Europe and the End of the Age of Innocence

By Francesco M. Bongiovanni

“Bongiovanni’s message should be heeded, especially in Brussels, Berlin and Paris” – John Peet, Political Editor, The Economist
Francesco Bongiovanni returns with a sequel to The Decline and the Fall of Europe, a book Guardian journalist Nils Pratley labelled 'a wake-up call for the twenty-first century'. Since 2012 Europe has been confronted with new, unexpected game-changing challenges such as the refugee crisis and its human tsunami, the surprise of Brexit and the explosion of 'alternative' politics. Europeans have finally come to realize that the open-societies that they have been comfortably living in are under threat and fragmenting, leaving their survival uncertain. Minorities are falling prey to an Islamist ideology that conveys values and customs diametrically opposed to European ones. Terrorist acts have become the 'new normal', part of daily life. The North-South cleavage brought aboutby the eurozone crisis is now completed by a deep East-West cleavage born from the refugee crisis. Against this backdrop, a Germany that is not all that it seems has become Europe’s de-facto ruler, but is unfit to lead, while Trump’s America cannot be counted on as it once used to be, forcing Europe to fend for itself. A beacon of stability and prosperity in the past, a naive and unprepared Europe, facing new and terrifying challenges is today more than ever torn apart, increasingly unstable and adrift.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Release date: Apr 2, 2018
• ISBN: 9783319743707

Book preview

© The Author(s) 2018

Francesco M. BongiovanniEurope and the End of the Age of Innocencehttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74370-7_1

1. Introduction

Francesco M. Bongiovanni¹ 

(1)

http://www.francescobauthor.com

Any fool can know. The point is to understand.

Albert Einstein

Apart from deserving my gratitude, anyone who read my first book, The Decline and Fall of Europe , is entitled to ask whether this sequel is really justified. Have things changed so much since the book was published in 2012 that a new one is necessary, or is this just the old dish being warmed up? To this legitimate question the returning reader needs a clear answer—as much as I needed one before deciding to embark on this new writing adventure. The fact is, sadly, that there have been dramatic new developments—most as sudden as they were unexpected—which have caused Europe to find itself today on a significantly more worrisome trajectory than the one I had anticipated in my first book. Interestingly, some of the people who, back then, suggested that The Decline and Fall of Europe was too pessimistic now say it was perhaps not pessimistic enough. This change in mood reflects the simple truth that, since 2012, the situation in Europe has considerably deteriorated across many dimensions and the changes are starting to directly and visibly affect a vast number of people. On top of a general worsening in ways that had largely been predicted at the time, new developments have piled up that may take the continent into uncharted, dangerous territory. I am therefore afraid that the answer to the above question is that it is high time to re-examine the situation in Europe .

The Decline and Fall of Europe was intended to be a 360 degree tour, offering a balanced description of the European ‘system’ and of the intractable challenges facing Europe, which were leading to inexorable decline across any dimension one cared to analyse. Among these, the transformation of the welfare state into the unsustainable ‘Civilization of Entitlements’ that was bound to condemn parts of Europe to gradual impoverishment (which I have at times jocularly taken to illustrate as follows in my speeches: ‘you can have long vacations or you can have the money for long vacations, but you can’t have both’); the crisis of a single currency built on a flawed architecture; the vast inefficiencies of the EU’s Tinguely Machine and so on. The purpose of the book was to try to figure out what was really going on and where it could take Europe, concluding that ‘the quality of life our children will know will be inferior to the quality of life we have enjoyed in the past half century’.¹ At the time The Decline and Fall of Europe was published, Europeans were still by and large in denial. Subjects such as failed immigration and integration policies, and the Islamization of Europe ’s open societies were still mostly considered taboo. A major publishing house I had approached about translating the book for distribution in France replied that while what the book said was true and mattered, the French were not ready to hear such truths. Similarly, publishers I approached in Germany, Italy, Spain and Scandinavia showed scant interest in translating the book for distribution in their own countries. It seemed that Europeans didn’t really want to know (or perhaps they already knew everything, or the book wasn’t good enough). The book therefore remained available only in its original English language and generally did much better in North America , the United Kingdom and Asia than in continental Europe . I was invited to give some speeches, lectures and TV interviews outside Europe. The point I am making here is that non-Europeans seemed far more interested in understanding the plight of Europe than Europeans themselves, whose main concern appeared to be to ensure that their privileged way of life would continue.

