Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy: A Scientific Re-Examination of the Mind-Body Problem

By David Låg Tomasi

This book presents an analysis of the correlation between the mind and the body, a complex topic of study and discussion by scientists and philosophers. Drawing largely on neuroscience and philosophy, the author utilizes the scientific method and incorporates lessons learned from a vast array of sources. Based on the most recent cutting-edge scientific discoveries on the Mind-Body problem, Tomasi presents a full examination of multiple fields related to neuroscience. The volume offers a scientist-based and student-friendly journey into medicine, psychology, artificial intelligence, embodied cognition, and social, ecological and anthropological models of perception, to discover our truest self.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Release date: Jan 30, 2020
• ISBN: 9783030353544

Book preview

David Låg Tomasi

Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy

A Scientific Re-Examination of the Mind-Body Problem

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David Låg Tomasi

University of Vermont Integrative Health, University of Vermont Medical Center, Department of Inpatient Psychiatry, Burlington, VT, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-35353-7e-ISBN 978-3-030-35354-4

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35354-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

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"A ‘scientific re-examination of the mind-body problem’ is certainly a ‘difficult task’ and Tomasi seems to navigate the rough water with a safe methodological approach. The book provides the reader with a comprehensive overview, which exhibits a remarkable balance in the presentation of disputed topics. In addition, the author provides the necessary tools to have both people with science or philosophy backgrounds acquainted to the topic.

Neuro-lovers will appreciate and learn from the presentation of the numerous neuroscience ‘sub-branches,’ together with details on the methodological approaches used in the neuroscience research. Philosophers will enjoy the freedom and degree of theoretical abstraction, unusual in neurobiology books. Tomasi does in fact analyse the ‘mind-body problem’ with a critical appraisal that combines the rigidness of the scientific method with the speculative insight and thoroughness of the philosophy. The combination of the two sources of knowledge makes this book a fundamental tool for those who share the need to bridge the (apparent) gap between science and philosophy.

Another key adjective for describing the book is multidisciplinary. The author spans from logic to quantum mechanics, from medicine to informatics, from religion to ethics, from theory to practice. In all the cases the rigor in defining critical words makes even a lay reader feel like taken by the hand during the journey."

—Francesco Orzi,Professor of Neurology, Sapienza University of Rome (retired), and member of the Accademia dei Fisiocritici, Siena, Italy

"Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy is impressive in many ways—from the scope and variety of information analyzed to the inspiration that scientists, philosophers, and the wider public will find in it. Bringing together and setting apart mind and body, self and world provokes thought and evokes emotion. I read it without stopping for breath. Razor sharp till the last detail in such a difficult field as neuroscience in its relationship to existential problems."

— Aneta Karageorgieva, Professor,former Chair of the Department of Philosophy, Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski Bulgaria, and member of the Bulgarian Society for Analytic Philosophy

"Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy really resonated with me because every day at OVR I work at the intersection of the mind and body. I find myself in a feedback loop while pursuing a deeper understanding of their connection as well as how to manipulate both of them simultaneously to produce positive human outcomes. This involves looking for links between science and philosophy, emotion and reason, data and intuition. Tomasi’s book detailing how all of these elements are inextricably linked to one another, from a neurophysical standpoint is poignant. It is especially relevant today, not only to my work, but to how we collectively think about human factors across all fields, markets, and disciplines."

—Aaron Wisniewski, CEO,OVR Technology LLC, USA

"David Tomasi has written simply the book we were waiting for, the book that the current fields in medicine and psychology badly need. Human beings are an amazing paradox between mind and body. The author has written really a remarkable book about the correlation between mind and body, from a neuroscientific standpoint. Soul and matter seen by a comprehensive and critical perspective of results in neuroscientific research and epistemological issues. Particularly notable is the choice to critically discuss also the applicability of these results and concepts in clinical medical and philosophical-existential situations.

This outstanding volume offers a complete overview of theoretical information about brain, psyche, culture, bringing an ideal combination of scientific and clinical perspectives to the topic. The author had the courage to say that philosophy is a basic approach toward neuroscience and more and more to speak about subjectivity in science, in terms of the unique truth we can reach and of the unique solution we have actually available to the mind-body problem.

