Sweden: From Neutrality to International Solidarity

By Ryszard M. Czarny

This book presents the legal and political factors determining international relations, including the processes of integration in all their complexity. The overall structure of the book, together with the composition of its separate chapters, allows for some general assumptions, identifying the main tendencies and placing them in a contemporary social context as well as establishing their relations with the practices of today. The content is a compendium of basic information and data related to the international processes which occur within specific formal, legal and political frames. The book is divided into five parts featuring not only deep historical context but most of all presenting current information and analyses of the last few years. Presented against the background and within the context of the Kingdom of Sweden’s political system and its international environment, the book brings into the foreground issues of particular importance for Sweden’s continuing European integration process and describes its response to the developments in the international situation.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Springer
• Release date: Apr 27, 2018
• ISBN: 9783319775135

Book preview

Part ILegal and Political Aspects of Neutrality

Abstract Neutrality has always been a much intriguing formal, legal, and political element of European international relations. The concept of neutrality, despite its long tradition and presence in international relations practice, is characterized by lack of uniformity both with regard to the definition of the actual concept and its types which relate to a wide spectrum of political phenomena. At some point in its historical development, the term neutrality has become a word denoting a wide range of political phenomena. This large set of designations includes a variety of equivalent or nearly equivalent synonyms, euphemisms, and periphrases such as non-alignment, peaceful or active coexistence, formal and active neutrality, positive neutrality, and isolationism.

Keywords Foreign policy · Security policy · Neutrality · Theory of small states · Peaceful coexistence

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Ryszard M. CzarnySweden: From Neutrality to International Solidarityhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77513-5_1

1. Neutrality in International Relations: Theoretical Foundations

Ryszard M. Czarny¹  

(1)

University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Trnava, Slovakia

Ryszard M. Czarny

Email: [e-mail]

The concept of neutrality, despite its long tradition and presence in international relations practice, is characterized by lack of uniformity both with regard to the definition of the actual concept and its types. It is both foreign and security policy doctrine and practice. This approach requires paying attention to the way the specific terms are used: foreign policy, security policy, neutrality, and the policy of neutrality.

External actions undertaken by a given entity constitute security policy whereas foreign policy carries out some of the security policy objectives. In practice, both concepts partially overlap each other, and that makes it difficult to explicitly and unambiguously assign a given action to the entity. Foreign policy fulfills objectives in the areas of security policy having an international dimension. Security policy is a broader concept as in addition it comprises a set of activities and instruments of internal policy. On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that proclaiming neutrality by a state (regardless whether it is a perpetually neutral state or just unilateral expression of political will, as in the case of Sweden) means making a firm commitment to a fundamental principle guiding a given state’s its foreign policy. By adopting neutral status, states express the will to sovereignly make decisions to ensure a maximum level of the state security and obtaining most favorable position in international system and that is why neutrality cannot be viewed as an end in itself.

1.1 The Notion of Neutrality

Neutrality has once been described as international law’s finest and most fragile flower (Lyon 1960, p. 259). International relations institution are dichotomous in nature and with the bipolar world order of East-West, neutrality was perceived as an attractive and viable option for the countries which wished to remain on the sidelines of possible conflicts generated by the Cold War. The first states which adopted policy of neutrality as a cornerstone of their external relations can be traced as far back as the 6th BCE when residents of the ancient city of Miletus refrained from supporting belligerents locked in an ongoing conflict between Ionian Greece and Persia (Raymond 1997, p. 123). The city-states of Ancient Greece (poleis) faced a dilemma of having to decide how to act at the outbreak of the war and sometimes chose neutrality although no words existed yet to describe this concept (Andrzejewski 1988, p. 31 and Ganiuszkin 1965, p. 5). Some Greek city-states waged wars with one another while the other ones simply preferred to watch it happen refraining from participation in belligerent activities. Such an attitude met with similar reaction during the ancient times as it was later in the course of history: occasional acceptance mixed with disapproval and skepticism. Very frequently, the ancient city-state of Argos was the object of disapproval as it was accused, among others, by Thucydides and Aristophanes of avoiding war and pretending impartiality to benefit from the war misfortunes of its neighbors. Demosthenes in his Philippics against Macedonians, just like John Foster Dulles during the Cold War, condemned the states declaring neutrality as their attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents was considered unnatural and immoral (Calvocoressi 1993, p. 146).