How much things have changed since then! Europeans have by and large woken up to the first tremors of the Titanic scraping against the iceberg. By early 2017 most of them were finally conscious of the frightening realities they were facing and recognized that there was no room left for blissful denial—a sea change from their attitude five years earlier. Something had clearly evolved in the collective European psyche, and denial had given place to bewilderment, fear and anger. These feelings translated into the recent and spectacular rise of ‘alternative politics’ across most of the continent, a development that could lead to dangerous territory if historical precedent is any indication. Europeans are now affected enough, worried enough, angry enough that they finally show significant interest in trying to understand what is hitting them (this will hopefully cause my books finally to be translated!). Consider, for instance, the controversial issue of the Islamization of European societies . New interest in this issue translated into the phenomenal success of Phillippe Houllebecq ’s 2015 book Submission,² a political-fiction novel set in 2022 in a France governed by its first president from an Islamic party. One can agree or disagree with the relevance of Houllebecq ’s book, but the fact remains that it sold 120,000 copies in France in five days upon its January 2015 launch, and became a top seller in Italy and Germany as well. This awakening does not, however, necessarily mean Europeans will collectively muster the will and courage to take appropriate measures to steer the ship away from the iceberg, assuming one can figure out what the appropriate measures should be. Unfortunately, I see very little chance of this happening and profess complete trust in the ability of governing political ‘elites’ to ensure that the ship holds its course steady to hit the iceberg, head on and at full speed. The reader will, by the way, notice that throughout this book the word ‘elites’ (in the context of European or Western political elites) is set within quote marks, reflecting the difficulty I encounter in associating the mediocre class of people guiding the Western world today with the very word ‘elite’.

Allow me to confess something personal. Writing a book on Europe is quite demanding, particularly if one carries out one’s own research, as I did for both books. This was all the more so in my case, since writing and researching takes away precious time from my interests in business and composing music. Unfortunately, not much money is to be made by writing such a book. So, my motivation had to come from some other direction. I wrote The Decline and Fall of Europe because of the shock I experienced when I came back from spending 15 years in the dynamic continent that is Asia only to find a Europe busy tying a rope around its own neck. I was then prompted to write Europe and the End of the Age of Innocence because the slow decay I had predicted in the first book appeared to have been replaced by a potentially swifter and more turbulent end game.

It seems that as Europeans are finally becoming interested in knowing more about their destiny and the reality surrounding them, they are realizing that they cannot rely on their political leaders, governments or the mainstream media to always tell the truth. Social media is not necessarily better. All of these players have been compromised, time and again caught lying, hiding facts, fabricating or manipulating information to advance their own interests or ideology-driven agendas. Having woken up from a long state of slumber and denial, the average European hungers for information but has become very suspicious of what he/she is fed, and rightly so. Written by an average European who put himself through the difficulties of trying to find out what was really going on, Europe and the End of the Age of Innocence is a small contribution to the need for a balanced and informative view, which I hope is laid out in a way that everybody can read and understand. To my readers, I should like to reiterate that I am no scholar, journalist, historian, political scientist or politician, nor do I harbour ambitions of becoming any of these. I am an ordinary man who decided to undertake a new journey of discovery to find out a bit more about today’s Europe, put these findings on paper and share them with you. Once again, ‘Trying to make sense of all the material turned out to be like one of these games where you connect the dots and slowly see patterns emerging.’³ No one is entirely impervious to outside influence or can wholly shed his/her own education and background; yet I have attempted to write a book devoid of ideological bias, laying out the facts as well as I could given my limited research capabilities and, apart from a few instances where I can’t resist venturing an opinion, I generally leave it to the reader to reach his/her own conclusions.

