Air War for Burma: The Concluding Volume of The Bloody Shambles Series. The Allied Air Forces Fight Back in South-East Asia 1942-1945

By Christopher Shores

In his monumental work Bloody Shambles, Volume Two, Christopher Shores described in detail the British retreat out of Burma, culminating at the end of May 1942. The monsoon then brought operations on land and in the air virtually to a halt for several months as the British and Indian forces prepared to retake Burma.

The Japanese however, had very different ideas. Air War for Burma picks up the story from the beginning of June 1942 and follows the hard-fought campaigns through to the end of the war in August 1945. Here the activities of the RAF and USAAF during the desperate fighting of 1942-44, resulting ultimately in victories at Imphal and Kohima, are fully recounted. No less a forgotten air force than was the 14th ‘Forgotten Army’, the RAF particularly was denied the most modern and effective aircraft until late in the fighting, struggling to survive with obsolescent equipment against frequently superior Japanese machines.

Described herein are the operations during the First and Second Arakan Campaigns; support for the Chindits in their long-range penetrations deep into enemy-held territory; the savage sieges of Imphal and Kohima; and the final victorious advance across the plains of Central Burma to Mandalay and Rangoon. Detailed also are the activities over the Indian Ocean and the East Indies of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers and the aircrews of the Fleet Air Arm.

Painstakingly researched from official sources, log books, letters and interviews, this is far and away the best reference work on the subject, and completes the set.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Grub Street Publishing
• Release date: Jan 19, 2014
• ISBN: 9781909166578

Christopher Shores

Christopher Shores began by writing the occasional book about military aviation, then quickened the pace as he grew older. By now, readers and reviewers are hard-pressed to keep up with him. Meanwhile, he pursued a career as a land surveyor and director of one of Europe's largest firms of property advisers.

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Published by

Grub Street

4 Rainham Close

London

SW11 6SS

Copyright © 2005 Grub Street

Text copyright © 2005 Christopher Shores

British Library Cataloguing In Publication Data

Shores, Christopher F., 1937

Bloody shambles

Vol. 3: Air war for Burma

1. World War, 1939-1945 – Campaigns – Asia, Southeastern

2. World War, 1939-1945 – Aerial operations

I. Title

940.5′425

ISBN-10: 1 904010 95 4

ePub ISBN: 9781909166578

PRC ISBN: 9781904010951

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any

means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,

without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

Typeset by Pearl Graphics, Hemel Hempstead

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn

Contents

Introduction and Acknowledgements

Setting the Scene

Chronology of the Air War in

India, Burma and over the Indian Ocean, June 1942-August 1945

Maps

General Map of Burma, north-east India and south-west China

North-east India, the Arakan and north Burma

North-east Burma and south-west China

North-east India, Assam and north-east Burma

Sketch map of the ‘Broadway’ area

Central and southern Burma

Appendix 1: RAF Order of Battle, September 1942

Appendix 2: RAF and USAAF Order of Battle, January 1943

Appendix 3: RAF and USAAF Order of Battle, June 1943 386

Appendix 4: RAF and USAAF Order of Battle, 12 December 1943

Appendix 5: RAF and USAAF Order of Battle, 1 July 1944

Appendix 6: RAF and USAAF Order of Battle, 12 December 1944

Appendix 7: RAF Order of Battle, 30 June 1945

Appendix 8: RAF Squadrons operating over India, Burma and

the Indian Ocean, June 1942-August 1945 Setting the Scene

Appendix 9: RIAF Squadrons

Appendix 10: RAF Support Units

Appendix 11: USAAF Units operating in the India-Burma area,June 1942-June 1945

Appendix 12: Units of the Imperial Japanese Army and Naval Air Forces

operating over India, Burma, Sumatra and Thailand, June 1942-August 1945

Bibliography

Index

INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

By the time the precipitate and very long retreat from Burma and into north-eastern India had ended at the start of June 1942, the British and Indian forces involved were no longer under any illusion regarding their opponents. With no relevant training having been available, all three forces, naval, ground and air, had found themselves up against a far more formidable foe than they could possibly have imagined.

The Far Eastern war proved to be a much greater clash of cultures than were the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that the Japanese ethos of total allegiance and service to the Emperor, who was considered a form of deity, together with a disregard for their own lives bordering on the suicidal, was quite alien to those from the West. This disregard led to a similar disregard for the lives and sufferings of their enemy, which seemed inhuman to those experiencing it. Yet the Japanese, as well as being a very industrious people, are also extremely artistic and have a strong thread of sentimentality. The lack of comprehension of each others’ beliefs, values, standards, etc, was complete, and was to remain so throughout the war. There is little doubt that the culture with which the Japanese people had been imbued prepared them well at that time for the waging of truly total war.

For the Japanese serviceman, death in battle was honourable in the extreme, whilst surrender for the vast majority was unthinkable, bringing with it total shame and humiliation. Thus they were not able to understand the willingness of Allied servicemen to surrender when all seemed lost, rather than to fight literally to the death. To them such people could only be considered beneath contempt. Consequently, to have to guard these captives, rather than to serve at the front, and to feed them when supplies for their own troops were scarce, was considered truly shameful.

The fighting in the Arakan, and at Kohima and Imphal, was probably unparalleled in its ferocity. The Japanese soldier’s draconian training, coupled with his ability to operate effectively on very small rations compared to western requirements, added to his great endurance, made him formidable in the extreme. His motivation was usually fanatical, and he could also be relied upon to fight to the death even when all hope was gone. It also prepared him to behave with great cruelty on occasion.

Night attack was probably one of the most illuminating examples. To avoid the risk of an accidental discharge of a firearm giving away surprise, the infantry usually moved up and carried out the assault with their rifles unloaded, relying entirely upon the bayonet. Officers used their Samurai swords on occasion with considerable effect. In one recorded instance during the latter months of the war, an officer leapt onto a British heavy tank, killed the commander in his turret cupola, and was through this cupola, attacking and wounding the rest of the crew with his sword before they were eventually able to kill him with their pistols. Such aggression had a considerable shock effect, and could be very difficult to counter.

It was this kind of tenacity and selfless bravery which infused the pilots of the JAAF as well, causing them to seek to ram opponents on occasion, or to dive their aircraft onto targets on the ground in self-immolation when their aircraft were too damaged or short of fuel to reach their own territory.

However it should not be assumed that their fortitude and unthinking loyalty branded them as uneducated peasants. The general level of education was high, and it was the Japanese who were to express themselves surprised by the low level of formal education exhibited by many of the Allied private soldiers who fell into their hands.

These then were the opponents who faced the Allied airmen as the retreat ended, and Allied thoughts turned to the future prosecution of the war.

