With My Own Eyes: Five Memoirs of Old California

By Brent C. Dickerson

Five lively firsthand accounts of real life in the exciting pre-Yankee era of Californias rich history are offered in this bookfour of them world premiere publications, and all of them new and complete translations. This was an era not only of political intrigues and sectional clashes but also of upheaval as new ideas and attitudes came to a conservative Californian society. Piracy, kidnapping, lust, Indian uprisings, and scenes of battle all vie for the readers attention with fascinating passages about everyday life in the missions and presidios, governmental offices, and barracks. Governors are ejected, invaders fought, revolts arise, and plots hatched. While largely centered in Southern California, these accounts also bring us north to the Bay area and south to Baja California and farther.

The reader of these memoirs will enjoy an intimate experience of life as it really wasa personal view not to be found in standard textbooks. As before with the authors previous foray into California history, Narciso Botellos Annals 18331847, the original manuscripts are rendered into a spirited English translation, capturing the nuances and vigor of these adventures in a land so familiar yet so exotic.

• Language: English
• Publisher: iUniverse
• Release date: Apr 13, 2018
• ISBN: 9781532046971

Brent C. Dickerson

Brent C. Dickerson is the internationally-known author of the most influential modern works on old roses. This is the enlarged second edition of his acclaimed first book The Old Rose Advisor; also in print are his definitive works The Old Rose Adventurer, Roll Call: The Old Rose Breeder, and The Old Rose Informant, the latter two books also being available from iuniverse.

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Copyright © 2018 Brent C. Dickerson.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced by any means, graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping or by any information storage retrieval system without the written permission of the author except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

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ISBN: 978-1-5320-4696-4 (sc)

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iUniverse rev. date: 04/13/2018

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1   Francisco Rico: Historical Memories of California

Notes and Commentary on Rico

2   Jose Maria Romero: Memoirs

Notes and Commentary on Romero

3   Julio César: A California Indian’s Story

Notes and Commentary on César

4   Jose Ramon Antonio Valdéz: Memoirs

Notes and Commentary on Valdéz

5   Victoriano Vega: Californian Life 1834-47

Notes and Commentary on Vega

Bibliography

Index

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express hearty thanks to both Sara Fonseca, who provided the initial translation, and Lorena Fonseca, who kindly facilitated the effort; to that descendant of many old Californios Franklin Mead, whose encouragement and learned assistance, notably including but not limited to military matters, have been invaluable, and whose very thorough and kind previous such efforts as I was writing the Botello book I must tardily acknowledge here; and to David Kier, whose great books, knowledge, and fervent assistance with that most important aspect of California history, Baja California, have enriched my understanding and given depth to what this book presents. Finally, thanks also to Bruce Barr for the part he played in my finally completing this work.

INTRODUCTION

As with formal words of welcome delivered while hungry guests at a banquet impatiently await the signal to commence dining, so is it with the introductions to books—that the wish to begin the nourishing part of the proceedings makes brevity in their preliminaries yet more welcome. The treatment of the materials and methodology undertaken in this book are the same as those undertaken in the first effort in this series, Narciso Botello’s Annals of Southern California (2014); and I hope that the present reader will be thrilled rather than disappointed that I do not repeat my remarks in full. Quickly: Having obtained new and original initial study translations of these memoirs, I developed these, checking difficult passages against the original in Spanish, rewording and putting the expressive flow of the narratives into idiomatic English while still retaining the memoirist’s own distinctive voice, and researching and supplying full annotations. While in that earlier book we dealt with one fascinating memoir, here five are presented, four of them to the best of my knowledge never before fully published in original or translation, and the other (Julio César’s) with a new, and full, translation. These five offer surprisingly varied experiences and backgrounds: Native-born Californios, immigrant Mexicanos, the experiences of an Indio, one Norteño among the Sureños, different generations, different personalities, different degrees of social standing, and of course different eyes seeing events differently. Though casting light on one another, and though familiar figures flit through them all, they are very decidedly separate stories; and I have placed them in an order which, I believe, enhances the impact of each. As before, the relations are presented whole, with the copious notes and remarks relegated to sections following each main text; and, as before, the Index is keyed to paragraph numbers in each section, not to pages. The notes are lavish! The main texts are valuable not only for their inherent value but also because they serve, through their notes, as springboards to a wider understanding of what it was to live in faraway and isolated California once upon a time.

