Unraveled: An Evidence-Based Approach to Understanding and Preventing Crime

By Karim Vellani

What cannot be measured, cannot be managed. Despite this axiom, few books in the security industry have tackled the need to truly understand crime. Unraveled: An Evidence-Based Approach to Understanding and Preventing Crime 

• Language: English
• Publisher: Threat Analysis Group, LLC
• Release date: Dec 14, 2021
• ISBN: 9798985359220

Book preview

Unraveled

UNRAVELED

AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING CRIME

KARIM H. VELLANI

© 2021 Karim H. Vellani.

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise without written permission from the publisher. It is illegal to copy this book, post it to a website, or distribute it by any other means without permission.

This publication is sold with the understanding that the author and publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. While diligent effort has been made to provide accurate, reliable, and up-to-date information, neither the author or publisher can place a guarantee on the correctness of the data or information contained within this book. The publisher and author do hereby disclaim any responsibility or liability in connection with the use of this publication or any data contained therein.

The author is the copyright holder of most content contained within this publication. Permission to use other content has been obtained under license agreements from the respective copyright holders. If any copyrighted material has been used without permission, please accept our apologies, and notify us at once so that this can be corrected in any future editions.

First Printing: November 11, 2021

Threat Analysis Group, LLC

P.O. Box 16640

Sugar Land, Texas 77496

www.threatanalysis.com

[phone]

[e-mail]

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ISBN: 979-8-9853592-2-0

CONTENTS

About the Author

Acknowledgments

1. Introduction

Statistics for Security Management

Users of Crime Analysis

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Purpose of Crime Analysis

Return on Investment

The Predictability of Crime

W, W, W, W, and H

Definition of Crime Analysis

2. Crime And Place

Units of Analysis

Country

State

Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)

City/County

Police Beat/District

Census Tract

Crime Statistical Reporting Area

Hot Spots

Area

Place

3. Data Sources

Utility, Availability, and Credibility

Security Incident Reports

Law Enforcement Data Sources

Calls for Service

Offense / Incident Data

Offense / Incident Reports

Uniform Crime Report (UCR)

NIBRS Offenses by Category: Group

Law Enforcement Data Limitations

Unreported Crime

Other Data Sources

Arrest Data

National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)

Demographic Data

4. Methodology

Process

Crime Typologies

Victim-Offender Relationships

Violence Escalation

Crime Rates

Temporal Analysis

Spatial Analysis

Spatio-Temporal Analysis

Other Crime Phenomena

5. Advanced Concepts In Crime Analysis

Crime Thresholds

Forecasting

Modus Operandi Analysis

Crime Harm Index

6. Crime Prevention Theories

Environmental Criminology/Crime Science

Crime Triangle

Problem Analysis Triangle (or new Crime Triangle)

Opportunity Structure and Signatures

Opportunity Theories

Routine Activity Theory

Rational Choice Theory

Crime Pattern Theory

Broken Windows Theory

7. Evidence-Based Research

Maryland Scientific Methods Scale

Scientific Methods

Scientific Knowledge is Cumulative

Logic Models

8. Crime Prevention Practices

Crime Prevention: A Process

SARA

Scanning

Analysis

Response

Assessment

Situational Crime Prevention

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Problem-Oriented Policing

Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits

Decay and Residual Deterrence

Deterrence

Focused Deterrence

What Works, What Doesn’t, and What’s Promising

Instrumental vs. Expressive Violence

Targeted Violent Crimes

Dispute-Related Violent Crimes

Predatory Violence

Limitations Of Violent Crime Prevention Research

Security is Situational

APPENDIX A: UCR SRS

APPENDIX B: UCR NIBRS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Endnotes

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Karim H. Vellani is the President of Threat Analysis Group, LLC, an independent security consulting firm. Karim is Board Certified in Security Management (CPP), a Board-Certified Security Consultant (CSC), and has over 25 years of security management, crime analysis, and forensic security consulting experience. He has a bachelor’s degree in Criminal Justice with a specialization in Law Enforcement and a master’s degree in Criminal Justice Management. He is the author of two other books, Applied Crime Analysis and Strategic Security Management (1st and 2nd editions), and has contributed to many other security-related books and journals. As an Adjunct Professor at the University of Houston - Downtown, Karim taught graduate courses in Security Management and Risk Analysis for the College of Criminal Justice’s Security Management Program. Karim has served on various research teams which conduct evidence-based research on security and crime prevention.

