Discovering the Battlefields of the Anglo-Zulu War

By Ken Gillings

Interest in KwaZulu-Natal’s battlefields – especially those of the Anglo-Zulu War – has soared since the film Zulu first screened in 1964, followed by Zulu Dawn in 1979 (the centenary of the Anglo-Zulu War).

During the centenary, the famous battlefields of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift were made ‘tourist-friendly’ by the then Natal Provincial Administration and controls were put in place by the heritage authorities to prevent relics from being plundered. Supported by effective marketing from the Battlefield Route Association and the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Tourism Authority, the battlefields have become a must-see. Indeed, Rorke’s Drift has become a tourist icon.

Specialist battlefield guides have been trained and are considered to be among the best in the world. New hotels and lodges have been built with battlefield tourism resulting in the creation of an estimated 7,500 permanent jobs in what is termed the Battlefield Region. There are, of course, many more Anglo-Zulu War sites to be seen: Discovering the Battlefields will enable visitors to find them and to read an account that is not too lengthy yet has sufficient content to bring it to life. GPS coordinates will enable those wishing to undertake a journey of exploration. The book is also a useful training manual for prospective battlefield guides.

Above all, however, the author shares his knowledge gleaned from over 50 years of researching the Anglo-Zulu War. He has blended firsthand accounts passed on from participants on both sides to subsequent generations with official or newly researched information that has become available in recent years. It is written in a style that is neither technical nor dramatic, is extensively illustrated with photographs of personalities and places and includes comprehensive maps of all the battle sites.

• Language: English
• Publisher: 30 Degrees South Publishers
• Release date: Oct 19, 2014
• ISBN: 9781928211181

Book preview

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND TO THE WAR

"A remarkable people the Zulu.

They defeat our generals, they convert our bishops and they put an end to a mighty European dynasty."

—British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, June 1879

By the 1870s India was Great Britain’s most valuable Imperial possession, while the two southern African colonies—the Cape of Good Hope and Natal—were then seen as financial burdens. How could this be overcome? Confederation was a possibility and the ideal of the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon. It was working well in Canada and there was no reason why it shouldn’t work just as well in South Africa.

The principle was pursued with vigour by Sir Bartle Frere, Her Majesty’s High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. His first step towards this goal was to annex the Transvaal and this task was undertaken in April 1877 by the Secretary for Native Affairs in the Colony of Natal, Sir Theophilus Shepstone. This promptly landed Britain in a war against Chief Sekhukhune of the baPedi and alienated the already antagonised Boers. Frere was convinced that the only obstacle to his plan was King Cetshwayo kaMpande of the Zulu nation, also the significant regional power, and he set about overcoming that hurdle.

King Cetshwayo was born in 1827 at the Mlambongwenya umuzi (homestead) near present-day Ulundi. He was the eldest son of King Mpande kaSenzangakhona and his first wife, Ngqumbazi, a member of the prominent Zungu clan.

The only incident to mar the 32-year reign of King Mpande was the Battle of the Princes (eNdondakusuka), which took place near the mouth of the uThukela (Tugela) River on 2 December 1856. The Royal House had split into two factions—the iziGqoza under Prince Mbuyazi kaMpande and the uSuthu under Prince Cetshwayo kaMpande. Mpande had initially encouraged this competition, saying: It is healthy for the bullocks to lock horns.

The battle was catastrophic for the House of Shaka. Mbuyazi and his five brothers were killed but this paved the way for Cetshwayo to succeed Mpande. Before the battle, the local Border Agent, Capt Walmsley (known by the Zulus as ‘Mantshonga’) and a trader named Rathbone (whom the Zulus knew as ‘Ngqelebana’) had attempted to defuse the situation, but were accused by Cetshwayo of having meddled in what was considered a domestic affair. Another white trader destined to play a significant role in Zululand history was John Dunn. He was given permission by Walmsley to cross the Tugela with a small force of black levies and he recommended to Mbuyazi that he transfer his women and children across the river. He also tried to parley with Cetshwayo but was fired upon. After the battle Cetshwayo acquired the praise name of uHlamvana bul’ umlilo uBaswe uMantshonga beno Ngqelebana’ (The little branch of leaves that extinguished the fire kindled by Walmsley and Rathbone). This was to have an interesting consequence nearly 23 years later, at the Battle of Isandlwana on 22 January 1879. To commemorate his victory Cetshwayo established an ikhanda (military barracks) at Gingindlovu (The swallower of the elephant—a reference to his victory over Mbuyazi at eNdondakusuka).

