Aces High, Volume 1: A Tribute to the Most Notable Fighter Pilots of the British and Commonwealth Forces of WWII

By Christopher Shores and Clive Williams

First in the Aces High series—a military reference of the fighter pilots who had five or more confirmed victories while serving in the Royal Air Force.

Introduced by the French quite early in World War I, the term “ace” was used to describe a pilot credited with five or more aerial victories. But in the United Kingdom, the term was never officially recognized. Becoming an ace was partly luck, especially considering the campaigns in which they flew and the areas of combat. There are three distinct kinds of aces: the defensive ace, the offensive ace, and the night fighter.

This book is a revised collection of the biographies of the highest scoring Allied fighter pilots of World War II—including those with the confirmed claims of shooting down five aircraft and those pilots with lower scores but whose wartime careers prove them worthy of inclusion. All details of their combat are arranged in tabular form. Included are a selection of photographs from hitherto private collections.

“There are some authors whose name alone is sufficient reason to but a book, and Christopher Shores is surely one of these . . . By profession a chartered surveyor, he served in the Royal Air Force in the 1950s so his writing bears the stamp of authenticity.” —HistoryNet

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Sep 18, 2008
• ISBN: 9781909808423

Christopher Shores

Christopher Shores began by writing the occasional book about military aviation, then quickened the pace as he grew older. By now, readers and reviewers are hard-pressed to keep up with him. Meanwhile, he pursued a career as a land surveyor and director of one of Europe's largest firms of property advisers.

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ACES HIGH

A Tribute to the Most

Notable Fighter Pilots of the

British and Commonwealth

Forces in WWII

ACES

HIGH

A Tribute to the Most

Notable Fighter Pilots of the

British and Commonwealth

Forces in WWII

Christopher Shores

and Clive Wiliams

GRUB STREET · LONDON

Published by

Grub Street

The Basement

10 Chivalry Road

London SW11 1HT

Copyright © 1994 Grub Street, London

Text copyright © 1994 Christopher Shores and Clive Williams

A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 1-898697-00-0

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

Typeset by Pearl Graphics, Hemel Hempstead

Printed and bound in Great Britain by

Biddies Ltd, Guildford and King’s Lynn

Contents

Foreword to the Original Edition

Foreword to the New Edition

CHAPTER ONE

Authors’ Introduction to the New Edition

CHAPTER TWO

Fighter Operations During the War

CHAPTER THREE

The Tools of the Trade

CHAPTER FOUR

The Squadrons

The Biographical Lists Explained

CHAPTER FIVE

The Aces — Biographical and Claim Notes

Fighter Pilots Claiming Four Victories

CHAPTER SIX

Diver — The V-1 Aces

Acknowledgements

The main contributors to this revised edition have been the pilots themselves, or their families. More than 300 have responded during recent years, providing access to logbooks and diaries, answering questions and laying open their private photo collections to the lens of our cameras. It would be invidious to single out only a few for thanks, but impracticable to list them all here, for they are within the body of the book. Gentlemen, each and every one of you, our grateful thanks. There is one to whom we do offer a particular debt of gratitude however, for he did much to facilitate the tracing of others, pursuing them on our behalf whenever necessary. This was Rod Smith, who generously used his own position within the Canadian Fighter Pilots’ Association to our great advantage. He telephoned frequently (from Vancouver!), offering encouragement and bringing his acute understanding to bear on some of the problems we encountered. Thanks too, to Air Vice-Marshal ‘Johnnie’ Johnson for kindly agreeing to write the Foreword to this new edition.

The ‘aviation fraternity’ have been as supportive as ever. Particular thanks are due to close colleagues and friends Frank Olynyk, Russell Guest, John Foreman, Brian Cull, Norman Franks, Chris Thomas, David Brown, Paul Sortehaug, Michael Schoeman, Dilip Sakar, Leal Kerr and Reg Wyness. Amongst the European nations whose airmen flew with the RAF, assistance of great worth was received from Jean-Louis Roba in Belgium, Tomas Polak in the Czech Republic and Bjorn Olsen in Norway. Norman Franks’ wife, Heather, and Chris Shores’ secretary, Sally-Anne Follett-Smith, dealt marvellously with the word processing of the vast manuscript within a painfully tight deadline. Our publisher, John Davies, his partner Anne Dolamore, and their assistant, Edward Ripley, were better friends, and more helpful, understanding and co-operative participants in this venture than any authors could reasonably hope for or expect.

Thanks too are due to the medal collectors, who were generous in providing many photographs and much information from pilots’ logbooks in their possession. These were Chris John, Chris James, Simon Muggleton, Graham Saunders and Nick Carter.

Our wives, Marion Shores and Judy Williams, have as ever been patient and supportive despite the constant interruptions to normal family and social life, and towards our restricted involvement in domestic life, which the preparation and writing of such a book in our spare time, imposes.

Authors’ Special Note

As we go to press, we have collected far more photographs than is practicable to include within this already-large volume. Additionally, after more than 30 years research it is clear that a work of this nature can never really be considered complete and 100% correct. We shall continue to look for additional information, and hopefully if any readers find they can add to or correct any matters included herein — or indeed, missing therefrom — we hope they will contact us forthwith.

It is our intention to follow this volume with a much slimmer addendum in 12 months time. This will include a large selection of additional photographs of the pilots, together with any additions or corrections which have come to hand in the intervening period.

If you know something we do not; if you have access to a logbook we have not seen, or if you have unpublished photographs of any of the pilots (or of their aircraft) please do let the publishers know at once.

June 1994

CFS and CW

Foreword to the Original Edition

When I was first approached by Christopher Shores to write a foreword to his book Aces High, I imagined that it would be another war book confined mainly to the air. However, when his manuscript arrived for me to read, I was very surprised to find that it was what could be described as a very comprehensive, but highly readable reference book. It is indeed quite a tome, and great credit is due to both Shores and Williams for the extensive and detailed research which must have been carried out.

I found Chapter Five, and particularly Chapter Six of tremendous interest, as so often during the war one was very closely associated with a number of pilots for a short period, and then never saw or heard of them again, except perhaps odd snatches of information or rumours, and in this book it is fascinating to follow their fighting careers throughout the battle areas of the last war – alas many of these careers end sadly and abruptly!