Had the trajectory followed by Europe been more or less in line with the findings laid out in The Decline and Fall of Europe , I wouldn’t have bothered to write a sequel, and you wisely wouldn’t have considered reading it had I done so. Yet, to name just a few of the unexpected and sudden developments that made necessary a reassessment of Europe’s state of affairs, who would have predicted, just a year before Brexit , let alone back in 2012, that the UK would leave Europe—the first time since the end of the Second World War that the European integration process has been officially put in reverse? Who would have said, back in 2012, that Marine le Pen would have had a significant chance of winning France’s 2017 presidential election with a programme intending to lead Europe’s second-largest country down the path of far-right nationalism and outside Europe and the eurozone , potentially reducing the European project to a chapter in history books? Who would have said, even in 2016, that the German general election of September 2017 would result, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, in a far-right nationalist party entering parliament and that Germany would find itself without a government? Who would have imagined that German Chancellor Angela Merkel would suddenly and unilaterally open her country’s doors to a human tsunami fleeing what American journalist George Friedman aptly calls the ‘world of chaos’, causing the death of Schengen, and fracturing Europe along East–West lines (just as mismanagement of the euro fractured Europe along North–South lines)? Who would have said that the placid Merkel would take actions that would contribute in no small measure to Brexit , to the rebirth of nationalism and the explosion of alternative politics across the continent? The issue of ‘others’ has now inserted itself prominently into the forefront of European life and politics. The ‘trilogy’ formed by unwanted mass immigration (UMI) , by the creeping yet increasingly visible Islamization of Europe’s open societies and of their Euromuslim minorities (by which I mean Muslims living in Europe), and by the daily Jihadist terrorist acts that have become Europe’s ‘new normal’, has replaced the economy and jobs as the main topic of conversation across the continent and constitutes a key focus of this book. Will Europe’s open societies and cherished way of life survive this onslaught? As I am writing these lines, I just heard on the news that another bombing took place in a London subway with dozen wounded and that yet another soldier was stabbed by a Jihadist in France. By the time you finish reading the first section of this book, it is likely that further Jihadist attacks will have taken place, that several thousand more migrants from Africa or the Middle East will have reached European shores and that a few hundred million euros of taxpayer money will have been spent dealing with UMI . The ‘trilogy’ is dramatically changing the broad socio-political landscape, to the great surprise of the mediocre and clueless traditional political ‘elites’ who, having fallen prey to a new form of seductive, multiculturalist and post-national ideology, have mostly chosen to ignore reality and the grievances of their constituencies (the fact, however, that politicians who tell the truth don’t enjoy long careers means ordinary people carry their share of responsibility). Where can this sea change take Europe?

And let’s not forget the Trump presidency—another unexpected development with profound implications for an increasingly fragmented Europe that may have to fend for itself more and more in an increasingly unstable world. After a long absence, geopolitics is inviting itself to Europe’s table, where it is finding a reluctant, bewildered and unprepared host. As if all this were not enough, Germany has become Europe’s de facto ruler, a position for which its qualifications are dubious at best. Granted, Berlin has probably not coveted this position and more likely finds itself in it as a consequence of France’s not-so-slow collapse and the United Kingdom’s recent estrangement. Germany’s policies in relation to the euro—in particular, its misplaced insistence on fiscal austerity measures and refusal to entertain any idea of economic solidarity —have ravaged southern economies and cast serious doubts on the viability of the single currency. Since Germans see Germany first (and who can blame them?) and Germany does not deliver the ‘international public goods’ (by which I mean things that a nation does but that other nations perceive as being also beneficial to them) that would contribute to its legitimacy as leader of Europe and benefit the rest of its partners, the ship scrapes the iceberg with no qualified captain on deck. The very recent and surprising dose of instability injected into German politics will make things even more difficult for Europe. Some of the challenges just mentioned couldn’t have been anticipated in The Decline and Fall of Europe , yet others could perhaps have been anticipated, constituting shortcomings of my previous analysis which it is now time to set right. To understand the plight of Europe, we are compelled to take a closer look at these and other issues in the course of the book. We shall also take a fresh look at what happened—or rather, what didn’t happen—to the euro after 2012, and what it means for the future of the single currency. We shall take a look at the geopolitical impact of the USA’s very recent inroads into European energy markets and the relationship with the Ukrainian crisis. Covering all issues affecting Europe today is an impossible task, so we shall focus on selected ones, among which what I call the ‘trilogy’ figures prominently. As stated above, this in my opinion is to a large extent responsible for Europe’s very recent and dramatic political transformation.

