Building Peace, Creating Conflict?: Conflictual Dimensions of Local and International Peacebuilding

By Nordic Academic Press

One of the most significant challenges facing the international community today is how to stabilize and rebuild societies emerging from civil wars, and this book, which includes both theoretical discussions and empirical applications, considers the various factors of peacebuilding. As it addresses several pertinent academic debates—relating to international interventions and local ownership, international and local conceptions of gender equality, and the legal aspects of peace implementation—this account demonstrates how some postwar countries have made significant strides towards peace and democracy while others have experienced a return to war. A policy-relevant topic, Building Peace, Creating Conflict? will appeal to students and scholars of international relations and peace studies, as well as to practitioners involved in peacebuilding efforts in war-affected countries.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Nordic Academic Press
• Release date: Jan 3, 2012
• ISBN: 9789187121227

Book preview

CHAPTER 1

Building peace, creating conflict?

Hanne Fjelde & Kristine Höglund ¹

Introduction

One of the most significant challenges facing the international community today is how to secure stability and rebuild societies emerging from civil war. Since the end of the Cold War, international agencies such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, and the African Union have, in their capacity as representatives of their member states, taken on increased responsibility for creating the conditions for durable peace in post-conflict societies. International peace-building missions have been deployed to a range of countries emerging from civil war, including Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, East Timor, the former Yugoslavia, Burundi, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti. These peace-building missions have not only had extensive conflict-management mandates, but have also authorized the relevant international agencies to intervene extensively in the domestic affairs of the post-conflict societies concerned. The current international approach to peace-building in war-torn societies has thus moved far beyond crisis management and a focus on military and security priorities to include a broad range of issues relating to institutional transformation, economic reconstruction, social inclusion, and reconciliation.

The record of international efforts to advance peace has been mixed. While some post-war countries have made significant strides towards peace, democracy, and development, other countries have seen a return to war, and yet others a partial implementation of peace, where the transition has generated new conflicts between local and international actors or between local communities. Whereas the promotion by international actors of policies and norms such as liberal democracy, economic liberalization, and human rights is intended to contribute to a sustainable peace, these efforts have frequently given rise to tensions between the diverse set of actors involved–at the international, national and local level– about the substance of these norms and policies. This book is about these conflictual dimensions of peace-building. It covers several themes and cases. Aggestam and Björkdahl explore the reasons behind ‘frozen conflicts’ and ‘unending peace processes’, and use examples from the peace processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Israel–Palestine to illustrate the dynamics in play (Chapter 2). The efficiency of peacekeeping operations is the topic of Held’s chapter. He employs a quantitative test–covering the period 1960 to 2005 –to assess whether peacekeeping operations contribute to transitions to democracy (Chapter 3). Gelot and Söderbaum address the local ownership problematique by theoretically analysing the nature of the ‘intervener’ relative to the local context (Chapter 4). The necessity of local ownership in peace-building operations is also the topic of Jarstad and Olsson’s chapter. They use the case of Afghanistan to illustrate how understandings of ‘the local’ in peace-building operations deviate among various types of international actor (Chapter 5). Kostić explores the interplay between local dynamics and international peace-building efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a particular focus on the external regulation of domestic politics in the aftermath of the 1996 Dayton Peace Accords (Chapter 6). Mannergren Selimovic considers peace-building from the perspective of transitional justice, using qualitative evidence from interviews in the Bosnian town of Foča about the role of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (Chapter 7). The tension and conflict between international and local actors created by international gender-equality interventions among Karen refugees in Thailand is the topic in Olivius’ chapter (Chapter 8).

In this introductory chapter we outline the main contemporary debates and research on peace-building and relate the chapters in this volume to these debates. After a brief overview of the concept of peace-building, we highlight four controversies in peace-building research relating to (i) the uneven track record of peace-building efforts; (ii) the normative and ideological underpinnings of peacebuilding; (iii) the dilemmas that are engendered by simultaneously promoting a variety of goals, such as democracy and stability; and (iv) the significance of local ownership. We conclude by pointing to areas for future research on the conflictual dimensions of peacebuilding, and suggest an actor-oriented approach to analysing the tensions that arise in a peace-building environment.