Cetshwayo succeeded Mpande after his death on 18 October 1872, and was officially recognised as King of the abakwaZulu at Mlambongwenya by Shepstone on 1 September 1873.

Lord Carnarvon was replaced as Colonial Secretary by Sir Michael Hicks Beach (‘Black Michael’) who showed very little interest in South Africa. He tended to leave Frere to his own devices, which included the as yet undisclosed intent to remove Cetshwayo as a likely obstacle to confederation and the subjugation of the Zulu nation. The Governor of Natal, Sir Henry Bulwer, expressed unease at Frere’s plans and their likely effect on race relations and stability in the Colony.

Frere’s next step was to exaggerate the threat posed by the Zulus to Natal. It should be borne in mind that at that stage communications between South Africa and Great Britain were poor and dependent on courier shipping. Indeed, details of the Zulu victory at Isandlwana on 22 January 1879 reached London only on 12 February 1879—twenty-one days later—while news of the event was being discussed by colonial ‘kitchen boys’ in the homes of Durban and Pietermaritzburg within a few hours of the end of the battle.

Several incidents led to Frere’s decision to go to war and these require a brief discussion. Some time before, the boundaries of Natal, the Transvaal and Zululand had been disputed. This had led to a Boundary Commission being established in 1878 to resolve the issue. In the meantime, the Zulu army—rumoured to be about 40,000 strong but in reality about 28,000—was considered to pose a threat to the Colony and potentially the Transvaal.

At the same time, a Swazi renegade prince named Mbilini kaMswati Dlamini was raiding the farms of Boer and German settlers and had pledged his allegiance to Cetshwayo. His activities were added to Frere’s list of ‘problems’ with the Zulu king.

Frere had instructed General Thesiger (who inherited his father’s title, Lord Chelmsford, shortly before the start of hostilities) to plan for a possible invasion. Accordingly, Chelmsford ordered that a survey of possible invasion routes be undertaken. One of these was across the Tugela River at Middle Drift (below Kranskop) (a drift is a South African term for a ford across a river) and the task was undertaken by a surveyor named Smith, accompanied by a trader named Deighton. They wandered into an island near the Zulu bank and were apprehended by a small party of Zulus for about an hour, until a passing induna ordered their release. News of this incident filtered through to Frere.

Furthermore, for some time and for a number of reasons, Cetshwayo had made life difficult for Christian missionaries. Most of these crusaders eventually left Zululand but several of their converts were put to death. This was considered unacceptable by Frere.

However, the most serious infringement, according to Frere, had been a little earlier, in July 1878. A prominent inkosi (chief) named Sihayo kaXongo lived in an umuzi that he called kwaSogekle (the rooster’s comb) situated on the slopes of the Ngedla hill, close to the Natal border. Two of his wives were involved in affairs with younger men and had fled across the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) River into Natal. The son of the principal wife, Mehlokazulu kaSihayo, twice crossed into Natal with his uncle, returned with the women to Zululand, killed the younger wife and then his mother.

This was seen as a direct contravention of an agreement that had been negotiated by Bulwer some time earlier and he demanded Mehlokazulu’s extradition. The king acknowledged the transgression and offered to pay a fine. Bulwer demanded a hefty payment of 5,000 head of cattle but Frere took the matter out of his hands. These indignantly handled transgressions were added to a melting pot of excuses to go to war against the Zulus. Frere’s devious opportunity came on 11 December 1878, when the findings of the Boundary Commission were to be made known at the Lower Drift on the banks of the Tugela River, near its mouth.

