Liberal Quicksand

By Yves Decock

According to a fairy tale, after World War II, Europe rejected nationalism and subsequently started the European project, which brought uninterrupted peace from 1945 on. In this book, this version of history is unmasked. First, Europe did not desert nor transcend nationalism after 1945. On the contrary, since 1800, the nationalist program, based on linguistic divisions, has been implemented continuously, also after the end of World War II. Not the rejection of the nationalist program but its nearly full implementation is the basis of the lasting peace in Europe since 1945. The delineation of linguistically homogeneous territories is the precondition to create a truly Lockean democracy. Second, nationalism is, by itself, in the first place a strong emancipatory force that is intrinsically connected with the liberal evolutions at the end of the eighteenth and the midst of the nineteenth century. A correct appreciation of the emancipatory role of nationalism and of the contribution of nationalism to the current structure of Europe is a necessity to be able to deal adequately with the issues the modern world is thrusting upon Europe and to assess the form a political entity Europe might take.

The European experience raises the question whether another path is possible. Throughout its history, the USA has followed the European path and has remained fundamentally Anglo-Saxon until 1965. Since then, the USA is struggling how to deal with its multicultural and multilingual reality and hesitates between an English-only mode, following the European model or something else, currently still not yet clearly defined.

And what are the implications of Europes history when applied to the Middle East or multinational states like China? Can they democratize without falling apart?

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse UK
• Release date: Jan 22, 2016
• ISBN: 9781504997973

Yves Decock

Mr. Decock breaks through the tunnel vision of classical liberalism and puts the realization of the nationalist program at the core of Europe’s history of the last two hundred years and, as such, renders justice to the statement by J. S. Mill that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.”

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© 2016 Yves Decock. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the written permission of the author.

Published by AuthorHouse  01/18/2016

ISBN: 978-1-5049-9795-9 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-5049-9794-2 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-5049-9797-3 (e)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016900823

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Contents

Introduction

Part I

Chapter 1:  Self-Determination – Short History of an Idea

Chapter 2:  Language, A Short History

Chapter 3:  Why Language is Different

Chapter 4:  Violence – The Hapsburg Empire

Chapter 5:  The Dismantling of the Ottoman Empire

Chapter 6:  The Paradox of Locke Meets the Curse of J.S. Mill

Chapter 7:  The Future of Europe – A Federation of Nations

Part II

Chapter 8:  America, A Nation State in Denial

Chapter 9:  The Original Sin – From Slave-State to Democracy

Chapter 10:  The Deconstruction of the USA

Chapter 11:  Language in the USA

Part III

Chapter 12:  Epilogue – The Rest of the World

Bibliography

In memory of my mother Gilberta Vanrafelghem (1933–2015)

who fed me with all the knowledge I hungered for when I was still a kid,

who was afraid that books would take over my life,

who tried to follow, both worried and amused, the meanders of my reasoning, until the end.

Introduction

I.

In 1995, the French President François Mitterrand declared forcefully, ‘Nationalism is War’ (‘Le nationalisme, c’est la guerre’). Just some years before, in 1989, the Iron Curtain, which had separated the communist from the Western world, had fallen and thereby opened an opportunity for peace and freedom for all. Soon, however, a civil war in Yugoslavia, not that far from the centre of Europe, erupted and put opportunity, peace, and freedom on hold once again. Subsequently, Yugoslavia fell apart into new states Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Kosovo, and the entity about which the final outcome still remains to be settled, Bosnia. Mitterrand expressed only what most people thought: Nationalism, which was responsible for much of the bloodshed that characterized the twentieth century, was back with all its destructive powers.

By 2015, the political entity called Europe has extended further eastwards and is in the early stages of incorporating Ukraine. The Russian-speaking population of the eastern part of Ukraine seems unwilling to follow the choice made by Kiev and so it revolts. Russia’s President Putin is criticized for warmongering, supporting the rebels, and surfing the waves of Russian nationalism. Putin is on the wrong side of history, his Western critics say.

Also in 2015, referenda in Scotland and Catalonia have put pressure on the unity of Great Britain and Spain respectively.

Nationalism seems to undermine the dream of a durable peace, which filled Europe with hope after the Second World War and again after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

II.

