Victoria Crosses on the Western Front: Battle of Amiens—8-13 August 1918

By Paul Oldfield

“Invaluable to those guiding visitors and those visiting the battlefields of WWI . . . it vividly tells a story of combat and courage.” —Firetrench

In the past, while visiting the First World War battlefields, the author often wondered where the various Victoria Cross actions took place. He resolved to find out. In 1988, in the midst of his army career, research for this book commenced and over the years numerous sources have been consulted.

Victoria Crosses on the Western Front: Battle of Amiens is designed for the battlefield visitor as much as the armchair reader. A thorough account of each VC action is set within the wider strategic and tactical context. Detailed sketch maps show the area today, together with the battle-lines and movements of the combatants. It will allow visitors to stand upon the spot, or very close to, where each VC was won. Photographs of the battle sites richly illustrate the accounts. There is also a comprehensive biography for each recipient, covering every aspect of their lives warts and all: parents and siblings, education, civilian employment, military career, wife and children, death and burial/commemoration. A host of other information, much of it published for the first time, reveals some fascinating characters, with numerous links to many famous people and events.

“Works both as an armchair guide and as a battlefield companion (although I’d opt for the Kindle version if I were traipsing across the fields of France). Well done to Paul Oldfield for producing another useful addition to Great War literature. 5 stars.” —Paul Nixon, Army Ancestry Research

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Dec 14, 2020
• ISBN: 9781473884946

Paul Oldfield

Paul Oldfield was born in Sheffield and was educated at Victoria College in Jersey. After serving in the Army for thirty-six years, he became a freelance battlefield guide (he is a badged member of the Guild of Battlefield Guides) and a historian. In 1988, he co-authored Sheffield City Battalion in the Pals series. Cockleshell Raid and Bruneval in Pen & Swords Battleground Europe series were published in 2013, and the first of nine books in the Victoria Crosses on the Western Front series in 2014.

Book preview

Victoria Crosses on the Western Front Battle of Amiens

Victoria Crosses on the Western Front Battle of Amiens

8–13 August 1918

Paul Oldfield

First published in Great Britain in 2020 by

Pen & Sword Military

an imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

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Copyright © Paul Oldfield 2020

ISBN 978 1 47382 709 7

ePUB ISBN 978 1 47388 494 6

Mobi ISBN 978 1 47388 493 9

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A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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Contents

Master Maps

Abbreviations

Introduction

Battle of Amiens and Subsequent Operations (Master Map 1, except 383 on Master Map 2)

373. Cpl Harry Miner, 58 Battalion, CEF, 8 August 1918, Demuin, France

374. Pte John Croak, 13 Battalion (Royal Highlanders), CEF, 8 August 1918, Hangard, France

375. Cpl Herman Good, 13 Battalion (Royal Highlanders), CEF, 8 August 1918, Hangard, France

376. Lt James Tait, 78 Battalion (Winnipeg Grenadiers), CEF, 11 August 1918, Beaucourt-en-Santerre, France

377. Lt Alfred Gaby, 28 Battalion, AIF, 8 August 1918, Villers-Bretonneux, France

378. Sgt Raphael Zengel, 5 Battalion (Western Cavalry), CEF 9 August 1918, le Quesnel, France

379. Cpl Frederick Coppins, 8 Battalion (90 Rifles), CEF, 9 August 1918, Hatchet Wood near Vrély, France

380. Cpl Alexander Brereton, 8 Battalion (90 Rifles), CEF, 8-9 August 1918, Hatchet Wood near Vrély, France

381. Lt Jean Brillant, 22 Battalion (French Canadian), CEF, 8-9 August 1918, Vrély, France

382. Pte Robert Beatham, 8 Battalion, AIF, 9 August 1918, Rosières-en-Santerre, France

383. Sgt Thomas Harris, 6 Royal West Kent, 9 August 1918, Morlancourt, France

384. Pte Thomas Dinesen, 42 Battalion (Royal Highlanders), CEF, 12 August 1918, Fransart, France

385. Sgt Percy Statton, 40 Battalion, AIF, 10-12 August 1918, Proyart, France

386. Sgt Robert Spall, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, CEF, 13 August 1918, Parvillers-le-Quesnoy, France

