The Psychology of Spies and Spying: Trust, Treason, Treachery

By Adrian Furnham and John Taylor

The Psychology of Spies and Spying tells the story of the people involved in spying: the human sources (agents) who betray their country or organisation and the professional intelligence officers who manage the collection and reporting process. It provides a rigorous psychological analysis of the personality and motivation of individuals involved in spying.

This book shows the importance of developing trust between agents and handlers, between agencies and their government and ultimately the public. It shows how agent handlers, operating in environments of complete secrecy, need to manage dark side behaviours because agents are selected for their access to secrets, not for their qualities. It explains why motivation is rarely simple since it is invariably a combination of many issues.It explains how fiction writers are good at developing plots and the characterisation of spies, but few capture the motivation of agents well. Finally spy gadgets and techniques are also described in detail. Included are twelve agent case studies in which most were motivated by ideology, had significant misfortune in their youth and offered their services rather than being coerced into betrayal.

The Psychology of Spies and Spying promotes the view that in the world of intelligence, it is trust not betrayal which dominates the mindset.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Troubador Publishing Ltd
• Release date: Jun 28, 2022
• ISBN: 9781803139890

Adrian Furnham

Adrian Furnham is professor of psychology at UCL, and adjunct professor of management at the Norwegian School of Management. He has written over 1,000 scientific papers and 70 books and is among the most well-known psychologists in the world.

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Copyright © 2022 Adrian Furnham and John Taylor

The moral right of the author has been asserted.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside those terms should be sent to the publishers.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official positions or views of the UK government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying UK government authentication of information. This material has been reviewed by the appropriate authorities in the UK government to prevent disclosure of classified information.

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For Ronnie, Isabella, Jack, Bobby and Lara (jt)

For Alison and Benedict (AF)

Contents

PREFACE

FOREWORDS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PHOTOGRAPHIC CREDITS

AUTHORS’ PROLOGUE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PREFACE

The world of espionage intrigues almost everybody. The spy novel and movie are as popular now as ever. James Bond, Jack Ryan and George Smiley present different images of the spy, and each generates a debate about how realistic they are. We receive regular reports of spies getting caught, diplomats expelled in revenge, and clever new tricks and toys available to those in the spying game. Our research also showed how poorly the agent is represented in fiction.

However, the profession is so secret authors, screenplay writers and journalists can say what they like, knowing full well that they are not going to be contradicted. Authors of ‘fake news’, who have a different, more malevolent agenda also have free rein to say what they like. This means it is hard to know what spies really do, how they are selected and how they go about their shady, cloak-and-dagger work. It is quite simply very difficult to be well informed about the world of espionage – for good reason.

Our aim in writing ‘The Psychology of Spies and Spying’ is not to expose all, or to criticise those who do write about espionage. We love the spy novel and film as much as anyone else. Our aim is to pull together information from open sources and present a picture of spying which is closer to the truth. We do so from a privileged position as we have had extensive contact over many decades with agencies from all over the world. We can therefore identify from the enormous quantity of freely available academic and other sources, material that is closer to the truth.

When we were writing the book, we asked friends what they thought a book on this topic would contain. What surprised us was how difficult the question seemed to be to answer, yet how intrigued they all were by what we said it did contain. The world of spying is so full of myths and misconceptions, we felt it was time to put things straight.

Authors may wish to draw on the book if they wish to introduce more realism or a different perspective in their works. Prospective candidates for employment in the intelligence world will, we hope, find this a useful antidote to the more extreme fictional works. And we would even like to think that there will be something in this book which may help intelligence officers develop into more effective source handlers.

The real world is no less exciting than the fictional. We have come across few intelligence officers who found their work boring or who left for more stimulating work. And impressively, as we note, their world is built more on trust than deceit.

We have chosen to view this world from the perspective of psychology and to focus on that most enigmatic of individuals in the spying world – the agent, the human source of intelligence. One reason for doing so is because there is a surprising amount of material available – biographies and autobiographies, newspaper reports, even television interviews. We are also, like everybody, fascinated by what motivates someone to betray their country.

We have called upon many friends and contacts to get feedback on what we have written and which we hope, has made us write more clearly and succinctly. We are responsible for any errors and omissions, though we have tried to minimise these.

We hope you enjoy reading this book as much as we enjoyed writing it.