Regarding the title of the book, Aces High, I found myself flinching slightly at this, as I think most fighter pilots always have done. The term, fighter ace, always seemed to me to conjure up the mental picture of some gay, abandoned, almost irresponsible young pilot leaping into his aircraft, and tearing off into the sky to chalk up victories like knocking off glass bottles in the circus rifle range. Nothing could be further from the truth. Any fighter pilot, after his first combat, is very well aware that air fighting on the scale of the last war was a cold, calculating, cat and mouse type combat, which required great preparation, lightening reactions, first-class team work and above all, cool decisive leadership.

Certain names, like Malan, Bader and Johnson, Finucane, Deere and many others became household names, but when one reads through the long list of pilots, one is struck by the large number of those who were credited with six, seven, or eight victories.

These young pilots formed the bulk and guts of our fighter force. Many of their names hardly became known, but each entry in this book indicates months and in certain cases years of gruelling tense flying and air combat in all theatres of the war. It made me feel glad and indeed proud that I had served with some of them, and to see their names recorded in these pages.

I have no hesitation in stating that this book is a very fine reference and a must for all those who served in, or were connected with the Royal Air Force.

Robert Stanford-Tuck

RAF Retd, Eastry, Kent

7th December 1965

Foreword to the New Edition

My old friend and comrade-in-arms Bob Stanford-Tuck, wrote the Foreword to the original Aces High (1966) and I am more than happy to follow in the footsteps of that great fighter pilot and fighter leader who, as distinguished fighter pilot and author Laddie would say, has flown to the Celestial Bar.

When, in the late summer of 1940, I joined 616 Squadron there was no gunnery training and we novices hosepiped our opponents from absurd ranges and did not estimate the amount of forward allowance. The average pilot of those days could usually hit an enemy aeroplane when he overhauled it from dead astern and sprayed his opponent with eight machine guns, but give him a testing deflection shot and he usually missed.

Because the average fighter pilot was a poor shot our machine guns were harmonised to give a fairly large ‘shotgun’ bullet pattern at the best firing range, and this ‘area of lethal density’, as it was called, gave the poor marksman the best chance of destroying his opponent. But good shots – Sailor Malan, Harry Broadhurst, Teddy Donaldson, Denys Gillam, ‘Screwball’ Beurling, ‘Hawkeye’ Wells and Wally McLeod – found that the shotgun grouping did not give them a good concentration of fire and harmonised their guns to give a ‘spot’ pattern which when used with the improved 20mm cannon tore enemy aeroplanes asunder.

The best fighter pilots were usually outdoor men who had shot game and wildfowl and therefore knew something about deflection shooting. The man who could hit a curling, dropping pheasant coming at him on a strong wind, or a jinking head-on partridge, or who could kill a widgeon clearly in a darkening sky, had little trouble bringing his guns to bear against enemy fighters.

I commend this carefully researched book to all those readers who are interested in the deeds of those above-average fighter pilots who had five or more confirmed victories and, in our world, became aces. When fighting defensively, as in the Battle of Britain, they lived a strange life which alternated between periods of intense excitement, sometimes fright, in the air, when they did not have enough time, and long spells on the ground, when they had too much. Once in the air they had the gift of becoming part of their fighters. Their morale was very high. In adversity they were bigger than their normal selves. Their devotion was well hidden beneath a shield of flippancy.

Air Vice-Marshal J.E. ‘Johnnie’ Johnson, CB, CBE, DSO**, DFC**

July 1994

CHAPTER ONE

Authors’ Introduction to the New Edition

When Clive Williams and I received our somewhat unexpected contract to produce the first edition of Aces High in 1964 there is little doubt that we were a couple of rank beginners in the military history ‘game’.

Only in later years, as I researched further books, did the full availability — but also the limitations — of the sources available for reference become clear to me. In our naivety, we had assumed both a reliable and standardised basis of recording of events for decoration citations, press releases etc., and a method of calculating the individual pilot’s victory totals commensurate with the relatively sophisticated Claims Board records developed towards the end of the war by the US 8th Air Force and the 2nd Tactical Air Force.

Experience has shown this assumption to be far removed from the truth! The first clue to this presented itself when I visited Wing Commander Douglas Benham whilst working on Fighters over Tunisia, and had an opportunity to look at his logbook. The citation to the Bar to his DFC, gazetted in May 1945, recorded ten victories of which two shared. At some stage this had been recorded elsewhere as ten and two shared, equalling 11. The logbook gave the clear picture, recording the citation correctly, and adding the fractions together as 8⁵/₆. A number of the better-known pilots whose totals had been listed in several earlier publications, had long baffled us, as our research had never been able to uncover the total of claims with which they appeared to have been credited, despite the fact that they were well-known. A check was therefore made of individual and shared claims, each of the latter treated as a full victory, and in most cases the previously-reported total, or a figure close to it, was arrived at!

During work on the World War I companion volume, Above the Trenches, it became clear that during the earlier war all the combatants with the exception of the Germans, had adopted such a basis of compiling individual totals. It soon started to dawn on us that several nations continued to employ this method following the start of the second war, initially including the US forces. In the event individual US air forces subsequently adopted a variety of bases as the war progressed, some not accepting shared victories at all, whilst others added the various fractions together.

The French, Russians, Italians and Japanese quoted totals which included shares treated as whole individual victories, although the Russians and Italians tended to differentiate, e.g. 15 victories, five of them shared. This was further complicated by an official policy in Italy and Japan of not recognising individual totals at all.

The World War I research indicated further complications. During that conflict the British forces also added together two categories of claims prior to the final months of 1918 — ‘destroyed’ and ‘out of control’. The French pursued a much more stringent confirmation process. All the ‘out of control’ claims of the British allies, and indeed it must be said, quite a few of the ‘destroyed’ category, would have been classified in the French service as ‘probables’. This explains why there appear to have been so far fewer French fighter aces, generally with lower scores, than was the case in the RFC and RNAS.

At the time of the outbreak of World War II, the RAF did not have in place the categorisation of claims as ‘destroyed’, ‘probable’ or ‘damaged’. These were introduced on 12 August 1940, as the Battle of Britain entered its second phase. Prior to this at the start of the war there had been only two categories, dating from an instruction of 29 August 1939. These were ‘conclusive’, which indicated that the aircraft had been destroyed, or ‘inconclusive’, where it broke away, suggesting that it had been damaged. At the end of March 1940 Air Ministry ruled that ‘conclusive’ had to include independent witnesses. This situation lasted for just one month until Fighter Command managed to persuade Air Ministry that this was impracticable.

