Russo-Japanese Naval War 1905: Volume 1

By Piotr Olender

Book describes technical aspects of the Russo-Japanese Naval War. Contains descriptions of all involved ships, Russian and Japanese ones. Maps, photos.

• Language: English
• Publisher: MMPBooks
• Release date: Oct 19, 2009
• ISBN: 9788361421740

Book preview

01 | Genesis of the conflict

For a long period of time the Russian government, occupied with the Turkestan conquest and the development of vast areas of Siberia, was not interested in expansion in the Far East. The situation changed in the mid-19th century when Russia took advantage of the difficult situation in China caused by the Second Opium War, first forcing the Ts’ing authorities to grant them the territory on the left bank of the Amur River (Treaty of Aigun in 1858). Then, as a result of China’s defeat in the Third Opium War, the Peking Treaty of 1860 granted them Ussuri krai (modern Primorye). Immediately two important ports were established in these new territories: Nikolaevsk-on-Amur and Vladivostok. It permitted the Russians to strengthen their position in the Far East.

The newly occupied lands, at first poorly populated, turned out to be economically attractive. As a result there was a gradual growth of interest by the Russian authorities in Far Eastern matters, which in the end resulted in a decision to build the Trans-Siberian Railway. Its rails would ultimately lead to Vladivostok. Construction started in 1891 (in 1895 the rails reached Chita) and triggered considerable political repercussions - because it not only created favourable conditions for the development of Russian lands in the Far East, but also for the penetration of neighbouring Chinese territories, especially Manchuria. This was soon treated as a Russian area of influence in China. When in 1895 the Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the Sino-Japanese War and granted Japan the strategically important Liaotung Peninsula along with Port Arthur and Talien, the Russian government, supported by France and Germany, (also interested in having a sphere of influence in China) sharply protested, stating that this decision was disturbing Russia’s business in the Far East. As a result, Japan had to give up Liaotung, whereas Russia strengthened its influence in Manchuria and Northern China.

The peaceful penetration politics of the Minister of Finance, S.J. Witte and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, V.N. Lamzdorf, based mainly on economic pressure, proved to be very successful. Soon after Russia granted the Chinese government a considerable loan needed to pay their war tribute, in 1896, the Russians managed to sign the so-called Li-Lobanov Treaty with the Ts’ing authorities. It allowed the use of Chinese ports by Russia in case of war and China’s consent to the construction of the China Eastern Railway (a part of the Trans-Siberian Railway) which was of huge economic and military importance¹. What’s more, in 1898 the Russians extorted an agreement forcing China to lease the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula to Russia and allow a railway line to be built connecting Port Arthur with Harbin².

This concession and the subsequent active participation of Russian troops in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, during which they occupied Manchuria, strengthened the Russian position in the Northern China provinces. This, however, created a potential conflict with Japan, which was also interested in this area. Russia’s diplomatic intervention after the announcement of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, forcing Japan to withdraw from the Liaotungu Peninsula, had already created a serious conflict. For Japanese leaders, it was a stain on their honour. However, they were ready to accept the loss of the peninsula on the condition that the Russian government would give up any attempts to subordinate Korea. Meanwhile, this country also found itself in the range of Russian interests, especially after 1895. In 1898 both Russia and Japan committed themselves to respect the sovereignty of Korea, but it was beyond a shadow of doubt that this was only temporary.

It must be noted that Japan made better use of the time given by this agreement. They started a large-scale military build-up, financed mainly by the Chinese war tribute, whilst diplomatic actions led in 1902 to the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This would secure Japan from the intervention of third powers in the event of war with Russia (in practice from France, which was Russia’s closest ally).

Count Vladimir Nikolaevich Lamzdorf, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and, until 1903, one of the chief architects of the Russian Far East policy. An opponent of the war with Japan.

Aleksandr Mikhaajlovich Bezobrazov – his intrigues concerning the forest concessions in Korea significantly contributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war.

The Russians, on the other hand, acted in an ill-considered way. Admittedly the Anglo-Japanese Alliance made a certain impression on them and even induced them to sign an agreement with China in 1902 concerning the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria within 18 months. However, it soon turned out that the Russian government was not willing to meet its conditions.

The causes of that turn of events can be found in the changes that were taking place inside the Russian government. There was a clash of two conceptions of Far East politics. One was that of peaceful penetration of Manchuria and avoiding a conflict with Japan, favoured by Minister Witte and supported by Lamzdorf. The other was the one of stretching Russian expansion in the Far East to Korea, even if this would lead to war with Japan. This was supported by the so-called Bezobrazov Circle, which was economically tied to businesses in Korea (forest concessions). It was also favoured by many influential people in the Tsar’s court. Having convinced the Tsar of his plans, A.M. Bezobrazov took actions that brought about Witte’s resignation. In August 1903, a position of a Viceroy of the Far East was created. It was awarded to Admiral E.I. Alekseev, who was also Bezobarazov’s business associate.

The creation of the Far East Viceroy position, which was subordinate exclusively to the Tsar, inflamed an already tense political situation in the Far East. It made it clear that Russia was ready for confrontation as far as Korea was concerned. Japanese leaders thought that time was of crucial importance, so they decided that the conflict should be settled while the Russians were still not sufficiently prepared for war – the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway was not finished and the Far East fleet was not strengthened³. Thus, in Tokyo, the decision to go to war was made. Also the international situation spoke for war. Both the British and the Americans, being worried by the growth of Russian power in the Far East, had nothing against their weakening at Japanese hands. The forthcoming conflict also suited Germany, who thought that it would help their expansion in Turkey, and even more important, would weaken the Russo-French alliance. For that reason only France was against the conflict, but this did not convince Russian politicians, who considered Japan a weak opponent that should be relatively easy to defeat.