Adrian Furnham and John Taylor

2022

FOREWORDS

Professor Sir David Omand GCB, former UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator

The primary purpose of gathering intelligence has not changed over the centuries. It is to improve the quality of decision-taking by reducing the ignorance of the decision takers of the dangers they face. They could be military commanders like the Biblical Joshua sending spies into the city of Jericho (where the spies teamed up with the prostitute Rahab, bringing together the world’s two oldest professions). The users of intelligence today are Presidents and Prime Ministers and their Cabinet members and staffs, military and police chiefs and diplomats. Some of what these decision takers need to know in order to make informed and sound choices is information that their adversaries certainly do not want them to have and may go to very violent lengths to keep from them. That is the purpose of secret intelligence, reducing the ignorance of the decision makers in respect of information that others wish to conceal from them. Information that has in effect to be stolen, at first by spies and later by interception of secret messages and diplomatic despatches and most recently by a variety of powerful technical means. But of all the many methods now available the well-placed human agent remains the oldest and surest way into the mind of an adversary.

It is important that the public has a reliable impression of what is really involved in keeping us safe through gathering this vital intelligence. This book therefore performs a public service in demystifying what human intelligence gathering involves and stripping away some of the cliches of popular film and fiction. Truth to tell, this is a vital area of human activity where fact is more surprising, and much more interesting, than fiction. Today, we face serious threats, including from hostile dictators and autocrats and their armed forces, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, cyber and other organized international criminal gangs, all intent on doing things that will harm us. We have repeatedly seen that they will go to extraordinary, often violent, lengths to prevent us accessing the secrets of their capabilities, identities and associates, location, movements, financing and above all their plans and intentions. The inhabitants of the peaceful city of Salisbury in England learned this in 2018 when Russian military intelligence sent two of their assassins to kill Lt Col Skripal, a former GRU officer who had successfully spied for MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service. They used a banned military-grade nerve agent, Novichok, to try to kill Skripal and his daughter but only succeeded in killing an innocent bystander. We need protection from such people. For that, secret intelligence is indispensable.

That in turn means equipping intelligence officers with the means to overcome the will of the person with the secret, who is determined not to give it up. Intelligence professionals have always rightly argued therefore that their difficult and sometimes dangerous job, one that they exercise on our behalf, requires us to accept they will break normal conventions. They will have to be trained to be ‘fishers of men’ and to use a knowledge of human psychology to nudge others into really wanting to cooperate with us. We should remember, too, that today the ideal well-placed agent may be someone with good access to the IT and communications systems of the adversary rather than the traditional recruitment target of a diplomat or intelligence official. Digital and human intelligence are no longer in separate boxes.

The ethos of the case officers of the British Secret Intelligence Service is built on a respect for how decent human beings should behave towards each other, including respect for another’s humanity and fostering trust, a word that rightly runs through this book, not just using other people as an expendable means to an end. But case officers do still in the end have to recruit and manage agents displaying the full spectrum of personalities, not all likeable, as well as quite possibly having psychological troubles. So, as this expert book explains, case officers have to be trained to be able, not cynically but when necessary and proportionate, to manipulate the feelings of others.

What I hope distinguishes our intelligence activity from that used in the service of totalitarian regimes is in the ethical values that our intelligence activity seeks to defend and must therefore embody. The reader will understand that after studying this book.

Michael S Goodman, Professor of Intelligence and International Affairs, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

To be asked to contribute the foreword to this book is both an honour and a privilege. Having grown up engrossed in fictional spy books and films, it was absolutely fascinating to start delving into the history of real-life intelligence work. What became clear very quickly was the central role played by people. This might sound odd or trite, but historians often conflate intelligence work into a simple process where individuals play a bit part and where the key element is the act of espionage. In many ways this is odd; after all, the great spy stories, real or otherwise, are usually about human espionage – the way that agents display heroic acts of derring do to steal secrets and save the world and, in so doing, change the course of history. Yet what is often missing from these tales is the human element of the human espionage. Why, for instance, did someone decide to betray their country? How did clever intelligence officers persuade that person that working for their adversary served their own national interests? What becomes clear from this fascinating book is that at the heart of human intelligence work is psychology.

We tend to focus on the great figures of intelligence work, the great spies who changed the world. Popular stories abound. We all know of GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who was jointly run by SIS and the CIA in the early 1960s and who provided critical intelligence in the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Similarly, Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB resident in the early 1980s, was cleverly run by SIS and passed across very valuable intelligence on the ailing Soviet leadership and their response to the NATO Able Archer exercise. We also know of spies working the other way, of Klaus Fuchs, the naturalised Briton who passed across atomic intelligence to the Soviet Union, or of the vast pool of information that the Cambridge Five passed to Stalin in the 1930s and onwards. These stories dwell on the espionage, but what of the people? Why did Penkovsky, Gordievsky et al decide to offer their services? How did very clever case officers in London and Virginia pick up the whiffs of betrayal and use them to their own national advantages? We assume that the heroes in these stories are the spies themselves, which they most certainly are; after all, they are the ones risking their lives. But what of the secret officers running and controlling them?