Biographies

Sources

Useful Information

Abbreviations

Introduction

The eighth book in this series sees the start of a new smaller format. It covers the beginning of the Hundred Days, the final and relentless advance by the Allies leading to the Armistice. This part of the war is less well known than the Somme in 1916 and Third Ypres in 1917. This is unfortunate as, arguably, the British Army was never better. It had learned the hard lessons, adapted, innovated, improved and created a formidable fighting force of all arms. Its effect was devastating. The Hundred Days resulted in the award of 119 VCs; almost a quarter of the 492 land forces VCs awarded for the Western Front between 1914 and 1918. This book covers fourteen of them, all but one being awarded to Dominion troops, indicating the important position they held within the BEF by this stage of the war.

As with previous books in the series, it is written for the battlefield visitor as well as the armchair reader. Each account provides background information to explain the broad strategic and tactical situation before focusing on the VC action in detail. Each is supported by a map to allow a visitor to stand on, or close to, the spot and at least one photograph of the site. Detailed biographies help to understand the man behind the Cross.

The titles of battles, actions and affairs are as decided by the post-war Battle Nomenclature Committee. VCs are numbered chronologically 373, 374, 375 etc from 8th August 1918. Refer to the master maps to find the general area for each VC. If visiting the battlefields it is advisable to purchase maps from the respective French and Belgian ‘Institut Géographique National’. The French IGN Top 100 and Belgian IGN Provinciekaart at 1:100,000 scale are ideal for motoring, but 1:50,000, 1:25,000 or 1:20,000 scale maps are necessary for more detailed work, e.g. French IGN Serie Bleue and Belgian IGN Topografische Kaart. They are obtainable from the respective IGN or through reputable map suppliers on-line.

Ranks are as used on the day. Grave references have been shortened, e.g. ‘Plot II, Row A, Grave 10’ will appear as ‘II A 10’. There are some abbreviations, many in common usage, but if unsure refer to the list provided.

I endeavour to include memorials to each VC in their biographies. However, every VC is commemorated in the VC Diary and on memorial panels at the Union Jack Club, Sandell Street, Waterloo, London. To include this in every biography would be unnecessarily repetitive.

Thanks are due to too many people and organisations to mention here. They are acknowledged in ‘Sources’ and any omissions are my fault and not intentional. However, I must continue to highlight the contribution of fellow members of the ‘Victoria Cross Database Users Group’, Doug and Richard Arman, without whom I simply could not complete these books.

Paul Oldfield

Wiltshire

December 2019

Battle of Amiens and Subsequent Operations

8th August 1918

373 Cpl Harry Miner, 58th Battalion CEF, (9th Canadian Brigade, 3rd Canadian Division), Demuin, France

374 Pte John Croak, 13th Battalion (Royal Highlanders) CEF (3rd Canadian Brigade, 1st Canadian Division), Hangard, France

375 Cpl Herman Good, 13th Battalion (Royal Highlanders) CEF (3rd Canadian Brigade, 1st Canadian Division), Hangard, France

376 Lt James Tait, 78th Battalion (Winnipeg Grenadiers) CEF (12th Canadian Brigade, 4th Canadian Division), Beaucourt-en-Santerre, France

377 Lt Alfred Gaby, 28th Battalion AIF (7th Australian Brigade, 2nd Australian Division), Villers-Bretonneux, France

By the time that the Second Battle of the Marne ended on 5th August, the Germans had reached crisis point. The homeland was in chaos, horrific losses had been sustained since the spring (106 of 201 divisions were unfit and battalion establishments had been reduced from 980 to 800), influenza was sapping the strength of those remaining and, despite repeated offensives, the prospects for victory remained as elusive as ever. Discipline was beginning to crack and Ludendorff was concerned about an increasing wave of defeatism.

Sensing that the time had come, Allied commanders met on 24th July to arrange three offensives; a combined Franco-British attack east of Amiens, a French attack in the Marne area and an attack by the Americans at St Mihiel. As little time as possible was to elapse between each to ensure that the Germans could not move reserves or reorganise. A major aim of these initial attacks was to free significant strategic railways so that Allied reserves could be shifted quickly anywhere on the Western Front. Thereafter two more operations were envisaged to liberate the northern industrial areas of France and to clear the Germans from around Calais and Dunkirk.