Categorisation then became ‘destroyed’ (confirmed) or ‘equivocal destroyed’ (unconfirmed); in the latter case the pilot’s word was accepted. This categorisation therefore covered the period of the Battle of France and the July and early August 1940 convoy battles over the English Channel.

When the new categorisation was introduced in August, the earlier ‘unconfirmed destroyed’ category was treated as effectively ‘probably destroyed’, leading the following year to the downgrading of some recorded squadron totals. This in itself caused some complaint on the grounds that the rules for ‘unconfirmed destroyed’ had been rather more stringent than those for the ‘probable’ classification, and that the reclassification was not therefore a fair one.

Now the fun really starts! It becomes clear that totals recorded in decoration citations relating to the fighting over France and Dunkirk in May and June 1940 almost certainly include an amalgam of confirmed and unconfirmed destroyed, and shares. Thus for instance a recorded six victories may relate to one and one shared confirmed, two and two shared unconfirmed. The only way of checking is via squadron record books, combat reports or individual pilots’ logbooks. However, this period is the most difficult of all to obtain such information for. The Air Component squadrons were ordered to burn all their records before evacuating France around 20–22 May, and indeed did so. 85, 87, 607 and 615 Squadrons particularly (some of the most successful units in the campaign) were four of those involved. Indeed in the case of 615 Squadron, the mobile office containing all the pilots’ logbooks was itself destroyed by bombing.

With units sending detachments out to France from England on an ‘ad hoc’ basis, for Fighter Command to keep records was also a less than perfect system in the chaotic conditions of the ‘Blizkrieg’. Bear in mind too, that many of the pilots involved were of pre-war vintage, those who survived now mostly being octogenarians. Logbooks of that period were not always kept up as fully as was the case later in the war. Indeed in some squadrons, recording other than the specific details of a flight — serial, hours flown and type of sortie — was actively discouraged on the grounds that the books were Air Ministry property, not the private diaries of the holders, or that if captured by the enemy, they might thereby provide information of assistance to the other side.

Logbooks have on many occasions been lost later in the war, or since, whilst many combat reports have disappeared from the archives during the past 50 years. It needs to be stated categorically therefore, that the period up to mid August 1940 must be treated as subject to uncertainty since the records are more incomplete for this period than at any other time.

Records were also incomplete or non-existent in regard to the early period of the defence of Malta, and the retreat from Greece in April-May 1941. Research has allowed much of the detail of the operations over these areas to be reconstructed, but one unit in particular continues to elude satisfactory resolution. This is 33 Squadron, whose operational diaries for the period in the Egyptian/Libyan Desert during late 1940-early 1941, as well as those covering subsequent operations in Greece and Crete, were lost during the retreat from the latter area.

Some of the records were also incomplete for units involved in the summer 1942 fighting in North Africa during the retreat from Gazala to El Alamein, but by and large this campaign has proved capable of almost complete coverage. There remain a few gaps here, and also during some of the early fighting over Tunisia in late 1942.

In the Far East, the period of the initial Japanese attack from December 1941 to May 1942 again caused records to be destroyed or inaccurately recorded, for obvious reasons. However in our work on the two-volume Bloody Shambles, we believe we have reconstructed the situation here to a reasonable degree.

Elsewhere a combination of operational record books (Forms 540 and 541) of squadrons and wings, combat reports, Fighter Command Combats and Casualties, and other Command summaries have provided an amalgam of information of at least 90% accuracy. In the final months of the war 2nd Tactical Air Force at last introduced a Claims Assessment Board which for the first time provided a confirmation system as thorough as that employed by the US air forces, Luftwaffe and Armée de l’Air. Additionally, a considerable number of logbooks have been viewed, and much additional information has been gleaned from these.

Finally there remains the thorny issue of overclaiming. Detailed research into a variety of claims, aided by the records of all combatants involved, leads to the conclusion that overclaiming in fighter combat is endemic — certainly in the conditions appertaining in World War II. Rarely does this seem to have been deliberate, but it does need to be borne in mind that we are dealing here with confident, aggressive young men who can hardly be blamed on occasion for seeing what they expected and hoped to see! The introduction of gun cameras on a wider basis later in the war tended to improve accuracy, but never fully coped with the situation where several pilots were firing at the same aircraft without noting the involvement of the others.

Generally it can be said that claims by night fighters were the most accurate since they were engaged in a ‘one-to-one’ situation. Attacks on individual aircraft, or on small bomber formations by single units of fighters also tended to result in fairly accurate claims. However, the larger the formations involved, particularly when the number of units on each side also multiplies, the greater is the situation fraught with opportunities for overclaiming to occur. The scenario most likely to produce such results is a whirling fighter-v-fighter engagement involving considerable numbers of aircraft, taking place above the sea, or over enemy territory, where subsequent counting of wrecks cannot take place. In such circumstances, through much of the war, experience shows that one loss for two claims represents a reasonable degree of accuracy. Frequently this can be shown to degenerate to one loss for three or four claims. The cross-Channel sweeps of 1941–2 are a particularly good example of this.

Commonwealth pilots were frequently ill-served by their own higher commands for a variety of reasons. Follow-up checking of claims was not undertaken by any reliable authority — either because there were more pressing things to be done, as in the Battle of Britain, or because it was not practicable, when action took place over enemy territory. British Intelligence, with its access to ‘Ultra’, was usually well aware of the true level of German losses; consequently detailed assessment of claims may well have appeared superfluous, and on occasion likely to be damaging to morale. These factors would certainly have contributed to the Air Ministry’s declared policy of not issuing formal confirmation of claims, or of recognising the concept of the ‘ace’.

Further, until late in the war, air-to-air gunnery training appears to have been abysmal. We have been drawn to the conclusion that prior to the war the RAF concentrated upon flying skills, such as formation aerobatics, etc. Air firing seems almost to have been treated as a vulgar occasional necessity, dealt with by an armament practice camp once a year. This would certainly have accorded with the desires of a parsimonious Treasury, anxious not to employ public funds on a liberal expenditure of ammunition ! Coupled with that, the Air Ministry’s espousal of the bomber as the principal weapon of the RAF, and the expectation that its fighters would be involved only in a defensive role against hostile bombers, rather than opposing fighters, meant that little attention was paid to the deflection ‘snapshooting’ necessary for fighter-v-fighter combat. Indeed it was believed in some quarters that the high performance of modern monoplane fighters would render it impossible for such activities to be indulged in. This situation seems to have pertained also in the US Army Air Corps, in direct contrast to the US Navy and the Luftwaffe, where it was fully expected that their fighters would engage in an air superiority duel with their opposite numbers. The latter therefore saw their fighters essentially as flying guns, training them accordingly.