The concept of peace-building

The concept of peace-building has no clear and unambiguous meaning. A broad understanding of the term is that peace-building denotes the various efforts in support of the political, institutional, social, and economic transformations necessary to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development (see, for example, Boutros-Ghali 1992; Jarstad & Sisk 2008; UN 2008). It is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of current hostility and to build national capacities for conflict management and resolution (Doyle & Sambanis 2000). The concept of peace-building is broad, and the difficulties in constructing a clear, coherent typology of peacebuilding operations mean that many fall back on referring to them in generic terms as ‘multidimensional’ or ‘complex’ peacekeeping operations (Chetail 2009). The complexities of these peace-building operations stem partly from the fact that they include tasks far beyond conventional crisis management and peacekeeping mandates, and aim at a more thoroughgoing transformation of political, economic, and social structures to promote sustainable peace and development.

As Chetail (2009) suggests, peace-building operations involve at least three overall processes of change. First, peace-building aims to foster a security transition, whereby societies move from open violence to peace. Second, building peace after conflict involves a democratic transition from authoritarian rule to one of democratic governance. Third, peace-building is envisaged as incorporating socio-economic recovery, involving a transition from a conflict economy to an economy of peace.

Of these three, the process of security transformation is often linked to conventional peacekeeping efforts and the aim of bringing the immediate violence to an end. But moving beyond that, the conflict-transformation aspect of peace-building also incorporates a process whereby the actors consciously work towards a modification of the structural dimensions of the conflict with the long-term goal of securing durable peace (Goetschel 2009). Police and military reform, demobilization, and demilitarization efforts targeted at former combatants and the security establishment are examples of peace-building efforts geared towards security transformation (Berdal & Ucko 2009; Themnér 2011).

The process of democratic transformation, meanwhile, focuses on the establishment of legitimate political authority in the postconflict state. Post-conflict societies vary considerably, but a majority of the countries that emerge from civil war share a history of non-representative government, widespread political repression, and exclusionary and dysfunctional institutions. A move towards more open and accommodating political institutions is an integral part of contemporary peace-building efforts, and most peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War have involved a significant democratization component (Hegre & Fjelde 2010; Fortna 2008). Facilitating democratic transition involves preparing for, administrating and overseeing political elections, promoting basic civil and political rights, drafting national constitutions that codify political and civil rights, sponsoring the growth of civil society, and ensuring the transformation of warring actors into political parties (Paris 2004; Kumar 1998).

The imperative for democratization in the course of peace-building reflects two ideas about fostering the conditions for durable peace. First, democracy promotion is seen as a security strategy (Mani & Krause 2009; Hegre & Fjelde 2010). The assumption is that if only democratization is achieved, peace will take root. As such, democracy is not only seen as the ideal standard of good governance, but also the most secure foundation for creating durable peace (Donais 2009). Second, the focus on democratization stems from a belief in the ‘promotion of good governance as a developmental concern’, where democratic governance is held to lay the foundations for economic development (Mani & Krause 2009: 105).

The third process of change involves economic recovery and a transformation of wartime economic relations into the patterns of economic exchange deemed profitable for peace. Economic development is critical in the post-war phase, for two reasons: (i) poverty and underdevelopment are exacerbated during violent conflict; and (ii) poverty makes societies susceptible to violent conflict (Junne & Verkoren 2005). In economic terms, peace-building typically involves not only economic reform, but also massive development aid for poverty reduction by international donors. Neither of these strategies is unproblematic. Liberalization and marketization, coupled with structural adjustment packages, may serve to destabilize vulnerable, war-torn societies and reduce the ability of their governments to address domestic dissatisfaction. Conversely, foreign development aid may not only create donor dependence, but, if unequally distributed and politicized, it may serve to create new conflicts (Berdal & Wennman 2010).

