Hitler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1941–1942: Barbarossa to Moscow

By Nik Cornish

This pictorial WWII history chronicles the epic drama of the Eastern Front, from Operation Barbarossa to the Battle of Moscow.

The world was not prepared for the massive onslaught launched by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union on June, 22nd, 1941. The scale of the invasion and the speed of the German advance forced the Red Army into a chaotic retreat toward Leningrad and Moscow as hundreds of thousands of soldiers were taken prisoner. But then came the Soviet’s equally astonishing response.

Despite all the predictions, the Red Army stemmed the Wehrmacht’s advance, held the lines before Leningrad and Moscow, and mounted a counter-offensive that changed the course of the campaign and the outcome of the Second World War. These are the historic events that Nik Cornish portrays in this volume of rare wartime images portraying the war on the Eastern Front.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jun 30, 2016
• ISBN: 9781473881433

Nik Cornish

Nik Cornish is a former head teacher whose passionate interest in the world wars on the Eastern Front and in Russias military history in particular has led to a series of important books on the subject including Images of Kursk, Stalingrad: Victory on the Volga, Berlin: Victory in Europe, Partisan Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1944, The Russian Revolution: World War to Civil War 1917-1921, Hitler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1941-1942 Barbarossa to Moscow, Hitler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1942-1943 Stalingrad to Kharkov and Hitler versus Stalin: The Eastern Front 1943-1944 Kursk to Bagration.

Book preview

Introduction

During the summer of 1939 the world was shocked to hear of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: this effectively declared that the USSR and the Third Reich would remain at peace with one another and divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. The first nation to suffer under this arrangement was Poland, which was overrun from east and west and reduced to impotence. Following this success the Red Army was launched on an ill-starred winter campaign to conquer Finland. However, the outcome was disastrous for the USSR for, despite eventually defeating the Finns, it was at such cost that the results were not worth the effort. The Baltic States were occupied, without bloodshed, during the spring of 1940, as was the Romanian province of Bessarabia some weeks later. The borders of the USSR had advanced several hundred kilometres to the west reincorporating former Tsarist Russian lands and creating a buffer zone against any likely attack from Germany.

The success of Germany in the west and north had enabled the USSR to move westwards. However, having overrun France, the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway, Hitler’s ambition was only wetted for further conquests. Although Britain stood isolated and apparently ripe for the plucking, the Führer turned his attention once more to the east and the lebensraum of the Russian steppes.

During the summer of 1940, flushed with the apparently easy victories to date, Hitler ordered selected staff officers to draw up plans for the destruction of the USSR. Under the code name of Operation Barbarossa, the plan was more of a series of flexible guidelines than a prescriptive set of instructions. It was optimistically assumed that the Red Army would swiftly collapse when faced with the onslaught of experienced blitzkrieg veterans. An eventual stop-line was pencilled in, running roughly from Archangel in the north, along the crest of the Ural Mountains down to the shores of the Caspian Sea. Beyond that the rump of the Soviet state was expected to wither and die amidst the forests and tundra of Siberia. The Caucasus, as far as the Turkish border, would provide a land bridge into the rear of British possessions in the Middle East that would yield up the crude oil so vital for mechanized warfare.

More than a hint of overconfidence was apparent during the autumn and winter of 1940–1 in Berlin. As goods and luxuries flowed in from the new conquests, the civilian population enjoyed a very merry Christmas and looked forward to a prosperous New Year. Although Operation Barbarossa was designed as a predominantly German affair, the Reich’s allies also wanted to share in the spoils. Slovakia, Italy and Romania were all eager to be involved and were prepared to contribute men and materiel to the cause. Finland, not formally an ally of Germany but smarting from the Winter War of 1939–40, was keen to regain her lost territories. Nor was Turkey an innocent bystander as the lure of regaining land in the Caucasus was an unstated desire that, should the USSR be on the point of collapse, would likely be satisfied.

However, Barbarossa was postponed because it was necessary to deal with Yugoslavia and Greece. The six-week campaign to eliminate these potential thorns in the Reich’s underbelly led to the launch of blitzkrieg in the USSR being put off until 22 June.