This book offers a paradigm shifting approach, scientifically based, empirically researched, for all professionals in search of more refined ways to conceptualize connection between mind and body, up to reach the Triple-S Model: Self, Soul, Spirit as a solving review of the fascinating mystery of our double nature, spiritual and embodied at the same time.

A book that will change the way you think, a must read that I can’t recommend more highly."

—Erica F. Poli, Psychiatrist-Psychotherapist,IEDTA, ISTDP Institute, EFP Group, Milan, Italy

"InCritical Neuroscience and Philosophy - A Scientific Re-Examination of the Mind-Body Problem, David Tomasi takes on a substantial task in this work on ‘Critical Neuroscience.’ He presents, in an entertaining, taxonomic style, the most important areas of scientific inquiry to ‘determine the theories, methods, techniques, and technologies used in recent times to investigate the connection between neural activation and multiple aspects of human nature’ (p.16). His work covers a vast and complex range of topics, starting from the purely biological physicalist viewpoint, discussing the most common subfields of neuroscience that deal with the neural underpinnings of psychological processes, with special attention to the central nervous system, particularly the brain. In the same way that Michel Foucault produced an archaeology of the human sciences in his bookThe Order of Things , Tomasi aims to achieve something similar in this book of sifting about neuroscience.

His work is critical in the epistemological sense of ‘providing a critique and criticism of the assumptions, methods, methodologies, theories, techniques, and technologies, and observation/interpretation of results in neuroscientific research,’ but is also critical in the sense of ‘applied and applicable to critical clinical-medical and philosophical-existential situations’ (p.13). But a central and consistent plank of his position to keeping in mind the principle that it is ‘impossible to completely avoid the subjective element in any scientific field dealing with human nature’ (p11), and challenges throughout the prevailing ‘Cartesian dualistic model of the primacy (supremacy) of human thought’ (p.41). And a significant conclusion on his part is his view that there is adequate ‘evidence of the existence of states, of multiple modalities of perceiving, understanding, and being, and of a non-physically-based-matter-based form of mind, soul, spirit’ (292).

What I appreciated about the work is that he achieves his aim of promoting the idea of Philosophy as a basic approach toward Neuroscience and consistently attempts to be flexible in ‘moving the focus back and forth from the smallest detail to the bigger picture’ (p.261). He also retains a certain pragmatism in the work and never claims to have found a final solution (to the mind-body problem) because ‘we do not think that there could be such thing as something final given’ (p.291).

I like the way that he consistently maintains, as a clinician, a view of another essential aspect of this study, i.e. the promotion of appropriate ideas for the amelioration of care for our patients’ (269). And, again in the same clinical vein, he looks for a balanced outcome in the subjectivity/scientific objectivity debate saying that ‘we should not try to eliminate (our) subjectivity in reaching a more objective understanding, and in the the same way we should not try to eliminate the place effect in reaching a more universal (statistically intended) healing method’ (292).

This work is very helpful to me as a practicing psychotherapist. Whilst I have a basic understanding of neuroscience and the mind-body debate, this work has substantially widened and deepened my understanding of the critical issues and debates in this area. A knowledge of neuroscience is essential in my clinical practice and David Tomasi’s taxonomic approach provides a valuable and concise insight into a vast area of clinical knowledge usually only accessible by experts in the neuroscience field."

—Tom Conlon, Clinical Director,Tri-Factor Health, Ireland

Acknowledgments

Being critical is an essential part of every investigation. Writing a book on Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy certainly falls into this prescription, and the process behind it is the direct result of the many contributions and insights from all the wonderful people I have met through the years. A very special thank you goes to Rachel Daniel, Senior Editor, Madison Allums, Editorial Assistant and all the staff at Palgrave Macmillan for their continuous support, professionality and enthusiasm in this project.

I would like to acknowledge the fundamental contribution and support of Tom Conlon, Alexander Gungov, Allison Kaigle Holm and Sten Holm, Aneta Karageorgieva, Paola Lusini, Giuseppe Manganelli, Francesco Orzi, Erica Poli, Stephen Sammut, Joan Walker, Aaron and Sam Wisniewski. I extend my gratitude also to all clinical and academic staff, students, faculty at the University of Vermont and the University of Vermont Medical Center, the Vermont Academy of Sciences, the Accademia dei Fisiocritici and the International Academy of Sciences.