This book is dedicated to my friend Joel Nahoun. Joel co-authored Applied Crime Analysis with me at a time when both of us were relatively inexperienced writers. That book was a fusion of our writing styles and an early indicator of our eventual divergent approaches to writing. In the years after the publication of Applied Crime Analysis, both of us grew as writers, me with a leaning toward research and Joel toward fiction. Sadly, Joel died in 2012 at the age of 40. This book reflects the lessons Joel taught me about communicating using the written word. I miss you, my friend.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book would not be possible without the research efforts and insights of environmental criminologists, most notably John E. Eck, Ronald V. Clarke, Marcus Felson, Jerry Ratcliffe, Tamara D. Herold, Lawrence W. Sherman, David Weisburd, and Patricia L. Brantingham. Thank you for your contributions to your field, criminology, and mine, security management.

Guillermo A. Tortolero contributed to Chapters 6, 7 and 8. His efforts undoubtedly allowed work on this book to continue on schedule when my work commitments threatened to derail the project. Thank you, Alex!

Without data, you’re just a person with an opinion.

– W. EDWARDS DEMING

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Crime - n. a violation of a law in which there is injury to the public or a member of the public and a term in jail or prison, and/or a fine as possible penalties. ¹

In a TED Talk entitled, Why smart statistics are the key to fighting crime, former New Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgram recounts the story of how she helped implement a data-driven policing approach for the Camden Police Department. Milgram explains that while senior police officials worked hard to reduce crime, they were ultimately not successful with an antiquated policing style. In Milgram’s words, the Camden Police Department was …essentially trying to fight crime with yellow post-it notes rather than data. She believed that data could be used to enable better police decision-making. In 2006, the year preceding Milgram’s appointment as Attorney General, Camden experienced violent and property crime rates of 21.1 and 59.8 per 1,000 people, respectively. Within a decade after her departure as Attorney General, Camden’s violent rate had declined to 16.4 and property crime rate to 30.3 per 1,000 people. Milgram received significant praise for her part in the Camden Police Department’s transformative approach to policing based on evidence, data, and research. Milgram herself compared the approach to that of Billy Beane of Moneyball fame, where the Oakland Athletics used an evidence-based approach to building a competitive baseball team. Milgram refers to her approach as moneyballing criminal justice. ²

The objective of this book is similar to Milgram’s for security programs. A data-centric approach to understanding crime, coupled with evidence-based security practices, can enable better decision making and optimize crime prevention efforts. The analysis of crime, as described in this book, involves removing fear, uncertainty, and doubt and, instead, focuses on relevant information to build effective security programs. Readers may possess much of the knowledge contained in this book. My hope is to validate your knowledge and then expand it, even by small, useful amounts.

It should be noted that this book (and the standards, guidelines, and best practices mentioned) does not establish a Standard of Care (the degree of care a prudent and reasonable person will exercise under the circumstances ³) of what property owners and managers must do. This book is not the place to learn about specific software applications or data visualization concepts (e.g., infographics, word clouds, and heat maps), which change too frequently to be adequately discussed in book form.

This book is the result of more than seven years of research. It represents an evidence-based evolution of ideas I have written about in other books, chapters, and articles. Some of the findings may be controversial to some readers, particularly those relating to Crime Prevention through Environmental Design and Broken Windows Theory. I have endeavored to present a balanced perspective on these and other topics that are based on criminological evidence. I encourage readers to explore the references found in the endnotes and then keep abreast of new research that will undoubtedly be published after this book. The evolution will continue.

STATISTICS FOR SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Statistics are like bikinis. What they reveal is suggestive, but what they conceal is vital.

AARON LEVENSTEIN

Business intelligence, metrics, and statistics are commonly used to plan by helping decision makers understand the past. The same is true in the security industry. Crime statistics and security metrics are important for many businesses as they guide the security risk assessment process, assist with the selection of appropriate security measures to mitigate risks, and are used to measure security and safety program effectiveness. The use of information regarding crimes and other security incidents can help security decision makers plan, select, and implement appropriate security measures that address the actual risks of places. Security decision makers, ⁴ after assessing the crime problem, can select the most effective countermeasures that mitigate or reduce risk to an acceptable or reasonable level. Budget justification is also accomplished with statistical and metrics analyses since effective security measures can reduce risk and the returns on security investments can be calculated and considered in the bottom line.

