magisterium), which are not the primary object of my inquiry. But the questions are nonetheless sufficiently important to justify at least passing comment. Thus in the conclusions stated in the final chapter I shall distinguish between areas of indirect and direct concern.

Method

Except for a few parenthetical remarks made in the final chapter, this inquiry has to do with but a brief span of some 119 years, from the election of Giovanni Maria Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti as Pope in 1846 to the end of the Second Vatican Council in 1965. In regard to doctrine, I will focus on seven issues and the modalities of their reception by the rest of the Catholic Church. The phrase modalities of reception by the rest of the Catholic Church thus recurs with some frequency. While in itself it surely applies to the so-called laity, in the study of reception, as pursued herein, I have had to restrict myself primarily to bishops and theologians or else be faced with an impossible task. Hence the reader should normally understand the phrase in that limited sense. In regard to dogma, attention to the function of authority will be confined to certain aspects of the process that culminated in the definition of the two Marian dogmas.

The reader should thus take careful account of what I am about, for I shall not treat the issue of infallibility itself, a fact reflected in the limited bibliographical selections on this topic. That is to say, though I write as a Roman Catholic with everything that implies both in principle and in fact, I shall not in this book address myself to questions such as whether the concept of infallibility is itself viable and, if so, whether there can be circumstances under which whoever exercises the Petrine ministry within Christianity can and should be judged to be endowed with that charism. Thus while I shall be concerned inter alia with whether modification and/or reversal of the teaching of the papal magisterium constitutes a valid argument against so-called papal infallibility, my conclusions, if correct, do not ground that dogma. They merely show that the minimalist argument, as defined herein, is without substance. I shall therefore not deal here with other issues that Küng raised in Infallible? An Inquiry. A thorough exploration of the infallibility question itself must await a subsequent book. Hence in Chap. VIII, in dealing with the two Marian dogmas, I shall be occupied mainly with praxis as it illuminates theory. Nor do I wish to deal here with conciliarists who, inasmuch as they are strict conciliarists, must logically reject Pastor Aeternus. That some minimalists be conciliarists is irrelevant as far as my present objectives go. Thus while I shall not be taken up with the problem discussed by Francis Oakley, I shall nonetheless proceed with an eye to that brought up by Brian Tierney.

As I have stated, I shall examine seven issues of doctrine, six of which have more to do with belief than with morals. A word must therefore be said about the principle of selection. At least two questions arise, the first being, why only one issue relating to morals? It is true that in this period, Pius XII frequently spoke about medico-moral problems but, though his positions have been largely well received by the rest of the Catholic Church, they did not on the whole attract widespread international attention. The fact of the matter is that in the period under discussion there are, other than the doctrinal issues raised by Rerum novarum (1891) and Casti conubii (1930), no highly significant doctrinal issues having to do with morals as such. Since it is impossible to discuss Casti conubii without considering its aftermath in Humanae vitae (1968), and since (except for an occasional aside) extended comment on it would go beyond the historical limits I have imposed upon myself, Rerum novarum remains the only relevant moral issue.

The second question that might be asked is, why only seven issues? To this, of course, I might respond that one must stop somewhere. But there are additional reasons. If one were to include decisions of the Biblical Commission, most of which have been tacitly revoked because of the modalities of their reception, one would indeed have a much broader terrain in which to operate. In principle, these decisions, as well as those of what was formerly called the Holy Office, are relevant to my task since, when setting up the Commission, Pius X indicated that each of its decisions was to be regarded as a motu proprio (q.v.) of the Pope. Yet, it is possible to make a technical distinction and to claim that such decisions do not, properly speaking, constitute the teaching of the ordinary papal magisterium. In view of the theory of doctrinal development I intend to sustain, I have judged it wiser to limit myself for the most part to those issues that are clearly doctrinal stances taken, or doctrinal pronouncements made by the Roman Bishop himself in exercising the Petrine ministry within the Catholic Church. The one exception is the brief discussion of the Monita ad Missionarios in Chap. II. On that basis, decisions by the other Roman congregations must be excluded for similar reasons. Nonetheless, I suggest that the seven cases around which my inquiry is principally oriented are sufficient to document my case inasmuch as it has to do with doctrine.

The results of the analysis of the function of authority in relation to development of doctrine and dogma are the two pillars on which the bipartite argument stated above rests; the same results ground most of the remaining conclusions with the exception of the seventh and eighth of Chap. VII, where I am concerned to show how my findings parallel certain data in the New Testament.

Initial Clarification of Language, Methodological Assumptions and Perspectives

T

ERMINOLOGY

The reader will no doubt be struck by at least three divergences from conventional English usage. The first has to do with my use of the term human being and is merely an attempt to avoid sexist language as much as possible; the second, with my use of the verb realize: I frequently use it in the sense of the French réaliser or the German verwirklichen; the third I have already alluded to. At the suggestion of one of the Fathers of Vatican II, I prefer to speak of the bishop at rather than of a particular place. This usage smacks less of lordship and brings out more forcefully Catholicism’s traditional but presently obscured stress on the importance of the local Church.

By the Church, I mean the Catholic Church. And by the Catholic Church I mean, as stated above, the Roman Church and those local Churches in union with it. But in making this distinction I do not wish to imply that, say, Protestant or Orthodox Churches are not Christian Churches, as will be clear from my treatment of this question in Chap. V. It is simply that, whether he or she agrees with me or not, the reader has a right to know what I mean by certain terms. Hence the term Roman Catholic rarely occurs unless that particular emphasis seems called for. By the Petrine function and/or ministry is meant the ministry of teaching, governing, and sanctifying as presently exercised by the Roman Bishop as the chief magisterial officer within Catholicism. The term conciliar documents embraces a number of collections. Contrary to usage current before Vatican II, I use the term sensus fidelium as synonymous with the term sensus fidei in Lumen gentium; that is to say: Since every real member of the Church is a fidelis, I use that term as pertaining to the whole Church.

Since I am writing not only for Catholics but also for a Christian readership that overflows the boundaries of the Catholic Church, I shall, whenever a technical term occurs, offer in parentheses a working definition and/or write q.v., which means that the reader is invited to consult the Glossary. Thus I use the term theological note (q.v.), which refers to the degree of certitude with which a particular doctrine is taught and/or believed within Catholicism. Though some Catholic theologians at present tend to eschew this kind of language, I find it useful provided it is not used rigidly. I also use the term infallibility (q.v.), though I would prefer to use another to express what Catholic dogma is meant to convey relative to so-called papal infallibility.

The phrase pertaining to the substance of the faith deserves special attention. I use it to include what is called both the primary and secondary objects of infallibility, the former meaning a truth revealed by God in Jesus Christ, the latter a doctrine not directly revealed but nonetheless so intimately connected with the revealed truth that to call this doctrine into question amounts