Neutrality viewed in this way has been a deeply ingrained element of European international relations as confirmed by the earliest civilizations on our continent. Notwithstanding the rich tradition of neutrality and its presence in the practice of international relations, the concept of neutrality is characterized by the lack of coherence both in terms of the definition itself and its separate forms. The etymology or source of the term neutrality is said to derive from the Latin word neuter denoting neither one of the two (see Sobol 2005). The Polish language dictionary defines the adjective neutral as not taking sides in a dispute, the one remaining neutral politically or excluded from armed hostilities. At some point in its historical development, the term neutrality has become a word denoting a wide range of political phenomena. This large set of designations includes a variety of equivalent or nearly equivalent synonyms, euphemisms and periphrases such as non-alignment, peaceful or active coexistence, formal and active neutrality, positive neutrality, and isolationism (Lyon 1960, p. 256).

According to Makowski (1948, p. 744), States which are not a party to the ongoing war are called neutrals and the legal status of those states is called neutrality. In general, States which maintain the attitude of impartiality are described as neutrals. Essentially, neutrality actually amounts to making ongoing efforts to uphold national sovereignty without making any concessions in return for protection within the framework of a political or military alliance. It is presumed that the national security benefits from retaining a cautious stance and remaining on the sidelines rather than pursuing protection of one or several great powers (Joenniemi 1988, p. 52). According to a number of writers, the terminological inconsistencies and theoretical confusion associated with the concept of neutrality arise from a dichotomous nature of the term which has its both legal and political dimension. Neutrality, from a purely legal point of view, has been traditionally associated with the sphere of public international common law and it determines the conduct of a state at time of war. According to Sutor (1972, p. 12–13), neutrality then invariably makes reference to a particular conflict and a particular state. Most often, this notion establishes the status of a nation that does not participate in an armed conflict (Popławski 1995, p. 14). Neutrality as a legal concept and treated as a distinct legal category, applied exclusively to the period of war and was not applicable at the time of peace (compare Czarny 1988a). The notion of duality of the term is shared by Klafkowski (1964, p. 377) who points out that due to the non-exhaustive description of neutrality as defined by international law, to gain full understanding of the concept political aspects of the phenomenon have to be considered.

Verosta (1967, p. 43) points out that neutrality, alongside a legal situation also denotes a political one in which a State de facto neutral, without undertaking any legal obligations affirming its permanent neutrality status, both in peacetime and wartime pursues a policy in line with that of the neutral countries, i.e. those which are not affiliated with any military alliances and remain on the sidelines of the conflict. Nahlik (1960, p. 38) in turn observes that neutrality in its political aspect should be viewed as some kind of a guiding recommendation which as a basic tenet of a country’s foreign policy can be at any time revoked in the name of national interest, without any international legal consequences of international law. The political aspect of neutrality can be thus summed up as the State activity in peacetime and the foreign policy which it pursues to keep the nation away from any armed conflict.

The presented overview of terminological challenges of neutrality reconfirms that any attempt to formulate a comprehensive definition of the concept is in practice extremely difficult if at all possible. For more comprehensive analysis of the phenomena in international relations, it proves useful to look at neutrality in the context of its types.

1.2 Contemporary Neutrality and Its Forms

It is worth repeating that neutrality as a kind of institution in international relations is dichotomous in nature. It prompts the need to look at neutrality in terms of its two aspects: legal and political. Presented below types of neutrality are closely related to neutrality as understood as political and legal categories.

1.2.1 Neutrality in the Armed Conflict

Neutral stance at the time of war is the oldest form of neutrality. In a traditional approach, the legal definition of neutrality pertains exactly to armed neutrality. Its essential condition is refraining from participation in an armed conflict. States or nations which take no part in a war adopt a position of neutrality guided by at least two reasons: preventing warfare on own territory and maintaining peaceful relations with the states/parties to the conflict to gain political or economic advantage (Andrzejewski 1988, pp. 20–21). A close examination of neutrality status by parties waging a war points out to the fact that that it is in their vital interest to forestall and prevent countries not engaged in a conflict to side with the enemy.

Under international law, neutrality is a posture of a state as regards armed conflict. A state which remains neutral takes no part in a war. At the same time, being neutral seems to be not only claiming a right to stay on the sidelines of the conflict, but it also involves meeting specific obligations related to the observance of the neutrality rules of international law, particularly as regards impartiality towards the warring parties (Andren 1991, p. 69).