Before moving to the narrative and the appendices relating thereto, a few words regarding some of the shortcomings of my research are perhaps appropriate.

In the index of RAF personnel, I have sought wherever possible to include initials and decorations, and to indicate the nationality of those named, showing whether they were members of the RAAF, RCAF, RIAF, RNZAF or SAAF. Where there is no such notation, they may generally be assumed to be British citizens, members either of the regular RAF or of the RAFVR. The same comments hold good for Royal Navy personnel. However, I have not been able to ascertain these matters in all cases. Therefore if you, or your relative, were actually a member of a Commonwealth nation rather than of the British Isles, my apologies; I have identified all those that I can.

It has been mentioned to me during my research that the award of decorations was sparce in the Far East, and that there was an attitude prevailing amongst the higher levels of command that most of the aircrews were doing no more than their duty. In this theatre the proportion of British personnel to those from the Commonwealth appears to have been somewhat higher than elsewhere, but a glance down the names in the index may well persuade the reader that the proportion of awards to members of the latter was extremely high. Perhaps the Commonwealth governments were more concerned to ensure that their people received due recognition for their efforts than was the case in the UK? Certainly, the dearth of awards of the DFM in an area where so many of the aircrew were of NCO status does seem a little strange.

Whilst I have been able to include considerable information regarding the USAAF units, some details of unit commanders, airfield moves etc, are not as complete as for the RAF units. The information I have been able to include has been greatly assisted by the work of my longtime friend and co-researcher, Frank Olynyk, and by the publications of another friend, Kenn Rust. I also express my thanks to Colonel James M. Fielder and Ted Young for the information to be gleaned from their respective books, 459th Fighter Squadron: The Twin Dragons, CBI, 1943-1945 and Air Commando Fighters of World War II. Help, guidance and illustrations related to the Fleet Air Arm operations during January 1945 came from Lt Cdr David Hobbs at the Fleet Air Arm Museum, Yeovilton, for which I am also most grateful.

In regard to the Japanese units and operations I am greatly indebted to Hiroshi Ichimura, who has produced his own books on the Burma campaigns in his home country, and with whom I have worked closely during the preparation of this work. I have also been greatly assisted by my old friend in Tokyo, Dr Yasuo Izawa, himself a historian and author of considerable note. Needless to say, as a result of the loss of records at the end of the war, information is not always by any means complete. With respect to some units it is indeed, manifestly incomplete; nevertheless, I believe that herein is the fullest account of Japanese aerial activities over Burma yet to have appeared in the English language.

As regards the activities of the RAF units and their personnel, I owe the greatest debt to another old friend, colleague and co-author, Norman Franks. Norman has been extremely generous in allowing me to quote widely from the first-hand accounts he obtained and was able to include in his three books relating to fighter operations over the Arakan and Burma, and for supplying me with numerous of the illustrations used in this book.

Wg Cdr C.G. ‘Jeff’ Jefford, MBE, is also to be thanked for preparing the maps included in the book; his excellent work, R.A.F. Squadrons was also of great assistance to me, as were the late John Rawlings’ Fighter Squadrons of the RAF and Their Aircraft and Coastal, Support and Special Squadrons of the RAF and Their Aircraft. Another book to which I have referred frequently has been Royal Air Force Flying Training and Support Units by Ray Sturtivant, John Hamlin and James J. Halley – fellow members of Air-Britain. A further work of invaluable reference has been the massive five-volume account of The War against Japan produced by Maj-Gen S. Woodburn Kirby, CB, CMG, OBE, MC, published by HMSO. Other helpful works are listed in the bibliography at the end of this book.

Individuals who have provided me with accounts, diaries and other relevant information include Mrs Angela Dolby (sister of Sqn Ldr W.M. Whitamore, DFC, deceased), and through her, Flt Lt Alan Peart, DFC; Anthony W. Spencer, Christopher

W. Morgan, Matt Poole, John P. Williams and Keith D.Hayward (for making available to me the diary of Sqn Ldr Frank Dismore, DFC). Photographic assistance also came from Sqn Ldr Andy Thomas, Jeff Jefford, William N. Hess, Edward Young and Chris Thomas, and from the late Wg Cdr Guy Marsland and the much-missed R.C. ‘Bob’ Jones.

In relation to the appendix detailing RAF, RCAF and RIAF squadrons which operated in the area, and in particular regarding the commanding officers thereof, where such an individual had already been in post before the unit reached the area, only the date when his command ended is shown. Similarly, when the unit departed elsewhere, or when the war ended whilst he remained in command, only the date on which he assumed command is shown.

In conclusion there is one more matter which readers might usefully bear in mind. In the conditions in which aerial combat took place over Burma and Assam, over frequently impenetrable jungle and knife-edged mountain ranges, often in adverse weather conditions involving the presence of much cloud, the incidence of overclaiming was high. This applied to all the three air forces operating over the area, and seems to have been endemic. Usually it did not arise from any desire of the pilots involved to overstate what they had achieved. Fighter pilots were almost universally young, aggressive and enthusiastic. Some may have believed they had seen what they wanted to see, or what they hoped had happened. On occasion, particularly on the Japanese side, there may have been an element of ‘saving face’ following situations when events had not gone to their advantage; readers will be able to draw their own conclusions in many of these cases from the details I have provided. But please remember that it did happen, and the lack of the requisite number of opposing losses does not, in the majority of cases, indicate that the other side’s records were incomplete. Where the latter may be the case, I have sought so to indicate.

General Map of Burma, north-east India and south-west China

SETTING THE SCENE

By the end of May 1942 the retreat of the British Imperial forces from Burma into the Indian states of Assam and Bengal had been completed. All lay in disarray, and how an adequate defence against further Japanese advance was to be offered was a question difficult to answer. True, British and US reinforcements – particularly for the air forces – were on their way, but they would take time to arrive and acclimatise to a totally new environment. Also, there was not much that they could do without an appreciable reinforcement of the troops on the ground, and all the support facilities associated with their presence.

On Ceylon the defence forces of 222 Group were gradually being rebuilt from the mauling which they had suffered during the attacks of the carrier-borne units of the Japanese Imperial Navy during early April 1942, but here already the Fleet Air Arm element had left, 803 and 806 Squadrons going aboard HMS Furious and Indomitablerespectively, the latter unit having been re-equipped with Grumman Martlet I fighters, all the Fulmars being concentrated in 803 Squadron. Similarly, 788 Squadron had been withdrawn to Africa during May, for duties of a different nature.

