Science-Based Interviewing

By Susan E. Brandon and Simon Wells

Following a general introduction, the first six chapters follow the course of an interview, beginning with planning (Chapter 2), impression management (Chapter 3), developing rapport (Chapter 4), showing active listening (Chapter 5), eliciting a narrative (Chapter 6), and good questioning tactics (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 describes how to create cooperation between the interviewer and the subject, and what to do in instances where the subject is less than cooperative. Chapter 9 provides methods of assessing whether the subject's story is likely to be true. These chapters include exercises that may help the reader practice the strategies and tactics.

The subsequent chapters provide information on related topics: the characteristics of good interviewers (Chapter 10), why people confess (or not) (Chapter 11), how memory works (Chapter 12), and the likely impacts of personality (Chapter 13), mental health disorders (Chapter 14), and drugs and alcohol (Chapter 15) on interview outcomes. Chapter 16 provides a brief overview of the polygraph. Chapters 17 and 18 offer brief histories of interrogations in the U.S. and the U.K., respectively.

• Language: English
• Publisher: BookBaby
• Release date: Jan 1, 1900
• ISBN: 9781098323943

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(U.K.).

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW

Although not very elegant, perhaps the best model of a good interview is one of building blocks, as shown in Figure 1. The foundation is rapport, built in the first moments of the interview and maintained throughout. Without rapport, the story that a subject tells is less likely to be detailed and credible. Once a story is told and the subject has responded to what is known about the case, the interviewer (or interview team) can assess the credibility of what is being said. Pull out the bottom block and the whole thing topples; pull out the detailed story block and asseessing credibility is hampered or made impossible.

Of course, each block has its own components: developing and maintaining rapport depends on good planning and preparation: Who is this subject? What do we know about him and what are we inferring about him? What are the objectives of the interview and how do we ensure that every segment of the interview supports those objectives? How do we manage first impressions, avoid decision-making biases, and come across as both competent and warm? Developing rapport requires instilling subject autonomy, and showing acceptance, adaptation, empathy and evocation. Rapport is strengthened by good listening: being in sync or coordinated with the subject, showing positivity, and attending to what the subject is saying, as evidenced by summarizing or paraphrasing what he has said and reflecting back key words and phrases.

Figure 1. An effective information gathering interview depends on building and maintaining rapport, eliciting a detailed story, and assessment of what has been said.

A powerful method of eliciting a detailed story is the Cognitive Interview, a method built on the sciences of social dynamics, human memory and cognition, and communication. The Cognitive Interview reinforces subject autonomy. Part of eliciting a narrative is asking good questions, using the words and language style of the subject to get more details. Of course, subjects are sometimes hesitant to provide details that might incriminate themselves; they may avoid answering questions or insist on addressing their own needs and worries. In such instances, the interviewer must have some means of pulling a subject into a more cooperative mode – sensemaking is one method of creating cooperation, as is using social influence tactics.

Assessing credibility depends on the subject providing details that can be verified. Truthful accounts are distinguishable by the nature of the details provided; a good interviewer increases those cues by helping the subject understand what details are needed and asking unanticipated questions. In instances where evidence or information about the case is available, this can be used strategically so as to increase cues to truthfulness as well as draw out additional details.

Developing and maintaining rapport, eliciting a detailed story, and assessing credibility are literally and figuratively the building blocks. How an interviewer progresses from one block to the next will vary, of course, depending on the interviewer, the subject, the peculiarities of the case, and the context within which the interview occurs. We don’t, therefore, offer a roadmap for an interview. The order in which the topics are covered in this book are roughly the order in which the issues are likely to be encountered, but unique decisions have to be made along the way: when should questions be asked, when should evidence be used, when should a story be challenged? What we do offer are guidelines for how to make these decisions as wisely and usefully as possible.

CHAPTER 2:

PLANNING & PREPARATION

The Boards is a term we use to describe how an interview team prepares for and supports an interview. The name comes from the fact that much of this planning is written on poster boards so that the whole interview team can view what is written and share in the planning.

The Boards provides a method for first organizing what we know (case facts) and what we think the information means. Once the interview starts and proceeds, what we know and what we think about the information we have will change. Therefore, the Boards are continually updated, producing a log and a visual representation of progress, and reminders of issues to follow up on or issues to avoid. The Boards also provide a framework for team roles and activities to support an interview.