Zooming out to look at the broader picture one can see that Europe is not alone in its predicament. The entire ‘Western world’ seems to have lost its compass. The West in general doesn’t seem to know what it stands for anymore, or where it wants to go. Perhaps this is due to the ‘fatigue’ of a Western civilization on the declining slope of its life curve—it is, after all, the destiny of civilizations, to come and go, just as anything ‘alive’ does. Perhaps because it is fast losing the absolute and relative pre-eminence among civilizations it was used to enjoying for many centuries. Or perhaps because it is tearing itself apart between two views of society which it convinced itself are mutually exclusive: a liberal-universalist view based on a flat world, and a conservative-nationalist one that sees a world full of mountains. Whatever the causes of this loss of direction, Europe and especially the USA seem intent on reconsidering if not rejecting the basis of post-Second World War Western civilization while offering no alternative, to the delight of rising powers such as China. The mediocrity of today’s political leadership on both sides of the Atlantic doesn’t help and reflects the decline of a civilization that is short of breath, short of ideas and energy, and that seems, at times, intent on self-immolation. Political correctness , which appears to have become the guiding force of Western thought, is no substitute for wise policy. The late Charlton Heston ’s words to the effect that ‘political correctness is tyranny with manners’ have long been forgotten on both sides of the Atlantic. Too busy tying itself in politically correct knots and in fighting internal wars of moralization , the West seems unable to marshal the energy and will to find pragmatic solutions to its identity and existential problems and is fast losing ground in the wider context of competing civilizations. Westerners who remain indifferent should perhaps be reminded of Dante Alighieri ’s warning: ‘The hottest places in hell are reserved for those who maintain their neutrality in times of moral crisis.’

This book is not about the larger issue of Western civilization and its alleged decline. It is about Europe. Watching Europe fall apart is no joy, especially for a European. As the epitome of a post-modern benign power, Europe has a very useful role to play in the world and it is truly a shame that it may collapse before playing it to the end. Yet it is falling apart right in front of our eyes and the movie is not even running in slow motion anymore. Things seem to be happening faster and faster. Many dejected Europeans have been turning to unsavoury and amateurish ‘alternative’ politicians for hope and solutions. Granted, some of the challenges facing Europe today do have solutions, at least in theory. The mere fact that Europe has recently moved from a state of denial to the realization that it is in deep trouble would normally inject a note of optimism , since the first step to finding and implementing solutions is to accept that there are problems and try to understand them. I have implicitly and explicitly ventured some personal ideas about solutions here and there in the course of this book. Many people far more qualified than I am have been proposing solutions as well. Yet, if you allow me to define political will as the inverse of the distance between a solution and its actual implementation, I can safely say that the absence of any noticeable political will when it comes to devising and implementing concrete, pragmatic, sensible solutions remains a hallmark of a Europe that revels in ‘muddling through’. Europe loves to shoot itself in the foot, then calmly reload and shoot itself in the other foot. Europe delights in being the prisoner of one ideology or another, rejecting pragmatism as intellectually and morally unworthy of interest. Europe rejoices in crossing the fine line dividing political correctness from cowardice time and again. This unfortunate state of affairs prevents me from harbouring any new feelings of optimism . To the question ‘do you think Europe is in worse shape today than it was five years ago’ (‘in better shape’ wouldn’t qualify as a serious question, would it?), my response is: ‘Europe is, today, in a worse shape than it was five years ago, and it is in better shape today than it will be five years from now.’ Whenever someone asks me to sign a copy of The Decline and Fall of Europe I have adopted the habit of handwriting this little sentence above my signature: ‘In the hope that I am completely wrong.’ I believe I shall continue this habit if I am asked to sign copies of Europe and the End of the Age of Innocence . I sincerely hope that I am utterly wrong in my assessment of the state and destiny of Europe and that things will work out for the best. Let the reader form his/her own opinion in the following pages.