This book delves into these sorts of questions. It is pathbreaking and unique. Written by two experts who talk the talk and walk the walk, it provides answers to these sorts of questions. In so doing it debunks a great many myths of intelligence work. This is not the world of James Bond but provides an insight into the way that human intelligence collection works. It is the perfect complement to the spy stories we all know and love and whilst it cannot name the heroes of SIS and other humint agencies, it goes some way to exploring and explaining the invaluable way that such officers operate. I cannot recommend it highly enough.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The task of thanking all those who helped write this book is made so much easier because most want to keep their identities secret. There are however a few who are not so reserved about their association with a book on spying!

Two friends and colleagues must receive a special mention if only by their first names: Peter and Andy. Both read the manuscript and offered many ideas and corrections. The book is much better as a result.

Katie Archibald can be named in full as she has no known connection with any agency. She did the painstaking work of proofreading.

John Hunt is the creator, founder and funder of SPYSCAPE, New York’s #1 rated museum and experience. He was very supportive and helpful in allowing us to use the typographies which formed the basis of Chapter 6.

There are however two people whose assistance and pure hard work have made writing this book so much easier as well as a pleasure and fun. Charlotte Robinson’s research work was excellent and made a big difference to the content of the book. Her contribution went further as she produced ideas and outstanding comment on our manuscripts.

We decided early on to self-publish. We therefore needed an editor who would not only check and edit our scripts, but oversee the formatting, artwork and cover. Anthony Banks did all of this and much more. He contributed enormously to the style and consistency of the manuscripts. He challenged us on statements and comments that we made. He did so with humour and a lightness of touch that while we might have seen the knife going in and seen the blood on the floor, we never felt any pain.

Gail Peachey worked closely with Anthony and produced the cover and much of the artwork in the book.

Looking to the future we will be asking Anthony to help with the marketing of the book; Lara Harris will help with our social media operations; Abi Reynolds with sales and Alison Furnham for making sure the accounts balance.

Our thanks go to all the above whether you are in the limelight or remain in the shadows. We alone carry the responsibility of any mistakes.

PHOTOGRAPHIC CREDITS

Credits for the photographs and images are as follows:

Cover - Anthony Banks and Gail Peachey; Authors’ photographs Adrian Furnham – own photograph; John Taylor - George Torode; page xvi – Commons Wikimedia: Kremlin.ru; page xvii – Commons Wikimedia Kremlin.ru; page 9 - Commons Wikimedia, Mary Anne Fackelman (White House photographer); page 10 – Keystone Press / Alamy Stock Photo; page 12 – SPUTNIK / Alamy Stock Photo; page 23 – Jeff Morgan / Alamy Stock Photo; page 28 – Everett Collection Inc / Alamy Stock Photo; – page 31 - The Guardian newspaper; page 33 – Keystone Press / Alamy Stock Photo; page 39 – Keystone Press / Alamy Stock Photo; page 42 – PA Images / Alamy Stock Photo; page 46 (Edward Lee Howard) – Commons Wikipedia, FBI 4 October 1985; page 46 (Edward Snowden) – Baikal / Alamy Stock Photo; page 47 – Moviestore Collection Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo; page 60 – collation from Commons Wikipedia, Keystone Press / Alamy Stock Photo (Blunt), Ian Dagnall Computing / Alamy Stock Photo (Philby) Getty images; page 61 – ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo; page 74 – PA Images / Alamy Stock Photo; page 78 - 80 Duckrabbit studios; page 102 – Wikimedia commons and Creative Commons:, SVR HQ, Alex Saveliev, SIS HQ, John Lobby, CIA HQ, Carol H Highsmith; page 105– SPYSCAPE; Page 108 – Commons Wikipedia; page 109 – REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo; page 110 – nsf / Alamy Stock Photo; page 118 – Wikimedia Commons; page 131 – Bellingcat; page 134 – Wikimedia Commons; Page 137 - Wikipedia Commons, Thomas Backa; Page 142 – Technika, Sweden; page 144 – Duckrabbit; Page 150 – SPUTNIK / Alamy Stock Photo; page 152 – Wikimedia Commons, National Archives; page 154 – REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo; page 157 – Wikipedia Commons, photograph by Raafat; page 159 – agencja FORUM / Alamy Stock Photo; page 160 – Wikimedia Commons, Sergei Kristo; Page 163 – Wikipedia Commons, FBI; page 165 – Commons Wikimedia, Federal Bureau of Investigations; page 167 – Banks/Peachey; page 169 - Banks/Peachey; page 170 - Creative Commons, Elekes Andor; page 172 – Kristian Buus / Alamy Stock Photo; page 193 – Theodore Liasi / Alamy Stock Photo;

AUTHORS’ PROLOGUE

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and President Putin

Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, just as this book was going to print. As we write this prologue a month later, the invasion is not going well for Russia. There have been military mistakes, but above all else it is a monumental failure of intelligence. We have delayed the printing by a few days so we can include a psychological profile of the man who ordered the invasion – President Putin.