It is something of a paradox that a further development of the concept of wartime neutrality and its foundation in international law was conditioned by the development in the law of war. Hugo Grotius also known as Huug de Groot, regarded as the father of international law, in his work entitled On the Law of War and Peace (1625) argued that the responsibility of the states not engaged in war was to refrain from any actions which were likely to be found to be a support for an unjust cause. Grotius was referring here to the support of that party against which just war was being waged.¹

Over time, there was has been nonetheless a departure from a notion of just war and neutrality as one of the ways in which a state can react to the outbreak of such a conflict. With the dynamic growth of maritime commerce, the 18th and 19th centuries brought about the codification of the law of neutrality.² A further strengthening of the solutions was provided through the First and the Second League of Armed Neutrality³ formed to protect the interests of the signatory States against the British blockade of Continental Europe. The multilateral treaties, which constituted a source of primary legislation for the League, included the following principles which, inter alia, concerned:

(1)

the right of neutral vessels to navigate freely along the shores of states that are parties to a conflict;

(2)

exemption of enemy goods on board neutral vessels from seizure, unless it is military contraband;

(3)

laws governing the legal regulations of seizure and legal procedures to claim damages for wrongful maritime seizure;

(4)

protection of convoys of merchant ships provided by neutral countries against enemy warships.

The further development of neutrality in naval warfare was provided the so-called three rules of Washington.⁴ The Paris Declaration of 1856, signed at the Congress of Paris which ended the Crimean War (1856), has had considerable impact on a further development and codification of wartime neutrality law.⁵

The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries together with the formation of the alliance system in Europe and the evolution of the art of war (a shift to land warfare) effected codification of war neutrality even to a greater measure (Czarny 1988a, p. 11). Given the two conventions issued at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, one could even talk about a dynamic development in the laws of neutrality. The V Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 in Chap. 1 specifies general rights and duties of neutral Powers and individuals in case of war on land. Article 1 of the Convention defines the territory of neutral States as inviolable. The territorial inviolability under the Convention prohibits moving troops or convoys of ammunition for belligerents across the territory of a neutral State (Art 2). In accordance with Article 4 of the Convention, corps of combatants cannot be formed, on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents. In Article 10, the Convention indicates that the use of force by a neutral State to defend its status of neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act.

The XIII Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 specifies the rights and duties of neutral States in naval war.⁶

Surprisingly, even though the Hague Conventions have been of key importance to the codification of the law of neutrality, the Conventions in themselves do not attempt to clearly define neutrality. Moreover, with a passage of time and the changes in the conduct of war through technological advancement that transformed the means and methods of warfare as well as in the wake of historical experiences, various new interpretations of the text of Conventions have emerged.

The Second World War brought about important change from the perspective of the definition of a neutral state. Some countries while declaring their neutrality failed to fulfill their obligations arising from the neutrality status and in a less or more hidden fashion assisted States engaged in war. Such practices, given the experiences of WWII gave rise to a concept distinguishing a neutral state from a non-belligerent state. The theory of non-belligerency concerned States that were not engaged in a war or a conflict which, however, unlike neutral States, were not obligated to treat the opposing belligerent States with equal impartiality.⁷

The emerging moral concerns (as already expressed by Grotius), prompting giving rise to fundamental questions whether a neutral state should maintain absolute impartiality in a conflict or if it should give its support to one belligerent side (the just party) once again confirms the conviction that neutrality as a phenomenon within the realm of international relations is a concept which aside from determining its legal nature must also be examined from the point of view of political science.

1.2.2 Permanent Neutrality

In contrast to the wartime neutrality which is firmly embedded in international law and therefore has political consequences, permanent neutrality (occasionally called also everlasting or perpetual)⁸ is a conceptual construct which has an equal political and legal dimension. Permanent neutrality can considered an institution on the basis of which a state remains neutral in wartime (in accordance with international law on wartime neutrality) and as well as peacetime (based on political declaration and recognition of its status by other countries). The essence of permanent neutrality lies in the fact that it cannot be only and solely based on adoption of a certain legal tradition nor considered as status to be proclaimed at each and any time convenient to the state.

Therefore there exist two significant differences between wartime neutrality and the permanent one. The former relates to the time period in which it occurs—in the case of wartime neutrality, the time limit is set between the outbreak of war and its end. The latter, i.e. permanent neutrality, is a consequence of a state’s political will expressed in peacetime; it is formally declared for an indefinite period of time in the future and the neutrality status is recognized by a tacit consent, or expressis verbis by other states (Czarny 1988a, p. 15). The form of recognition of the status of a permanently neutral state is the second feature distinguishing wartime neutrality from the permanent neutrality.

Recognition of the status of neutrality is affirmed in a multilateral treaty⁹ which prescribes the rights and obligations of a neutral state and other states at times of peace and at times of war (Andrzejewski 1988, pp. 22–23). In exceptional cases, the recognition of the status of a permanently neutral state takes place by way of tacit consent or through so-called facta concludentia.