As events were to prove, the situation had been rendered somewhat less dire for the Imperial forces in India – and indeed, in the Indian Ocean area generally – by a series of events, some of them far distant, which now altered the strategic picture. In Burma the Japanese Army had quite simply outrun its supplies, and urgently required a period to rest, and replenish its units. The Army Air Force was also overdue for a session of re-equipment for many of the units which had accompanied the advance into Burma.

Of perhaps even greater significance was the shock administered to the Japanese Navy when it was challenged in the Coral Sea, bringing a halt to expansion in the New Guinea area. It had then suffered a severe and costly defeat at the hand of the US Navy carrier aircraft at Midway at the start of June. This critical battle ensured that there was little chance of any further major forays into the Indian Ocean in the immediate future.

Finally, June also saw the commencement of the monsoon season in Burma, which rendered any further campaigning difficult, particularly taking into account the extended lines of communication and supply with which the Japanese were now faced. At this stage the Japanese had no plans for an advance into Assam in the near future, or for a conquest of India at all. Any further advance would require considerable logistical build-up which would take a long period to achieve. In mid July 1942 General Count Terauchi, commander of the Japanese Southern Area, received orders at his base in Singapore to prepare for an advance to a line Akyab-Imphal, followed by exploitation to the Brahmaputra river. The purpose of such an expansion of territory was to try to prevent Allied use of the airfields in Assam and eastern India for the air supply route to China.

Initially there was little the British could do, for in the past all communications had been directed towards the North-West Frontier, and no consideration had been given to a need to move a large force to Assam and then to supply it. Effectively there were almost no communications to the area, which was crossed by both the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. Such railways as there were featured different gauges of track, and in places it was necessary to ferry complete trains across these major rivers. The distances by water were vast. Therefore any possibility of a major campaign in Assam was unlikely to be viable – for either side – earlier than 1944.

The Arakan was nearer, and could be supplied by sea from the Calcutta area, but at first there was a significant shortage of suitable vessels, particularly following the losses of shipping inflicted by the Japanese Fleet during the previous April.

As was Winston Churchill’s way, he sought at once to plan an early reconquest of Burma, proposing to reinforce the army and air force in India, now firmly under the command of Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, previously the ABDA commander during the retreats from Malaya, Singapore, the Indies, Philippines and Burma. Initial plans were posed which were far-reaching and optimistic, but were quickly brought to nought when in June Erwin Rommel launched his offensive on the Gazala positions in North Africa. This sent the Commonwealth’s forces in the Libyan desert tumbling back in full retreat towards Egypt and the Canal Zone, the psychologically important port and fortress of Tobruk falling into Axis hands with great rapidity. For the time being all available resources would be diverted here, and the India/Burma theatre would have to do the best that it could with what little it already had, and that could be spared.

The manpower resources of India were, of course, considerable, as were those of China, but without supplies and training, little could be done in a hurry. Further, in India at this time there was much unrest and agitation for the removal of British rule – particularly from the Congress Party of Mahatma Ghandi and Pandit Nehru. Forces thus had to be retained in the interior to prevent insurrection and sabotage.

At the start of June 1942 therefore, little of the Allied air force remained anywhere near the frontal areas. There was no front line as such – the terrain was too wild and undeveloped, and the distances too great to allow for this. In the vast area of Assam, to the immediate north of Burma, only two RAF units remained available for operations. At Dinjan, located in the far north-east of the area, was 5 Squadron with its Curtiss Mohawks, whilst more than 100 miles to the west of this base, 113 Squadron was at Tezpur with Bristol Blenheim IVs.

5 Squadron was in the process of being joined by the first elements of a USAAF fighter unit – the 51st Fighter Group. Equipped with Curtiss P-40 fighters, this unit was just arriving, although the first of the group’s three squadrons to be formed, the 16th, was to be sent to China to aid the 23rd Fighter Group there. The 25th and 26th Squadrons were not yet operational.

Indeed, the only US unit which was operational at this time was the 9th Bomb Squadron (Heavy) with Boeing B-17s, which had already provided sterling service during recent months. However, towards the end of the month this unit departed for the hard-pressed Middle East. The 436th Bomb Squadron (Heavy) had arrived to take its place, but at this stage did not have enough B-17s to hand to commence operations. One further unit, the 22nd Bomb Squadron (Medium) was arriving in India with North American B-25 Mitchell bombers, but this was not yet in a state to be declared operational either.

The greater part of the RAF in India was based around the Calcutta area, or within the city itself. At Dum Dum were 135 and 146 Squadrons, together with part of 79 Squadron and a detachment of 215 Squadron. This latter unit had arrived from the UK during April, and had commenced bombing operations with its Vickers Wellington Ics early in May. 79 Squadron had arrived soon afterwards, and had been divided between Dum Dum and nearby Alipore. 135 Squadron had, of course, been heavily involved in the defence of Rangoon, and the subsequent withdrawal. 146 Squadron was a very different ‘animal’ however. Only formed locally in India as recently as October 1941, its nucleus had been B Flight of 5 Squadron, and its initial equipment Hawker Audax biplanes. During March it had received a few Mohawks and the residue of 67 Squadron’s Buffaloes, brought out of Burma by that unit. In December 146 had moved to Dinjan, where it joined a detachment of 5 Squadron. On 5 May 1942 the 5 Squadron detachment at Dinjan had absorbed 146, whilst the balance of 5 Squadron at Dum Dum took on the mantle of 146.

Dum Dum was also at this time the home of 353 Squadron, which was forming with three Lockheed Hudsons and crews drawn from 62 Squadron and 103 Coastal Defence Flight.

At Alipore with the other part of 79 Squadron, were 67 Squadron and 136 Squadron, and 607 Squadron, which had come out from England at the same time as 79. During June 136 Squadron would move to Red Road, a wide strip of tarmac in the centre of Calcutta in the park known as the Maidan.

17 Squadron was based at Jessore, some miles to the north-west of Calcutta. This veteran of the Burma retreat had been joined there by 615 Squadron, which like 79 and 607, had departed the UK during March. During June supplies of Hurricane IIcs armed with four 20mm cannon each, had arrived at Karachi, and initially these were issued to the newly-arrived 79, 607 and 615 Squadrons. By the end of the month 67, 135 and 136 Squadrons had all been brought up to strength with Mark IIbs, while 146 Squadron had also received these by the end of the month. 17 Squadron’s remaining Hurricane Is and Buffaloes were partially replaced with Mark IIbs, to be brought up to strength as soon as 67 Squadron could be converted to Mark IIcs. However, 607 Squadron would then be called upon to exchange its Mark IIcs for 17 Squadron’s Mark IIbs.