The Commission’s report (read by John Shepstone, brother of Sir Theophilus) was largely favourable towards the Zulus; the izinDuna (representatives of the King) sat beneath a large and shady ficus sur (Broom Cluster Fig) over which a tarpaulin had been rigged, and memorised the findings after the document had been translated by Mr Bernard Fynney, a border agent.

As they were preparing to depart Shepstone asked them to remain seated and then read a long, rambling 4,000-word document that was little more than an excuse for war. The gist of it was that the Zulu military system had to be abolished, there was to be freedom of marriage for Zulu men and open trials were to be conducted. Heavy fines in the form of cattle were to be paid for transgressions, missionaries were to be permitted to return to Zululand and continue unhindered with their preaching, the Zulu social system had to be revised and a British resident had to reside in Zululand to enforce compliance with the terms of the ultimatum. The ultimatum had a two-stage expiry: the first stage required the surrender of Mehlokazulu and his brothers and some fines of cattle and would end on 31 December 1878. The second stage would end on 11 January 1879.

The izinDuna, who listened in silence, were astounded. Regarding Sihayo’s wives one retorted: Are the actions of two foolish children enough to set Zululand aflame? and as far as the rigid discipline of the Zulu system was concerned, another asked: Have the Zulus ever complained? It was clearly a desire by the British to destroy the King’s authority over his own people whilst also dismantling the fundamental social and political structures of Zulu life.

King Cetshwayo kaMpande. (Bourquin collection)

Sir Bartle Frere, British High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. (Bourquin collection)

eNdondakusuka battlefield. (Author’s photograph)

Sir Henry Bulwer, Governor of Natal. (Author’s collection)

Mehlokazulu kaSihayo. His actions were seized upon by Frere as the excuse to go to war with the Zulu nation. (Bourquin collection)

John Shepstone reading Sir Bartle Frere’s ultimatum to the Zulu izinDuna, 11 December 1878. (Bourquin collection)

Where the Ultimatum Tree stood, the site in 2013. (Author’s photograph).

King Cetshwayo kaMpande at his Colonial Coronation, Mlambongwenya ikhanda, 1 September 1873. (Author’s collection)

King Cetshwayo kaMPande’s crown, presented to him by Sir Theophilus Shepstone (Somtseu) at Mlambongwenya on 1 September 1873, now on display at the Royal Welsh Museum, Brecon. (Author’s photograph)

CHAPTER TWO

PREPARATIONS BY THE ZULU ARMY

Once the izinDuna had departed they had to locate their King. He discussed the ultimatum with his counsellors and the Zulus decided to oppose the now very obviously planned invasion by the British. Naturally the nation needed to prepare itself. The amabutho (warriors) were ordered to report to kwaNodwengu ikhanda on 8 January 1879 for the initial stage of preparation, which involved the First Fruits ceremony.

A type of melon was collected from the coastal region, taken to the King’s capital at Ondini (Ulundi) and then tossed about until it was broken. Each warrior was required to touch it.

The purification of umnyama (evil or darkness) followed. A black bull representing evil influences in the land was caught on the second day of the call-up at the respective amakhanda (garrisons) on the Mahlabathini plain. The bulls were killed bare-handed by an ibutho (regiment), following which izinyanga (war doctors or medicine men) then cut strips of meat from each bull and treated these with muthi (medicine) to strengthen the warriors and bind them together in loyalty to their king. The strips of meat were then roasted on fires lit from wood collected the previous day and the izinyanga threw the strips into the air. The warriors—who would have been drawn up in a great circle—caught and sucked them. The izinyanga then burned a special mixture of muthi and the warriors breathed in the smoke and were then sprinkled with cinders from the fire.

In the meantime, the Inkatha yezwe yakwaZulu was removed from its repository and taken to Ondini. This was a coil of tightly woven grass in the form of a tubular ring the size of a small motor car tyre, bound with a python skin. It dated back to the time of King Shaka’s rule and during such ceremonies the King would sit upon it. It was as dear and as ritually significant to the Zulu Nation as the crown jewels were to Great Britain. Indeed, seizing and destroying the Inkatha would later be an objective of the British army; its task was to locate the Inkatha, destroy it and in effect break the link between the Zulu people and their king.