The recognition itself is of fundamental importance for it details the guarantees affording the state to maintain its neutrality in future military conflicts and awards protection of its neutral status by great powers. Therefore, it should be stressed once again that permanent neutrality is conditional upon its international recognition. Permanent neutrality on the one hand is an expression of the sovereign and free will of a State declaring its neutrality status, and on the other hand, however, its status has no raison d’être without the corresponding recognition. Therefore, permanent neutrality, even though it relates to a particular country (under international law, there are no norms that set out rules of permanent neutrality), ceases to be a purely private matter of the country concerned (Czarny 1988a, p. 16).

Switzerland is an entity governed by international law which possesses a firmly entrenched status of permanent neutrality. Its neutral status was legally established and guaranteed under the provisions of the Congress of Vienna and since 1815 it has never been violated so far. In the practice of the international community, Swiss neutrality represents the oldest example of permanent neutrality.¹⁰ The status of permanent neutrality–apart from self-defense–prohibits any use of Swiss armed forces against another country. Moreover, a permanently neutral state is bound to refrain from concluding any agreements and entering into military alliances as well as avoid any actions that may lead to its engagement in military conflicts. It should abstain from holding membership in any political or economic structures the principles of whose operations would in the event of war hinder the effectiveness of fulfilling its obligations arising from the status of neutrality. The example of Switzerland in defining permanent neutrality is also important as it proves once again that only the neutral state solely has competence to exercise its adopted neutrality (Popławski 2005, p. 453). The joining of the League of Nations by Switzerland, that is a formal recognition of greater advantages stemming from its presence in the LN collective security system (which the League of Nations attempted to be), confirmed the real role of the State as an important source of interpretation of its own status of neutrality. The withdrawal of Switzerland from the League of Nations in 1938 only proves the rule.

1.2.3 Policy of Neutrality

The policy of neutrality, sometimes referred to in literature as neutralism,¹¹ is an institution of a purely political nature. Neutralism has no foundations in public international law (as is the case with wartime neutrality), or in any multilateral treaty or common law (as is the case with permanent neutrality). Neutralism is an expression of the unilateral, sovereign, political decision of a State which under on the same principle may change the direction of its policy.¹² The very essence of the policy of neutrality (just like permanent neutrality) is non-membership in any military alliance that may lead to a country’s engagement in military warfare. States pursuing the policy of neutrality (for example Sweden) argued that from the perspective of freedom of action and developing pro-peace foreign policy, the policy of neutrality appears to be a better option than permanent neutrality (Czarny 1998, pp. 75–92) which entails limits on freedom of action for indefinite periods and could result in greater influence of super powers which under international treaty recognized and affirmed the neutrality status (Popławski 1995, pp. 22–23). However, it has to be emphasized that states pursuing the policy of neutrality are bound to observe the rights and obligations resulting from the law of war neutrality. The situation is different in time of peace. States pursuing the policy of neutrality (Sweden and Finland), in their neutrality policy were never bound by any norms of international legal nature and thus their conduct and policies as neutral States have been a result of the adopted policy doctrine and foreign policy practice (Czarny 2002, pp. 36–56). This means that any change to the existing doctrine has no international legal consequences (Andrzejewski 1988, pp. 54–55).

The forms and scopes of neutrality policy vary and depend upon the international status of a State, its domestic situation or other States’ expectations. As practice has shown, the typical scope of the neutral countries’ activities in the international arena include: good services assistance, humanitarian operations, developmental aid to the third world nations, intermediary and mediation services, global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts and others.

References

Andren, N. (1991). On the Meaning and Uses of Neutrality, Cooperation and Conflict. SAGE Publications Ltd. (published under the auspices of Nordic International Studies Association), Vol. 26, No. 3, retrieved February 03, 2011 from 1988, p. http://​cac.​sagepub.​com/​content/​26/​2/​67.​full.​pdf.

Andrzejewski, P. (1988). Neutralność w polityce zagranicznej Finlandii i Szwecji. Poznań, Warszawa: PWN.

Calvocoressi, P. (1993). Neutrality now, [in:] Harden, S., Neutral States and the European Communities. CDS, UK.

Czarny, R.M. (1988a). Die Neutralitätspolitik als Sicherheitsproblem des Königreiches Schweden, Greifswald Universität.

Czarny, R.M. (1998). Teoretyczne i praktyczne aspekty neutralności Szwecji. "Sprawy Międzynarodowe, no. 10.