After the Second World War, Europe started an ambitious process of peaceful economic and political integration which led in a remarkably short time to the creation of a European Parliament, a common market zone, a common economic policy (The Maastricht Norms), a common currency (the euro), and a European Central Bank. According to European founding mythology, Europe set upon this road because it realised that nationalism had been the proximate cause of two consecutive world wars. Wise politicians realised that nationalism had to be overcome, sublimated or transcended in order to make a recurrence of the previous wars unlikely, if not impossible, so the story goes. Now that the European project is under pressure as a consequence of a financial and economic crisis, defenders of a growing Europe clash with defenders of a Europe ‘light’. Defenders of a stronger political unity plead for solidarity and blame their opponents for being populists or, worse, nationalists.

Against that background, it is essential to correct the founding myth in at least one important respect. Evidently, the different European states have started to cooperate better with one another through the creation of a common market zone and the alignment of economic and monetary policies. However, this better cooperation is not the result of the rejection of nationalism. The improved cooperation and lasting peace were only possible because the nationalist programme has been realised during the last two centuries with accelerations after the First and the Second World Wars and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The story that the peaceful character of the current Europe is the result of the conversion of wise politicians who turned their back on nationalism is a fairytale.

On the contrary, Europe is currently peaceful because it has devoted roughly twohundred years to creating states with homogeneous language groups; to a high degree, the political, national, and territorial unit are now congruent. Peace in Europe and the European Union is possible, not because the nationalistic programme has been rejected, but because the nationalist programme has been implemented in Europe. From that perspective, the European Union is the dream of Giuseppe Mazzini, the creation of a ‘brotherhood of peoples’, come true.

In this book, we will describe how the map of Europe was rearranged over the last twohundred years according to the nationalist principles and how these rearrangements formed a solid basis for a lasting peace.

This ‘nationalist’ stance is, therefore, in the first place a statement of facts and not a normative position. We take notice of the path which history in Europe has followed. Only based on that understanding can we take a normative position, namely, that it is impossible or at least dangerous to ignore the historic laws of nationalism.

This understanding of the historical events which created Europe and the uncovering of its DNA throws a long shadow over how a political unity called ’Europe’ might look. While we believe that the creation of such a super-state is a necessity in the long run, at least if Europe wants to play more than a marginal role in the world of tomorrow, this super-state can only be created on top of the existing nationstates and not by destroying them. The choice between Europe and the nationstates is a false one. The super-state Europe can only exist as a federal structure if it retains a deep respect for the nation states.

III.

Some might invoke the nationalisms which blossom in Catalonia, the Basque Provinces, Scotland, and Flanders to prove that, contrary to what we claimed above, the nationalist programme has not yet been fully executed and that peace in Europe is, therefore, not yet assured. From a broader perspective, these nationalist movements should, however, be considered as the finishing touch, the cherry on the pie. In the case of Spain, we can easily argue that the ‘natural’ (i.e. democratic) process was interrupted by the dictatorial regime of Franco and that only in the wake of the democratization process after his death, the democratic nationalisms of Catalonia and the Basque Provinces, could bring national identity to fruition. In Belgium, the development of a Flemish state was delayed by the unfortunate tactical choice made by some Flemish nationalists to cooperate with the German occupier in the Second World War. It gave the opponents of Flemish nationalism the opportunity to portray Flemish nationalism as an equivalent of Nazism. Even today, French-speaking politicians try to criminalize Flemish nationalism by associating it with Nazism.

Some pundits have declared nationalism an anachronism, an old-fashioned, nineteenth-century ideology which should, therefore, not be taken seriously. They are correct in stating that nationalism is an ideology of the nineteenth century. But then again, democracy is to an important degree an ideology of that century as well. What is more, in this book we will demonstrate how democracy and nationalism transformed Europe, working hand in hand, in the nineteenth century. If there exists an anachronism, then it is that in 2015, the nationalist principle has not yet been fully applied in some European states.