The valuable experience gained by many of the Luftwaffe’s pilots in Spain during the civil war there, only confirmed this situation, allowing them to develop tactics and formations appropriate to this role. The same circumstances applied to the Japanese, arising from their experiences in China and Mongolia.

Thus it was that many RAF pilots who were able to achieve quite marked success against the bomber formations met in 1940, found themselves experiencing much greater difficulties in bringing their guns to bear on the Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs that proved to be their main opponents over the years that followed. Numerous pilots have informed us that not until they had attended courses at the Central Gunnery School, or similar establishments set up later in the war, did they feel that they knew how and were able to shoot accurately and with a high probability of success against opposing fighters.

Compounding this problem, the stream of black exhaust smoke emanating from the Daimler-Benz engines of the Luftwaffe’s Messerschmitt Bf109s, and the violent evasive manoeuvres of their highly-experienced pilots, appear in many cases to have persuaded Allied pilots that their destruction had been achieved when in fact thay had suffered only minor damage, if any at all.

Subsequent post-war research, including particularly that by ‘aviation archaeologists’, has on occasion proved that an aircraft claimed only as damaged or probable, had in fact fallen. On several occasions we have been asked if such aircraft should not be included in the relevant pilot’s total. Our response has been that we seek here to record the claims made and accepted in good faith at the time. Where such circumstances as that recorded above have occurred, we have indicated this by footnote. Logically, if we are to include victories confirmed long after the war in this way, we should also discount those proved not to have been correct, and here we would be opening a ‘can of worms’ that would prove virtually impossible to cope with.

So how have we dealt with the various constraints and circumstances that have been highlighted here, and which were not recognised as such 30 years ago when we wrote the original book? Firstly, the reader may have noted a subtle change of title. Since we cannot be categoric regarding individual totals in certain cases, this has become a book about pilots who were successful in aerial combat. You will find no ‘league table’ of scores this time, as we can no longer be sure that we are comparing like with like. Each pilot’s biography has been made as complete and concise as possible within the constraints of space, while those claims we have been able to find (which we believe to be the vast majority) are listed in order that readers may assess for themselves, together with the relevant squadron summaries, the conditions under which each pilot operated, and the level of achievement thereby indicated.

Are they all ‘aces’? No, not in the strict sense of the word. We have had to set ourselves a number of criteria, and seek to adhere to these. Firstly we considered, should we include only those pilots whose scores added up to five or more, by an amalgamation of fractions where necessary? We decided that the uncertainties of the 1940 period made this difficult to achieve in many cases. Secondly, several pilots long listed as ‘aces’ would then have to be left out. Yet frequently these were leaders, with interesting and worthwhile wartime careers, some of them notable commanders of high rank after the war. We decided therefore that:

(A)   We would include pilots who had participated in the confirmed claims for shooting down five aircraft, provided that the shares considered were generally not lower than ¼ — i.e. shared with three or less other pilots. This involves the addition to the book of some 60–70 pilots who were not included originally.

(B)   We would delete only those pilots where clearly there had been some misunderstanding over their status originally, and who there can never have been any question of them having made five claims, or anything near this figure. We list these separately, so that readers of the original edition are not led to believe that they have simply been forgotten.

(C)   We would leave in the book pilots previously reputed to have been aces, who proved to have lower scores, but who are still considered worthy of inclusion in order that the make-up of their totals can be seen. There was a level of self-protection in this decision, as otherwise, from past experience, no matter what we write here, we will receive an endless stream of letters saying You included Fred Bloggs in the first edition! Why have you missed him out of this one?

(D)   Finally, because we felt that the inclusion of pilots in category (A) might be a little unfair to those who claimed four clear individual successes, there is a list — but no more than that — of those we know to have achieved that total.

There is also a list of those claiming five or more V-1 flying bombs shot down. This has been arranged alphabetically this time, instead of in score order, to allow easier reference to the pilots’ names. Whilst the most successful of all pilots against V-1s, Squadron Leader Joseph Berry, did not claim five aircraft shot down, his biographical notes are included because of his unique achievement.

___________________________

So what is an ‘ace’? The term was introduced by the French quite early in World War I to describe a pilot credited with five or more aerial victories. It was a term well-understood in France and the USA in particular. To this day every US fighter pilot is fully aware that the elusive fifth victory secures for him a place in aviation’s Hall of Fame, and the American Fighter Aces Association is a thriving body with several hundred members.

In the United Kingdom the concept has never been officially recognised by the authorities, and while some British and Commonwealth fighter pilots fully understand the term, many others still do not. These latter group remain under the impression that the term relates purely to the high-claiming few, who became widely lionized by the popular Press. Many asked the authors whilst being interviewed, Why me — I’m not an ace, when we knew that they had perhaps seven or eight confirmed victories to their credit.

It should be made clear that many fine pilots never became aces, either through lack of opportunity, or sheer circumstance, or because they were killed or injured before they were able to build up their scores. To judge a fighter pilot purely by the number of his victories is as unfair as to judge a fisherman purely by the number of fish he catches. Given the necessary skill and the right tools, an element of luck must always exist to put the right man in the right place at the right moment.

Large numbers of highly-decorated pilots spent their time involved mainly in ground-support activities. They deserve a book of their own. It would have been an attractive proposition to include all decorated fighter pilots — but space prevents. The claims criteria may not be considered by some to be an entirely fair one to adopt, but it does provide a yardstick which allows selection to be made of a particular body of pilots. This is not just a book about fighter pilots — it is a book about fighter pilots who achieved a degree of success in aerial combat, which must still be considered the fighter’s predominant role and duty.

In describing the circumstances under which the RAF and Commonwealth air forces operated during World War II, we concluded the opening chapter of the first edition much as follows:

As has been mentioned already, becoming an ace was partly luck. It is therefore necessary to consider the campaigns and areas of combat which produced aces among the forces under review. There are three distinct kinds of ace, though many aces in fact combine something of each. These are:

(i)   The defensive ace: that is, the pilot flying over his own country or lines, in an effort to prevent the enemy attaining air superiority.