1

HISTORICAL MEMORIES OF CALIFORNIA

DON FRANCISCO RICO

Captain of the Auxiliary Defenders of the Homeland

[¶ 1; p. 1; October, 1844] At the end of 1844, Don Manuel Castro, Don Jose Jesus Pico, Don Jose Antonio Chavez and I planned a revolt against the existing government, which was headed by Brigadier General Don Manuel Micheltorena. The purpose of the plan was to reduce the department’s expenses caused by the growing number of employees, troops, and officials. The department’s indebtedness was to shrink; and—to tell the truth—we Californios were used to divvying up our assets amongst ourselves without including any Americans or other immigrants.

[¶ 2; pp. 1–2; 1842–44] We were not motivated by any dislike for General Micheltorena or his governance, because in every way he had conducted himself well, and we were satisfied. It was well known that among the troops led by General Micheltorena there were many bad and perverse recruits who committed unmentionable crimes; and some of them were extremely arrogant. But General Micheltorena did not overlook their crimes—he punished them severely. General Micheltorena was a man of very good character, and was a good governor, carefully attending to his duties, considerate to all of us, and very well educated. But as I have mentioned we wanted to have control of our affairs in our own hands.

[¶ 3; p. 2; October, 1844] In the revolt’s plan, it was specified who the people were to fill the top positions. Those positions were: Governor, Comandante General, and Customs Officer for the maritime trade. For the first position, Pio Pico was proposed, it being his by right as leader of the assembly. For Comandante General, Lieutenant Colonel Jose Castro. And for Customs, Juan Bautista Alvarado, the former governor.

[¶ 4; p. 2; October, 1844] Also, in order to prevent future discord, there was an attempt to patch things up between the communities of the South and those of the North. Since way back, there had been a constant and mutual animosity due to the North getting preferential treatment, especially in matters of governance, as well as having in their hands total control of the offices and of the income in a lot of things, and taking the lion’s share of the proceeds. This naturally had the South very upset, which had in due course led to the long civil war.

[¶ 5; p. 3; October, 1844] The leaders of the respective forces were Don Carlos Antonio Carrillo and Don Jose Antonio Carrillo for the South, and Don Jose Castro, Don Mariano G. Vallejo, and Don Juan Bautista Alvarado for the North. This war caused its fighters many losses when the barbaric emancipated Indians committed numerous robberies and brought about a great deal of destruction.

[¶ 6; p. 3; visit to Alvarado on November 13, 1844] The Plan of the revolution once formed, I was chosen to take it to the residence of Señor Alvarado at El Alisal for his opinion as a man experienced in public affairs. After a long discussion, Alvarado expressed his disgust with the undertaking. Once again, I explained to him the reasons which brought it about, the motives which would be imputed to us, and what the outcome would be. When all was said and done, he agreed to the written plan just as it stood, without questioning anything. He appreciated being consulted, and he promised us what in reality what was more valuable—his assistance in making it happen.

[¶ 7; pp. 3–4; November, 1844] Meanwhile, we assessed our resources. Certainly, we had good horses. Quite a few had an abundant stock of cattle. Anyone accustomed to fatigue will eat whatever’s available, seasoned or not. In the meeting with Alvarado, it had been agreed that he would come with me to the ranch of his brothers-in-law the Castros across the bay at San Pablo to make known to the northern towns his participation in favor of a change. To accomplish this [change], I was assigned the duty of watching over the Treasury; and I was to go to San Francisco in order to put a stop to the smuggling being practiced by whaling ships. Don Benito Diaz was Receiver.

[¶ 8; p. 4; November, 1844] I arrived at San Francisco; and even before any necessity of arranging a meeting with Señor Alvarado, I had already won over the Receiver as well as the military commander of San Francisco, Don Joaquin Piña. He put at my disposal all the weapons and military equipment that General Micheltorena had placed in the fort for defense of the port and so on.

[¶ 9; p. 5; November, 1844] I arrived where Señor Alvarado was, accompanied by various other gentlemen (Dons Rafael Linares and Bernardino Soto from the North, who were of our party). After being across the bay for several days and winning over everyone he knew, Alvarado and I proceeded to Mission San Rafael. We had a lot to do; and, once there, we split up. Alvarado went home, and I went back to San Francisco for a while; but I kept track of the time and the duties we had agreed upon concerning the revolt.