A common application of statistics in the security arena is the use of security reports and crime data to determine the security risks to a facility. The security decision maker does not need to be a mathematician to fully utilize statistical data. Only a basic understanding of the various techniques and methods, along with a basic knowledge of spreadsheet software (e.g., Microsoft Excel and Google Sheets), are needed.

Most of us need no further evidence than the pocket-sized computer we have nearby that technology has evolved rapidly over the last few years. Technology has enabled us to analyze crime in more meaningful ways than ever before and rendered older methods obsolete. Our vastly improved understanding of crime has enabled us to prevent crime more effectively and efficiently. Sherlock Holmes proclaimed, There is a strong family resemblance about misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can't unravel the thousand and first. Holmes was right, but what Sir Arthur Conan Doyle did not envision when he wrote these words was our current ability to have all the details of a million misdeeds, the computing power to analyze them, and the algorithms to unravel not only the thousand and first but every crime thereafter.

Crime analysis is a key component of a security risk assessment as it provides insights into historical threats and potential solutions. Identified threats can form the basis for the security program. In some industries, this is referred to as a design basis threat. For example, the design of a security program in the nuclear power industry is based on the threats to radiological assets. The same approach can be used in lower risk environments. For example, an office building security director concerned with a flood of thefts of employee wallets and purses may conduct a security risk assessment with an eye toward the theft opportunities available in the office suites. When walking through the offices, the security director may find that purses and wallets are readily visible from office doors and windows, thus providing the opportunity for criminals to see the target property. A simple and cost-effective solution to this problem is to institute a clean desk policy that requires employees to lock personal belongings in desks or a company locker.

USERS OF CRIME ANALYSIS

There are numerous books and associations for public sector crime analysis that serve crime analysts who work in law enforcement and academia. This book is not for them. Instead, I wrote this book for a different group - people responsible, directly or indirectly, for formulating decisions relating to security and crime prevention. I refer to these readers as security decision makers throughout this book even though their roles as crime analysts or business intelligence analysts may be limited to advising the ultimate decision makers. Secondary readers of this book are those who serve as forensic experts, discussed in more detail below.

Crime analysis has gained widespread adoption in the private sector since Francis J. D'Addario wrote the first crime analysis book, Loss Prevention Through Crime Analysis, geared to the private sector in 1989. Today, it’s not uncommon to find companies, large and small, with one or more analysts on staff or on contract responsible for analyzing crime, security, and other business intelligence to enable better decision making. While instinct and experience will always have a place in security decision making, crime analysis provides an empirical basis for better decisions.

For security decision makers, particularly those with more than one property, analyzing crime and other security issues at each property becomes increasingly more challenging as the number of properties increase. However, much like any dataset, the ability to understand crime at their locations also increases. That is not to say that crime at one property should affect security decisions at another property. To the contrary, security decision makers should not take a cookie cutter approach to security resources. This concept is discussed in greater detail below.

Forensic experts are expert witnesses who testify or provide forensic opinions in a court proceeding by virtue of their specialized knowledge. The primary objective of a forensic expert is to educate judges and jurors on a particular topic in which the expert holds specialized knowledge beyond that held by the average person. Forensic security experts are sometimes needed in negligent security cases. Negligent security is a theory of premises liability law that victims of crime assert against owners and occupiers of land for failing to prevent foreseeable and avoidable criminal attacks from occurring. ⁵ Foreseeability is one of three elements of a premises liability case and is defined as the ability to reasonably anticipate the potential results of an action, such as the damage or injury that may happen if one is negligent or breaches a contract. ⁶ Foreseeability is a continuous rather than a discrete variable and can be evaluated on a continuum from not foreseeable to highly foreseeable. ⁷ In negligent security litigation, security experts have knowledge that is beyond that of an average juror and may be retained by one or both sides of the legal dispute to educate jurors during a court proceeding. Forensic experts involved in negligent security litigation may have expertise in medical damages, economic damages, property management, criminal profiling, psychology, criminology, and security. For purposes of this book, it is primarily criminologists and security experts who may engage in crime analysis to assist in developing their opinions.