(ii)   The offensive ace: the pilot flying into the enemy’s territory to seek out and destroy him, in an effort to attain air superiority.

(iii)   The night fighter: unlike the other two categories, he must fly alone, rather than in a pack, accompanied only by his ‘alter ego’, the radar operator; they must proceed with infinite patience and caution in order to stalk and catch their prey.

The battles which have produced the largest numbers of British aces have been the defensive ones, and this is generally the case, unless the enemy being attacked has a large number of aircraft of indifferent performance (as occurred during the German invasion of Russia in 1941). The defensive pilot is flying over his own lines, thus if shot down he can often take to his parachute, or crash-land, and return to action in a matter of hours. He is also fighting large numbers of opposing aircraft and has plenty of targets to pick from. As he does not have to fly long distances to and from the area of fighting, he can generally remain there longer. However, he is generally outnumbered, and his attackers usually have the advantage of height and initiative. Frequently also, the defender is flying an aircraft which is technically inferior to his opponent. In the early years of the war it was considerably more of a feat for a Hurricane pilot to shoot down a Messerschmitt Bf109, than for a Bf109, pilot to shoot down a Hurricane. Consideration of this fact adds further to the achievements of the RAF pilots.

Since the end of the Second World War much has been written regarding the scores claimed by the leading aces of the combatant nations, and the great differences here have led to much misunderstanding, controversy and speculation. During the First World War the opposing air forces operated in very similar manners and roles, over the same fronts. Generally, the aircraft in use were reasonably well-matched, and as a result the leading pilots of each country claimed closely comparable numbers of victories. However, during the war of 1939–1945 the position of the various air forces and the pilots therein were greatly different.

At the outbreak of the war, each of the combatant nations possessed a nucleus of highly trained fighter pilots. Only the Germans however, had the advantage of actual combat experience due to the involvement in Spain, which has already been mentioned. During the first eighteen months of the war the only air force met by the Luftwaffe which had aircraft of a comparable performance to its own was that of the British. Thus during the fighting in Poland, France and the Low Countries, experienced pilots met less experienced opponents with inferior equipment, and were able to build up good scores and add to their own prowess. Further, the attacking German fighters almost always enjoyed the advantage of height, sun and surprise. The Luftwaffe continued to enjoy these tactical advantages during much of the Battle of Britain, although operating at extreme range, and with an overwater flight home.

Throughout this period the standard German fighter, the Bf109, was superior in many ways to all opposing aircraft which it met, with the exception of the Spitfire. Not surprisingly, the end of 1940 found the Luftwaffe’s leading aces (known as ‘Experten’) with somewhat higher scores than their opposite numbers in the RAF. In 1941 the situation changed considerably. New pilots began to pour into the RAF from the Commonwealth training schemes, and many veterans of 1940 were withdrawn for training duties. Germany on the other hand, preparing for war on two fronts, found pilots at a premium. Experienced fighters could not be spared for training duties, much less staff jobs, and remained in action for many months, and often years.

In the Middle East it was the same story. Here the first German fighters to arrive, already veterans of the campaigns of 1940, met British pilots who had previously flown only against the Italians, and who generally were flying aircraft of somewhat lesser performance than the Messerschmitt. It was to be in Russia however, that the German pilots really began to build up their scores. Experienced, confident, and flying excellent aircraft, they now met large numbers of inexperienced pilots in old and outclassed aircraft which they shot down by the hundred. For the remainder of the war in the East, German pilots were never short of targets, and being based close to relatively static front lines, were able to take off several times a day. This sort of fighting, similar to that during 1918, continued until late 1944. Many pilots remained in action throughout the whole of this period, and it is little wonder that their scores frequently rose well over the 100 mark.

In the West the growing weight of the Allied air offensive provided plenty of opportunties for aggressive and experienced defending pilots further to increase their scores. This pattern is followed by most of the Axis nations, particularly the Japanese; early victories over poorly equipped opponents, followed by the situation where experienced pilots were fighting defensively for many months against large numbers of opposing aircraft. However the cost was high, and it is interesting to note that more than half the leading German and Japanese aces did not survive the war, whereas the vast majority of British and American aces did so.

To return to the RAF after 1940, the opportunities for meeting Axis aircraft decreased sharply. Although the campaigns in the Western Desert and North Africa, and occasional big battles over Europe provided some air combat, many pilots flew dozens of sorties without ever meeting the enemy. As the supply of pilots increased, the system of tours was reinforced whereby after a period of operations, pilots spent a further period on non-operational duties. Pilots who ran up big scores were withdrawn from action to pass on their skills to new pilots at Operational Training Units and Gunnery Schools. The theory behind this policy was that a pilot who might have gained ten more victories, instead possibly taught 100 pilots each how to shoot down one enemy aircraft, and thus greatly assisted the war effort. The result was a large number of well-trained pilots, and was in many ways a wise and correct course to take, although it did at times result in a high loss rate amongst inexperienced new pilots. It did mean however, that Allied aces were still further denied the opportunity afforded to those in the Axis forces of building up high scores. The American forces, with their vast supply of manpower, utilised this system to an even greater degree and the scores of their top aces are closely comparable with those of the RAF.

Thus, due to the totally different conditions and circumstances under which the Allied and Axis air forces operated, it is unfair and unrealistic to compare the totals of the ace on opposing sides. Without doubt, given the same opportunities as the Luftwaffe pilots, many of those covered in this book would have had totals comparable with those of Hartmann (352), Novotny (258), Phillip (213), Mölders (115), Galland (103) and other top Luftwaffe aces.

During the course of the war the ‘ace’ pilots claimed something over 60 percent of all confirmed victories, though during the early years of the fighting this percentage was considerably higher. Yet the 1,200-odd pilots included here represent only about 5–6 percent of all fighter pilots serving with the Commonwealth air forces during the war. That is why we consider this book is totally justified, and why we wished to produce this new edition, fully to record for posterity their jointly outstanding contribution to the war effort, and to history.