Czarny, R. M. (2002). Szwecja w Unii Europejskiej. Studium polityczno-prawne. Kielce: Wyższa Szkoła Ubezpieczeń.

Ganiuszkin, B. (1965). Nejtralitet i neprisojedinienije. Moscow.

Goetschel, L. (1999). Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept? Cooperation and Conflict. SAGE Publications Ltd. (published under the auspices of Nordic International Studies Association), Vol. 34, No. 2, retrieved July 12, 2016 from http://​cac.​sagepub.​com/​content/​46/​3/​265.​full.​pdf+html.

Grotius, H. (1957). Trzy księgi o prawie wojny i pokoju. Księga III. Warszawa: PWN.

Bierzanek R., Jakubowski, J., Symonides J. (1980). Prawo międzynarodowe i stosunki międzynarodowe. Warszawa: PWN.

Joenniemi, P. (1988). Models of Neutrality: The Traditional and Modern, Cooperation and Conflict. SAGE Publications Ltd. (published under the auspices of Nordic International Studies Association), Vol. 23, No. 1, retrieved February 11, 2012 from http://​cac.​sagepub.​com/​content/​23/​1/​53.​full.​pdf.

Klafkowski, A. (1964). Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Lyon, P. (1960). Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism. The Review of Politics, Cambridge Journals Online, Vol. 22, No. 2, retrieved June 10, 2016 from http://​journals.​cambridge.​org/​action/​displayAbstract?​fromPage=​online&​aid=​5292420.

Makowski J. (1948). Podręcznik prawa międzynarodowego. Warszawa.

Nahlik, S. (1960). Neutralność Austrii. Sprawy Międzynarodowe, no. 10.

Popławski, D. (1995). Austriacka polityka neutralności 1955–1995. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR.

Popławski, D. (2005). Zmierzch neutralności w Europie–interpretacje; [in:]: Kuźniar, R. (Ed.). Porządek międzynarodowy u progu XXI wieku. Wizje–koncepcje–paradygmaty, Warszawa: WUW.

Raymond, G.A. (1997). Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power, Cooperation and Conflict. SAGE Publications Ltd. (published under the auspices of Nordic International Studies Association), Vol. 32, No. 2, retrieved May 07, 2016 from http://​cac.​sagepub.​com/​content/​32/​2/​123.​abstract.

Rotocki, Z. (1997). Neutralność w ramach zbiorowego bezpieczeństwa. Łódź: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.

Sobol, E. (2005). Słownik języka polskiego. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Sutor, J. (1972). Państwa neutralne i niezaangażowane. Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna.

Verosta, S. (1967). Die dauernde Neutralität, Gutachten, Verhandlungen des III Österreichischen Juristentages. Wien: Manzsche Verlags-und Universitätsbuchhandlung.

Footnotes

1

The notion of just war has been known since antiquity. The term was used by Cicero (106–43 BCE) and St. Augustine (354–430). A war must meet several requirements to be considered just. A just war is a defensive war and needs to be waged in response to an unwarranted aggression. Another condition that must be satisfied for a war to be considered just is that there must be a reasonable chance of winning it. In addition, civilians should never be made the target of attacks and the use of force should be limited to justified cases. More on Hugo Grotius’ position on the rights of war [in:] Grotius (1957). The Rights of War and Peace: In Three Volumes, Volume III, Warszawa: PWN, pp. 411–413.

2

In armed conflicts of that time, due to not respecting the inviolability of merchant ships, the maritime commerce was greatly affected.

3

League of Armed Neutrality (1780 and 1800) initially included Russia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Austria and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The Second League of Armed Neutrality was an alliance of only Russia, Denmark, Prussia and Sweden.

4

The Rules of Washington were formulated in the course of dispute settlement between Great Britain and the United States in 1871. The rules defined the obligations of neutrals to prevent the fitting out, arming or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use. The Rules of Washington also banned the use of neutral ports and territorial waters a as a base of naval operations. More on the subject in: Bierzanek, Jakubowski, Symonides (1980).

5

The Paris Declaration outlined three principles concerning ships of neutral states: enemy's goods shipped on a neutral vessel are not liable to capture (with the exception of military contraband); neutral goods on board of an enemy ship are inviolable (also with the exception of contraband of war); a neutral state ship has a right pf protection against the effects of a blockade.

6

In addition to the previously cited Paris Declaration of 1856, the Hague Conventions of 1907, the London Declaration of 1909 is cited as a key document laying the foundations for laws relating to the law of neutrality. Although the declaration was never ratified, it serves a source of customary international law on neutrality in naval warfare as it defined the principles of protecting neutral ships in the event of a blockade.