The attack east of Amiens had first been proposed by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding Fourth Army, as early as 5th July, based on the tactics of the successful Hamel operation (see previous book in this series). The outline plan envisaged the reinforcement of Fourth Army by the whole of the Canadian Corps. In addition, 1st Australian Division was to join the Australian Corps and the Cavalry Corps was to be poised to exploit success. The Franco-British boundary was shifted five kilometres south to ensure that the main part of the initial operation all came under Rawlinson’s command. Nine divisions would make the main attack, with others on the flanks. Significantly, the Australians and Canadians had been unaffected by the reductions suffered by British formations in the spring and retained four battalions in each brigade.

The offensive that commenced on 8th August 1918 made significant gains across the Fourth Army frontage on the first day.

The start of the Franco-British offensive was set for 8th August and the French First Army, on the right of Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, was placed under Haig’s orders. The French were to guard the right flank, while their XXXI Corps and the Canadian and Australian Corps advanced six and a half kilometres to the former Outer Amiens Defence Line and fill the space between the Somme and the Avre rivers. III Corps was to cover the left flank. The French were then to press on towards Roye and the British towards Chaulnes.

Fourth Army faced the German Second Army (General von der Marwitz), consisting of ten divisions in the front line and four in reserve. Of the total, four were assessed as unfit by the British. Von der Marwitz considered only two to be fully battle fit. Morale was generally poor. The German front line represented their furthest advance in the spring and the defences were comparatively weak, with little wire and few dugouts. Their greatest strength lay in the huge number of well-concealed machine gun posts. Despite German losses, the British enjoyed only marginal local superiority. Many German reserve divisions were close by and they retained much of their mobile artillery. However, their commanders were complacent and did not believe this area would be attacked. As a result there was no enthusiasm to improve the defences, which consisted of little more than shell hole posts in places.

Success depended upon surprise and great efforts were made to preserve secrecy. Planning was carried out by a selected few staff officers and the assault troops were unaware of the arrangements for the offensive until twenty-four to thirty-six hours beforehand. A ‘forbidden zone’ was established behind the front and very few civilians were permitted to enter it. Amiens had been evacuated in March 1918 and this also helped to cover the preparations. Amassing all the men and stores could not be hidden from those in the administrative chain and they were encouraged to ‘keep their mouths shut’. Normal artillery fire was maintained. Concealed within it was some registration by extra batteries; but in general they were to ‘shoot off the map’. From 1st August onwards all forward movement only took place by night. Having achieved air superiority, the RAF was able to stop German aerial reconnaissance of the British rear areas. RAF daylight flights over the rear areas reported any visible unusual activity. Poor weather in the days before the offensive also aided concealment. In case any enemy aircraft got through, work on rearward defences continued in order to make the Germans believe that no offensive was planned. London was not told the details to aid security and also to ensure there would be no political interference. Preparations for a cancelled attack on Orange Hill, east of Arras, continued in order to attract enemy attention.

As formations moved into the area they were forbidden to open radio communications until the offensive had been launched. Reconnaissance was to be conducted by a limited number of officers, who were not to move over the open or consult their maps except under cover. Roads leading to the front were covered in straw and rope was wrapped around the wheels of vehicles to help reduce the extra traffic noise. To the north, in First and Second Army’s areas, activity increased, including radio traffic, as a diversion. The tank wavelengths were also used to indicate an offensive. False daylight moves reinforced this, as did extra noise and dust. A few tanks were allowed to be observed near Notre Dame de Lorette. The RAF also occupied more airfields in Flanders and increased activity over that front. Although the enemy was not completely deceived by these measures, they were certainly confused as to where the blow would fall and when.

The administrative arrangements for the attack benefitted from the experiences of four years of war. The scale was enormous and wide ranging with railways, roads and canals being used. Units were to carry three days’ rations. Replacement guns and machine guns were stockpiled at Pont Remy and Longeau. Labour companies were poised to repair roads as soon as they had been overrun.