The Boards help the team think through four key topics:

1. What do we know? – Collect and collate the facts surrounding a potential subject we may be interviewing.

2. What have we heard? – Collect and collate additional information (intelligence) that has yet to be verified.

3. What do we think? – Develop inferences based on the facts and the assessment of the information.

4. What do we do? – Depending on the inferences and assessments, determine who on the team will be responsible for executing actions based on the knowledge developed from the evolving information, and what the short-term and long-term goals of the interview will be.

What does the science say?

The Boards methodology per se has never been explicitly tested. However, the components of the Boards have support in research on teamwork, hypothesis testing and decision making.¹,²,³ In fact, the Boards are a method of hypothesis testing, the foundation of the scientific method.

The Boards within your organization

At the beginning of any decision to interview a subject, there is some level of pressure on the interviewer, and some level of uncertainty about how the process will play out. The pressure and/or uncertainty comes from many sources – the organizational hierarchies within a unit or agency, the media, the family or friends of the subject, and one’s own colleagues. The number of people and entities impacted may increase as these individuals and entities become aware of the investigation or intelligence collection, thus increasing the pressure. The confusion comes from the various entities involved in the process and uncertainties about the roles each should play. The Boards is a way of dealing with both the pressure and the confusion.

The need to identify what has happened and separate fact from untested information is crucial for any number of reasons. Most important is that we do not want to make unjustified assumptions about who the subject is, what they may know and how they may behave in an interview setting. There also may be a tendency either to see information already collected on the case as relevant or irrelevant or for there to be a lack of analysis and discussion regarding the case before the interview even begins. Using the Boards, we distinguish:

HOW TO USE THE BOARDS

Below we describe how The Boards should be used.

STEP 1: WHAT DO WE KNOW?

The first column of the Boards contains information that falls under the category of ‘What do we know as verified facts?’ This column should contain facts about the subject. Facts, in a criminal investigation or intelligence interview, are items such as:i

•Video footage (CCTV) – video records of a particular event

•Mobile phone/cell site data that geo-locates the phone at a location; third party conformation [e.g., a surveillance team] may locate the subject at the same place as his phone

•Finance – if there is independent evidence that the subject has access to an identified banking account, then banking activity in that account can be relevant; it is important to ascertain whether that access is unique to the subject

•Fingerprints/DNA

•Clothing worn, items gathered from the subject’s pockets, bags, handbags, etc. (‘pocket litter’)

•Details about the location of arrest and/or detention

•Houses and vehicles registered or owned

•Events known to have occurred and conditions known to be present prior to the detention; e.g. home break-ins, similar assaults

•Eyewitness reports – but only if reinforced by video/audio recordings

The list will vary case by case. Note: all facts should be treated with caution unless they are cross-referenced. For example, as discussed in Chapter 12, eyewitness testimony is unreliable unless cross-checked against video or audio recordings.

STEP 2: WHAT HAVE WE HEARD?

One issue that a team may face when preparing for an interview, particularly if the person has been a subject of interest for some length of time, can be an overwhelming amount of information already in the case files. This could be witness or victim statements, forensic evidence, notes from sources, or police or intelligence agents’ interpretations of behavior. However, if it is not an independently observed fact, the information should be included under the heading, ‘What have we heard?’ This can include:

•Cell site data that geo-locates the subject at a location without third party conformation

•Reports from witnesses as to behavior and reaction to arrest and/or detention, without corroborating data

•Source information, without corroborating data

•Assessments as to the meaning of conversations on telephones, email or other electronic media

•Open source or other media reporting (including a resume, social media, reports from school)

•Opinions or thoughts from previous interviewers or people who have had encounters with the subject

STEP 3: WHAT DO WE THINK?

The next column of the Boards deals with inferences the team makes about the verified facts and information, which may include an informed prediction of what the subject will say and whether he will cooperate or avoid engaging with the interviewer. As a consequence of collating what we know (the verified facts), and what we have heard (the information), we can then develop inferences to consider what we think about the subject, and the incident or events we are seeking to collect information about.

An inference is a statement that describes what the team thinks based on the evidence. It may include the why, who, what, when, where, and how; the level of confidence for each inference should be noted. An inference should go beyond what is known and be supported by a series of premises. A premise an assumption based on ‘what we know,’ and ‘what we have heard.’ It is vital to review premises for bias and to identify underlying assumptions.

STEP 4: WHAT DO WE DO?

The next step in the Boards process focuses on what the team plans to do. It could identify what additional information should be collected or who may be the best person to engage the subject, based on the inferences made.