While opinions in regard to the mind–body problem vary almost as much as the shapes of snowflakes, in this analysis I also discovered that this diversity is not only incredibly complex and vast, but it represents the very nature of the discourse, while determining the best parameters of clinical intervention. In this regard, I cannot thank enough all the patients I had the privilege and honor to work with. They have shared their beautiful stories, their successes and their struggles, their minds and their hearts, in ways that have enriched my experience as a psychotherapist as well as, most importantly, a human being.

Last but absolutely not least, I would like to acknowledge the understanding, the support and the encouragement of my family both in Europe and in the United States, especially my parents Lino and Rosa, my wife Livija and my sons Lucas and Adrian.

This study, as every other study, is dedicated to you.

David Låg Tomasi

Contents

1 Introduction 1

References and Further Readings 11

2 The Exact Science of the Hard Matter 13

2.​1 General Aspects 13

2.​2 Examining, Controlling and Verifying 15

References and Further Readings 43

3 Between Psyche and Mind 47

3.​1 Recollection 47

3.​2 Talking to the Mind and Mind-Talking 54

References and Further Readings 80

4 Medicine on, of and off the Brain 83

4.​1 Disease and Disorder, Illness and Issue 83

4.​2 To Treat, to Heal, to Cure 103

References and Further Readings 120

5 Brain, Culture, Society 125

5.​1 Context and Situation 125

5.​2 Mother Nature, Father Nurture 130

References and Further Readings 143

6 Perception and Cognition 145

6.​1 The Mind–Body Problem:​ A General Overview 145

6.​2 Perceiving, Seeing, Evidencing, Understanding 194

References and Further Readings 213

7 Conclusion:​ Philosophy as Basic Approach Toward Neuroscience 217

7.​1 Preliminary Discussion 217

7.​2 The Triple-S Model:​ Self, Soul, Spirit 222

References and Further Readings 250

References and Further Readings 253

Index 297

List of Figures

Fig.​ 1.​1 A left dorsolateral view of the brain, with focus on the cerebral cortex with the four lobes, the cerebellum and the limbic system.​ Highlighted are the central proprioceptive neural areas with the central sulcus dividing the primary motor cortex and the somatosensory cortex 9

Fig.​ 2.​1 The brain stem in the central nervous system (in red, including pons, medulla oblongata and spinal cord), seen here with the cerebellum (in green) 18

Fig.​ 2.​2 A rendering of the partial process part of the activation/​deactivation cycle involving G protein–coupled receptors (GPCRs) and related G protein–mediated signaling.​ Of note, the cyclic adenosine monophosphate signal pathway and the phosphatidylinos​itol signal pathway are two principal GPCR signal transduction pathways 21

Fig. 2.3 A general view of the most important neural elements, in particular microglial cell (a ), multipolar neuron (b ), oligodendrocyte (c ), myelinated axon with Schwann cell and node of Ranvier (d ), ependymal cell (e ), and astrocyte (f ) 23

Fig. 2.4 Analysis of embryonic neural development and brain growth after 25 days of gestation (a ), 35 days (b ), 40 days (c ), 50 days (d ), 100 days (e ), and after 9 months (f ). Highlighted, prosencephalon with optic vesicle (in green), mesencephalon (yellow), rhombencephalon (fuchsia), and spinal cord (light green) 27

Fig.​ 2.​5 Lateral view of the brain stem with mesencephalon, pons and medulla oblongata.​ Aside from sensorimotor functions and regulatory activities of the brain stem toward the respiratory and cardiac activity, this area of the central nervous system is relevant for the regulation of sleep patterns and wakefulness/​awareness/​consciousness and thus plays a primary role in the brain stem stroke syndrome at the root cause of locked-in syndrome 35

Fig.​ 3.​1 Left superior frontolateral view of the cerebrum with the limbic system with cingulate gyrus (green), hippocampus (blue), amygdaloid bodies (red), mammillary bodies (fuchsia), thalamic areas (brown), pineal gland (light orange), and brain stem (pink) 55