[¶ 10; pp. 5–6; November 1844] Once the people of the towns of San Francisco and Dolores had been won over, I went with some twenty men to the fort [castillo] to seize all the weapons and military equipment. This step was taken to free Commander Piña from his obligations; and, afterwards, he wined and dined us. I put the weapons in three carts which had not-very-round wooden wheels, and which were pulled by very skinny oxen. On the way, the wagons screeched so much that, to prevent the enemy from hearing them, I had to stay in the back country. It took me a day to go from the fort to the out-of-the-way place where I transferred all the war materials to some small boats [chalupas] which we had prepared. There I was provided with horses and more people to take to Monterey, where I would meet my comrades.

[¶ 11; p. 6; November, 1844] Our progress on the road was slow; but I kept at collecting every horse, person, and weapon I could find, as well as anything else that might be needed.

[¶ 12; p. 6; November, 1844] After going for three days, I met up with our partisans [pronunciados] at Ojo de la Coche (on the road between San Jose and Monterey). I found Jose Castro there with the Norteño supporters, including twenty-five soldiers from the Monterey presidio who served under Capt. Manuel Castro. At this time, [Jose] Castro was military commander of the San Joaquin outpost [punta]. General Micheltorena had sent Castro there with twenty-five men to contain the wild Indians.

[¶ 13; p. 7; November, 1844] The leaders of the coup had sent a commission to invite [Jose] Castro to join us. Castro came with troops. He however alleged that he was indebted for life to Micheltorena and his unquestionable services, and because of that did not want to take any part in any action against his friend and patron. But finally he decided, reluctantly, to take our side, realizing that it was necessary to do this to improve the lot of his countrymen—the only consideration that could persuade him to break faith and do such a thing against his compadre. Once everyone was convinced, we immediately left for Monterey; but the forces were not yet sufficient to be able to do battle with those of the general, who would immediately get on the move against the rebels with all the force at his command. We returned to San Jose, where we invited Don Carlos Weber and all sympathetic Americans to join us. He and some others did enlist—thirty American riflemen. From there we went on to Santa Clara to establish headquarters.

[¶ 14; p. 8; late November, 1844] Once there, we waited for General Micheltorena to advance and to see if he had arrived at the Alvires lagoon. Don Jose Castro, once named chief general of the revolt’s forces, immediately dispatched two companies. One night, he sent infantry under the command of Capt. Weber and cavalry under the command of Manuel Castro to the camp of Don Joaquin de la Torre to link up with his cavalry. We were on the road all night. We arrived at the Alvires lagoon around 2 in the morning. The night was stormy—it was very rainy. We positioned the force in a ravine 300 or 500 yards from the house where General Micheltorena was fortified.

[¶ 15; p. 8; ca. November 27, 1844] Weber and I went to reconnoiter the enemy’s camp to see if we could attack or even sneak into the house’s corridor like cats. We made our way past armed guards; and once we knew everything, we returned to our camp to share the good news on how we could mount a surprise. It was decided that we would make the attack. The time that we had at our disposal to plan the attack was very short.

[¶ 16; p. 9; November 28, 1844] Whilst all preparations were being made with the greatest speed, and we were inspecting all the weapons to see if they had gotten wet, a soldier let fly a gunshot. I do not know if it was intentional or accidental; but to my way of thinking, it was intended to avert battle, and I wanted to punish the shooter with a traitor’s death; but the other leaders prevented it.

[¶ 17; p. 9; November 28, 1844] General Micheltorena immediately roused his Monterey forces; and with a field piece, they advanced upon us. At once, we were forced to occupy a rocky height in order to defend ourselves. We sent word to Comandante General Castro in Santa Clara about what was happening. He and his forces got underway to aid us. Before he arrived, Micheltorena was preparing an attack; however, he did not attack us that day because of the advantages of our position.

[¶ 18; pp. 9–10; November 29–30, 1844] Once Castro arrived, he and our company headed back to San Jose and assembled at the Roblar Rancho de Santa Teresa. The bad weather wearied us so much and caused us so much despair that, after two days of suffering, I resolved to attack General Micheltorena along with Capt. Weber—just our two forces, since the plan did not come from the commander-in-chief. With the troops already on the move, the attack was interrupted by Señor Alvarado, who quashed it in both camps, explaining that it was not advisable to undertake a violent act; and so we desisted.

[¶ 19; p. 10; December 1, 1844] Afterwards, there were some negotiations between the opposing forces resulting in a compromise and a cessation of hostilities, allowing General Micheltorena to embark in due course (once he settled his affairs) and go with his troops to Mexico. Our forces would occupy Mission San Jose until Micheltorena left, set to be in about two months or so.