Now that the team has distinguished between what it knows as verified facts, what it has as information, and what it can infer from both, the team can begin to plan the interview strategy. What are the near- and long-term objectives? Who should be the lead interviewer and who might serve as note-taker or secondary? What will be the first thing the interviewer will say when he walks into the room, and what does the team anticipate the subject saying in return? (These topics are continued in Chapter 3, Impression Management.)

CASE STUDY EXAMPLE

An example of the Boards: The primary objectives are to obtain details regarding a missing person and other possible victims. The data come from the investigation of Colonel Russell Williams (see http://www.sthecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/russell-williams-case/).

Colonel David Russell Williams was a decorated air force pilot and commander at the Canadian Forces Base in Trenton, Ontario. He was arrested in 2010, and charged with the murders of two women and numerous other sex-related crimes.

The types of information collated by the team prior to the interview might include:

•Fifteen reports of home break-ins in the vicinity of Orleans, reported to the Ottawa Police Department

•Taunting message on a computer left during one of these break-ins

•Semen on the photograph of a woman left during another of these break ins

•Witness reports: two women in Tweed attacked while sleeping; both were bound and blindfolded, assaulted and forced to pose nude for photographs

•Jessica Lloyd reported missing; Lloyd lives in Belleville, Ontario

•Witness reports of seeing a silver-colored SUV parked in a field near Lloyd’s house on the night of her disappearance

•Tire tracks found near Lloyd’s house with a distinctive tread

•While stopped by Ottawa Police at a checkpoint, Williams said he was in a hurry to get home because of a sick child (later it was found he had no children)

•Treads on Williams’ car match those found in the field near Lloyd’s house

•Williams often spent time at a cottage in the village of Tweed, Ontario, although he had a house with his wife of 13 years in Orleans

Below is a brief example of how such verifiable facts, hearsay and inferences could be used to populate the Boards to support the interview planning process.

The next stage in the Boards process is to set out ‘What do we do?’ The actions and activities to be undertaken should be in line with the inferences. The first stage is to identify the objectives of the interview. An example is given below (note that the first objective is to get Williams talking; without that, no progress can be made; the remaining objectives are written here in an order that reflects concerns for public safety):

– Engage the subject: get him talking & keep him talking

– Find Jessica Lloyd, who might still be alive

– Determine whether there are any additional victims, dead or alive

– Get information on previous 2009 assaults & break-ins

– Incorporate findings from home search into interview as it proceeds

Having discussed and developed the objectives, the next step is to decide what to do as a team. The actions and activities to be undertaken should be in line with the inferences and objectives. The text offered below is an example and not a complete interview strategy:

– Based on the inference that the subject is a person of authority, defer to his position & recognize his authority.

– Emphasize autonomy, which is consistent with the subject’s view of himself as a person of authority & will engage commitment and consistency (see Chapter 8).

– The interviewer (and his secondary, if present) should be dressed in a neat, but functional manner.

– The opening lines should be to set an agenda and explain why the interview is taking place.

– The subject is likely to communicate in an Instrumental manner (see Chapter 8).

– Present evidence in a systematic and organized manner.

The team will then rehearse and consider the nature of the team and, depending on availability, pick those members of the team who are most likely to achieve the objectives to serve as the primary and secondary interviewers.ii

MAINTAINING THE BOARDS

There are no rules as to how the Boards should be maintained once the interview begins. However, following the first conversation with the subject, certain issues may become apparent. For example, the team could know better how the subject prefers to talk (in an Instrumental, Identity or Relational framework; see Chapter 8). How does he respond to silence or summaries? Were there certain topics that might make the subject talk more or made him shut down? As information is collected, it should be noted in as much detail as possible.

Examples of additional Boards that then be created might include:

– Speaking in an instrumental framework

– Use of silence

– Use of summaries

– Being clear as to what a question means

– Direct questions

– Perceived criticism or judgment of the subjects’ behavior

– Making the subject feel as if he has no choices

This board would be made of bullet points outlining what the team has elicited from the subject and should be completed in ‘live time.’

A member or members of the team should be assigned to keep the Boards up to date -- teamwork is essential for the Boards to be effective. Ideally, this means the team members can hear or see the interview via real-time audio or video feed.

In the instance of an interview that continues for more than a few hours (with appropriate breaks), it may be useful to organize the Boards along a timeline. This helps the team identify points in time about which the subject is providing very little detail (perhaps to hide information or protect people he cares about). Events can be written on post-it notes so that they can be easily moved around and adjusted as more information is collected.⁴

This board would align information about activities and locations against times during the day(s) and/or night(s) under consideration. (For more on using timelines, see Chapter 7.)

The Boards also will assist in teamwork. The interviewer cannot be the only means by which information is obtained.