Current debates on peace-building

Given the comprehensiveness and ambition of the peace-building agenda, it is no surprise that it has given rise to controversy in academic circles as well as among politicians and those on the ground. The chapters in this book provide novel insights and observations relating to several of these controversies.

The peace-building track record

First, several observers question the track record of the current approach to peace-building. In spite of the multiple actions and huge resources devoted to the process of peace-building, it has, many conclude, yielded few clear-cut results. The outcome has been more difficult and unpredictable than expected, in some cases even having a destabilizing effect on the post-conflict countries (Paris 2010). Even if many of the societies that have experienced peace-building operations have not seen a return to fully-fledged civil war, many still struggle with a range of other ills that peace-building operations set out to address. For example, post-conflict countries can display very weak popular legitimacy for political and judicial institutions; persistent patterns of inter-group insecurity; discriminatory politics against segments of society; and several have seen a relapse into more authoritarian rule (Höglund & Söderberg 2010; Kostić 2007). Despite considerable international attention to peace-building, many civil-war countries find themselves in a grey zone of neither war nor peace (MacGinty 2006). The vast literature on peace-building and interventions notwithstanding, there is no clear consensus on when and why interventions fail or succeed.

Several chapters in this book point to the uneven track record of international peace-building. These deficiencies can be described both in terms of negative notions of peace (or an absence of violence) and positive notions of peace (or the presence of some favourable characteristics in a society, such as democracy, justice, or development). Aggestam and Björkdahl’s chapter–drawing on insights from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Israel–Palestine–describes the frequent friction in the diverse, unequal encounters between the international community, the local elites, and local grass roots; encounters where new power dynamics emerge in the intersection of the internationally promoted, liberal, democratic peace with local expectations and experiences of peace. They emphasize the continuities rather than the discontinuities between war and peace in societies with recent experience of civil war. They refer to a situation of ‘frozen conflict’, when direct and immediate physical violence may have decreased, but the root causes of the dispute and the conflicting parties’ underlying interests have neither been addressed nor moderated. This generates fertile ground for the (re-)emergence of conflict and a relapse into violence. On a more positive note, Heldt’s chapter provides evidence that supports the hypothesis that UN operations have a positive effect on the level of democracy in post-conflict countries: one of the key components of positive peace.

Normative dimensions of peace-building

Second, many scholars question the ideological and normative underpinnings of the peace-building agenda. The core ideas underlying ‘liberal peace’–democratization, economic liberalization, neo-liberal development, human rights, and the rule of law–have exercised a growing influence over the way contemporary peace-building is practised (Richmond 2004; Pugh 2004). In the words of Paris (2002: 637), ‘international peace-builders have promulgated a particular vision of how states should organize themselves internally, based on the principles of liberal democracy and market-oriented economics.’ The liberal model of peace-building is criticized for being embedded in Western notions of the state, democracy, and the preconditions for development. Security and development concerns are invoked as a pretext for Western humanitarian intervention, in which the aim is to secure the Western way of life (Duffield 2007).

The contributions to this book in various ways demonstrate the implications of the normative dimension of international intervention. In particular, Kostić’s chapter analyses the normative foundations of international peace-building efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the rhetorical guise of support for local ownership, the US-LED, Western intervention promoted a set of liberal norms and values such as civic citizenship, democratic elections, civil society, human rights, the rule of law, and a market economy that did not sit well with the local post-war agenda. He suggests that the international community’s practices of external control and regulation have in fact curtailed local ownership of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the process of regulation was carried out in an undemocratic way, in striking contrast to the norms and principles ostensibly promoted in the rhetoric. External actors have, on a number of occasions, sidestepped the constitution and domestic institutions to put Western-oriented actors into power. This has spawned new political and social conflicts that have been used as a reason to further extend international control.