[¶ 20; p. 10; early January, 1845] We held to this peaceful footing for about two months; but then we learned that Micheltorena was on the march to surprise us in our camp at [Mission] San Jose with his Monterey force and Don Juan A. Sutter’s troops composed of Americans and Indians.

[¶ 21; p. 11; force left San Jose January 2, 1845] We had only a handful of men, and no time to gather any forces. We decided to march to the towns of Southern California with whatever troops we could pick up.

[¶ 22; p. 11; assault on L.A. barracks night of January 20, 1845] We knew that Don Andrés Pico had been named Comandante Militar by General Micheltorena when he had been in Los Angeles, and would be relied on in that capacity; and Pico had a small force, with a lot of war materiel. We took every precaution that he not capture our supplies, and to take him by surprise. We succeeded in capturing the barracks by assault, and the leaders were taken prisoner. Both sides had some wounded and some dead: three dead and six wounded. The attack was at night.

[¶ 23; p. 11; January 21, 1845] Next day, our leaders worked to convince the Americans and the Sureños. Don Pio Pico, Don Jose Antonio Carrillo, and Don Andrés Pico joined our forces. There was a sustained effort [acto continuo] to name Jose Antonio Carrillo major-general of the forces; Andrés Pico was also given a position of honor. That was what the Sureños wanted.

[¶ 24; p. 12; early February, 1845; anti-Micheltorena forces in San Buenaventura area about February 8, 1845] Without wasting any time, the forces were put in order to face the enemy coming on with such force. Once we were ready, we turned to meet the enemy with three or four hundred or men, Californios and foreigners alike. We camped about a mile north of the former mission of San Buenaventura, in the narrowest place between the beach and the mountains, where we awaited battle. We were situated at a strategic point with natural defenses. Sure that there was no other route, we set up camp there. Micheltorena, however, realizing his disadvantage, had no intention of going that way. He halted and disposed his forces in another place so that he could attack us from the rear. Just then came a very strong and overwhelming rainstorm, and we left by the route still open to us so we could do battle elsewhere. We arrived at Rancho Las Pozas, which belonged to Jose Carrillo, son of Carlos Antonio Carrillo. That same day, the weather improved, and we were told that Micheltorena was moving forward in disarray.

[¶ 25; p. 13; February 8–14, 1845] The Comandante General was asked for a unit to make an attempt at gaining an advantage against the enemy; and the request was granted. I chose a hundred men, mounted and armed; and with a forced march I placed them in the forest between the mission and our previous camp. I sent four men to reconnoiter—to cross the beach and to get as close as possible to the enemy so that we could find out how they were positioned and so on. A force of foreigners sent by General Micheltorena was waiting on the same road, as I had verified by lookouts. But General Micheltorena pounced on our scouts. These men tried to return to us while being chased by the enemy. I had enough time to prepare a good ambush for capturing the pursuers. As a defensive measure, our scouts went to some nearby high ground. This was a trap in which the pursuers themselves were captured. The Comandante General was notified of this, and he came to assist as Don Manuel Castro was closing in on them.

[¶ 26; pp. 13–14; mid-February, 1845] With the arrival of Don Jose Castro, everything was in place for an agreement being made which proposed better treatment henceforth. This was shown to the prisoners, who were taken to Mission San Fernando to remain there with whatever they needed. They kept their weapons, and were treated as best as we could until the outcome of the revolt was decided, without them taking any part in the hostilities. In other words, the foreigners were obliged on their word of honor to remain completely neutral.

[¶ 27; p. 14; ca. February 18–21, 1845] These foreigners were very grateful for our behavior, and sent a secret messenger to the others with Sutter who were on Micheltorena’s side. The result of this was that, during the combat that we had at Alamo, near Cahuenga, we persuaded all of Sutter’s foreigners. The [foreign] combatants left the General, went to one of Cahuenga’s [ranch-] houses, and submitted to Castro and Alvarado. From there they went to join the other foreigners at [Mission] San Fernando under the same conditions.

[¶ 28; p. 15; February 18–22, 1845] General Micheltorena continued his march through the [San Fernando] Valley. During the night, it was halted by two pieces of artillery placed at some distance farther into the Valley to prevent him from taking over Los Angeles. He suspended the march and took a superior [altura] location until the next day, when the negotiations began between the two forces. Afterwards, Señor Castro took care of his needs. Here the final arrangements were made for the embarkation of the General and his troops as soon as possible. Our forces went to locate in Los Angeles, taking Sutter’s Indian soldiers with them the same day.