Fig.​ 3.​2 Lateral view of the brain with cerebrum (beige/​white) and cerebellum (maroon), with highlighted neural areas involved in emotional processing according to Pessoa (2008):​ somatosensory cortex, anterior insular cortex and anterior temporal lobe (blue), and orbitofrontal cortex (red, used most frequently) 61

Fig.​ 3.​3 Left lateral midsagittal section of the brain with serotonin pathways (red) and dopamine pathways (green).​ The two red dots represent the Raphe nuclei, and the two blue dots indicate the ventral tegmental area, while the aquamarine-highlighted areas indicate frontal cortex, nucleus accumbens, striatum and hippocampus 69

Fig.​ 4.​1 The amygdalae, as primary area of emotional, mnemonic and decision-making processing in the limbic system 91

Fig. 4.2 The process of neurogenesis as a reinterpretation of the model. In the bottom left ventricular zone, we observe the neural stem cell (neuroepithelial cell) and the neuron (silver), followed by the radial glial cell and the neuron (in blue and bright red, respectively), followed by type 3 cells (dark yellow), ependymal cell (gray/pink), subventricular-zone astrocyte (type 2 cell, in green) and oligodendrocyte precursor cell (in bright orange/yellow), all in the subventricular zone. In the white matter we observe oligodendrocytes (light orange) and ALDg1L + GFAP + (yellow) 104

Fig.​ 4.​3 A ventral, semitransparent and superimposed view of the brain showing inferior olives, flocculi, middle cerebellar peduncles, optic tract, nerve, and chiasm, olfactory bulb and corpus callosum, infundibulum, mammillary body, cerebellum, pyramid, and posterior perforated substance 109

Fig.​ 4.​4 Rendering of the basal ganglia with pallidum, striatum, substantia nigra and subthalamic nucleus 114

Fig.​ 5.​1 Rendering of a neuron with nucleus (purple), mitochondria (beige), endoplasmic reticulum (light green), dendrites and dendritic branches (green/​fluorescent green), microtubules (dark green), sections of the Golgi apparatus (orange/​red) and of the Nissl bodies (dark red), polyribosomes (dark purple) and axon (light blue) 129

Fig.​ 5.​2 A colored representation of the main elements of the brain stem, with the thalamus (light blue), the edge of cerebrum (green), the midbrain (light orange), the pons (bright orange), the cranial nerves (yellow), the edge of cerebellum (dark red), the medulla oblongata (purple) and the spinal cord (red) 133

Fig.​ 5.​3 Lateral view with the section of the eye including lateral rectus muscle, cranial nerves II, IV, V, VI and frontal, infraorbital, lacrimal, maxillary, nasociliary supraorbital, zygomatic nerves, as well as trigeminal ganglion 140

Fig.​ 6.​1 If the Cartesian analysis of the pineal gland did not survive modern neuroscientific research data, the pituitary gland is still referred to as the ‘master gland’ for its fundamental role in hormonal regulation at the intersection of endocrine and nervous systems.​ In this image, the pituitary gland is seen with anterior and posterior pituitary (in red and beige, respectively), optic chiasma (light orange), hypothalamic neurons in the paraventral nuclei (light blue), axons and neurons in the ventral hypothalamus and hypothalamic–hypophyseal tract through the infundibulum (aquamarine), hypothalamic neurons in the supraoptic nuclei (fuchsia) and venules (blue) for ACTH/​FSH/​GH/​LH/​PRL/​TSH and Oxytocin/​ADH in the anterior pituitary and posterior pituitary, respectively 149

Fig.​ 6.​2 Ventral and dorsal views of the human brain on the left and right side, respectively.​ The colors on the ventral view indicate the frontal lobe with higher mental functions (blue), the association area (in light green), the olfactory area (dark purple) and the motor functions in the cerebellum (orange), together with the brain stem (pink).​ The colors on the dorsal view indicate the frontal lobe with higher mental functions (blue), motor function areas, more specifically eye movement and orientation (light green) and initiation of voluntary muscles (dark red), followed by the sensory area (purple), somatosensory association area (orange), and Wernicke’s area (dark green).​ Finally, in yellow, the visual area in the occipital lobe is indicated 151