Others will say exactly the opposite, that nationalism is irrelevant because it is the result of modern (again nineteenth-century) fabrications and social engineering exercises. Again, to a certain degree, this statement is correct. But what is the conclusion to be inferred from this? That because these languages and their nations are fabricated, they are less real? But the creation of all languages and nations is to a high degree a matter of social engineering. Also French, English, and Spanish were created artificially at some moment in time. Even more, France, the United Kingdom, and Spain spent a lot of time and energy to (artificially) destroy living rival languages and cultures. Against that background, the resilience of small language groups is remarkably strong.

Notwithstanding at least fourhundred years of oppression of Welsh by English, the Welsh language still exists. Notwithstanding pressures in Belgium to impose French as the official language, a strong Flemish region still exists. Notwithstanding the policies of Franco in Spain, the Catalan and Basque languages are still very much alive and kicking.

Yet, we are willing to admit that nationalism has already attained its major goals in Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland. The major drive behind their nationalisms is currently not some form of linguistic suppression but rather the direction and level of the financial streams among the different regions. Catalonia and Flanders are convinced that they contribute too much to the Treasuries of respectively Spain and Belgium and the main aim of their nationalist movements currently seems to adjust these contributions.

IV.

A similar analysis can be made of the events that take place in Ukraine, at the outskirts of Europe. As long as Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and simmered between the West and the East, it could linger on, but once it decided to turn radically to the West in 2014, the population in the East of Ukraine, who mainly speak Russian, revolted and turned to Russia for support. Even if there were a high degree of Russian involvement, it would be a mistake to reduce the Ukraine problem only to Russian warmongering. Sure, Russian nationalists have enough geopolitical reasons not to give up their main access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean in a fit of absent-mindedness. However, at bottom, there remains a Ukraine problem; an important minority of Russian-speaking Ukrainians do not wish to become a part of Europe.

Again, it does not help to declare these nationalisms anachronistic fabrications; one should in the first place acknowledge the existence of a nationalist problem that has to be resolved before a peaceful state of affairs can be achieved. Again, the history of Europe will help us to demonstrate how this principle worked, time and again.

V.

Just like Europe, the USA has some foundational myths of its own. Correctly, the Americans point out that they created a new world far away from feudal structures and national and religious struggles. The new continent attracted immigrants from all over Europe and hosted a new breed which transcended the rifts which had divided and would continue to divide Europe. In that sense, the USA sees itself as an example for Europe and for the rest of the world.

However, this version of history is to a large extent a myth as well, and the United States is certainly no example for the rest of the world because the Americans were able to build on empty land (or at least they behaved as if it were empty). They did not have to resolve the European problem: how to democratize an existing heterogeneous society with a strongly structured social order. The Americans could start from scratch.

Further, the Americans very soon conquered Indian and Mexican territories, held black slaves, started to apply discriminating immigration policies, and even started linguistic quarrels. From that moment on, the ideals of American democracy came under pressure in the confrontation with the complexity of the new society and their experiences are, therefore, relevant for the understanding of the development of nationalism and democracy in complex societies. But at the same moment the American model really starts to resemble the European model. Anglo-Saxon immigrants in the USA created a copy of the England they left behind and tried to assimilate all newcomers; other races were tolerated but severely discriminated against; voting rights were in practise withheld from important minority groups until the 1960s. Only from then on did America democratize and a fear rise that the country might fall apart along racial, ethnic or linguistic lines. Robert Kaplan, witnessing the evolution within the USA and acutely aware of events in Europe, showed his most pessimistic side: ‘Despite what some believe, ethnic identity has yet to destabilize American politics because, with the exception of Native Americans, ethnicity is largely divorced from territory, unlike in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union.’¹

On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, an African-American teenager, was fatally shot in Ferguson, Missouri, by a white police officer. Riots followed. In 2015, the US Justice Department concluded that the police officer did not commit prosecutable acts but at the same time concluded that the police of Ferguson tended to behave in racist ways. After the shooting of Michael Brown, others followed with a remarkable frequency within the country, creating a tone of ongoing civic unrest in many regions.

America suffers from a split personality. One part looks in the mirror and sees a multicultural America founded on the promise of freedom and equality for all. Another part only sees slavery, racial segregation, and the continued economic and social backwardness of specific racial groups in stark contrast to the American dream. The real history of the USA is, therefore, complex and nuanced, containing both high hopes and dark undertones. The definition of the American identity and nation is still uncertain.