7

At some point, Turkey and Spain maintained this position; see: Rotocki (1977), pp. 121–134.

8

In literature, alongside this term, there appears also a notion of ‘neutralization,’ i.e. prohibition of the use of a given territory for war purposes. Neutralized territories are, for example, the area of the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal strategic waterways. In the international legal doctrine, neutralization is also used to denote neutralization activities within certain areas as a result of pressure exerted by outside powers on a state; for more on the subject, see: Bierzanek, Symonides 2008, pp. 219–242.

9

Permanent neutrality can be institutionalized by adoption of internal legislation but it also must be always and each time recognized by other states, empowered in or guaranteed by international law; for more on the subject, see: Popławski (2005, p. 452).

10

Switzerland’s status of permanent neutrality has been based on several fundamental principles which: (1) were considered by the great powers of the day as a neutral privilege the granting of which could only take place when explicitly requested; (2) Swiss neutrality was granted as an element stabilizing European new order and balance of power in the post-Napoleonic era; (3) long-lasting, affirmed in practice efforts of Switzerland to gain neutral status have been acknowledged; (4) the afore-mentioned practice, i.e. common international law and the Congress of Vienna obligations were considered the legal basis for Switzerland’s permanent neutrality. The treaty did not specify Switzerland’s obligations as a permanently neutral state except for stating that its neutrality was everlasting and that Switzerland was barred from taking part in any wars (except in self- defense); the principles of neutrality are to be observed with respect to all states; Switzerland cannot seek any enlargement of its territory without consent of the signatories of the Treaty.

11

European form of neutralism (Sweden, Finland) need to be differentiated from non-alignment which is a concept shared by the so-called Third World States which tried, among others, to abolish the colonial order.

12

Neutrality policy (and more broadly neutrality) has its roots in the concept of State sovereignty whose origins date back to the end of the Middle Ages when the claims of universal power by the Roman Catholic Church began to wane. The concept of sovereignty was consolidated by the end of the 19th century when the remaining limits imposed by the natural law were removed. In this context, sovereignty means power or control over all state matters, and above all the right to engage in war at any moment benefiting State interests. Likewise, the right of a State to adopt the neutrality status may be justified (conducting the policy of neutrality) when it best serves the interests of the State. See: Goetschel (1999, p. 119).

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Ryszard M. CzarnySweden: From Neutrality to International Solidarityhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77513-5_2

2. Neutrality in the Theory of International Relations

Ryszard M. Czarny¹  

(1)

University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Trnava, Slovakia

Ryszard M. Czarny

Email: [e-mail]

2.1 Idealism or Realism?

Bearing in mind the raison d’être of a State, neutrality may be considered an instrument of foreign policy through which the State pursues its national interests. Traditionally, neutrality has fulfilled various political functions. Among those so-called realistic functions, the most important objective is to ensure political independence while remaining on the sidelines of armed conflicts.¹ Moreover, as the realist theory claims, maintaining neutrality policy has rather limited benefits. According to Waltz’s theory (1993, pp. 50–53), any State at any time can resort to armed force; therefore, each state must always be prepared for the contingency to counter the threat or bear the consequences of its weakness. Thus neutrality itself must offer to third countries something in return in order to be effective in ensuring neutral state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom. One of the best known feel-good gratifications for the international community is neutrality’s equilibrium function performed at different times by various States. Swiss neutrality, for example, has its roots in the guarding of Alpine passes; Austria in turn served as a neutral separator (neutraler Riegel) in Cold War Europe, and Sweden was the center-point of the so-called Nordic Balance (Goetschel 1999, pp. 120–121).

Neutrality tradition has much in common with the Idealist approach in international relations. It is mainly linked to neutral States giving up their keeping military force for offensive purposes and limiting and regulating the use of force in international relations. Neutral States by their engagement in sustaining peace efforts and peace-peacebuilding have always manifested their commitment, sense of moral obligation and the need of cooperation for the common good of international community. It has been manifested not only in their intermediary efforts but also in offering good services or building a much wider support for a systematic approach to solutions governing region’s security policy, as was the case with neutral states efforts within the OSCE (Joenniemi 1993, pp. 289–304).

2.2 Balance of Power Theory and the Theory of Small States

According to the Realist theory, neutrality is a function of the balance of power and any imbalance of power by semi-hegemonic or hegemonic system would likely be the end of neutrality (Morgenthau 1939, p 473–486). Consequently, following E. Bonjour, it should be concluded that the balance of power between competing forces provides excellent conditions permitting neutrality to flourish (Raymond 1997, p. 126).