Those not included in this edition, who were listed in the original book but where we now know for certain that they were incorporated in error, due probably to some misleading press report or inaccurate citation, are as follows:

AMBROSE, Squadron Leader Henry, DFC & Bar 175, 181 and 257 Squadrons

BARKER, Sergeant Gordon 80 Squadron

BELLMAN, Flight Sergeant Gordon Eugene

BUNGEY, Squadron Leader Robert Wilton, DFC, RAAF 226, 79, 145 and 452 Squadrons

FITZGERALD, Wing Commander Thomas Bernard, DFC, RNZAF 607, 41, 141 and 14 RNZAF Squadrons

GAUTHIER, Pilot Officer Cleo, RCAF 261 Squadron

GAWITH, Wing Commander Alan Antill, DFC, RNZAF 23 Squadron, 1451 Flight

GILLAN, Wing Commander John Woodburn, DFC & Bar 111 and 222 Squadrons

KEARNEY, Flying Officer James Timothy, DFC 31 RAAF Squadron

LANOWSKI, Flight Lieutenant Witold Alexander (Polish) 308, 317, 302 Squadrons, 56th Fighter Group (All claims with USAAF)

MARRA, Flight Lieutenant Terence B 243, 67 and 146 Squadrons

McDONALD, Squadron Leader Kenneth Neal, DFC, RAAF 31 RAAF Squadron

MULLINER, Squadron Leader Reginald William Lee, DFC & Bar 222 and 183 Squadrons

NICHOLLS, Group Captain Charles William Kelvin, DSO, RAAF 17 RNZAF Squadron

PIOTROWSKI, Wing Commander Maciek, OBE, DFC & Bar (Polish) 309 and 316 Squadrons

REMLINGER, Commandant Jacques (French) 341 and 602 Squadrons

TENNANT, Wing Commander Eric, DFC 69 Squadron

THOMAS, Squadron Leader Rhys Henry, DSO, DFC 92, 603, 129, 266 and 66 Squadrons

van ARKEL, Lieutenant Colonel J (Dutch) 41, 167 and 322 Squadrons (claimed 12 V-1s — see V-1 ace list)

WHITLEY, Group Captain Eric William, DSO, DFC (New Zealander) 245 Squadron

YAXLEY, Wing Commander Robert Gordon, MC, DSO, DFC 252 and 272 Squadrons

CHAPTER TWO

Fighter Operations During the War

Before considering in depth the details of the individual squadrons and pilots involved in fighter operations with the RAF, FAA and Commonwealth units, it will be helpful to trace the course of such operations in a more generalised manner throughout the course of the war, and in the many areas of the world over which they occurred.

With the declaration of war on Germany by Britain and France on 3 September 1939, several squadrons of Hurricanes moved across the Channel to be based in France. 1 and 73 Squadrons became a part of the Advanced Air Striking Force, located near the Franco-German border in the area of the Siegfried (West Wall) and Maginot lines. Their task was to provide escort and airfield defence for the Component’s bombers — the Fairey Battle squadrons withdrawn from Bomber Command’s 1 Group. Two further units, 85 and 87 Squadrons, were to form the fighter element of the Air Component, based further north and west near the Belgian border, to support the British Expeditionary Force. They were soon to be joined by two Gloster Gladiator-equipped Auxiliary Air Force units, 607 and 615 Squadrons.

Western Europe then settled into the ‘Phoney War’, little activity being seen other than some patrol and reconnaissance flights over the Western Front, which led to some desultory engagements.

The squadrons in England experienced even less activity, though those based in Scotland and Northumberland did become involved in occasional interceptions of bombers from North Germany seeking to reconnoitre and bomb Royal Navy vessels in the Scapa Flow and Rosyth areas.

After a particularly hard winter, the early spring of 1940 brought some limited increase in activity over France, but in early April the Germans launched an invasion of Denmark and Norway. Attempts to aid the Norwegians led to the despatch of forces both to central and northern Norway, supported initially by aircraft carriers of the Royal Navy. At the start of the campaign some of the Navy’s Blackburn Skua fighter-dive bombers achieved a notable success, flying from the Orkneys to sink the cruiser Königsberg in Bergen harbour — the first operational loss of a major warship to aircraft. Thereafter operating from the carriers off the coast, these underpowered aircraft enjoyed a surprising degree of success against the largely unescorted German bombers operating over central Norway. Particularly successful was Lieutenant WP Lucy, who had led the attack on Königsberg.

An initial attempt to base RAF fighters on a frozen lake at Aandalsnes proved little short of disastrous. The Gladiators of 263 Squadron flew off a carrier to this area, but lost all their aircraft in a few days, mainly on the ground, for the achievement of relatively few victories. Later this unit, reequipped, together with 46 Squadron with Hurricanes, were flown off to the Narvik area, where considerably greater success was achieved. At the start of June the majority of the remaining aircraft were flown back aboard HMS Glorious for evacuation to the UK, as a general withdrawal began. This not inconsiderable feat came to naught when the carrier was intercepted and sunk by German battlecruisers, only two of the pilots aboard surviving. Others for whom there had been no aircraft, returned safely in transport vessels, the two units being reformed rapidly. (The story of all these early operations, from September 1940 to the fall of Norway, is told in detail in Fledgling Eagles, another title in the Grub Street series).

In France the start of the major German spring offensive which began by invading Holland and Belgium, and driving armoured units through the Ardennes forests to outflank the French frontier defences, became known as the ‘Blitzkrieg’. From 10 May 1940 all units were involved in constant heavy action, suffering attacks on their airfields, and frequent moves during an increasingly chaotic retreat. 607 and 615 Squadrons had just completed re-equipment with Hurricanes, whilst 3, 79 and 501 Squadrons were at once rushed to France, rapidly followed by other Hurricane units from Fighter Command.

As losses mounted, flights from other units were sent over, often on a daily basis, returning at dusk, and a number of composite squadrons were formed, usually only briefly. Within ten days withdrawl of Air Component units became necessary due to the pace of the German advance, although those with the AASF, accompanying the French forces retreating southwards towards Brittany, were to remain for much longer.

At the start of the invasion of Holland, Spitfires from 19 and 66 Squadrons, Hurricanes of 17, 32 and 56 Squadrons, the new two-seat Defiant turret fighters of 264 Squadron, and Blenheim Ifs of 600 and 604 Squadrons operated for a few days in the Dutch coastal area until that nation’s surrender. Following this 54 and 65 Squadron’s Spitfires continued to patrol over the Dutch and north Belgian coastal region.