Fig. 6.3 (a ,b ) Sections of the spinal cord. Ina (right) we observe the spinal nerve and sensory root (1, in blue) the white matter with corticospinal tracts (2, in yellow), the gray matter with sensory and motor horns (3, in green, ventral and dorsal, respectively), the external layer of the dura mater (4, in red), as well as the central canal (at the center of the image, in black). Inb (left) we observe the fasciculus cuneatus (1) and gracilis (2), the vestibulo-spinal tract (3, 4), and the spino-cerebellar tract (5, 6), as well as the lateral corticospinal tracts (A1, A2), and the gray matter with the central canal (B) 182

Fig.​ 6.​4 The thalamus with the connection to the prefrontal cortex (1), the internal medullary lamina (2), the anterior nuclei (3), the intralaminar nuclei (4), the connection to the motor cortices (5), the VPM (6), the centrum medium (7), the connection to the posterior association areas (8), the lateral geniculate (9.​ to V1) and the medial geniculate (10.​ to A1) 185

Fig.​ 6.​5 The neural mechanisms of attention according to the model by Mangun and Hillyard (2012).​ In detail, the pathways originating in the brain stem cholinergic nuclei are here represented in red, the pathways originating in the locus coeruleus in green, and the pathways originating in the Raphe nucleus in blue.​ The feedback is indicated by the black arrow (1) and the feed forward by the light blue arrow (2), with the eye perspective and the focus of attention in the side plane-view (red) 199

Fig. 6.6 A comparison of the associative circuit (A., in light blue) involving the dorsolateral prefrontal and lateral orbitofrontal cortex, the limbic circuit (L., aquamarine) involving the limbic and paralimbic cortex, as well as the amygdala and the hippocampus, and the motor circuit (M., in orange) involving the sensorimotor and premotor cortex. This model has been investigated in detail by McBride inTrends in Neuroscience (2014) 202

Fig.​ 6.​7 Cross-sectional analysis of peripheral nerve with neural axon, surrounded by endoneurium, perineurium, fascicle, blood vessels and epineurium 206

Fig. 6.8 Analysis of the process of neurotransmission in developmental ethanol exposure according to the model of Valenzuela, Puglia, and Zucca (2014), with views of axon terminals, dendrites, glial cells, and Ca ² channels in phase A and B 210

Fig.​ 7.​1 The concept of continuity of self and the interaction of the individual-subject with the external world of stimuli via sensory perception.​ As it is well known, the olfactory system has the particular feature of almost completely bypassing the thalamic analysis (decoding, amplifying and transmitting) in its paths toward cortical areas 226

Fig.​ 7.​2 Anatomical view of the ear in relation to auditory transmission (signaling in blue).​ Highlighted we can observe the ear canal and the eardrum or tympanic membrane (pink), the labyrinth (orange), the middle ear space (purple) and the cochlea (blue) 232

Fig.​ 7.​3 View of the Reticular Activating System (RAS), with thalamus and corpus subthalamicus, substantia nigra, medial and lateral lemniscus (including the nucleus and the decussation), decussation of the superior peduncle, reticular formation, the internal arcuate fibers, and the olive.​ The RAs play a very special role in the processes involved in alertness, arousal, attention, consciousness and habituation 242

Fig.​ 7.​4 Rendering of the comparative analysis of neural correlates of consciousness in humans according to the meta-analysis by Rees et al.​ (2002), showing localized areas (in red), Lumer et al.​ (1998, in aquamarine), Kleinschmidt et al.​ (1998, in light blue), Portas et al.​ (2000, in yellow) and Beck et al.​ (2001, in dark blue) 245

List of Tables

Table 2.​1 States of full/​partial/​limited consciousness vs.​ vegetative states according to the General Medical Model 34

Table 4.​1 List of the most important neurotransmitter​s and neuroreceptors subdivided by type/​class 118

Table 4.​2 List of the most commonly prescribed modern psychotropic medications with generic and US brand names 119

Table 6.​1 Most common views in philosophy of mind, according to the model proposed by Baxter, more specifically dualism, epiphenomenalism​, psychophysics parallelism and non-reductive physicalism 158

Table 6.​2 Simplified description of Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) according to the model proposed by Bandura 167

© The Author(s) 2020

D. L. TomasiCritical Neuroscience and Philosophy https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35354-4_1

1. Introduction

David Låg Tomasi¹  

(1)