[¶ 29; p. 15–16; Micheltorena and troops sail from San Pedro about March 12, 1845] Two or three days after celebrating the agreement, Micheltorena proceeded to Monterey by way of San Pedro in order to arrange his affairs and collect the dispersed remains of his force. At this point, I went by land to Monterey with Don Andrés Pico, with an escort to take charge of Monterey, which was to be under Andrés Pico as Comandante Militar. The general arrived to put his things in order. He took his troops and embarked [for Mexico] in a frigate belonging to Don Guillermo Howard. He left honored as commander in the highest rank of the Army of the Republic.

[¶ 30; p. 16; March, 1845] Shortly after, the new government was established with Don Pio Pico as the internal governor, and Don Manuel Castro as prefect of the second district. I was named the prefect’s secretary; but I should say it was in name only because I busied myself with my own private affairs.

[¶ 31; p. 16–17; mid to late 1845] Once I was here in Gonzalez, taking care of my own business, Don Manuel Castro, Don Jose Antonio Chavez, Don Francisco Arce, and Don Rudecindo Castro came and joined me at my home. They told me that they had a commission from the government to deal with the cargo of a ship that had touched at the Port of San Diego; but it seems that it was really a secret commission involving Don Jose Maria Híjar, special commissioner of the supreme government. I went to Monterey to ascertain Don Jose Castro’s purpose in sending some gentlemen south [to Mexico]. He suspected that Don Manuel Castro and other Señores were plotting with Don Pio Pico to make a change in the government. Finally, all of this stopped and everything quieted down. Don Manuel Castro returned from Los Angeles, and some days I went to work at the prefecture. My duties were repetitious at times.

[¶ 32; p. 17; January 29, 1846 (initial message from Frémont)] At length, a pernicious message came from Captain Frémont asking the authorities of the country, both the military and civilian, for permission to enter any part of the department with the force he brought. Don Jose Castro seemed willing to grant his request, but prefect Don Manuel Castro refused permission, the result of which was a small feud between Don Jose and Don Manuel Castro. I made a great effort to put an end to it or to undo something that had already come to the point of Don Jose challenging Don Manuel to fight. Don Tomas O. Larkin, Consul of the United States, tried hard to get the permission that Frémont asked for, but in vain.

[¶ 33; pp. 17–18; January–March, 1846; March 6, 1846, Frémont constructing fort on Gavilan Peak] Frémont was very angry and made some threats. He immediately left Monterey to rejoin his forces, located right next to Pacheco’s [Rancho] San Felipe. They moved on to the heights of Gavilan Peak, where they dug in. This came at once to the ears of the authorities in Monterey, who without a moment to lose decided to proceed with gathering forces. Once a hundred men had been assembled, I led them, by order of the general, to San Juan Bautista to stay put until further notice. After I left, Captain Joaquin de la Torre was sent with a small force to reconnoiter Frémont’s camp. Comandante General Castro went in person to San Juan [Bautista] with more troops to press an attack on Frémont. Once everything was ready to get underway to accomplish this, one of the lookouts or scouts arrived and informed us that Frémont had abandoned his position, leaving behind some weapons and ammunition.

[¶ 34; pp. 18–19; March 6–10, 1846] Because of his ferocity and other auspicious qualities, Capistrano Lopez had been chosen to spy on Frémont. And this gave him an opportunity to be the first to betray the country in its hour of need. He went to where Frémont was and gave him information about the preparations for attack that Castro’s forces were making. Frémont was grateful for this service, and rewarded him with $100 in American gold. Lopez then showed up to tell us part of the tale, namely that the bird had flown. Once Frémont’s escape became known, the forces were dissolved, leaving it to those in charge to busy themselves with determining which way he had gone.

[¶ 35; pp. 19–20; May–June, 1846] Soon after, it was learned that Mr. Frémont, in order to invade the country, was busy assembling any foreign riflemen that were in the north. As a result, a force was immediately formed under the command of Capt. Don Joaquin de la Torre. He was given emphatic instructions by General Castro; and he marched to Sonoma and further points of the northern frontier. Later on, it became known that Frémont’s forces were far superior to those of de la Torre, which were in imminent peril. When there were enough troops and resources, they made short work of establishing their general headquarters at Mission Santa Clara. There, a force of a hundred men was put together, the best that could be done.