ADVANTAGES OF GOOD TEAMWORK

Those who are conducting the interview themselves – perhaps a lead and a secondary – will have difficulty hearing and remembering all that is said. The individuals ‘in the room’ should be assisted by a team who can hear and/or see what is being said to assist in the information collection. In addition, working as a team provides different perspectives: when people with different backgrounds work together, they each have access to different information, different information gaps, different biases, and make different inferences.⁵ By working together, the team may be able to efficiently identify and subsequently fill knowledge gaps, overcome individual biases, and make more valid inferences. Simply talking through assumptions and inferences can reveal gaps in known facts.⁶

MATCH THE TEAM TO THE PROBLEM

A good rule of thumb is that a team’s diversity should match the complexity of the task: with a very complex task, a team with multiple talents and expertise is advantageous. With a simpler task, a less diverse team is better.⁷

An effective team can work together to:

LOOK FOR CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION OR EVIDENCE

An individual interviewer might infer that the subject has certain beliefs based on his status, group identity, or life history. In the example above, if the interviewer approached the subject from the start of the interview as if he were criminal, and he was in fact a commander involved in the lives of the people he leads, it would be difficult for the interviewer to recover from making such an assumption. Members of a team can argue for different perspectives. Years of experience in the analysis of human intelligence has shown that it is useful to look for evidence that contradicts the inferences that are made.⁸

MAKE EVIDENCE FOR EACH INFERENCE EXPLICIT

If, through the course of the interview and completion of the Boards, the team learns that a critical piece of evidence was omitted or new evidence is discovered, it is important to adjust the team’s understanding of the case facts, the implications of the evidence for the case, and the actions to be taken by the interviewer. For example, the team in the example here is inferring that the subject is connected to the missing women. It may be that the subject is affiliated with one or two women but only because of his status as a leader or because they were his neighbors.

IDENTIFY THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

There is a trade-off between working collaboratively and working alone: working as a team requires more coordination as people adjust their schedules and workload and agree on individual roles on the team. It is possible that teammates cannot understand each other, fight over resources, or interfere with each other (referred to as process losses). These are the trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages of working collaboratively.

Barriers to good teamwork are:

•Not recognizing the need to collaborate -- people do not always recognize the extent to which their own training, background and professional activities have shaped their world views. ⁹

•Not knowing who to have on the team – it may be difficult to identify people with the required expertise; people tend to select team members whom they already know instead of selecting the team based on the task at hand. ¹⁰

•Intergroup rivalries – teamwork requires trust and that each member is willing to expose what he does not know.

DECISION MAKING & COGNITIVE BIASES

Part of planning and preparation is making decisions based on the case information. Ideally, these decisions are grounded in fact, based on careful evaluation of the information, and free of unsubstantiated assumptions. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to be entirely true.

We make hundreds of decisions each day: do we go right or left at the light; do we recognize this person; do we trust our boss; is this problem similar to previous problems – and so on. Because it would be very inefficient to weigh the pros and cons for each decision, humans have developed short-cuts to this constant decision-making, which often are ‘right’ (that is, they lead to a good outcome). However, sometimes these quick decisions are wrong (that is, they are based on faulty reasoning, evaluating or remembering) – and because we make so many decisions without a great deal of thought, we often are unaware of when these ‘errors’ occur. Such errors are called cognitive biases. Cognitive heuristics (or, cognitive short-cuts) are decision-making rules that we learn for making judgments and solving problems. These heuristics may result in errors in reasoning, evaluating, or remembering.

Cognitive heuristics often are a result of holding onto one’s preferences and beliefs regardless of contrary information or a rational balancing of pros and cons. Because these cognitive heuristics operate quickly and often, unconsciously, they are difficult to override even when we are aware of them.³ They may interfere with good planning, preparation and analysis via the Boards. Cognitive heuristics¹¹ include:

THE LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS – This bias occurs when we rely too heavily on a single instance in making a judgment and fail to recognize that the observation may have been quite unlikely given how varied such events are likely to be.¹²

•For example, because the terrorists used airplanes in their attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, some people apparently perceived air travel as extremely risky in the months after the attacks. That is, flying was considered dangerous because of the events of that single day. The events of 9/11 made people overestimate the likelihood of a terrorist attack and turn to driving rather than flying – when it is statistically more dangerous to drive than to fly. Researchers compared domestic air travel, driving miles, and fatal traffic accidents in the months before and after September 11. They concluded that 1,595 more traffic fatalities occurred from October 2001 to March 2003 than were predicted on the basis of common traffic statistics. ¹³

•In terms of the Boards Case Study above, a law of small numbers bias might lead the team to think that the subject was close to a particular woman because he recently was observed talking with her two times. However, a Commander meeting with someone twice in carrying out his duties is not very often – if these were the only two meetings, he may not, in fact, be very close to that individual.