It is a case study of a man whose early career was in the KGB and who has been moulded by that experience. The KGB taught him many skills which will have proved useful – how to win people over, how to influence them and how to eliminate them where necessary. But more than this every intelligence service develops a mindset in its staff, an attitude which determines how they go about their business. The KGB captures the hearts and minds of their officers like few other services.

Putin is a man of modest intellectual abilities, he struggled at school and had to work hard for his degree. We believe it is his determination and drive, combined with his KGB training that has brought him to this phenomenal position of power where he can manipulate those around him to succour his megalomaniac dark side tendencies.

Vladimir Putin, President, Russian Federation

Early life and education

Cultural background is an important influencer on all of us and particularly with Putin’s Russian heritage. In Russia there is a huge discrepancy between the less and the more powerful people. Behaviour must reflect and represent the status roles in all areas of business interactions, be it visits, negotiations or cooperation; the approach should be top-down and provide clear mandates for any task. The photograph below shows how Putin, while using the excuse of Covid social distancing, treated President Macron of France, having in addition made him wait for over an hour before meeting.

When Russians interact with people considered to be strangers, they appear very formal and distant. At the same time formality is used as a sign of respect. They feel very threatened by ambiguity; they avoid uncertainty.

They have a pragmatic mindset. They believe that truth depends very much on situation, context and time. They show an ability to adapt traditions easily to changed conditions, a strong propensity to save and invest, thriftiness and perseverance in achieving results.

Putin in a speech just before the invasion of Ukraine said:

Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent Russian philosopher, writer and TV pundit who is a strong supporter of Putin demonstrates this attitude very well when he said in a recent interview: "There is no such thing as fact only interpretation."

Putin was born in Leningrad in 1952. He has no surviving siblings (his mother had two boys before Putin, both died early). Putin’s parents, Maria and Vladimir, survived the Leningrad siege. His father was badly wounded in the war and suffered great pain from his disfigured legs. Maria also nearly died. By the time the siege was lifted she was no longer able to walk on her own. Many describe Putin’s birth in 1952 as a miracle.

The Putin family lived on the top floor of a five-story block in Leningrad. Their flat was a single room with a shared toilet and stove in the corridor which passed as a kitchen. This however was the experience of many people in Russia at that time.

Putin’s parents doted on him and made many sacrifices for him. They had a television and gave him a wristwatch, a rare and expensive accessory for any age group at that time.

His schooling was unremarkable except that Putin was involved in many fistfights. He had a fierce temper. Putin enjoys speaking about this time. He describes himself as a ‘real thug’.

At 12 Putin developed an ambition to become a KGB officer, inspired in part by a best-selling novel The Shield and the Sword. He may also have been influenced by his father who fought behind enemy lines and reported to the KGB’s forerunner, the NKVD.

Putin’s intellectual ability in his early years was never described as anything more than ‘modest’. He did however have determination and believing he needed to go to a prestigious institute to get into the KGB, he applied to Leningrad university. He left school with the grades of ‘excellent’ in history, German and gym; ‘good’ in geography, Russian and literature and ‘satisfactory’ in physics, chemistry, algebra and geometry.

Leningrad university reportedly had forty people apply for each place. It is something of a mystery as to how he managed to pass the rigorous entry examinations.

Putin married Lyudmila in 1983 and joined the KGB residency in Dresden, East Germany in 1985. Their first daughter, Mariya was born in 1985 in Leningrad and their second, Katerina in 1986 in Dresden. There have been rumours that Putin has had affairs and produced other children. All have been denied by the Kremlin. Putin and Lyudmila divorced in 2013.

Significant career and life experiences and

any close associates/attachments

Aged 22 Putin was approached by the KGB in his last year of university and started his training in Leningrad in 1975. His first job was in counter-intelligence (Second Chief Directorate). He then moved to foreign intelligence (First Chief Directorate), both based in Leningrad. In 1984 he was sent to Moscow for further training and from 1985