Britain's Plot to Kill Hitler: The True Story of Operation Foxley and SOE

By Eric Lee and Ian Kershaw

Operation Foxley was the name of the secret plan supported by Winston Churchill to assassinate Hitler in 1944-45. More than 75 years after its conception, the assassination plan remains shrouded in mystery. Eric Lee’s new book is the product of painstaking research and sheds more light on this plan. Lee also asks what would have happened if Foxley had been executed successfully.

Concocted in 1944 by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), Foxley’s objective was to kill Hitler and any high-ranking Nazis or members of the Fuhrer’s entourage who might have been present at the time.

Different methods of assassination had been considered by the SOE, but were ultimately deemed too complicated. These methods included derailment and destruction of the Hitler’s personal train, the Fuhrerzug, by explosives, and also clandestine means such as slipping a tasteless poison into Hitler’s drinking and cooking water. Some of the ideas were considered quite bizarre, including one scheme to hypnotise Rudolf Hess and return him to Germany to kill Nazi leaders. The Americans and Soviets had their own plans to kill Hitler too, with some equally strange ideas (including injecting female hormones into the Fuhrer's vegetables).

Eventually, after intel gathered revealed that Hitler took a routine, solitary walk every morning to the Teehaus on the Mooslahnerkopf Hill from the Berghof residence, a plan was created to assassinate Hitler using a sniper rifle fitted with a silencer.

A perfect investigation for readers who enjoy reading about modern historyl, and the Second World War in particular. It is also tailored to those with an interest in the “secret war”, covering topics like the SOE, and military intelligence.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Greenhill Books
• Release date: Apr 21, 2022
• ISBN: 9781784387280

Book preview

Britain’s Plot to Kill Hitler

Britain’s Plot to Kill Hitler

The True Story of Operation Foxley and SOE

Eric Lee

Foreword by Ian Kershaw

Britain’s Plot to Kill Hitler:

The True Story of Operation Foxley and SOE

Greenhill Books

First published by Greenhill Books, 2022

Greenhill Books, c/o Pen & Sword Books Ltd,

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Copyright © Eric Lee, 2022

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

CIP data records for this title are available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-78438-727-3

eISBN 978-1-78438-728-0

Contents

Foreword by Ian Kershaw

1We Are Not Mad, Nor Is This a Joke

2Man Hunt

3The Unlikely Assassin

4The Perfect Murder

5The Manchurian Candidate

6Peace on Earth to All Men of Good Will

7Combined Operation

8Stalin’s Hitler Scheme

9Professor Moriarty

Conclusion

Appendix: HS 6/624: Operation FOXLEY

Notes

Bibliography

Acknowledgements

Foreword

It should probably have been no surprise that secret plans to assassinate Hitler (and a number of subordinate Nazi leaders) were mooted in Britain during the war. But it certainly was a surprise when the news of Operation Foxley broke. The sensation in the press showed how closely the secret had been guarded. There was surprise, too, at the extent and quality of SOE’s intelligence on Hitler’s surroundings and movements at his Alpine retreat near Berchtesgaden, in southern Bavaria, and on his security arrangements. Some of this new information makes a notable addition to previous knowledge. The publication of the full dossier on Foxley is, therefore, greatly to be welcomed, above all for the intriguing insight it provides into thinking in top British intelligence circles during the last phase of the war and the possible methods of carrying out the assassination.

Among the most revealing papers in the files, in my view, are the conflicting assessments of the desirability of killing Hitler. SOE’s senior staff officers were sharply divided in their views. The argument that killing Hitler would ensure his martyrdom in the eyes of the German population, and that his bungling war strategy (as SOE chiefs saw it) made him worth more alive than dead to the Allies, was countered by the view that the German war effort would collapse almost overnight if Hitler were eliminated. The varying responses of historians and other commentators to the papers on their release showed that widely differing interpretations still prevail more than half a century later.

How desirable it would have been to assassinate Hitler depends in some measure on the timing. According to one memorandum in the dossier, SOE had considered such a move in 1941, only – for reasons not disclosed – to discard the proposition. The killing of Hitler at that date – though it is, in fact, doubtful in the extreme that it could have been accomplished – would have had seismic consequences for the course of the war. By late June 1944, when Foxley was seriously discussed for the first time, that was less clear. The Allied landing in Normandy had by then been successfully consolidated, though the advance was still slow and German resistance tenacious. In the East, the Red Army was making notable advances, even if a mighty struggle, ending in the streets of Berlin, still lay ahead. The war was far from over. But the days of the Hitler regime were plainly numbered. Allied strategy had long been targeted at the total defeat of Germany, embodied in the policy of unconditional surrender proclaimed at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. This aim was now in sight.

Of course, a successful assassination of Hitler might have helped realize that aim earlier than it was in fact attained, and might have brought a more rapid end to the war. This would have spared much of the immense human misery and suffering which mounted drastically in the last months of the conflagration. The victims of the unbelievable inhumanity in the concentration camps would have been released from their torture much earlier. Many who succumbed in the last months would have lived. In Germany itself, the carnage in Dresden and other cities obliterated by Allied bombing in the final phase of the war would not have taken place. And the continuing enormous military losses on the eastern and western fronts, including those resulting from the last great German offensive in the Ardennes, the Battle of the Bulge, initiated directly by Hitler, would have been avoided. The potential gains from an assassination of Hitler were, therefore, massive. Even without the advantage of hindsight into the magnitude of what might have been achieved, it is easy to see why some of the SOE chiefs were drawn to Operation Foxley.

But it is also possible that the killing of Hitler would not have accelerated the end of the war. Most probably, as other SOE strategists argued, a successful assassination by enemy forces (and, as was pointed out, this would inevitably have been recognised) would have brought an intense rallying round the cult of the martyred Führer and a strengthening of the fanaticised minority of the population which remained, despite all setbacks, fervent and devoted believers in Hitler. Many of these had burnt their boats in the genocidal policies of the regime and would have been unlikely to throw away their arms unless some self-serving deal could have been struck with the Western Allies. Göring or, more probably, Himmler would most likely have taken over as the next leader. It is doubtful that power would have passed to the Wehrmacht. Most of the leading oppositional figures in the army had in any case been arrested, many of them killed, following the ill-fated Stauffenberg attempt on Hitler’s life on 20 July 1944 (which had brought a big upsurge in support for the Führer). Many of the remaining generals were either Hitler loyalists or politically supine. The most likely guess is that the war would have continued, at least for the time being, while the next leader tried to negotiate a peace separating the Western Allies from the Soviet Union – something the Nazi leadership had always strived for. If the Western Allies entertained such a separate peace – which would have been highly unlikely, and would have flown in the face of the unconditional surrender policy with victory practically there for the taking – the breach with the Soviet Union would have come before it actually did; before, that is, a total defeat of Germany had been achieved. This would scarcely have altered the postwar balance of power in eastern Europe. But it might well have enhanced the prospect of more than just a Cold War between East and West in the following years. Without such a separate peace, however – without, that is, negotiated terms leaving the Allies with less than the unconditional surrender they sought – it is not easy to see why the Germans, even without Hitler, would have seen an alternative to fighting on to the bitter