Thus the great city of Calcutta could soon look to no less than eight squadrons of Hurricanes for its defence, should attacks be commenced against it. Barrage balloons, radar stations, repair and salvage units and anti-aircraft flights also arrived, and by 24 August nine radar stations would be in place in the immediate area.

Elsewhere nearby were several of the longer-serving units equipped for bombing and reconnaissance, which had also been active earlier in the year. To the north-west of the city were a group of airfields which included Ranchi, Asansol, Pandaveswar and Ondal. At Ranchi was 28 Squadron, equipped with Westland Lysanders. The Blenheim IVs of 34 Squadron had recently moved to Ondal from Allahabad (further to the west), whilst the similiarly-equipped 60 Squadron was at Asansol. Pandaveswar provided the main base for 215 Squadron, and also for 3 PRU, equipped now with B-25C Mitchells and some Hurricanes.

Much further north-west, beyond Delhi, 31 Squadron, still the sole transport unit in the region, was based at Lahore, operating a heterogenous collection of DC 2s, DC 3s and Lockheed 12As. Somewhat to the south of Calcutta, close to the coast of the Bay of Bengal, was Cuttack, where 62 Squadron disposed its Hudsons for coastal patrol and bombing duties. The only other resident units in India were 20 Squadron, based at Jamshedpur on the North-West Frontier with Lysanders, and the units of the Indian Air Force.

However, 45 and 84 Squadrons were both in the process of reformation on Blenheim IVs, the former at Dum Dum and the latter at Quetta, far away in the north-west, north of Karachi. Here it had been joined by 110 Squadron, which had flown in its Blenheims from the UK. 99 Squadron was also arriving in the Karachi area from the home islands, and would soon move its Wellington IIs eastwards to join 215 Squadron at Pandaveswar.

Finally, June was to see 79 Squadron gather its various parts from Dum Dum and Alipore, to take up station at Kanchrapara, to the north of Calcutta.

A primary matter was, of course, the control, supply and maintenance of such varied units, and at the start of June 1942 these RAF formations lay within the hands of a number of groups. Initially the primary such unit in north-east India was 221 Group, which had originally been formed in Rangoon prior to the Japanese attack, and had been reformed in Calcutta in March 1942 from the remnants of the old Burma commands – 221 Group itself, ‘Burgroup’ and ‘Norgroup’. This unit was at first responsible for all fighter and bomber squadrons in the area.

This was a situation which had lasted only a short time, for at the start of April 224 Group, which had been the Singapore-based fighter group until its disbandment after the fall of Java, was reformed at Calcutta under the command of Air Cdr J.L. Vachell, MC, to control fighter units operating in Assam and Bengal. Before the month was out this group took over responsibility for all 221 Group’s fighter units, leaving the latter body only with the bomber squadrons (at first 62, 113 and 215 Squadrons), and 3 PRU. 221 would soon add 34, 60 and 353 Squadrons to its establishment, initially maintaining a regular programme of strikes and shipping reconnaissances along the Arakan coast.

Whilst north-east India clearly formed the initial focus of activity, the attacks on Ceylon had ensured that the security both of that island and of southern India remained of great importance. In Ceylon 222 Group had been formed in Colombo on 1 April 1941, and had been fully functioning at the time of the Easter 1942 raids. It continued in this role. 223 Group had served in Singapore and Sumatra as a bomber group until disbanded in March 1942, but already a nucleus of a new group had been formed in the UK and arrived at Bombay on 12 April. Transferred to Bangalore in southern India, it was re-numbered 225 (Composite) Group and became responsible not only for the defence of this area, but of the whole Indian coastline from Bengal down to Karachi.

Meanwhile at the start of May a new 223 Group had been formed from 1 (Indian) Group at Peshawar, becoming responsible for operations over the troubled North-West Frontier area. As such it would play little part in the matters dealt with in this account.

Two more groups had been, or were, forming at this time. 226 Group had been the Singapore fighter group, and had moved to Sumatra and then Java, where it had been lost early in March 1942. On 9 May it was reformed at 301 Maintenance Unit, Drigh Road, as the maintenance group responsible for all reinforcements reaching the country, and their onward supply to the operational units. In this role it would move to Clifton, Karachi, in mid June.

Finally, on 6 June 227 Group was formed at Lahore to deal with all training requirements throughout the sub-continent and its associated areas.

The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) at Air HQ, India, in New Delhi, was Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, KCB, DSO, AFC; his Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) was Air Cdr J.L. Vachell, MC, (who moved over from 224 Group to this appointment) and his Air Officer Admin (AOM) was Air Vice-Marshal A.C. Collier, CB, CBE. At Air Headquarters (AHQ), Bengal, in Calcutta – and hence in immediate command of the ‘sharp end’ – was Air Vice-Marshal D.F. Stevenson, CBE, DSO, MC, until recently commanding officer of 221 Group. Stevenson’s SASO was Air Cdr A.R. Churchman, DFC.

HQ, 221 Group, was now in the hands of Air Cdr H.J.F. Hunter, CBE, MC, (previously commander of 225 [Bomber] Group in Singapore and Sumatra), while 224 Group would soon be taken over by Air Cdr G.E. Wilson, OBE. In Ceylon 222 Group was commanded by AVM J.H. D’Albiac, CB, DSO, who had earlier commanded the RAF contingent in Greece, whilst 225 Group was led by Air Cdr P.H. Mackworth, CBE, DFC. This officer had until recently commanded 223 Group, which was now to be taken over by Air Cdr A. Gray, MC. The ‘support’ groups were in the hands of Air Cdr L.M. Iles, CBE, DFC, (226 Group) and Air Cdr S.J. Vincent, DFC (227 Group); the latter had commanded 226 (Fighter) Group in Singapore, Sumatra and Java.

The USAAF units in India would soon come under the command and direction of the new US 10th Air Force, which had arrived at New Delhi on 16 May and would soon be based in Karachi. This new air force would be commanded by Maj Gen Lewis H. Brereton, who had headed the ill-fated Far East Air Force until its demise in Java. He would be replaced on 18 August 1942 by Maj Gen Clayton L. Bissell, who during World War I had flown under RAF command with the 148th Aero Squadron of the USAS, claiming six aerial victories whilst piloting Sopwith Camels.

This then was the basis of the air force which was to support any operations aimed at the reconquest of Burma, simultaneously being responsible in the first instance for the defence of the great Indian base areas around the northern end of the Bay of Bengal and the Brahmaputra valley, nestling above northern Burma, and at the foothills of the Himalayas.

What of the enemy these Anglo-American units faced? It may be recalled by readers of Bloody Shambles, Volume 2, that the units available to the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force in Burma towards the end of March 1942 had included the 1st, 11th, 50th and 77th Sentais, all equipped with Nakajima Ki 27 fighters, the 64th Sentai with Nakajima Ki 43s, and the 47th Independent Chutai with a handful of pre-production Nakajima Ki 44 fighters.