Much of the literature on the role small states play in contemporary international relations claims that in the balance of power, small states generally favor to adopt a non-aligned position. However, when forced to choose, as a rule they will side with the potentially stronger adversarial power in the conflict.² This is in line with the well-known Kenneth Waltz’s concept of bandwagoning, where small states are guided by their own interests linking them with the interests of victorious powers (Gustavsson 1998, p. 70).

It is perhaps worth emphasizing once again that neutrality of a small state (for example, such as Sweden) is almost entirely dependent on the existence of a balance of power. On the other hand, the existence and activities of small states are essential to the nation-states system as well as to the functioning of the balance of power as without the fluidity provided by small states it would simply cease to exist. Thus the theory of international relations asserts that small States should bear costs proportional to their size and capabilities, related to establishing universal or regional mutual security system. Whenever it is not possible to establish proper relations between great powers, neutrality will always remain a security policy option for small States (Hopper 1945, p. 448). On the other hand, however, departing somewhat from rejecting somewhat firm principles of Realpolitik, the role of small neutral States can be described as soft power of growing importance in contemporary foreign relations. It seems natural because, for instance Sweden (as well as other Scandinavian countries) is so well known not only for its distinguishing characteristics exemplified by the work towards international peace (Czarny 1986, pp. 240–260) but also viewed as promoter of standards and good practices in international relations (Ingebrigsten 2006, pp. 275–276).

2.3 Neutrality as an Instrument of Foreign Policy and State Security

Following E. Cziomer, it should be stated that foreign policy is a process of formulating and implementing nation-state self-interests in its interaction with other States and stakeholders in the international system (Cziomer and Zyblikiewicz 2000, p. 106). On the other hand, the idea of security policy is closely related with the term security which means the absence of threats or protection against them (Bobrow et al. 1997, p. 3). It seems that it would be fitting here to bring up (Kukułka’s 1982) synopsis of critical value of a state’s national security:

the survival of a state as an independent political entity (it is a fundamental value for the protection of which any state would be willing to sacrifice other values since those cannot be preserved without guaranteeing national survival itself);

territorial integrity (understood as a principal correlate of security);

political independence;

the quality of life of citizens of a state–the value based on several variables such as standard of living, the level of socio-economic development, the extent of civil liberties and human rights, the quality of the natural environment, national culture, and prospects for development (Kukułka 1982, p. 34).

The presented values are safeguarded through a variety of means which could be defined as security policy. As the traditional approach to the State security is closely linked to the origin of external threats, major importance is assigned to the full range of measures as a whole relating to the protection of the essential interests of State security an delegated to foreign policy (Bobrow et al. 1997, p. 4). Its essential task is to develop a strategy and policy including appropriate means and actions as well as methods of delivery in the international environment. The above considerations lead to a conclusion that the adoption of neutrality status by a State (regardless of whether it is sanctioned by international law or an expression of the political will of a State), at the same time entails its adoption as the principle of foreign policy. Neutrality therefore should not be viewed as an end in itself for the States choosing this status sovereignly decide about the most favorable situation ensuring the maximum level of security for them and seek the most advantageous position in the international system (Popławski 1997, pp. 145–146). Foreign and security policy of a neutral State has at its disposal the same measures as any other State; however, when fulfilling its obligations arising from the neutrality status,³ it may increase the scope and intensity of any future actions so that it was perceived as credible and effective in implementing its policy. It mainly relates to the so-called more active (offensive) foreign policy of neutral Sates. Active neutrality in this case indicates a wide range of efforts for the promotion of peace, international security, disarmament, sustainable development, etc. (Czarny 2002, pp. 36–65). This offensive orientation of neutrality affirms the vital importance of the foreign policy practice in achieving the primary objectives which for a neutral State is maintaining its own security (Popławski 1997, pp. 152–153). Defense policy has always played an important role in the security policy of neutral States. This is closely linked to the principle applicable to permanently neutral States, obligating them to preserve their neutrality. Irrespective of a number of various differences in their approaches to defense policy, during the Cold War the underlying premise of neutral States’ foreign policy in Europe was the conviction that with their more extensive military buildup, there was a lesser chance of violating their neutrality (Czarny 1985, pp. 91–106).

References

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Carlsnaes, W. (1993). Sweden Facing the New Europe: Whither Neutrality? European Security, Routledge–Taylor & Francis Group, Vol. 2, No. 1, retrieved May 11, 2008 from http://​www.​tandfonline.​com/​doi/​abs/​10.​1080/​0966283930840711​1?​journalCode=​feus20.