University of Vermont Integrative Health, University of Vermont Medical Center, Department of Inpatient Psychiatry, Burlington, VT, USA

David Låg Tomasi

Email: [e-mail]

From Gr. kritikḗ (tékhnē)

A Scientific Re-Examination of the Mind-Body Problem is the subtitle of this study on critical neuroscience. It presents a very difficult task, a struggle many scientists and philosophers have been dealing with since time immemorial. Is there anything that can be said about such an incredibly complex topic, anything at all which can be added to the conversation? Our main goal is to present a brief summary of the most important theories and experimental studies conducted so far on the correlation between mind and body. We will focus in particular on information and analysis from neuroscience and philosophy, but also provide new ways—new in terms of recent scientific discoveries and millennia-old philosophical traditions, and all the combinations thereof—of interpreting both. Given these premises, we will provide a general outlook on the most important sub-branches of neuroscience, including their connections to other scientific and therapeutic fields such as psychiatry, psychology and engineering, and at each intersection analyze their epistemological component, validity and applicability to our ‘human nature’. Debating the existence and possible correlation, even in a casual sense, between mind and brain or more broadly intended between a (concept of) self and a physical (body) entity is therefore at the center of this discussion. The very definition of ‘Critical Neuroscience’ is in this sense a product of progressive differentiation and specialization of areas within neuroscience and philosophy. Of course, we will admit right at the beginning of this discussion that we have a specific point of view toward certain aspects of the debate. We not only present such ‘bias’ openly and directly but also embrace it in attempting to discuss with the highest possible degree of objectivity and evidence-based scientific analysis and methodology all those elements which can be and should be put under very rigorous scrutiny using the most reliable and verifiable cutting-edge scientific techniques and technologies. We hereby claim, however, that there are areas—or at least certain elements in each area—of the debate which cannot (they do not necessarily fail to) be analyzed with the exact same methods used in our general scientific inquiry. This is not because we should rely on ‘less scientific’ parameters for this type of analysis, but exactly through scientific analysis we have come to the realization—and we are certainly not the first ones to reach such conclusion—that there are much deeper and greater parameters to follow when addressing issues as big as the mind–body problem. Certainly, we completely reject any attempt to discard the scientific method used in any research study and experiment to examine quantifiable data and information pertaining to observable matter. This is fundamental as well as ethically mandatory in our day and age, where we are often faced with pseudoscientific claims on, for instance, the nature of man and the universe or on certain therapeutic techniques in the medical field, which are not only based on unscientific claims but can often lead to unpleasant and risky clinical outcomes.¹ Given these premises, why would there be a need of embracing a ‘bias’ if we are indeed to follow the most objective, evidence-based, experimental scientific methods offered to us? There are several reasons, which we will thoroughly examine in the following chapters. To present a general summary of these reasons however, we can start from the very concept of subjectivity in interpreting certain results. As with phenomena such as the placebo/nocebo effects (in medicine), the observer effect (in physics) or double hermeneutic (in social sciences), we need to keep in mind that not only it is impossible to completely avoid the subjective element in any scientific field dealing with—at least—human nature (although it is certainly possible, at least to a certain extent, to monitor and quantify the possible effects in terms of confounding variables, skewed results or comorbidity factors), but we could use such element to our advantage, in order to better understand certain phenomena. This is important, especially when some results appear to be unclear outliers or simply do not conform to the current scientific paradigm. The purpose is also to reach a higher level of understanding of the ‘big picture’ (as we do not claim here to be able to see the ‘whole’ picture, at least not yet), as opposed to a confined, limited understanding of only this or that factor or variable. Of course, an analysis of a method is very hard to conduct from within. In other words, investigating the scientific method used for all aspects of human nature using the scientific method (as commonly defined by the parameters used until very recent times²) could represent a paradox, an oxymoron or even a double-bind, a ‘Catch 22’ or a ‘regression problem’ in our effort. Of course, not every investigative strategy which starts and develops ‘from within’ is to reject a priori. Some deductive and inductive aspects of concepts such as ‘introspection’, especially in the psychological sense, appear to be quite useful and effective in this context, as long as we understand the difference in magisteria between the areas where this strategy is justified and the areas in which the ‘standard’ scientific method ought to be applied. Certainly, this would account for moving the issue ‘one step up’, and we are still faced with the main concern of determining the parameters for this differentiation. The strategy we hereby suggest to solve the problem comes from the application of philosophy as a method for science, particularly medical science, and especially in the context of psychosomatic disorders. Of course, this is the core of epistemology, a branch or subfield of philosophy concerned with the analysis of science and the scientific method, and more broadly the parameters, the prerequisites and the boundaries of knowledge, including the acquisition, the attainability and the validity of such knowledge, which is also understanding, comprehension and realization, as evidenced by the German equivalent Erkenntnistheorie, and Gnoseologie as synonyms for Epistemologie. We will therefore apply many of the concepts used in classical epistemology as well as the ones presented by criticism to the core of epistemology, whether from philosophical skepticism or from general postmodernism. But we will extend the discourse to one of the most important areas of investigation of the human nature, neuroscience.