The 8th Sentai was equipped in the main with Kawasaki Ki 48 twin-engined light bombers, whilst the 12th, 14th and 98th Sentais operated the heavier Mitsubishi Ki 21-IIs. One chutai of the 8th flew Ki 15 single-engined army co-operation and reconnaissance aircraft, whilst the 31st Sentai flew Ki 30 single-engined light bombers. Two Independent Chutais, the 51st and 70th, flew various reconnaissance types, including a small number of the very high-performance Mitsubishi Ki 46s.

The 8th, 12th, 14th, 64th and 98th Sentais, all of which were equipped with the most modern combat aircraft available, would soldier on in Burma for many months to come, but the other main units were now equipped with aircraft that had to be considered obsolescent. In consequence the onset of the monsoon and the general halt to further advances provided the opportunity for a far reaching programme of re-equipment to be put in hand.

Indeed, the 50th Sentai had already withdrawn to Formosa during April 1942 to exchange its Ki 27s for Ki 43s, the 47th Independent Chutai returning to Japan at the same time. In June the 77th Sentai withdrew to Manchuria, whilst the 1st and 11th Sentais would head for Japan in July, where they would also receive Ki 43s at Akeno. The defence of Burma remained solely in the hands of the 64th Sentai for the time being, this unit having operated from Toungoo and Magwe during May, but now establishing its main base at Mingaladon, just outside Rangoon. From here it could rapidly send detachments to any of the areas to the north which might be threatened.

Despite the apparent superiority of the Ki 43-I over the heavier Hurricane IIb, the Japanese pilots considered the latter to be a dangerous opponent. Commented Sgt Yoshito Yasuda of the 64th Sentai:

The Hurricane was a unique plane with twelve 7.7mm (0.303in) machine guns which caused deadly damage if we were shot from behind. Its diving speed was much faster than the 01 Fighter (Ki 43). Therefore, when we fought with Hurricanes we attempted to counter its fire power with the better manoeuvrability of the 01 and tried to hit its radiator, bringing the engine to a stop. Even with the poor fire power (two 12.7mm guns) of the 01, Hurricanes could be shot down merely by a hole in the radiator.

During this initial period, two targets recommended themselves to the Allied commanders. For aircraft with the range to do so, Rangoon remained of primary importance, for it was to this port that the majority of supplies for the Japanese Burma Area Army would now be transported. Much nearer to the units based around Calcutta was the island port of Akyab, located at the foot of the Mayu Peninsula, and it was to this target that much of the initial RAF effort was to be directed.

Indeed GHQ, India, would order a limited offensive here to clear the Mayu Peninsula and invade Akyab Island and its port. This latter controlled the mouths of two major rivers, the Kaladan and Mayu. However, the main purpose of this operation was to raise morale, indicate that a British comeback was approaching, and to prevent the Japanese from seizing the initiative here.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE AIR WAR IN INDIA,

BURMA AND OVER THE INDIAN OCEAN

June 1942 – August 1945

Thursday, 4 June 1942

Thus it was that on 4 June 1942 two B-17s were despatched by the US 7th Bomb Group to raid Rangoon. Here defending Ki 43s of the 64th Sentai took to the air. Sgt Maj Yoshito Yasuda attacked one of the bombers three or four times before it escaped into cloud, and he gave up the chase. As the bombers withdrew, they were intercepted by three Ki 27s of the 77th Sentai’s 3rd Chutai, operating from Magwe. One B-17 was chased, and was claimed shot down 95 miles north-west of that airfield by Lt Junichi Ogata. One Fortress was indeed shot down, and the other was badly damaged, the surviving crew reporting that they had been attacked by some ten fighters.

Tuesday, 18 June 1942

It was to be some days before any further actions of note took place, but on 18 June six Mohawks of 5 Squadron, on their first offensive operation, escorted three 113 Squadron Blenheims to attack targets in the Myitkyina area. One of the bombers was obliged to return early, but a second, flown by Sqn Ldr C.W. Harper, failed to return.

Recently converted to Hurricane IIbs, 146 Squadron’s fighters are lined up at Dum Dum as three more of these aircraft take off. (via A.Thomas)

The defences of Calcutta were being strengthened as rapidly as possible during the monsoon season by the four-cannon Hurricane IIc. This is an aircraft of 615 Squadron. (Fox via N. Franks)

In command at Alipore airfield was one of the RAF’s greatest fighter pilots, Wg Cdr Frank Carey, DFC & 2 Bars, DFM. (N. Franks)

The fighter type available for offensive duties during June 1942 was the Curtiss Mohawk IV. An aircraft of 5 Squadron is seen at Dum Dum at this time. (R. Holloway via C.G. Jefford)

The main bomber employed by day in mid 1942 was the Bristol Blenheim IV. Here an aircraft of this type from 60 Squadron heads out at low level to attack Akyab. (M.W. Huggard)

Saturday, 23 June 1942

Five days later on 23rd, six more Blenheims drawn equally from 60 and 113 Squadrons, raided Akyab during the morning. On this occasion a 60 Squadron aircraft, flown by Lt L.J. Beesley, SAAF, was lost, this bomber last being seen leaving the target area. The causes of these two early losses have not been ascertained, for no claims by Japanese fighters appear to have been submitted on either date. They must be deemed to have succumbed to anti-aircraft fire, bad weather, or both.

As July came, so too did the first of the reinforcements for the RAF, 82 Squadron arriving at Karachi from the UK, equipped with Blenheim IVs. The similarly equipped 113 Squadron was relieved of its army co-operation duties by the arrival at Tezpur of a detachment of Lysanders from 20 Squadron at Jamshedpur, whilst 28 Squadron, also with Lysanders, left Ranchi to take over 20 Squadron’s duties on the North-West Frontier. 3 PRU, ready now for operations, moved from Pandaveswar to Dum Dum, via Agartala.

Hurricane IIb BE198 HM-R of 136 Squadron having come to grief at Red Road, Calcutta, on 10 July 1942. (V.K. Jacobs via A. Thomas)

The monsoon continued to make flying difficult throughout July and August, operations remaining distinctly muted. Another Blenheim was lost on 8 July when a 45 Squadron aircraft, operating under the control of 113 Squadron, was reported missing, nothing further being heard of Flt Sgt F. Butcher and his crew.

On 11 July Air Cdr Vachell departed 224 Group for his new job on Peirse’s staff, Grp Capt J.W.C. More, OBE, DFC, taking over command on a temporary basis. He would finally hand over to Air Cdr G.E. Wilson, OBE, on 9 October.