III Corps took over the front of 5th Australian Division north of the Somme, allowing it to go into reserve, replacing 4th Australian Division, which was then able to take over 6,400m of extra front from the French on the right of Fourth Army. This would be the Canadian area when they arrived. To the Germans these moves appeared to weaken the front and strengthened their belief that there would be no offensive in the area.

The Canadian Corps was at full strength, having not been involved in the spring battles. Its appearance in the line would have confirmed to the Germans that an offensive was expected. While the Canadian Corps moved south to join Fourth Army from First Army, a few of its units moved to Kemmel in Second Army’s sector and made their presence known. This reinforced the German belief that the attack would fall in this area, as did heavy RAF activity. The rest of the Canadian Corps was held well back and did not go into the line until the day before the attack. Indeed the forward assault battalions did not take over the front line until two hours before the attack commenced.

1st Australian Division was released from the Hazebrouck front to join the Australian Corps. Three cavalry divisions moved through Amiens on a single road to assemble at the junction of the Somme and the Avre. On the eve of battle the British attack front consisted of the Canadian Corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Canadian and 32nd Divisions), the Australian Corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Australian Divisions), III Corps (12th, 18th, 47th and 58th Divisions and US 33rd Division), IX Corps Headquarters and the Cavalry Corps (1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions). By the start of the offensive Fourth Army had swelled to 440,000 men and 98,000 animals. It was reinforced by ten Army field artillery brigades, the guns of 25th Division (its infantry was reconstituting at home), the guns of 5th Canadian Division (its infantry was used as drafts) and thirteen brigades and four siege batteries from First, Second and Third Armies. Massive quantities of shells were brought up. In addition to the engineer units in the various divisions and corps an extra forty-five engineer units were made available, varying from gas companies to workshop companies and a field survey battalion. There were commensurate increases in signals, medical, service and ordnance units.

V Tank Brigade was reinforced by 2nd, 4th, 3rd (Light) and 6th (Light) Tank Battalions, 17th Armoured Car Company and four tank supply companies. In total there were 342 heavy, seventy-two Whippets and 120 supply tanks available. Movement forward was at night and the noise was deadened by sand covered roads and aircraft flying up and down the front. They had to be carefully camouflaged by day. A chance shell hit one supply tank hidden in an orchard. The petrol it was carrying exploded and the subsequent fire attracted a massive German bombardment, which resulted in all twenty-five tanks there being destroyed. The fighting tanks moved forward to 900m behind the infantry start line on the night of 7th/8th August. Routes to the front were checked and any obstacles cleared.

Air support was provided by the RAF’s V Brigade of 332 aircraft and IX Brigade of 294 aircraft. Other aircraft in other brigades were close by in case they were required. In total the Allies had 1,904 aircraft. The maximum the Germans could muster was 365. As the ground attack was launched, the air forces were to strike airfields and railway targets in the German rear. They were also to provide cover over the battlefield to prevent German aircraft interfering with progress and also to provide close air support to the advancing infantry and tanks. Later in the day bombers were to target railway stations and the bridges over the Somme to hinder the move forward of German reserves.

As the assault troops took up their positions, the Germans suspected nothing. The only interruptions were occasional routine gas and high explosive bombardments. It was a fine but dark, moonless night. Mist formed and at daybreak visibility was only ten metres. This meant that the RAF could do little in support of the attack before 9 a.m.

Battalions adopted much the same attack formation in five waves. The first wave, comprising of skirmishes, was also to guide the tanks. The second, third and fourth advanced in section columns twenty-five to fifty metres apart. Machine guns, trench mortars and signal parties were with the fifth wave. Start tapes were laid for each wave about ninety metres apart, the first 275m from the enemy front line. The intention was for all waves to have passed the friendly front line before the enemy protective barrage fell. HQ Fourth Army devised a new form of fighting order to eliminate unnecessary weight and distribute the remainder more evenly. It consisted of haversack, 250 rounds of ammunition, gas mask, water bottle, iron rations, entrenching tool, two grenades and two sandbags.