While case law regarding the responsibility of property owners to control crime at their properties varies across the states, owners may have some ability to control crime on their property and some may have an obligation to do so. ⁸ Forensic security experts generally utilize the same methodology for assessing crime risks regardless of the type of property or the state in which its located. Many forensic security experts follow the Forensic Methodology developed in 2000 by the International Association of Professional Security Consultants (IAPSC). ⁹ The Forensic Methodology is a peer-reviewed and consensus-based guideline. The relevant portion of the 2020 edition of the IAPSC Forensic Methodology reads as follows:

THREAT ASSESSMENT

A threat assessment is an evaluation of events that can adversely affect operations and/or specific assets. Historical information is a primary source for threat assessments, including past criminal and terrorist events. A threat assessment considers actual and inherent threats.

1. Actual Threats - The crime history at the subject property based on data reflecting actual crime data. [a footnote here states: Depending on the police jurisdiction that serves the subject property, different types of crime records may be available. The most common type of crime record used in a crime risk analysis is Calls for Service or dispatch logs. It is important to note that Calls for Service or dispatch log accuracy varies by jurisdiction. Further, changes to incident management and dispatch systems may also impact accuracy even within the same jurisdiction. When assessing relevant crimes, Calls for Service and dispatch logs should not be used alone. Offense/Incident Reports are necessary to validate the Calls for Service or dispatch logs, specifically the crime type, crime location, and whether a crime actually occurred. Calls for service or dispatch logs alone, in many jurisdictions, are insufficient for these three elements]. Actual threats are a quantitative element of a threat assessment. When assessing actual threats, the following may be considered as deemed relevant by the security expert:

a) Relevant crimes on the subject property for a three to five-year period prior to the date of the incident. [a footnote here states: The IAPSC recognizes that criminology studies and related research have generally found that crime in the area may or may not be relevant to the subject property.].

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b) Relevant crimes in the immediate vicinity of the subject property for a three to five-year period prior to the date of the incident. [Note: There is no single definition of what constitutes an immediate vicinity or neighborhood around a given property. Often what is available for evaluation from a law enforcement agency depends upon that agency’s software programming and/or staff capabilities (e.g., the agency can only provide data for a set size of an area, such as a quarter mile radius).]

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c) The expert may consider the relationship between offenders and victims (e.g. interpersonal, domestic, targeted, etc.).

2. Inherent Threats – The crime risk at the subject property as determined by the expert based on the property’s characteristics, the expert’s research and/or experience in similar environments, information gathered through the discovery process, and/or a site inspection (if conducted).

As described in the Forensic Methodology, forensic security experts should follow a consistent methodology regardless of an individual state’s case law. When assessing the security needs of a property, both security decision makers and forensic security experts can benefit from the Threat Assessment section of the Forensic Methodology. There are three key crime analysis components of the methodology that are required if deemed relevant by the expert:

Temporal aspects of crime

Spatial aspects of crime

The victim-offender relationship

If deemed relevant by the expert, 3-5 years of crime data (temporal) for the property (spatial) may be considered. Separately, and if deemed relevant by the expert, 3-5 years of crime data (temporal) for the area (spatial) may be considered. This is a critical distinction and in Chapter 2, I provide a detailed discussion of crime and place. The Forensic Methodology also suggests an evaluation of the victim-offender relationship. This issue is discussed in Chapter 4. Lastly, the Forensic Methodology provides guidance on the quality of crime data, specifically as it relates to calls for service. This issue is addressed further in Chapter 3.

The International Association of Professional Security Consultants defines inherent threats as the crime risk at the subject property as determined by the expert based on the property’s characteristics, the expert’s research and/or experience in similar environments, information gathered through the discovery process, and/or a site inspection (if conducted). For example, certain types of facilities or assets may be prone to loss, damage, or destruction (e.g., infant abductions from healthcare facilities, auto theft from parking lots, and shoplifting from retail stores).

Forensic security experts often face a series of questions relating to whatever crime analysis methodology that they utilize. These questions typically come by way of deposition and trial testimony but may also be addressed in written opinion reports or expert designations. Some of the questions may include the following:

What evidence/facts did you rely upon to opine that the crime in the present case was or was not foreseeable to the defendant(s)?