Sir Hugh Dowding, AOC of Fighter Command, resolutely refused to send Spitfires to France, but during May elements of 601 and 504 Squadrons moved over with their Hurricanes, followed by detachments from 17, 32, 56, 111, 145, 151, 213, 229 and 253 Squadrons. As the BEF withdrew towards the Dunkirk area in late May, and evacuation became the only possibility, the Spitfires were thrown in alongside the Hurricanes, but operating from bases in south-east England. Many of the Hurricane units, now withdrawn from France, operated alongside them, and here for the first time a degree of aerial superiority was achieved over the Luftwaffe, albeit at high cost and of a transitory nature. Units involved here from 21 May onwards included 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 92, 222, 266, 609, 610, 611 and 616 Squadrons with Spitfires, most of the Hurricane units already mentioned, joined by 245 and 605 Squadrons, and 264 Squadron with Defiants.

With the conclusion of the Dunkirk evacuation, squadrons continued to operate over France, escorting bombers which were supporting French forces still resisting further south. Indeed it was not until quite late in June that 1, 73 and 501 Squadrons, more recently reinforced by 17 and 242 Squadrons, were to withdraw via the Channel Islands, prior to the French Armistice.

July saw the start of the English Channel convoy battles, which comprised the first phase of the Battle of Britain. This epic conflict, lasting until the autumn of 1940, has been dealt with in such detail elsewhere as to require little further mention here. It was to see the steady introduction of further new RAF fighter squadrons, together with the first of those formed with qualified and experienced foreign pilots escaped from the debacle on the continent. Notable amongst these were the Poles of 302 and 303 Squadrons, and the Czechs of 310 and 312. Other pilots from these nations, together with French and Belgian nationals, flew in RAF units. The latter would have their own squadrons in due course. Another unit to see its first action at this time was 1 RCAF Squadron (later to be renumbered 401 Squadron, to avoid confusion). Some American volunteers also began to reach squadrons at this time.

During the summer of 1940 the first night bombing attacks were made on targets in the UK, initially being met by the Blenheim Ifs, which had been relegated as unsuitable for most daytime roles in Western Europe, and by Hurricanes and Spitfires operating in the dark. Without radar, these activities were based mainly on luck in all but conditions of the brightest moonlight. Some early success was achieved, notably by Michael Herrick of 25 Squadron in a Blenheim, but the solution was already to hand — airborne interception radar operating in close conjunction with ground control. First AI sets in their rudimentary form were tested in Blenheims during the summer, but before the year was out, the first examples of the powerful new Bristol Beaufighter began to reach chosen squadrons, these aircraft being equipped with relatively effective early AI equipment. As a stop-gap the Defiants, which had suffered severe casualties by day, and had been withdrawn, were thrown into the night role, their two-man crews providing a little more prospect of success than was to prove possible with the single-seat Hurricanes. Spitfires rapidly showed themselves to be quite unsuitable for night work.

At the outbreak of war, training in the art of aerial fighting had generally been left to the squadrons themselves. Early experience showed that in times of war, training of this kind required to be undertaken prior to joining a squadron. Consequently the Fighter Command Group Pilot Pools were rapidly expanded and developed into Operational Training Units. Even before the withdrawl from France, experienced pilots from the AASF units were being pulled out when it was felt they were in need of a rest, and posted to these new units to pass on the benefit of their experience to the new young accolytes. This procedure would be enhanced and refined throughout the war, and few were the experienced fighter pilots who did not spend at least one period as instructors at these vital establishments between their operational ‘tours’.

Whilst Fighter Command fought desperately for its own, and it country’s continued freedom and existence during the summer of 1940, action had broken out elsewhere. As the French collapse became imminent, Benito Mussolini, the Italian Fascist dictator, had declared war on Britain and France as an ally of Germany, in order to seize spoils of war amongst the African colonial possessions of the Allied partners, and to reinforce Italy’s sphere of influence in the Mediterranean. Attacks were made on the south of France by the Regia Aeronautica, and later in the year a small force was despatched to Belgium to take part in the Luftwaffe’s attacks on England.

On Malta, still an important staging base for the Royal Navy, an ‘ad hoc’ flight of Sea Gladiators, manned by RAF flyingboat pilots, had been formed, and this was rapidly reinforced by the arrival of a few Hurricanes and their pilots before the fall of France. These offered an initial resistance to early Italian air raids, which were not to be particularly sustained. In August the first of many deliveries of fighters flown off an aircraft carrier to the island occurred, a dozen more Hurricanes allowing 261 Squadron to be formed.

In Egypt the RAF maintained a small force, including three squadrons of Gladiators, 33, 80 and 112. These also received a few Hurricanes in the early days of the war here, which commenced on 10 June 1940, such that in August, 274 Squadron could be formed with these aircraft. 30 Squadron also converted its Blenheim I bombers to the fighter configuration. A unit also arrived from Australia, 3 RAAF Squadron being intended for army co-operation duties. However its role rapidly changed to that of a fighter unit, and it too received Gladiators.

Initial action over the Egyptian-Libyan frontier area was brisk, if restricted, but in September an Italian invasion began. The vastly outnumbered British force fell back, but the Italian thrust soon ran out of steam, and they dug in a few miles into Egypt, a period of stalemate commencing. Meanwhile in October Mussolini invaded north-western Greece from Albania, but was held in the Epirus mountains by a fierce Greek resistance. RAF help was at once offered, 30 and 80 Squadrons, together with a number of bomber units, moving to this new area.

In East Africa a substantial Italian colonial empire existed, and defence against the forces here was also necessary, since incursions into British Somaliland, the Sudan and Kenya, and against Aden were to be anticipated. In the Sudan were some units of elderly bombers, but no fighters. A flight of Gladiators from 112 Squadron was flown down from Egypt to join 14 Squadron on attachment. In Aden 94 Squadron was already in existence, equipped with a limited number of Gladiators, while in Kenya 1 SAAF Squadron arrived, equipped with a few Hurricanes and Hawker Fury biplanes. Some of the pilots had been flown up to Egypt to receive Gladiators, with which they then moved to the Sudan, whilst the balance of the unit and its aircraft in Kenya formed the nucleus of a new 2 SAAF Squadron.

To supply the various areas in which British forces were thus employed required control of the Mediterranean, and to ensure this, naval forces were based at each end of this sea. The Mediterranean Fleet, based at Alexandria enjoyed the presence from September 1940 onwards of the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, carrying 806 Squadron with the Fleet Air Arm’s new Fairey Fulmar two-seat fighters. Prior ot that the Fleet only had HMS Eagle, without a formal fighter squadron, but with a detachment of Sea Gladiators aboard. Thus was the stage set for a long period of sustained action for the British fighter forces.