About 3.30 a.m. an enemy bombardment fell on parts of the Canadian and Australian fronts, forcing the men into the shelter of trenches and shell holes. A few minutes before zero the tanks left their assembly positions with just sufficient time to close up with the infantry as they set off. The attack was launched at 4.20 a.m., an hour before daybreak, with thick mist and darkness making navigation difficult. The start time was chosen to allow the first line of enemy defences to be overcome before daylight, but with sufficient light for direction keeping as the attackers advanced towards the lightening eastern horizon. There was no preparatory barrage in the British sector. However, the French had lost most of their tanks on the Marne. To make up for this they decided on a forty-five minutes bombardment prior to attacking at 5.05 a.m. In the British area more than 900 guns opened fire at zero and it was five minutes before the German counter barrage fell. By then the assault troops had moved on. British counter battery fire also took its toll. Overall the German barrage was not very heavy or effective. Indeed 504 of the 530 Germans guns in the attack area had been identified before zero and came under heavy counter-battery fire. The British used 450 of their 684 heavy guns for this task, each gun having sufficient ammunition to fire four rounds per minute for four hours. Most German guns were neutralised and abandoned. In addition the British had 1,386 field guns.

The French, attacking on the British right, advanced up to eight kilometres, eliminating the Moreuil salient, crossing the Avre and exploiting across the Santerre Plateau. However, success was not total.

The Canadian Corps had commenced its move southwards by train on 30th July to concentrate southwest of Amiens. The troops were told that they were in GHQ Reserve and could be called upon to resist German attacks in a number of places on the French and British fronts. Moves forward were made by night only. The time was limited to bring up guns and ammunition etc on limited roads, with a shortage of transport and petrol, but it was achieved. Early on 4th August a German raid on the front to be taken over by the Canadians made off with five Australian prisoners. Nothing was revealed.

The Canadian Corps had a frontage of 6,400m between the Amiens–Roye road and the Amiens–Chaulnes railway. Despite only taking over the line a few hours before zero, the reconnaissance had been carried out well. Because the French on the right were not to attack until forty-five minutes after the British, an Independent Force, commanded by Brigadier General Raymond Brutinel CB CMG DSO, Canadian Machine Gun Corps, was formed to protect the flank. It consisted of 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades, nine Lewis gun detachments of the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion and a section of six 6" medium trench mortars mounted on lorries. This force was to protect the flank by holding the Amiens–Roye road between the second and third objectives. It was also to support the cavalry if it was able to exploit beyond the third objective. In order to maintain liaison between the French and 3rd Canadian Division, a small force was organised under French command, consisting of a detachment of the French 94th Regiment (42nd Division) of thirty men with a machine gun and a platoon of 43rd Canadian Battalion. Many of the documents relating to the attack were annotated ‘Llandovery Castle Operation’. On 27th June 1918, HMHS Llandovery Castle was on a voyage from Halifax, Nova Scotia to Liverpool with Canadian medical personnel aboard, when she was torpedoed off southern Ireland, against international law and Imperial German Navy standing orders. Of the 258 personnel aboard (164 crew, eighty CAMC personnel and fourteen nurses), only twenty-four survived the sinking and subsequent ramming and machine gunning of lifeboats. The incident was the deadliest Canadian naval disaster of the war and was one of the war’s worst atrocities.

The Canadian Corps on 8th August. Extensive security measures were successful in concealing its presence until the offensive commenced.

The Canadian Corps’ attack was led from the right by 3rd, 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions to the Red Line, which ran northeast from Mézières to just west of Harbonnières. 3rd Cavalry Division (including the Canadian Cavalry Brigade) would then pass through the infantry to capture the Old Outer Amiens Defence Line (Blue Dotted Line). However, on the left, 2nd Canadian Division was to go through to the final objective on the Blue Dotted Line. Most resistance was expected on the right. In that area, 4th Canadian Division was to pass through 3rd and 1st Canadian Divisions on the Red Line and either relieve 3rd Cavalry Division on the Blue Dotted Line, or assist in its capture. 32nd Division, attached to the Canadian Corps, was moving up from the west of Amiens.

IV Tank Brigade was attached to the Canadian Corps. It had 1st, 5th and 14th Tank Battalions equipped with Mark V tanks. Each forward division was allocated one tank battalion, each of forty-two fighting tanks, whilst the 4th Canadian Division had a battalion of thirty-six tanks. An infantryman rode in each tank to maintain liaison. Each infantry division was also allocated about six Mark IV supply tanks filled with trench mortar and small arms ammunition, water, wire, stakes and digging tools. In addition each tank battalion had six supply tanks to bring forward petrol. The CRE had another six tanks for additional equipment and stores for the final objective.