What timeframe did you consider when developing your opinions about the risk of crime at the subject property?

What is the basis for using that timeframe?

Are crimes that occurred more recently more important?

What area crime did you consider when developing your opinions about the risk of crime at the subject property?

What was the size of the area?

What criminological studies support using that size area?

Do Calls for Service reflect actual crimes?

Did you use offense/incident report when assessing the risk of crime at the subject property?

Did you read the offense/incident report narratives for crimes reported to have occurred at the site?

Was the incident in question an interpersonal, non-stranger crime or a stranger-initiated crime?

If the subject incident was a stranger crime, what is the significance of including/excluding interpersonal, non-stranger crimes?

Was the incident in question a targeted crime?

Are targeted crimes more or less difficult to prevent?

What is the crime risk threshold when assessing (i.e., how many crimes have to occur at the place - or in the area for a crime – for a crime similar to this to be foreseeable)?

What is the basis for a one-mile radius (or whatever area the expert uses)?

Are random, unpredictable crimes more difficult to prevent?

While forensic security experts may face these questions, and many others, case law in each state may govern some of these elements. Unfortunately, case law is not always based on criminological research or, at best, fails to keep up with criminology. As a result, forensic security experts may have to vary from the methodology to meet the requirements of case law. Each state in the United States uses one or more of four basic tests for foreseeability:

Specific Imminent Harm Test. A landowner does not owe a duty to protect patrons from the violent acts of third parties unless aware of specific imminent harm about to affect them.

Prior Similar Incidents Test. In order to establish foreseeability requiring a landowner to take precautions against third-party crime, the plaintiff must establish a past history of similar criminal conduct on or near the premises.

Totality of Circumstances Test. This test looks to a host of factors such as the nature, condition, and location of the land; the level of crime in the surrounding area; and any other factors that may alert the landowner to the likelihood of crime.

The Balancing Test. This test seeks to address the interests of both business proprietors and their customers by balancing the foreseeability of harm against the burden of imposing a duty to protect against criminal acts of third persons. ¹⁰

At the time of this writing, Texas had one of the more comprehensive approaches to crime foreseeability using the Prior Similar Incident Test by requiring forensic security experts to consider five factors regarding prior crime: similarity, frequency, recency, proximity, and publicity. The IAPSC Forensic Methodology directly addresses proximity and recency. Similarity and frequency are addressed by criminological studies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Publicity speaks to the legal concept of notice. All five factors are considered later in this book.

It should be noted that even in states with clear case law, the judge may determine that the case law is not applicable to the fact pattern of a specific incident. For example, in a situation in which there is an escalating dispute between two parties at a bar, over a period of time, that comes to the attention of the bar’s management and is ignored, may result in the application of a different foreseeability standard, such as the Specific Imminent Harm Test.

Finally, the Forensic Methodology’s Threat Assessment section calls for the assessment of inherent threats. Inherent threats are determined by the expert based on the property’s characteristics, the expert’s research and/or experience in similar environments, information gathered through the discovery process, and/or a site inspection (if conducted). This is a qualitative assessment, rather than a quantitative one. While it is important to consider what crimes may happen at a particular type of place, it is also paramount to understand that places are not the same. That is, studies of facilities show that crime is always highly concentrated within any homogeneous set of facilities (e.g., most bars have little or no violent crime and a few have a great deal). ¹¹ ¹² This issue is discussed in Chapter 2.

PURPOSE OF CRIME ANALYSIS

This book was conceived to address the fundamental crime challenges faced by American businesses by setting forth a methodology to assess crime in a meaningful way that leads to effective crime reduction strategies. All too often, the data available to private sector businesses pale in comparison to the data available to law enforcement who have visibility to city wide crimes, whereas businesses are mostly limited to data for their properties only. This will change as open data portals, websites that provide access to large volumes of data, become more common. Even then, the crime analysis techniques used in the private sector will often be insufficient to gain a full appreciation of the crime picture at specific places. Places, as used throughout this book, means an area that:

Is very small (i.e., one address, one land parcel, one building, etc.).

Has a known geographic location.

Is contained within defined property boundaries.

Serves one general function.

Has an owner with the authority to legally control the use of the place. ¹³

No doubt the term crime analysis is often confused