Summarised fairly briefly, the small-scale, but nonetheless important campaign in East Africa saw the conclusion of a series of successful battles by April 1941, with the virtual annihilation of the Italian forces in the area, although the final elements were not to surrender until November. The conclusion of the fighting here allowed the units operating in Ethiopia and Eritrea to be moved north to reinforce those in North Africa. In the latter area an offensive launched against the Italians in December 1940, rolled up the Italian armies and led to their retreat right across Cyrenaica (the eastern province of Libya), British Commonwealth forces reaching Tripolitania by early March 1941.

This success coincided with a decision by the government to reinforce Greece, which was now considered to be under threat of German invasion. Many units were withdrawn from the Western Desert for service in this country, including 33 and 112 Squadrons. Egypt meanwhile was reinforced by 73 Squadron from England, the first of many units to be sent out over the next 18 months.

In April 1941, in order to secure the southern flanks prior to the planned invasion of the Soviet Union, and following a show of defiance by the Yugoslavs, German forces invaded Yugoslavia and Greece, whilst a force was sent to Libya to bolster the Italians there, preceded by the arrival of Luftwaffe units in Sicily to neutralise Malta and the British fleets in the Mediterranean.

In rapid succession, Malta’s defences were almost overwhelmed; the carrier Illustrious was badly damaged; the overstretched forces in Libya were forced to retreat right back into Egypt, and those in Greece were obliged to evacuate to Crete after a fighting withdrawal. In May an airborne invasion took Crete, and an Axis-supported insurrection in Iraq threatened the Allied rear in the Middle East. This catalogue of disasters finally halted when much of the German strength was withdrawn to take part in the Russian adventure, which commenced on 22 June 1941.

In the UK, the Battle of Britain had become the ‘Blitz’, and during the first six months of 1941 a sustained battle was fought between the night defenders and the German bomber force, the fighters taking a steadily increasing toll. Many new fighter squadrons were formed for both day and night operations, and included the first units of US volunteers — the ‘Eagle’ squadrons. Spitfire IIs and Vs steadily supplanted the earlier Mark Is, whilst the Hurricane units either received Mark II versions of their aircraft in their a, b or c versions, or re-equipped with Spitfires. Whilst Luftwaffe fighter sweeps and fighter-bomber attacks continued, increasing numbers of offensive operations were flown over occupied France and Belgium, usually involving a small group of bombers escorted by large numbers of fighters.

As the invasion of the Soviet Union approached, and as Luftwaffe units were withdrawn to re-equip, rest, or see service in the Mediterranean area, the ‘Blitz’ suddenly died away, while resistance to the daytime intrusions became sporadic. Not for the last time, RAF opinion was that the Germans had been seen off. So began a pattern which was to continue for most of the next two and a half years. Able to assist the new Russian allies only by action in the Middle East or by air over Europe, the night bomber offensive was pressed forward by Bomber Command. To hold as many Luftwaffe fighter and Flak units as possible in Western Europe, Fighter Command joined the bombers in a so-called ‘Non-Stop Offensive’. ‘Circus’ operations, involving small bomber forces with vast fighter escorts sought to draw up the Germans for a battle of attrition, supported by all-fighter ‘Ramrods’ and ‘Rodeos’. In poor weather pairs and quartets of fighters went over at low level on ‘Rhubarbs’ to shoot up targets of opportunity. Shipping along the European coastline was attacked, as were the Atlantic ports used by German U-Boats and surface raiders, whilst by night ‘intruder’ Hurricanes, Havocs and Defiants sought aircraft over the German bomber airfields as they took off and landed.

It was a costly period, where success was constantly over-estimated. With many experienced pilots of 1940 rested, posted to the new Middle East war zone, or out of action due to wounds — or worse — losses inflicted by the experienced German pilots were high. The latter enjoyed all the advantages of height, generally superior aircraft, and of operating over their own territory. Whilst the Messerschmitt Bf109F now in use and the Spitfire V were probably much of a match for each other, the radical Focke-Wulf FW190 which began appearing in increasing numbers from the end of 1941 onwards, was much superior. The Germans engaged or not virtually at will, whilst Fighter Command, faced with oversea flights before and after engagement, fuel shortage over the target due to the restricted range of its fighters, and at this stage still poor tactical formations, had a difficult time.

Increasingly, Hurricanes were realised to be inadequate for the main fighter role, and were relegated to fighter-bombing, night intruding, anti-shipping or non-operational duties — or were shipped elsewhere. In August 1941 two newly-formed squadrons were shipped to North Russia as 151 Wing, to introduce the aircraft to the Red Air Force prior to the delivery of large quantities of the aircraft to aid the Soviets. More were planned to go to the Caucasus in South Russia.

In December 1941 came the Japanese attack in the Far East, which whilst bringing the USA into the war on the Allied side, initially required the despatch of yet more forces and equipment to this new war zone, mainly at the expense of the Mediterranean front, but also of aid to Russia. News of the disastrous reverses in the Far East were made worse in February 1942 by the audacious escape of the German warships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen up the English Channel under the very noses of the British defences, despite desperate efforts to sink them by air attack.

In the Middle East during 1941, the position had been stabilised and improved. Malta faced once more only by Italian attack, had been reinforced to a strength of three squadrons of Hurricanes and a flight for night defence. The island was able to engage in offensive action against Axis shipping crossing the Mediterranean with supplies and reinforcements for the forces in North Africa. Action to subdue Iraq had been followed by a month’s sharp fighting against the Vichy French, including some quite fierce aerial combat, at the end of which Syria had been occupied. Substantially reinforced with Hurricane squadrons from the UK, arriving both from carriers via Malta, and across Africa from Takoradi on the Gold Coast, and by American-built Curtiss Tomahawk (P-40B and C) fighters, delivered by sea mainly to West Africa, the air force in Egypt was greatly strengthened. After two brief and unsuccessful attempts by the army to launch offensives during the summer, a very substantial attack was commenced in November 1941. Known as Operation ‘Crusader’, this was the biggest offensive of the war so far by British forces, and was successful in retaking much of Cyrenaica from the Axis, also allowing a long siege of the port of Tobruk to be raised. During this offensive the units equipped with the new Tomahawks went far to gaining air superiority against the Luftwaffe’s Bf109Es — although the F version of the Messerschmitt was beginning to appear in this area at the time.