Tuesday, 21 July 1942

On this day another of the 7th Bomb Group’s B-17s attacked Rangoon. A reported 23 fighters intercepted, the 9th Squadron gunners claiming four of these shot down. The 64th Sentai had circa 15-20 Ki 43s based in the Rangoon area at the time, and undoubtedly some of those in the air made several passes, causing an impression of numbers. None were lost however, whilst the bomber, having reached itsdesignated target, released its bombs and returned on only two engines, the ruddercontrols also having been shot away.

Blenheim IV V6456 AD-T of 113 Squadron at Feni in July 1942. (G.J. Hancox via C.G. Jefford)

A number of changes amongst the RAF’s units continued to occur during August. 28 Squadron returned to Ranchi from the North-West Frontier, becoming operational again with its Lysanders. From Pandaveswar the Wellingtons of 215 Squadron moved to the airfield at St Thomas Mount, Madras, to undertake shipping patrols, whilst 45 Squadron, still non-operational despite sending aircraft and crews forward to reinforce 113 Squadron, flew from Calcutta to Asansol for training prior to entering full operations. The Hudsons of 353 Squadron moved from Dum Dum to Cuttack.

The increasing availability of Hurricanes for the defence of eastern India led to some quite wholesale re-organisation during the month. 135 Squadron despatched detachments from Dum Dum to Cuttack and Vizagapatam, and 136 Squadron moved from Red Road in Calcutta to the latter of these airfields; 607 Squadron transferred from Alipore to Jessore.

During August US Marines were landed on the island of Guadalcanal in the Solomons, strongly supported by US naval forces. In co-operation with this effort, the British aircraft carrier HMS Formidable sortied out into the Bay of Bengal to create a diversion.

Sunday, 2 August 1942

Anxious to keep track of this unexpected sortie by the British vessel, flyingboats of the Japanese Navy’s Toko Kokutai, operating from Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, searched the area. On 2 August one of these Kawanishi H6K (‘Mavis’) ’boats, which had departed Port Blair during the morning in the hands of Sub Lt Yokoyama, was intercepted by a pair of Grumman Martlet fighters of 888 Squadron from Formidable, and was shot down by Sub Lts J.E. Scott and C. Ballard 30 miles east of the carrier and her escorts, and to the south of Ceylon.

Saturday, 8 August 1942

Six days later a North American B-25C of 3 PRU undertook a reconnaissance of the Andamans, flying over Anson, Blair and Port Cornwallis. Over the third of these targets the Mitchell was engaged by two fighters identified as ‘Army 97s’ (i.e. Ki 27s), and was hit several times before making good its escape. The interceptors were in fact

North American B-25C Mitchell used by 3 PRU for long-range photo-reconnaissance flights during 1942. (G. Marsland)

Lockheed Hudson IIIa ‘J’ of 353 Squadron in flight. (D. Williams via A. Thomas)

Mitsubishi A5M Type 96 fighters of the Navy’s 3rd Kokutai, a detachment of which was based in the islands.

Tuesday, 18 August 1942

Ten days later it was claimed that fighters from this unit had shot down a Hudson and damaged a second such aircraft. No such loss has been discovered, although on this date Plt Off P. Smith was escorting the cargo vessel SS Itinda in his 62 Squadron Hudson when a flyingboat attempted to bomb the ship. He made seven attacks on this intruder, observing hits, and drove it off into clouds.

At this time operations against the Japanese were not the only duty of the RAF. As indicated earlier, civil disturbances were rife within India during this period, and on this date three Blenheims from 113 Squadron and two from 60 Squadron were involved in security patrols over the Asansol-Patna-Sasaram-Goya areas. Crowds were dispersed at Bildarnagar, but one of the 113 Squadron aircraft crashed near Goya, the pilot, Flt Sgt Goss, being killed. The other two members of the crew were then slaughtered by rioters. Many more such sorties would be flown by the Blenheim units during the next few months before agreement was reached with Ghandi and the Congress Party that no further anti-British activities would be undertaken, in return for the promise of independence as soon as the war ended.

Meanwhile on 18th Capt Kiyoshi Nagasawa, a reconnaissance pilot of the Dokuhi 89th Chutai had been ordered to investigate the Allied airfields across the Indian border in his Ki 36 aircraft. Consequently, he had flown up to Tinsukia on 15 August, carrying four (30lb) bombs, then undertaking his initial search, taking photographs and dropping the bombs in an effort to dissuade any resident fighters from being scrambled.

Thursday, 20 August 1942

Following these initial flights, Nagasawa was ordered to undertake a similar exercise over a group of airfields known to be located in the Imphal area. On 20 August therefore, he took off from Anisakan, refuelled at Shwebo, and headed north. Carrying no bombs this time since he had to go over some fairly high mountains, he flew just below the monsoon overcast to Kohima, then turning south to pass directly over Imphal.

Not a ‘Nate’! On 20 August 1942 Sgt W.S.Garnett of 5 Squadron claimed the first victory in the air for the Mohawk in India. Reported in the past as having been a Nakajima Ki 27 ‘Nate’ fighter which he had shot down, it was in fact a Tachikawa Ki 36 tactical-reconnaissance and army co-operation aircraft of the 89th Sentai, flown by Capt Nagasawa and similar to that shown here. The aircraft was later code-named ‘Ida’. (Aireview)

At much the same time five of 5 Squadron’s Mohawks had commenced an afternoon armed reconnaissance, armed with 20 lb bombs beneath the wings, some of which were released in the Yuwa and Mawlaik region. Sgt W.S. Garnett then spotted a lone single-engined, fixed undercarriage monoplane, which he identified as an Army 97 fighter. Jettisoning the remaining bombs that his aircraft was carrying, he climbed above this intruder and fired a half-second burst from dead astern, closing from 100 to 30 yards. The aircraft at once went down, pouring smoke and flames from the cockpit. At 1,000 feet the pilot was seen to bale out and the aircraft crashed and burst into flames.

Flying around Tamu airfield, Capt Nagasawa had suddenly felt a number of violent blows to his aircraft, and turning his head, saw what he took to be a P-40 passing him after firing, and a second coming onto his tail. The cockpit of the Ki 36 was full of flames, and he shouted to his observer, Lt Takumi Kitajima, Kitajima! Bale out! However, there was no answer, and realising that his companion was already dead, Nagasawa took to his parachute just before the aircraft crashed. His face was so badly burned that he was temporarily blinded, but he was fortunate to be found by a Burmese hunter, who led him to a Japanese army camp.