No.8 Squadron RAF was allocated to cooperate with the tanks. No.5 (Corps Reconnaissance) Squadron was attached to the Canadian Corps from July until the end of the war. Its primary task in the attack was to drop forty pound phosphorus smoke bombs at points beyond the range of the artillery. It was also to supplement artillery smoke screens as there was a shortage of 60 Pounder smoke shells. In the event thick mist precluded much of the need for smoke. As the fog cleared, the aircraft were to maintain contact with the forward troops and report back. No.6 Squadron was allocated to cooperate with the cavalry. To identify the machines from the ground, those working with the tanks had a black band on the middle of the right side of their tail. Those working with the cavalry had streamers on both inside struts and contact patrol aircraft working with the infantry had rectangular panels (30 x 60 cms) on both lower planes about a metre from the fuselage.

Because of the distance envisaged for the advance, special arrangements had to be made to ensure that the leading troops had artillery support. The Corps had a total of 646 guns, divided into seventeen field artillery brigades, nine heavy brigades, three batteries of 6″ guns and a single 12″ howitzer battery. Much of the artillery came from outside the Corps, whose own 1st and 2nd Brigades CGA had remained with First Army. For the first few kilometres the field artillery could support the advance. Thereafter the heavies would provide as much assistance as possible, while a field artillery brigade per infantry division leapfrogged forward to new positions in order to keep the enemy within range.

3rd Canadian Division attacked astride the Amiens–Roye road with 9th and 8th Canadian Brigades leading, right and left respectively, supported by 5th Tank Battalion. The last of the attacking units took up their positions only twenty minutes before zero. Because of the potential difficulties caused by the French attacking later and the Luce valley splitting the Division’s front, it had a narrow frontage and was allocated six field artillery brigades, whereas the other divisions only had four. Initially the ground was intersected by deep ravines running down to the Luce, with Rifle, Hamon and Jean Woods at the head of three of them. After these features the ground was level.

9th Canadian Brigade on the right was to squeeze up south of the Luce with three battalions forward – 43rd Battalion on the right, 116th Battalion in the centre and 58th Battalion on the left. 52nd Battalion was in reserve. The Brigade was to avoid a frontal attack by one battalion advancing rapidly and turning Rifle (Dodo) Wood from the north. The rest of the Brigade was to advance along the south bank of the Luce, under the edge of the plateau. One battalion would then get into the rear of the Rifle Wood sector defences, while another headed for Demuin and Courcelles. Two companies of 5th Tank Battalion were attached to the Brigade, with a total of twenty-eight tanks. B Company formed up on the Thennes-Hourges road and A Company was spread along the Amiens–Roye road, with its leading elements just short of the Luce bridge at Domart. Each tank was to carry an infantry soldier, two tins of water and spare Lewis gun drums. There were sufficient water bottles to equip each man with two. At the first objective (Green Line) at 8.20 a.m., 7th Canadian Brigade was to pass through with six tanks, and any others left from the action with 9th Canadian Brigade, to seize the second objective (Red Line), about 2,300m beyond the first.

8th Canadian Brigade (less two battalions) advanced north of the Luce, with one battalion and fourteen tanks to capture Hangard Wood. It was then to work along the north bank of the Luce to support the left of 9th Canadian Brigade and the right of 1st Canadian Division.

The 9th Canadian Brigade battalions moved off from Gentelles Wood between 10 p.m. and 11.45 p.m. on 7th August. The last battalion was reported to be in its assembly position at 3.50 a.m. In the front line they relieved 51st Battalion AIF. The tanks began moving in second gear at 4.08 a.m. Only a faint hum could be heard in the front line. As they closed, their noise was covered by harassing fire and a bomber flying up and down the front. However, they had been unable to carry out detailed reconnaissance for security reasons and the mist and marshy ground also hampered progress. Some were late in starting and all found it almost impossible to keep up with the infantry, particularly in the early stages of the attack.

The precise locations of Miner’s VC actions are not known. However, B Company overcame three lots of resistance and this fits with the account of the three enemy posts that