On March 11, 2004, terrorists detonated bombs on several commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killing approximately 200 people and injuring more than 1400 others. The Spanish National Police recovered fingerprints on a bag of detonators connected with the attacks and transmitted them to INTERPOL with a request that the FBI Laboratory provide assistance in identifying the fingerprints. On March 19, the FBI Laboratory’s Latent Print Units (LPU) identified a U.S. citizen, Brandon Mayfield, as the source of one of the fingerprints on the bag, referred to as Latent Fingerprint Number 17 (LFP17). Mayfield’s fingerprints had been initially retrieved, along with others, as a potential match to LFP17 based on a computer search of millions of fingerprints in FBI databases. This automated search by the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) generated a list of 20 candidate prints from the FBI’s Criminal Master File. An FBI examiner then began side-by-side comparisons of LFP17 and the potential matches, one of which was Mayfield’s fingerprint. Following a detailed comparison of LFP17 and Mayfield’s known fingerprint, the examiner concluded that Mayfield was the source of LFP17. This conclusion was verified by a second LPU examiner and reviewed by a Unit Chief in the LPU, who concurred with the identification.

As a result of this identification, the FBI immediately opened an intensive investigation of Mayfield, including 24-hour surveillance. The FBI determined that Mayfield was an attorney in Portland, Oregon. The FBI also learned, among other things, that Mayfield was a Muslim who had married an Egyptian immigrant, had represented a convicted terrorist in a child custody dispute in Portland, and had contacts with suspected terrorists…The FBI arrested Mayfield on May 6 and executed [the] search warrants the same day, seizing evidence from his home and office.…he was incarcerated at the Multnomah County Detention Center in Portland, Oregon.

On May 17, the Court appointed an independent expert to review the FBI’s fingerprint identification. On May 19, the independent expert concurred with the FBI’s identification of LFP17 as being Mayfield’s fingerprint. However, on that same day, May 19, the SNP informed the FBI that it has positively identified LFP17 as the fingerprint of a different person - an Algerian named Ouhnane Daoud…The FBI initially provided a variety of explanations for the fingerprint misidentification…[including] over confidence in the power of IAFIS and the pressure of working on a high-provide case as contributing to the error [and] that the verification was ‘tainted’ by knowledge of the initial examiner’s conclusion.// Office of the Inspector General (2006). A review of the FBI’s handling of the Brandon Mayfield case. Department of Justice, Washington DC. Accessed at https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0601/final.pdf

REPRESENTATIVENESS – This bias is when we judge the likelihood that something will occur by the extent to which the occurrence is like a typical case.

•The following description was offered: Tom W. is of high intelligence, although lacking in true creativity. He has a need for order and clarity, and for neat and tidy systems in which every detail finds its appropriate place. His writing is rather dull and mechanical, occasionally enlivened by somewhat corny puns and by flashes of imagination of the sci-fi type. He has a strong drive for competence. He seems to feel little sympathy for other people and does not enjoy interacting with others. Self-centered, he nonetheless has a deep moral sense. When asked what major Tom had in school, most of the study participants chose engineering, because the description matched common views of engineers. However, engineer majors are relatively rare among a college population, so the best guess would have been the most popular major (which is usually the social sciences). The description of Tom was a good representation of an engineering major, so the representativeness heuristic led them to make a judgment about what major he was pursuing. ¹⁴

•In terms of the Boards Case Study, representativeness might lead the team to infer that the subject could not be a person of interest because of his status in the military as Base Commander, and Commanders are thought to law-abiding citizens, well deserving of respect by the community.

CONFIRMATION BIAS – Confirmation bias is a psychological phenomenon that explains why people tend to seek out (and place greater value on) information that confirms their existing opinions while overlooking or ignoring information that refutes their beliefs.¹⁵ In other words, confirmation bias occurs when people filter out potentially useful facts and opinions that are not in line with their preconceived notions (i.e., they develop tunnel vision), which can negatively affect perceptions and decision making. It is easy to see how confirmation bias can be problematic for an investigation – using the case information, investigators may form an opinion, identify a theory of the events, and then work to prove that the theory and opinion are correct.

•Researchers re-presented fingerprint experts with pairs of prints from a prior case. The experts were told