This, the first victory of the war for an RAF Mohawk, has for long been identified as a Nakajima Ki 27, just as Garnett had recognised. However, none of these fighters remained in Burma in August, and clearly the victim had actually been the little Ki 36 reconnaissance machine.

Friday, 21 August 1942

Next day one of the Toko Ku’s far-ranging H6Ks was again encountered over the BayOf Bengal, Sqn Ldr T.A.F. Elsdon, DFC, and Plt Off A.G. Conway of 136 Squadron spotting one such machine as it was attacking a ship outside Vizagapatam harbour. Elsdon, a Battle of Britain veteran, snapped off three short bursts before losing his quarry in cloud.

With the arrival of September, the monsoon rain clouds at last began to retreat, and the onset of better weather promised an early resumption of more sustained operations for the air forces. Ready for this, 99 Squadron, which had now gathered in all its Wellingtons at Ambola as they arrived from the UK, moved to Pandaveswar to commence bombing operations. Far to the east at Dinjan the 25th Fighter Squadron of the 51st Fighter Group now also became operational, although for the time being the unit’s 26th Squadron had been detached to China, to further reinforce the 23rd Fighter Group there. This latter unit had been formed around the nucleus provided by the American Volunteer Group (‘Flying Tigers’) which had previously operated in Burma. Another new US unit, the 341st Bomb Group (Medium) was also forming in India with B-25 Mitchells.

More movements took place amongst the RAF’s Hurricane units; from Jessore 17 Squadron (Mark IIcs) moved to Alipore, and 607 Squadron (Mark IIbs) to Feni, ready for operations over the Arakan area. 146 Squadron moved to Alipore from Dum Dum to replace 17, while 136 Squadron returned north to take 146’s place at Dum Dum, flying in from Vizagapatam.

In Burma the 64th Sentai was joined by the 50th Sentai, newly-re-equipped with Ki 43s, which flew in to Mingaladon, where the unit was ready for action by 2 September.

September 1942

An Order of Battle for the RAF and USAAF units in the India/Burma area may be found at Appendix 1.

Thursday-Friday, 3-4 September 1942

Flg Off Harries, pilot of 353 Squadron Hudson ‘Q’, radioed at 1145 on 3rd whilst on patrol, stating that he was going to have to force land. Next day a search found the aircraft, which was seen half-submerged on the east bank of a river on the Arakan coast near Chittagong. No reason for its demise was obvious.

Wednesday, 9 September 1942

With the arrival of better weather, and with British activity on the Arakan front growing, the Japanese sought to reinforce their troops in the area, the first cargo vessel to arrive at the port of Akyab sailing in on 9 September, escorted by six Ki 43-Is of the 50th Sentai’s 2nd Chutai. As they approached the port, a formation identified as 12 Blenheims was seen under the overcast at 30 feet, flying in from the west. Lt Akira Takano attacked the leading bomber, which he reported broke away and headed out to sea just above the waves. Lt Yasushi Murayama pursued this bomber and claimed to have shot it down. Sgt Toshio Miyabe attacked another head-on, and between them the Japanese pilots claimed to have shot three down.

The deadly enemy; Nakajima Ki 43-I fighters of the 50th Sentai. These nimble fighters were too manoeuvrable to be ‘dogfought’ by their RAF or USAAF counterparts. (Aireview via Y. Izawa)

The attacking formation had actually comprised four Blenheims from 60 Squadron, five from 113 Squadron, and four from 34 Squadron, all flying from Asansol, briefed to attack one merchant vessel of some 1,500 tons, and a 500-ton escort in Akyab harbour. Their ultra low-level bombing attack was made between 1015-1030 hours. 36 250lb bombs were dropped, one being seen to hit the deck at the stern of the larger vessel at 1015, and another struck the bows two minutes later. Several hits were also seen on the jetty, and then one more direct hit on the ship at 1022. As the bombers departed the target, they were subjected to attacks by fighters lasting some 20 minutes. Two 113 Squadron aircraft (piloted by Flg Off Loane and Sgt Reid) and one 60 Squadron (V5425 ‘Y’, flown by Plt Off Mackridge) failed to return, whilst Plt Off McMillan of 60 Squadron got Z9798 back as far as Chittagong with one engine shot out; here he overshot on landing. Meanwhile, Flg Off Bassingthwaite of 113 Squadron force-landed his badly damaged aircraft at Dum Dum.

The Blenheims’ attack was followed two hours later by four Hudsons from 62 Squadron and two from 353 Squadron, all of which operated from Cuttack. These arrived to find both vessels apparently sunk, and attacked the jetty instead. However a subsequent report indicated that the escort vessel appeared still to be afloat at 1245. The 50th Sentai fighters were still at Akyab, and incorrectly reported the trio of Hudsons approaching from east and west; apparently in practice these were the 62 Squadron formation arriving and departing. Capt Masao Miyamaru, the 2nd Chutai leader, reported that he silenced the turret gunner in one Hudson, and then shot it down. A second Hudson was also claimed, although Sgt Miyabe’s Ki 43 was hit and damaged. Again, the Japanese claims had been quite accurate; AE532 ‘T’ (Sgt White) failed to return, whilst FH234 ‘U’ (Flt Sgt Brown) was badly damaged, and was force-landed at Chittagong. RAF air gunners believed that they had shot down one fighter and damaged another during these raids. The attacks had, however, to some extent justified themselves, for the 2,019 ton Niyou Maru was severely hit, and was run aground to prevent it sinking. It was clear nonetheless, that any further bombing raids on Akyab would require fighter escort.

A welcome addition to the RAF’s bombing strength in India was represented by the arrival on 14 October 1942 of the Liberator II bombers of 159 Squadron from the Middle East. At first these aircraft operated over hostile territory only by night. (IWM)

Saturday, 12 September 1942

September was to prove a busy month for 221 Group’s bombers. On 12th six Blenheims drawn equally from 60 and 113 Squadrons took off to attack Mandalay station. As it was getting into the air, 113 Squadron’s ‘R’ blew up, but Flt Sgt Foster and his crew all survived with only slight burns.

Two Mohawks from 5 Squadron strafed an aircraft identified as an ‘Army 98 reconnaissance-bomber’ on the ground at Myitkyina, pieces being seen to break off as their fire hit it.

Sunday, 13 September 1942

60 and 113 Squadrons each despatched two Blenheims to raid Yenangyaung, where workshops and other buildings were bombed.

Monday, 28 September 1942

An attack was made on railway rolling stock at Mandalay by eight Blenheims of 34 Squadron led by Wg Cdr Cox, accompanied by four more such aircraft from 60 Squadron and one from 113 Squadron.