The warriors were then given more muthi, lined up next to a pit close to where the eNthukwini stream flows into the White Mfolozi River and made to vomit into it. The izinyanga then took samples of the vomit and added them to the Inkatha. Traditionally the Zulus believe that one’s spirit comes from one’s stomach, so the spirit of the nation was represented in this symbolic manner. Some physical traces of these ceremonies were then bound into the Inkatha, before it was returned to its repository.

Cetshwayo’s intelligence system made him aware of the strength of the British army and the routes it intended taking. He was aware, too, that the Lieutenant General Commanding the Forces, Lord Chelmsford, was with the Central Column and it was therefore important to match him against his own Army commander, Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza.

The Zulu army totalled approximately 28,000 warriors. The political head was the King’s hereditary ‘Chief Minister’, Chief Mnyamana Buthelezi and the other principal commander deploying with Ntshingwayo was Chief Mavumangwana kaNdlela Ntuli, son of King Dingane’s famous commander, Chief Ndlela Ntuli.

The army left kwaNodwengu on Friday 17 January 1879, proceeded westwards in a single column across the White Mfolozi River and camped on the other side. The following morning, Saturday 18 January 1879, 4,000 warriors under Chief Godide kaNdlela Ntuli (Mavumangwana’s brother) were detached from the main force and set off to attack the No. 1 (Coastal) Column of Colonel Charles Pearson, which was en route from Fort Tenedos on the banks of the Tugela River, heading towards Ondini. Elements of this Column had crossed the Tugela before the final expiry of the ultimatum.

That night, the 24,000-strong main army camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda in the Mpembeni River valley. The impact of their bivouac was so great that the veld lay flattened for five months, as was the veld along the route taken by their advance.

On Sunday 19 January 1879 the Zulu army split into two parallel columns, with Ntshingwayo leading the left and Mavumangwana the right, and camped near Babanango Mountain. Under normal circumstances, the main Zulu army would probably have advanced via a traders’ route to the south and west of iThala mountain across a nek (mountain pass) known as iSkhala semBomvu, crossed the Nsuze River valley and ascended the heights overlooking the Mangeni River valley (known as the Phindo).

On Monday 20 January 1879 the army moved 18 km and camped near the isiPhezi Mountain. At this stage, Isandlwana camp was being occupied by the British and they clearly had the opportunity to patrol the local area in some depth if they chose to do so. On Tuesday 21 January 1879 small groups of warriors moved towards the Ngwebeni River valley whilst Ntshingwayo had sent the powerful local inkosi of the Mangeni area, Chief Matshana kaMondisa, and his roughly 2,000 warriors, to distract the British and to probe their intentions. At that stage the British were patrolling the area of the Hlazakazi Mountain which overlooked Chief Matshana’s homestead although they do not appear to have conducted any systematic searches of the Nquthu ridges and valleys to their north and east. Throughout the night of 21 January 1879 these small groups lit several fires, convincing the British patrol, under the command of Major John Dartnell, that the main Zulu army was lurking in the nearby hills and that his own force was in peril. We should take care in attributing very specific purposes to these fires. They at least caused some alarm and confusion, whilst also alerting the the still moving Zulu main body to the presence of a forward detatchment of troops from Isandlwana. Though the effect could not have been reliably predicted at the time, it was also to provide a decoy that drew forward more troops and very probably much sooner than had been expected. Meanwhile both columns of the Zulu main body moved themselves into the deep Ngwebeni valley, though significant numbers of stragglers continued to migrate into the general area of the Nqutu ranges throughout the night and not all of them would have found their way into the deep valley.

The Zulus were all armed with an iklwa (stabbing spear), two or three izijula (throwing spears or imikhonto); some carried an iwiza (knobbed stick or knopkierie, with which young boys were able to bring down a bird in flight); some held an isizenze (battle-axe); all carried an isihlangu (cowhide shield); and, incredibly, probably as many as one in three carried some form of firearm—both muzzle loading and breech loading—although the type and levels of handling skills would have varied significantly.

Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza, commander of the Zulu army. (Author’s collection)

Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford, Lieutenant General Commanding the British Forces. (Provincial Museum Service)