Footnotes

1

Francesco M. Bongiovanni . ‘The Decline and Fall of Europe’. Page 4. Palgrave Macmillan. 2012.

2

Philippe Houllebecq ‘Submission’, Editions Flammarion, 2015.

3

Francesco M. Bongiovanni . ‘The Decline and Fall of Europe’. Page 4. Palgrave Macmillan. 2012.

Part IThe Trilogy

© The Author(s) 2018

Francesco M. BongiovanniEurope and the End of the Age of Innocencehttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74370-7_2

2. The Awakening

Francesco M. Bongiovanni¹ 

(1)

http://www.francescobauthor.com

How something changed in Europe and it is no longer just about jobs and the economy

Jolted!

The November 2015 terror attack in Paris’s Bataclan theatre , during which Jihadists left 130 dead, resonated worldwide with the same intensity as 9/11 in New York, the 2004 Madrid bombings and the 2005 London Underground bombings. The year 2016 was another annus mirabilis with, among others, the March carnage in Brussels that left 32 dead, the 14 July massacre in Nice—perpetrated by a single truck driver, Tunisian-born French resident Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel —with 84 victims, followed by a copycat attack in Berlin—carried out by yet another single truck driver, Tunisian asylum seeker Anis Amri —resulting in 12 deaths. These were among the most horrific examples from a long list of Jihadist attacks that was getting longer every day. Each time, the culprit was singled out as radical Islam ; each time, social media was awash with shock and indignation; each time, governments pledged their determination to do whatever was necessary to fight this evil; each time, the enemy was portrayed as a nebula of alien religious fanatics; and, each time, additional steps were taken to tighten security and seek targets for retaliation at home and possibly abroad. Yet the succession of massacres showed that nothing was changing, no end was in sight and mayhem could happen again anywhere, anytime. By 2016 it had become clear to Europeans that, when it came to domestic security matters, this was Europe’s terrifying ‘new normal’.

Evidence reportedly exists that some of the perpetrators of the Bataclan massacre rode the current wave of mass migration from the Middle East to a welcoming and careless Europe and that some of their accomplices were likely radicalized French citizens free to move around after their return from ‘Jihad 101’ abroad. This attested to the self-destructive levels permissiveness had reached in Europe . Some French Jihadists who joined ISIS abroad were even known to have been receiving payments from French social security and the authorities’ initial lame response was that they could not do much about it.¹ Evidence has shown that most terror attacks are perpetrated by people who are known by the security services to be dangerous radicals and yet remain free to move around, evidence of Europe’s dramatic failure to effectively address such issues.

A mere month after Bataclan, incidents of mass sexual assaults perpetrated by migrants and refugees against women in Cologne (as well as in various other German and European cities) at the end of 2015 were, similarly, a wake-up call with regard to the masses Europe had welcomed. Cologne was the tipping point because it was too big to ignore—over five hundred complaints were filed—and it also revealed in broad daylight the extent to which the authorities and mainstream media were engaged in a conspiracy of silence.² The perpetrators could not have chosen a more tolerant and liberal city than Cologne, where migrants make up a third of the population.³ The incident had the effect of a cold shower on naïve Germans, aghast to discover that these people could turn out to be so brazenly ungrateful, defiant and violent towards their hosts. Cologne police reported deliberate attempts by migrants and refugees to provoke them, including an instance when one ‘tore up a residency permit with a smile on his face, yelling You can’t touch me. I’ll just go back tomorrow and get a new one,’ and another who said ‘I’m a Syrian! You have to treat me kindly! Mrs. Merkel invited me’.⁴ According to German feminist and publisher Alice Schwartzer , ‘this explosion of sexual violence on the same night in five countries and in a dozen cities is no coincidence. This is organized.’⁵