VI.

Currently, both Europe and the US struggle with a drastically changing demographic composition. As a consequence of the Schengen agreements, border checks at the signatories’ common borders were abolished and migrations within Europe increased strongly. At the same time, massive legal and illegal immigrations in Europe, especially originating in Africa and the Middle East, led to increased discussion about the identity of Europe and of the different nationstates and sharpened nationalist reflexes, which in turn led to the success of identity-based nationalist parties like UKIP in the United Kingdom, the ‘Front National’ in France, the PVV in the Netherlands, the Vlaams Belang in Flanders, the Finns party in Finland, and Pegida in Germany.

In the United States, immigrations from Central and South America have increased drastically in the last two decades and the political parties have to decide how to position themselves against this evolution.

In both Europe and the United States, a rethinking of what it means to be European or American is unavoidable; the answer to that question will determine which immigration is acceptable and which is not, will define what can be demanded from an immigrant and what cannot. Such a rethinking should be based on a correct understanding of how the current Europe and United States became what they are. This book will help to determine that view.

VII.

In a nutshell, our view on nationalism goes as follows.

Over a period of twohundred years, starting with the French Revolution, Europe changed drastically and formed nationstates. Such nation states respected the nationalist political principle, which holds that the political, the national, and the territorial unit should be congruent.² In other words, within a well-defined territory (the territorial unit), a nation organizes a society (national unit) and on top of that society, its state(the political unit).

Nationalism was the driving force behind that evolution and it acted through three different ‘modes’: as an ideology, as a psychological driver, and as a sociological driver. And whichever mode sat in the driving seat, whether individuals were moved by arguments, emotions or social processes, violence was often used to bring about change.

As an ideology the nationalism of the nineteenth century was in the first place a revolutionary idea, an innovative extrapolation of the concepts of freedom and equality, initially formulated at the level of the citizen, but now also applied to nations. Nations freed themselves from oppression by other nations and created states of their own. Self-determination became a key word. The revolutionary idea itself was not sufficient to transform reality. In practise, the idea was supported and strengthened by psychological and sociological processes with a logic of their own.

Nationstates were in most of the cases defined by language. States tried to impose one language all over their territory but sometimes met strong resistance. Whether it was a Breton in France, a Welshman in the United Kingdom or a Fleming in Belgium, the person who could not speak or understand the language of the ruling or cultural elite was treated as a culturally and politically inferior being. In many cases, these peoples were not allowed to use their mother language; some of them learned to talk the language of the elite, be it English or French, but others found comfort in the liberating force of the ideology of nationalism. This psychological reality can turn the ideology of nationalism into an ardent fuel. The anger and frustration which people feel when they are mistreated or disrespected because they speak the wrong language finds a strong spokesman in the ideology of nationalism. In general, the principle that people should be judged, administered, ruled and served in their own language, which is the basic way to show respect for somebody’s mother tongue, is the psychological cornerstone of nationalism.

The rise of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also corresponded to a sociological reality: The transformation from an agrarian or warrior society into a commercial or industrial one created more jobs in which the role of language was pivotal. The creation of the modern state with its administrations only accelerated this process. The development of the printing press further accentuated the importance of language while increased mobility raised people’s awareness of the existence of different dialects and languages.

The psychological and sociological processes reinforced each other. Because of the growing importance of language in society, especially as a result of the creation of the administrations of the new states in the nineteenth century, the disrespect for a language and its users was now felt as a greater form of oppression than before. People became aware they were discriminated against because of the language they spoke. Language became the most important quality in the definition of a nation.