The result of the predominance of the liberal model for peace promotion has been a ‘peace-building consensus’. The term has been used to capture a general consensus that has been developed concerning ‘the objectives of intervention and approaches to ending conflict that are deployed therein. There is also concurrence on the main root causes of violence, how they should be addressed and who should do so’ (Richmond 2005: 85). The ‘peace-building consensus’ gives leading roles to the main promoters of the liberal peace template: the UN, the international financial institutions, and Western donors such as the US, the UK, Canada, Germany, and Norway. However, the consensus has been increasingly questioned. This is partly a response to the emergence of other actors in post-war reconstruction, which has undermined the leverage of those traditionally associated with liberal peace-building. China has become an increasingly important actor in Asia and Africa, and India, South Africa, and Brazil are among the emerging powers also seeking to play a role in economic development in the Southern hemisphere. These countries are poised to have greater influence over domestic policies in post-war countries, at the expense of the ‘traditional’ peace-building countries and organizations (Höglund & Orjula 2011; MacGinty 2007).

Olsson and Jarstad’s chapter brings attention to these very frictions in the norms and efforts of the international actors. Taking the case of Afghanistan, they identify two different approaches to state-building among the international agencies: the one based on forming a strong central state, as in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan; the other reliant on the people’s power as the foundation for political authority, resembling Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of the General Will. In the former, the main local counterpart is the state. In the latter, it is the citizens, not the political state structures. These divergent approaches can be identified among the different types of actors. In Afghanistan, the military strategies to support statebuilding have tended to follow Leviathan lines, whereas development aid has appeared more concerned with General Will. While the first approach could thus be interpreted as seeking to strengthen state control of the population, the second can be considered as seeking to empower the population to control the state. The chapter thus illustrates the conflictual nature of the norms and policies of the international community.

Peace-building versus democracy

In the third, and related, controversy, scholars have discussed the important trade-off in the peace-building agenda between stability and democratization (Jarstad & Sisk 2008). Whereas the holding of elections and the introduction of civil and political rights are frequently seen as the end of a successful peace-building mission (for example, Doyle & Sambanis 2000), advances towards more open and competitive political processes also threaten to undermine progress made towards post-conflict stability. Democracy is an institutionally based procedure for the peaceful resolution of conflict in pluralist societies, and as such can be seen as a precondition for durable peace. However, the process of political liberalization and popular mobilization also generates tensions (Snyder 2000). Some research suggests postponing democratic elections and liberalization in favour of institution-building, while others argue in favour of fast-track democratization to establish legitimate government (Sisk 2009). Paris (1997, 2004), for instance, argues that accelerated economic liberalization and strong efforts to democratize before the state is sufficiently strong to co-opt all its citizens into one institutional framework can precipitate a recurrence of violence. Reilly (2003), on the other hand, suggests that elections are necessary to democratically endorse a new post-war order. The introduction of democratic institutions in general is seen as a requirement for creating legitimate political authority.

Heldt’s statistical analysis in this volume clearly indicates that there is something about ambitious peacekeeping operations that promotes transitions to democracy. He holds that democratization mandates in peacekeeping operations are premised on the belief that the sooner democracy is established, the sooner peacekeepers can leave, and–because of the lowered risk of renewed violence in democratic countries–the less likely they will have to return. At the same time, several chapters problematize the relationship between democratization efforts and stability. Aggestam and Björkdahl point out that at times a frozen conflict is sustained by the presence of outside actors keeping the peace but not resolving the conflict. The situation may be traced to the discrepancy between the virtual realities constructed according to an overly ambitious peace agenda by the international community and the contrasting realities on the ground where the root causes of conflict are still being experienced. Broad, local participation in ‘peace politics’ beyond exclusionary, elite negotiations and a ballot box approach to democratic participation seems vital to localizing the peace. Kostić’s findings highlight the inherent tension between strong international control and the development of local democracy. In post-Dayton Bosnia, interventions by international actors to promote a specific form of peace have prevented local versions of peace and democracy from taking root. Olivius’ chapter shows that the promotion of policies and norms such as gender equality, human rights, or democracy by international actors in peace-building contexts does not take place in a vacuum. International agendas for social and political change coexist and interact with the political agendas and projects of local actors, and are thus shaped by local conditions.

The local ownership problematique

A fourth controversy concerns the question of local ownership in post-conflict peace-building