Given the exciting results of the ‘decade of the brain’ and the following ‘decade of the Mind’, and the philosophical schools of thoughts originating from this type of research, for instance in neurophilosophy, we wanted to present the most recent viewpoint on the validity and application of this research in areas traditionally associated with philosophical thought, such as conscience vs. consciousness, (self)perception and awareness, identity, and personality, meaning, sense, purpose and so on. In this sense, the title Critical Neuroscience has a double valence. It is critical in the epistemological sense of "providing a critique-criticism of the assumptions, methods, methodologies, theories, techniques, and technologies, and observation-interpretation of results in neuroscientific research, but is also critical in the sense of applied and applicable to critical clinical-medical and philosophical-existential situations". In other words, we are talking about a critical situation or emergency that is both situated (in a social/anthropological sense, but also historical/philosophical sense³ and in regard to embodied cognition) and truly emergent (Lat. ex -mergere). As we stated, some crucial elements in this analysis have already been presented in other works, especially in Medical Philosophy (Tomasi 2016), although in this context they have been further elaborated under the lens of neuroscience and, in some areas, have been used as critical variables to be examined again in the exploration of a philosophical defense for certain positions, especially in regard to the mind–body problem. It follows that some viewpoints that were simply presented in Medical Philosophy to provide a general survey of the possible philosophical positions on, for instance, the nature and essence of being human are hereby discussed as integral parts of a guided suggestion-suggested guide for a better understanding of our self, especially in the context of treatment modalities. Thus, beyond the defense of the aforementioned scientific methodological basis necessary for experimental science, we also question here some assumptions Western science has had over the centuries. Assumptions which were relevant during the age of enlightenment, and even more so in modern times, where science has often turned into, in the words of Iranian philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a replacement for religion (Hossein Nasr 1968). This is a position similar to Giorgio De Santillana, especially in regard to the valence of pre-Socratic and ancient philosophical-religious traditions and ideas on the origin and development of our nature, but very interesting parallels, especially in regard to brain–computer interface, biological vs. virtual perception, and artificial intelligence, with the work by Marco Somalvico at the Politecnico di Milano.

The concept of ‘primacy of perception’ is part of the scientific-philosophical debate on consciousness under the framework of existence over essence—thus presenting themes akin to the ones found in existentialism—or ‘matter over mind’, albeit with possible subjectivity over objectivity. This dialectical and comparative conceptualization originating in post-Cartesian speculations is the basis for perspectives on ‘bodily intentionality’ and ‘motivation’. According to this viewpoint, we ‘see the world through sight’, that is, through the evidence via sensory modalities. Our ‘bodiliness’ is thus responsible for the way we interpret the world, although interpretation and perception are not separate(d) at all in that they define two different aspects, or more precisely two different moments—not necessarily in a logico-temporal (chronological) way, but in a perspective-like orientation—of a cognitive or mental process. In other words, our thoughts, emotions, feelings, perceptions and behaviors cannot be ‘reduced to matter’ because they already are or they ‘emerge from’ matter. This view is a central axiom in some areas of contemporary philosophy of mind, whether of embodied cognition, as in Foglia and Wilson (2013), or in a more emergent materialist-based typology, as in Bunge (2013). In our analysis we will take into account these perspectives and investigate the validity of a process-based epistemology of method, that is, if we can