It’s Not the Economy Anymore

This string of terror attacks confronted Europeans with the reality that anyone could become a victim. Citizens from all walks of life recoiled with horror, imagining what the thousands of Jihadists Europe was known to harbour could do. The proliferation of ‘lone wolf’ attacks caused some to fear that any Muslim, including their neighbour, could be a potential threat. In the wake of the electoral victory of the anti-immigrant right in Austria’s October 2017 elections, public opinion expert Peter Hajek said that ‘after initially welcoming refugees in 2015, voters grew jaded and came to see the newcomers less as legitimate asylum seekers than as economic migrants . They also began to regard Muslims in general as suspect […] They do not really differentiate between Muslims and Islamic extremists […] Nearly every Muslim seems to be dangerous.’⁶ It dawned on Europeans that they were in a one-sided war and that the world around them was changing due to the ubiquitous presence of increasingly assertive minorities, masses of unwanted migrants, and the creeping Islamization of their societies. To a growing mass of citizens increasingly affected in their day-to-day lives by these emotionally charged issues it was all evidence that accommodation had gone too far. Many came to the conclusion that the radicals’ most potent weapon was not their kamikazes, it was the naiveté and political correctness of open societies. Questions that were previously considered taboo were publicly asked with newfound alarm. To show themselves welcoming and tolerant, did Europeans need to continue bending over backwards to accommodate ungrateful and hostile minorities with incompatible values? How compatible was Islam with European values, and how much of it could be tolerated? How much national identity should be sacrificed to make space for minorities? Did Europe have to absorb, in the name of compassion, masses of migrants from societies that did not necessarily share the same values, and do so at a time of economic crisis? Wolfgang Schäuble , Germany’s minister of finance and a key figure of Angela Merkel’sChristian Democrats (CDU) party used words that were unthinkable just a few years earlier: ‘Without a doubt, the growing number of Muslims in our country today is a challenge for the open-mindedness of mainstream society.’⁷

By the second half of 2016 it was obvious that something had changed dramatically in the collective European psyche. Wherever I travelled within the continent, the ‘trilogy’ of unwanted mass immigration (UMI) , Islamization and Jihadist terrorism had replaced jobs and economic concerns as the main topic of conversation. The shift in priorities was as clear as it was sudden and unexpected. The Economist recognized that ‘European voters worry more about immigration and terrorism than about economic insecurity.’⁸ Surveys conducted by Eurobarometer revealed that, while unemployment was the main concern for 45% of respondents in the winter of 2014, within less than a year immigration had moved to first place (with unemployment and the economy back in second place and terrorism far back).⁹ By the spring of 2016, 48% placed immigration as their main concern with terrorism now a close second at 39% and the economy far behind at 20%. Even in Sweden, traditionally one of Europe’s most migrant-friendly societies, UMI had, by early 2016, become the main concern for 40% of citizens, above worries about jobs, welfare and schools. This represented the biggest opinion swing ever witnessed by the pollsters.¹⁰ In another Swedish poll, those considering immigration as one of the top 3 social issues in the country more than doubled from 25% to over 55% between 2014 and 2016.¹¹ In the United Kingdom, there is little doubt that Brexit was to a large extent about the British people’s desire to regain control of their frontiers. Similarly, security was a key concern of the majority of French voters before the 2017 presidential election and a large majority felt the state could not adequately protect them.¹² By mid-2017, nearly half of the Germans surveyed said refugees and integration were their biggest concerns, with social inequalities the focus of only 14%.¹³ The Economist wrote that ‘immigration has soared to first place in ranking of voters’ concerns’ ahead of the September general election in Germany.¹⁴ The Alternative for Germany party (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) then entered parliament: the first time a far-right nationalist party had done so in Germany since the end of the Second World War. An IPSOS survey taken that same year showed that 63% of Germans considered Islam a menace and 60% of all Europeans said immigration had had negative effects on their countries.¹⁵ All over Europe , security was now a paramount concern, in addition to the safety of the European way of life and national identity. All of these issues concerned the relationship of mainstream populations with the ‘others’. At the same time, people felt that the traditional political parties had failed to understand their new concerns, let alone address them. In Germany , for instance, 58% felt the country’s established parties were failing to take concerns about radical Islam seriously enough.¹⁶ The combination of these new challenges and people’s disillusionment with mainstream political forces amounted to a game-changer for Europe.