The backbone of the Allied heavy bomber force during 1942-1943 were the B-24Ds of the US 7th Bomb Group. This is aircraft 20 of that Group’s 9th Squadron. (Ken Sumney via K. Rust)

Wednesday, 9 September 1942

An effort to neutralise further such interceptions over this important target was made on 30 September when 12 Mohawks of 5 Squadron attacked Akyab satellite airfield, dropping 120 20 lb bombs on the runway and dispersals, before carrying out a strafing attack. Eight aircraft had been reported to be present at this base, but all that was seen by the attacking pilots were between four and seven dummies, which appeared to have been created from wrecked RAF machines, on some of which the roundel markings were still to be seen. During this attack Sgt W.G. Thomas crashed on the airfield and was killed. Since no Japanese troops or return fire was experienced, this appears to have been due to pilot error.

Thursday, 1 October 1942

A new layer of command was inserted into the RAF in the Far East with the start of October, bringing it into line with both the UK and the Middle East. No longer would the relationship be directly from group to squadron, as a number of new wings were now created. The first to be formed were 164 (Signals) Wing in Delhi, five tactical wings, 165 at Dum Dum, 166 at Jessore, 167 at Asansol, 168 at Ondal and 169 at Agartala, 170 (Medium Bomber) at Pandaveswar, 175 (General Reconnaissance) at Cuttack and 179 (Ferry) Wing at Bombay. Outside this general numbering sequence, 293 Wing was formed at Alipore under Wg Cdr J.A. O’Neill, DFC, for the defence of Calcutta and the Delta area. For this purpose it would control 5, 67, 136 and 146 Squadrons.

170 Wing was initially commanded by Grp Capt R.C. Wilson, but almost at once he was posted to become SASO, 221 Group, his place being taken by Grp Capt G. Seaton Broughall, MC, DFC. Broughall himself had just been posted from Jessore to 224 Group as supernumerary when 166 Wing had been formed at this airfield under the command of a great fighter pilot, Wg Cdr M.M. Stephens, DSO, DFC. Commanding officers of the other wings on formation would be:

Later in the month 172 (Composite) Wing would form at St Thomas Mount under Wg Cdr E.C. Lewis, and towards the end of November two more would be set up, 171 (Army Co-operation) at Ranchi under Grp Capt T.B.M. Wallis, OBE, and 173 (Composite) at Trichinopoly. At a later date 173 and 175 Wings would both be re-titled as Naval Co-operation Wings. It will be noted that those wings intended to control single-engined aircraft types were commanded by wing commanders, and those likely to have under command predominantly multi-engined types, with their wing commander COs, and considerably larger personnel establishments, by group captains.

Unlike numbered wings in North Africa which tended to have specific squadrons allocated to them which remained under command for considerable periods of time and during moves of base, the wings here were to be more like those in the UK. They remained at the named airfield into which a variety of squadrons were posted at various dates, or were removed to serve elsewhere.

Sqn Ldr Bill Pitt-Brown, formerly commanding officer of 5 Squadron, was appointed as the new 169 Wing’s first Wing Leader on 14 October 1942. This is his personal Mohawk, BS790, carrying his initials WPB, and seen here at Agartala. (Air Cdr W. Pitt-Brown via A. Thomas)

Two days after these changes took place, 224 Group was re-organised to become a fully mobile unit.

Wednesday, 7 October 1942

The Mohawks returned to Akyab on 7 October, ten preparing to escort three Blenheims of 60 Squadron and one of 113 Squadron to attack the port, led by Sqn Ldr Bill Pitt-Brown. As the fighters were refuelling at Feni, a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft passed overhead, and as this indicated the likelihood of a raid, all took off as quickly as possible and headed for the target area, where shipping was again to be attacked. Four of the little fighters flew as close escort to the Blenheims, the other six operating as high cover at 5,000 feet. As they approached, four bombers were seen by the top cover pilots, all painted overall silver-grey, and identified as Army 97s (i.e. Mitsubishi Ki 21s).

Again mis-identification had occurred. At this time a cargo vessel carrying supplies for the 33rd Division was approaching Akyab, covered by 12 Ki 43s of the 50th Sentai’s 3rd Chutai, whilst three Kawasaki Ki 48 (‘Lily’) light bombers of the 8th Sentai – the ‘Tobi Hachi’ (Flying Eighth) were also in the air on patrol. It was these latter aircraft which had been seen by the Mohawk pilots, who thought that they must have taken off to avoid being caught on the ground. One flew straight through the British formation, and the two others headed out to sea. Flt Sgt R.R. Lawrence, RCAF, attacked one of the latter; on his third pass the port engine caught fire and the aircraft dived to starboard and crashed into the sea. The Japanese crews reported meeting eight fighters, one Ki 48 being lost and a second, flown by Sgt Ushiyama, crash-landing east of Akyab, from where all the crew were rescued.

During the day a reconnaissance aircraft – almost certainly a Mitsubishi Ki 46 – appeared over the Calcutta area. This was intercepted by a 67 Squadron Hurricane IIc, the pilot firing three bursts of 20mm at a range of 200-250 yards, but the Japanese aircraft proved too fast for him and it escaped.

North-east India, the Arakan and North Burma

Monday, 12 October 1942

Blenheim ‘Z’ of 34 Squadron undertook a reconnaissance during the day, flown by SqnLdr Keeble. The aircraft crashed 35 miles north of Chittagong with the loss of two ofthe crew, the third member being injured. Next day th squadron would be stood dow from operations to undertake intensive training in night flying.

This date also saw Wg Cdr Frank Carey, DFC, DFM & Bar, posted from 293 Wing to become Wing Leader of 165 Wing; his place was taken by Wg Cdr T.A.F ‘Jimmy’ Elsdon, DFC, who had been holding this position in 165.

Tuesday, 13 October 1942

A further convoy sailed towards Akyab on 13 October, but during the day the Ki 43 flown by Sgt Maj Hideyoshi Maeda, wingman of the 2nd Chutai leader from the 50th Sentai, disappeared, his fate unknown.

Wednesday, 14 October 1942

Having submitted such accurate claims on 9 September, the 50th Sentai reversed this situation on 14 October, making the first of a number of totally unverifiable reports of successes on this date. Again the action was over Akyab, where a cargo vessel was sunk after it had been unloaded. Versions differ, but one report stated that all eight of the Blenheims responsible were shot down, whereas a second report indicated that Ki 43 pilots of the Sentai’s 2nd Chutai shot down six of 18 Blenheims over a convoy to Akyab. A pattern will emerge from which it will become apparent that whenever the 50th Sentai failed to stop the sinking of a ship or the destruction of a bomber formation which