Czarny, R.M. (1985). Szwedzki przemysł zbrojeniowy w świetle praktyki aktywnej neutralności, [in:] Stankiewicz, W., Kołodziejski, Z., Majchrzak, F. (Eds.). Przemysł obronny i obronnie zorientowany. Opole: WAP, WSI.

Czarny, R.M. (1986). Polityka neutralności Szwecji wobec zagadnień zbrojeń i rozbrojenia, [in:] Pałyga, E.J. (Ed.), Społeczno-polityczne aspekty zbrojeń i rozbrojenia. Warszawa: COM SNP.

Czarny, R.M. (1988b). Teoretyczne i praktyczne aspekty neutralności Szwecji. Sprawy Międzynarodowe, no. 10.

Czarny, R. M. (2002). Szwecja w Unii Europejskiej. Studium polityczno-prawne. Kielce: Wyższa Szkoła Ubezpieczeń.

Cziomer, E., Zyblikiewicz, L., (2000). Zarys współczesnych stosunków międzynarodowych. Warszawa-Kraków: PWN.

Goetschel, L. (1999). Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept? Cooperation and Conflict. SAGE Publications Ltd. (published under the auspices of Nordic International Studies Association), Vol. 34, No. 2, retrieved July 12, 2016 from http://​cac.​sagepub.​com/​content/​46/​3/​265.​full.​pdf+html.

Gustavsson, J. (1998). The Politics of Foreign Policy Change. Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership. Lund: Lund University Press.

Hopper, B. (1945). Sweden: a Case Study in Neutrality. Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, No. 23, retrieved June 19, 2010 from https://​www.​foreignaffairs.​com/​articles/​sweden/​1945-04-01/​sweden-case-study-neutrality.

Ingebrigsten, C. (2006). Norm Entrepreneurs. Scandinavia’s Role in Word Politics; [in:] C. Ingebrigsten, C. Small states in international relations. University of Washington Press.

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Kukułka, J. (1982). Bezpieczeństwo a współpraca europejska: współzależności i sprzeczności interesów. Sprawy Międzynarodowe, no. 7.

Morgenthau H.J. (1939). The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe. American Political Science Review, Cambridge Journals Online (published for the American Political Science Association), Vol. 23, No. 3, retrieved March 27, 2014 from https://​www.​jstor.​org/​stable/​1948823?​seq=​1#page_​scan_​tab_​contents.

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Footnotes

1

The same realistic perspective of the function of neutrality was establishing such relations with the belligerent neighbors to ensure that during the war own State is not cut off from supplies and is able to maintain at least limited trade relations.

2

Literature cites other approaches to the role of small states in the balance of power. W. Carlsnaes views neutrality as a specific type of power relations between the actors involved where a neutral State attempts to influence major powers to prevent violation of its territorial integrity in the event of war. For more on the subject, see: Carlsnaes (1993).

3

This relates in particular to the so-called secondary duties (Sekundäre Pflichten), a neutral State efforts pursuing on the one hand aiming a credible policy of neutrality, that is avoiding involvement in military conflicts, but on the other hand, demonstrating actively pursued foreign policy.

Part IIEvolution of Swedish Neutrality in a Historical Context

Abstract The origins of Sweden’s neutrality can be found first of all in the transformation of this country from a superpower into a state of somewhat limited potential and opportunities, and second in the changes of Swedish foreign policy in the nineteenth century marked by several attempts at rebuilding the powerhouse position by consecutive kings. In this context, it is worth noting the orientations of foreign policy during WWI, including the efforts to maintain a fairly coherent neutrality, and the twenty-year-long interwar period which was first dominated by the belief in common security guarantees as provided by the League of Nations and then by the trust in the policy of neutrality.

Keywords Neutrality system · Scandinavism · Winter war · Concessions · Reorientation of foreign policy

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Ryszard M. CzarnySweden: From Neutrality to International Solidarityhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77513-5_3

3. The Origins of Sweden’s Neutrality

Ryszard M. Czarny¹  

(1)

University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Trnava, Slovakia

Ryszard M. Czarny

Email: [e-mail]

3.1 Origin and Development of the Neutrality System

3.1.1 The Superpower Period

The development of the Swedish nation state in the 16th century took place in conflict with Lübeck and the Hanseatic League which at that time dominated trade in the Baltic Sea. Sweden gained its independency by breaking away from the Nordic great state of the Kalmar Union times established under the rule of Denmark. The rivalry between Sweden and Denmark for a leading position in Scandinavia was