It was not surprising that in these conditions the Russo-Japanese negotiations concerning their areas of influence in the border regions were futile. Russia was not going to evacuate their troops from Manchuria on time and they sent warships to the Korean harbour of Chemulpo. The Japanese, on the other hand, demanded recognition of their protectorate over Korea, which Russia would never accept. On 13 January 1904 Japan submitted a severe diplomatic note to the Russian government (almost an ultimatum), demanding resignation from the conditions of demilitarisation of Korea (Russia had called for it earlier), its exclusion from the Russian area of interests and recognition of China’s territorial inviolability. Russia, realising that they were still not prepared for war, tried to discuss these conditions, although from the start they rejected the idea of excluding Korea from their area of interest. That kind of reply did not satisfy Japan, which was not interested in weeks-long futile negotiations. On 4 February 1904 during the meeting of the emperor’s council with government officials, a decision on going to war was taken. On 6 February, Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and two days later its navy attacked, without an official declaration of war, Russian warships in Chemulpo and Port Arthur.

Admiral Evgenij Ivanovich Alekseev, the Tsar’s Far East Governor.

Japanese Emperor Mutsuhito (photo taken in his youth). His posthumous name Meiji has been ascribed to the entire period of his reign (1868 - 1912), in which the war with Russia took place.

02 | Opponents

Three warships representing the three stages of Japanese fleet development: in the foreground the old small battery battleship Fuso (the first battleship built for the Japanese fleet, in 1904 classified as a coast defence battleship), in the background the cruiser Chiyoda, built as part of the plan of 1882, still further away Chin Yen, a battleship captured from the Chinese.

The events of 1885 made the Japanese government aware of the fact that further expansion into the continent must lead to a conflict with Russia. As the expansion toward Korea and Northern China was inevitable from a Japanese point of view, they decided to prepare for the coming conflict well.

Thanks to the military reforms of the 1870s, Japan possessed an army and navy that had both proved their good quality in the 1894-1895 war with China. Russia, however, was an incomparably more dangerous opponent than China. The Japanese had to increase their armed forces, at the same time maintaining their current quality.

The war with China demonstrated the importance of the navy for Japan as an island nation. There was no doubt that in case of war with Russia the role of the navy would be at least equally important. No wonder that much attention was paid to its development. Before the end of the so-called small program of 1892, two battleships, a cruiser and a light cruiser were built. (During the course of the war a second cruiser was purchased using these funds). In 1896 an extensive program for a 10-year naval development was introduced. It proposed the construction of four battleships and nine cruisers (including four heavy ones) and construction and development of naval bases, shipyards and armament industry working for the navy. Thanks to an immense effort the work was carried out by the end of 1902. It increased the size of the Japanese navy by four battleships, six armoured cruisers, six cruisers, a light cruiser, a gunboat, 20 destroyers and 63 torpedo boats¹. Naval bases in Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo were extended and the base at Maizuru was completed. Considerable sums were also allotted to the extension of private shipyards, Mitsubishi in Nagasaki, Kawasaki in Kobe and to the indispensable munitions base. Essentially, this program ate up huge amounts of money, considering Japan’s capabilities - the sum of 212 million yen. It gave the Imperial Navy a strength that was equal to that of the Russian naval forces in the Far East.

The day before the outbreak of the war with Russia, the Japanese navy consisted of six modern battleships and one old battleship, eight modern armoured cruisers², 17 cruisers of different sizes (mainly modern ones, two more were nearing completion), ten light cruisers (including three modern ones), a torpedo gunboat, seven gunboats, 19 destroyers (three more were almost complete) and 80 torpedo boats (the construction of an additional five was nearing completion). For the duration of war Sasebo became the principal base of the Japanese fleet, with support bases at Kure, Yokohama, Maizuru, Hakodate and Takeshiki in the Tsushima Archipelago. Korean harbours were also to be used as bases, especially Chemulpo and Pusan.

In terms of supply and condition of its vessels, the Japanese navy was very well prepared for the coming war. Crews were superbly trained and their morale was exceptional.

The principal command over the military forces of the Empire was nominally exercised by the Emperor. In practice, naval matters were supervised by the minister of the navy. In 1904 this position was held by Baron Yamamoto Gombei. Strategic decisions were made in cooperation with the Head of the General Naval Staff, Admiral Ito Yuko. Direct command over naval forces (so-called Combined Fleet) was exercised by Vice Admiral Togo Heihachiro who, like Ito, was a veteran of the war with China. He was an experienced officer, full of fighting spirit, and had a considerable standing in the navy. Apart from that, over 60 merchant ships were chartered from the owners. They were able to carry to the continent at least three divisions along with supplies within 48 hours and later provide them with a constant flow of reinforcements and provisions.

Table No. 1: Organization of the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of war.

A Japanese infantryman at the time of the Russo-Japanese war.

Admiral Togo Heihachiro, the commander of the Combined Fleet at the time of the Russo - Japanese war.

Simultaneously with the navy, the army was also extended. It increased to over three times the size it had been in 1894. At the beginning of 1904 it comprised 12 dual brigade infantry