The Red Army was mustered along the western border of the USSR. On paper it was a massive force, with immense tank and air fleets. However, numbers are deceptive and reassuring. This apparently mighty array suffered from a number of weaknesses that all but undid the strength in numbers. The infantry were solid but inexperienced, trained to fight a war that called for clear leadership and planning where the initiative lay in their officers’s hands. Until the mid-1930s Soviet strategy had assumed a defensive war which led to the erection of the Stalin Line along the old border. This concept had proved incompatible with Stalin’s new policies and from the mid-1930s aggressive warfare had become the order of the day. Fighting would not take place on Soviet land, but across an enemy’s border. It became blindingly clear during the Winter War that the Red Army was a blunt instrument, ill-suited for the cut and thrust of mechanized campaigns. Its leadership, deprived of such a huge number of senior officers during the purges of the late 1930s, was a pale shadow of its former self. Gone were many of the thinkers, the experienced men and in their place were officers who would not rock the strategic ship – men who, concerned for their lives, would not act without reference to higher authority. Often having been promoted beyond their capabilities, many of these officers were to prove singularly inadequate in the summer of 1941. These men had read of Germany’s blitzkrieg in the west and they had seen the French and British armies humbled, but they were also aware of their near-defeat against Finland. However, they were reassured by the German-Soviet Pact that promised peace. Few, if any, were psychologically prepared for the storm that was coming.

Across the border the Axis steadily assembled its forces. Veterans of three campaigns manned the tanks that would spearhead the invasion. Pilots, flying some of the best warplanes in Europe, would fight for control of the skies over the battlefields. Their leaders were well-trained, products of a system that encouraged initiative and flexibility. Their weapons were tried and trusted. Many balmy evenings passed with the landser (infantry) dozily listening to lectures that stressed the sub-human nature of their opponents. Nevertheless, few were stupid enough to underestimate a trained enemy with a gun fighting for his homeland but they were buoyed up by and confident in their record of success. Psychologically these men were anticipating victory and then, maybe, peace.

Deserters telling tales, intelligence of the German forces arriving daily, reconnaissance flights without number – all these signs were ignored by the Kremlin: to Stalin and thus the Soviet government war with Germany was inconceivable. It was only when the bombs and shells rained down that the fact was slowly and grudgingly accepted – Hitler’s Wehrmacht was on the move eastwards.

For the vast majority of the Red Army training exercises such as this were the nearest they came to combat. Those who had fought against Finland and Poland were thus at an advantage when it came to the real thing. These men are taking part in a chemical warfare exercise supported by a T-26 tank.

However, the majority of the German army had combat experience. Campaigning from Poland to the English Channel had provided invaluable experience for millions of landser as well as proving the worth of their equipment and tactics. These troops are seen advancing on a town in Poland.

Having demonstrated the lethal power of blitzkrieg-style warfare, the Germans were more than confident that the speed of their armoured forces would once again reduce a less mobile enemy to confusion. This SdKfz 232 armoured car is equipped with a ‘bedstead’-style aerial. Efficient communications were one of the areas where the Germans were infinitely superior to the Soviets.

Other than the Spanish Civil War, the Red Army’s experience of armoured warfare had been confined to limited action in Poland, Manchuria and Finland. This armoured car crew is part of Zhukov’s army that defeated the Japanese in 1939 during the Khalkin Gol Campaign.

A German artillery crew carefully apply camouflage to their 210mm howitzer. Although an imposing weapon, its drawback was its short range – under 15km. The Germans deployed over 7,000 guns in support of Barbarossa.

On the border with Romania an NKVD (Russian acronym for People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) frontier guard (right) warily eyes his Romanian counterpart. Romania, as well as regaining the lost province of Bessarabia, had ambitions to control Odessa and parts of the Black Sea coast and Crimea. They were only officially briefed on Barbarossa two days before it began.

Chapter One

Into the Great Beyond

Perhaps fate was dropping a huge clue when Hitler gave responsibility for the basic planning of Operation Barbarossa to General Friedrich Paulus, for it was he that was to lead Germany’s largest army to ignominious defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943.

The German invasion force was divided into three army groups, north, centre and south. On 14 June 1941 Hitler defined the objectives of the invasion as Leningrad, Ukraine, the Donbass and the Caucasus. Moscow was not mentioned. It was assumed that the Red Army would collapse, swiftly followed by the Soviet state. Operation Barbarossa was therefore to be a short campaign, some six to ten weeks of fighting, with a mopping up period followed by the establishment of zones of occupation.

There were three army groups lined up from north to south, Army Group North (AGN), Army Group Centre (AGC) and Army Group South (AGS). AGN consisted of Eighteenth and Sixteenth armies, Fourth Panzer Group and Luftflotte I. Its objective was the occupation of the Baltic States, the capture of the Baltic Sea