The sociological and psychological processes made the nations of Europe aware of their co-existence on one territory within the borders of a state and were the start signal for a competition to determine the official language within this territory and state, i.e. the language to be used for legislation, administration, and education. In many cases, these competitions ended in some kind of deadlock. Sometimes, the introduction of more democracy was blocked to enable the continuation of the suppression of certain nations. Sometimes, democracy was introduced in such a way that certain participant nations could block the system, which they did. And often, these deadlocks were only broken by violence, by ethnic cleansing, by systemic murder, or by deportations. Where democracy failed, the parties involved resorted to violence in order to re-organize the state. And European democracies continued to run into problems as long as linguistic homogeneity was not realised.³

The revolutionary concept, the mix of psychological and sociological processes all seasoned with a dose of violence, are the ingredients that went into the nation states of Modern Europe. They are the building blocks which define the core of modern nationalism as it unfolded in the last two centuries. This nationalism ultimately created the existing set of nationstates, itself the solid basis for a union or association of European nations on a basis of equality. And the central concept of both the psychological and the sociological drivers is the same: the language. A nationalism of the modern times and certainly of the twenty-first century is built on the concept of language. Persons are repressed as a nation as long as they speak the ‘wrong language’. Sociological cohesion requires territorial regions where the same language is spoken. And very importantly, this European nationalism is inclusive: it allows foreigners to become part of the nation if only they learn the language of the guest-land. This is the phenomenon described with some amazement by M. Nussbaum: ‘Finns often judge people alien if they cannot speak Finnish. … Today, in fact, my Finnish friends tell me, an African immigrant who speaks fluent Finnish would be considered less alien by many people than a blond Protestant who speaks only English or German.’⁴

VIII.

We should not take the definition of nationalism given above for granted. First, as we will describe, it grew out of a completely different society where multi-lingualism was the norm. Second, it was constructed over a period of twohundred years, sometimes with patience, sometimes with blood, but never with ease. Third, at least in theory, nationalism could have been elaborated in another way. We might think of an organization in which different nations live together within one territory, each with its own political state-like organizations. In this book, we will see how the Ottoman millet system looks like a pre-modern example of this. The Austro-Marxists like Otto Bauer and Karl Renner saw such a system as a way to re-organize the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. It was put in practise in Moravia, in the same period and for a short span of time. In Belgium, in 1921, a constitution was approved by voters based on similar principles but was never implemented. Nowadays, the organizational set-up of Brussels, which regulates the co-existence of French and Flemish speakers, has some characteristics of this system but it looks like it will not last.

However, European history demonstrates that overall such alternative forms of nationalism were not chosen or, if they were, did not last.

VIII.

Nationalism can further be defined in a negative way, by describing what it is not. Here is an overview of negative definitions which, taken together, refine the term nationalism as we use it throughout this book:

Non-democratic (pre-1800) processes of centralization of state power.

Already before the advent of the French Revolution, some kings and governments started the creation of the nationstates as we know them today and understood the importance of language. The Statute of Kilkenny imposed the use of English in the area around Dublin in 1367, mainly to stop English settlers in Ireland from converting to Irish language and customs. The Act of Union in 1536 imposed the use of English in Wales. ⁵ In France, the use of French was imposed in 1539 through the Edict of Villers-Coterêts. While these decisions demonstrate that kings acknowledged the importance of language and started a centralization early on, the fact remains that the well-being of their citizens was far from their main concern.

A variant of this theme, which also still played after 1800 was the tendency by enlightened rulers to spread the use of ‘languages of culture’ to the speakers of ‘dialects’ or non-historical languages. Empress Maria Theresa and her son Emperor Joseph II tried to decree a knowledge of German in the Habsburg Empire. In England, a committee decided that the Welsh language was an obstacle to the development of the Welsh people and that the study of English would help the moral development of that people. In France, in 1902, priests were put in jail because they celebrated mass in Breton, which was forbidden by law. Also, in Flanders, it was considered self-evident that learning French would contribute to the spiritual growth of the Flemish people.

The expansion of the use of the ‘languages of culture’ was, therefore, not just a natural or organic process but to a high degree a result of social engineering. In general, these forms of social engineering were not inspired by nationalism but by something much worse. They were driven by cultural imperialism, the conviction that one culture or language was superior to another. These cultural imperialist policies, although not nationalist in themselves, definitely contributed to realizing the nationalist programme; in the regions involved and if successful, the rulers contributed to the creation of homogeneous language zones. If not successful, they spurred nationalistic counter-reactions.

The invention of a glorious past.