In late 2016, Europeans woke up from a long period of denial to find that the golden era of European exceptionalism was over. The list of Jihadist atrocities grew endlessly; masses of unwanted migrants from the ‘world of disorder’ kept flowing in; domestic security visibly deteriorated and relations between host populations and increasingly assertive elements from Euromuslim minorities deteriorated.¹⁷ As a result, the blissful and innocent life most Europeans had got used to, largely insulated from the instability plaguing other parts of the planet, gave way to a deeply unsettling new normal. By 2016, a palpable feeling that enough was enough, that things were spiralling out of control arose among ordinary citizens, whose day-to-day lives were increasingly affected by these issues. Disillusion and a feeling of impotence were being replaced with anger at the deep disconnect of mainstream political ‘elites’ unable to face reality and provide solutions. Europeans were now forcing themselves to ask a question they had done their best to avoid for a long time: were they going to continue down the path of self-immolation in the name of lofty egalitarian and humanitarian ideals, or were they prepared to compromise these ideals in order to protect their cherished way of life? Their collective response to this question would determine whether or not Europe’s open societies could survive as we know them.

The Things We Talk About

These emotionally charged issues are complex to analyse. To better understand them, it is important to differentiate between two broad topics. On one hand is the current of Islamization affecting Muslim minorities in European societies (as well as the host societies themselves to some extent) and the radicalization of a subset of these minorities. This topic relates to settled minorities that are already part of Europe, and carries a significant religious component. On the other hand is the challenge posed by the masses of unwanted economic migrants and war refugees, a topic related to new immigration that has (to some extent) less of a religious component. These issues have different dynamics and implications, although they feed into each other. They both deal with the relationship between host populations and ‘others’—in other words, people who are not European or are not of European descent—and touch on the challenges, real and perceived, that their presence on European soil poses to host societies.

As earlier pointed out, I aggregate UMI , Islamization and Jihadism in a box labelled the ‘trilogy’. Crucially, it is their combined impact that has shaken Europe to the core, reshaping societies and politics in ways that were unthinkable in 2012. At that time, Islamization and immigration were not perceived by mainstream Europeans as existential threats to their societies, despite warnings from Cassandras, such as Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci back in the early 2000s. However, the three elements of the ‘trilogy’ combined into a powerful, combustible mixture bound to reach a critical mass and detonate at some point. Were it not for the ‘trilogy’ we likely wouldn’t have witnessed the rise of ‘alternative politics’ (comprising far-right nationalism), which has the potential to take Europe back to pre-Second World War and pre-EU times: a dramatic reversal of the course of history. Were it not for the ‘trilogy’ we likely wouldn’t have witnessed Brexit : the New York Times recognized that ‘It is the flow of people into the European Union that has had the greatest geopolitical impact, and helped to precipitate the British vote.’¹⁸

Who imagined a few years ago that Berlin would be the object of a major terrorist attack, that more than a million refugees would reach the heart of Europe in the course of a single year, that Schengen would fall apart and that Sweden would carry out the first substantial mass deportation seen on European soil since the Second World War? This ‘trilogy’ has, in just a few years, become the chief driver of a profound change in today’s Europe. An understanding of what is going on and where it may be heading starts with an understanding of the nature, origins and dynamics of each of its three components. To have any real value, this understanding must be based on facts, analysis and common sense, rather than ideological or religious bias. Such is the basis of the research I personally conducted and am now sharing. I have chosen to divide the study of the ‘trilogy’ into two parts. The first part, ‘The Tsunami’, deals with UMI . UMI deserves to be treated separately because migrants are not at war with Europe. UMI is the result of human tragedy on a large