In some cases, modern nationalists invented a glorious past to raise enthusiasm of the general public for their nation. The Bulgarian Father Paisi wrote a glorifying history of Bulgaria. The Czechs falsified their history to spice it up. The Flemish remember how they defeated the King of France in the ‘battle of the Golden Spurs’ in 1302. The Finns wrote their national epic, the Kalevala, and Sir Walter Scott invented an epic Scottish past as well. These creations feed the claim that nationalism is nothing but an invention, although they are not at all the core of modern nationalism. These stories were the marketing tools to reach the broader public, boost their spirits, and bolster their self-confidence. In general, the ‘fabrication’ of tradition was a defence mechanism against the cultural imperialism of the major languagegroups.

The claims of historical rights.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Hungarian, Czech, and Croat nobility claimed rights which had once belonged to their predecessors and were abolished by the Emperor. They referred, respectively, to the ‘lands of St Stephen’, the ‘lands of St Wenceslaus’, and the ‘Triune Kingdom’ to argue that their rights should be restored. Though these noble classes had a nationality, they did not act to obtain favours for a whole nation but only for their own dynasty. This ideology is pre-modern and in no way of relevance to an understanding of our times and modern nationalism. Sometimes, modern nationalists formed a coalition with this historic nobility for opportunistic reasons. However, this does not change the essence of modern nationalism.

The crimes of the Naziregime.

For the generation who survived the Second World War and their descendants, nationalism is inextricably connected to the crimes of the Naziregime. For them, the battlefields and death camps such as Auschwitz represent the essence of nationalism. The concentration camps and gas chambers discredited nationalism beyond repair for a long time. However, these atrocities are not the responsibility of nationalism per se, but of imperialism and racism. The ideology of nationalism contains the concept of the equality of nations. By itself, it does not imply a hierarchy among nations, which is typical of the imperialist and racist paradigms. Nationalism remains in its essence a movement of emancipation. Like other movements, however, it turns evil when it is polluted by imperialism and racism. But this is not part of its core. And there is no reason at all to suggest or assume that the nationalist ideology is more prone to such pollution than are other ideologies. Racism and imperialism were the ugly monsters of the twentieth century and they permeated the whole of Europe and all the ideologies of that time, not only nationalism.

The definition of an identity.

Modern nationalism, as construed in this essay, is not concerned with defining an identity for people who are lost or who need a reaffirmation of their identity against the background of an overwhelming globalization process.

Language does not provide an identity; it is a tool used to communicate. If we assign a high importance to language in this book, it is not because we are conservatives but because we believe that history demonstrates that language functions both as a barrier to people who do not speak or understand a given tongue, and as a bridge to the ones who do. Language seals off groups of people from other groups of people as effectively as do seas and mountains.

IX.

The lessons we draw in this essay will have consequences for the rest of the world, as we will apply them to many different regions. At this point, we only mention two considerations.

(1)The process of state formation that took place in Europe still needs to occur as well in a lot of other places with all the consequences this might entail. Given the bloody history of democratization in Europe, a hesitation to pursue the same road is understandable;

(2) It does not really make sense to compare states like China, India, and Indonesia with states like Germany, France, and Italy. China, India, and Indonesia are multi-language states who are still confronted with the problem how to let different linguistic groups live together, an issue which has been resolved in Europe via the introduction of the nationstates. It is a more informative exercise to compare China, India, and Indonesia on the one hand with Europe, on the other.

X.

In this book, we focus nearly only on the histories of Europe and the USA and only marginally on what has happened in Africa and Asia. This is not at all because we consider them irrelevant. On the contrary, we admit that we are insufficiently knowledgeable about their histories; it is out of respect that we do not treat them in any detail.

PART I

Chapter 1

Self-Determination – Short History of an Idea

The French Revolution drastically changed the rules of the political game in the whole of Europe. Overnight, feudal masters lost their privileges. Slaves and serfs became owners and citizens. Aristocratic privileges were replaced by the will of the nation (i.e., peuple, das Volk, narod).‘The revolutionary happening of the nineteenth century was the intrusion into politics of the people, the masses,’ A.J.P. Taylor wrote⁶. Until then, Emperors, Kings, and Czars had ruled, unhindered by constitutions or elections. Until then, history had been made and written by the rulers and their feudal aristocracies. From now on, citizens were not only protected against the power of the state but were even invited to participate