[¶ 36; pp. 20–21; June 28, 1846] Under orders to march in order to help Capt. Joaquin de la Torre, with some very strict instructions promoting acting with humanity [hermandad: brotherhood] concerning prisoners and the events of the war so that there would be nothing to arouse extra strife, I marched my forces as hard as possible until we arrived at the island of San Pablo, which I considered the best place to cross the bay. With quite some difficulty, we were supplied by the Castros [of Rancho San Pablo] with some small boats to be managed by Indians and the boats’ owners; but as a precaution I assembled the entire force; and I asked them who would dare to be the first to go off alone towards Capt. de la Torre—the danger and the trouble would be great, but that it would not be wise for us to proceed without having someone to protect us after landing—to which a young man named Haro (I forget his name) answered that he would do it with great pleasure, as much for the common good as in order to see his close friend Ramon Carrillo and see what he thought about things. Since he was also part of the de la Torre force, this offer was accepted. A brother of his asked me for permission to accompany him, because he was his twin brother and he wanted to share whatever fate awaited his brother. I had to consent, though it was with regret. With the aforementioned sheet of instructions in hand, they embarked in a boat under the charge of Don Gabriel Castro. While the two Haro lads were embarking, old man Berreyesa came up to me begging to be allowed to go in same boat because his sons on the other side [of the bay] were in grave danger, and he wanted to see what he could do to help them. I denied him permission, saying that if it was dangerous for one, for three it would be even more difficult to proceed without being seen; but as he continued to insist, with tears in his eyes, in pity I allowed him to board.

[¶ 37; pp. 21–22; June 28, 1846] The boat left in the direction of [Mission] San Rafael. I myself kept my eye on the vista to see if enemies or friends would discover this other group. Two hours after the boat had left, I saw a force coming down from a height to where the boat was headed, and going by appearances, I believed that it was the enemy. At night the boat returned; and the owner (Castro) informed me that he had disembarked the Haros and old man Berreyesa and that all seemed calm. He had not seen any forces.

[¶ 38; p. 22; June 29, 1846] I remained there the whole day, waiting for the arrival of any message from de la Torre. The next day I resolved to embark no matter what. We were casting off when, by the island, we saw a launch [lanchón] under full sail, and, in pursuit, two armed [cañoneros] boats, with soldiers, coming straight on towards land. Half an hour later, the launch landed on the beach, pursuers hot on their trail. It was Joaquin de la Torre and his men. He told me everything that had happened on his mission, giving a good fight to combatants who outnumbered his to such a degree. By use of force, he managed to commandeer this boat with its owner, along with what was in it; and that’s how he got out of the clutches of the enemy.

[¶ 39; pp. 22–23; June 29, 1846] I was notified of the killing by Frémont’s troops of the Haro boys and old man Berreyesa when their boat landed. He told me the story about the battle he had in Nompalé [Olompali] with the enemy, in which he lost Alférez Manuel Cantua (killed, also a twin), and of a soldier Agaton Ruiz, with a grave wound in the chest which fortunately healed afterwards.

[¶ 40; p. 23; July, 1846] General Castro, who with all his forces came to meet us, was informed of everything. From there, by order of General Castro, we marched to the towns of the South. Nothing else happened then, other than the capture in Santa Ynez of the prefect Don Manuel Castro by those foreigners who were going to the northern frontier to meet with Frémont; but along the way his men rescued him. At last we reached Los Angeles, having collected here and there whatever resources and people we could find, and meantime leaving our friend and compatriot Don Jesus Pico (who until now had not been of much help) in his home in San Luis Obispo vowing that in due course we would meet up again down South.

[¶ 41; p. 24; Castro and Pico departing for Mexico August 9–11, 1846] Our aspirations were to a great degree frustrated because Governor Pio Pico was hobbled by the lack of resources needed to defend the country. This made Don Jose Castro resolve to go to Mexico, with those who wanted to accompany him, to inform the supreme government of the situation California faced. For his part, Governor Pico decided to go to Sonora via Baja California to avoid compromising and disgracing the country, taking some twenty or more thousands of pesos for his unusual expenses. I don’t think he told anyone about how much he had profited by the missions being nationalized. The army was dissolved. Every man went home, with no agreements having been entered into with the invader.

[¶ 42; pp. 24–25; August-September, 1846] In this state of affairs, with the country completely disrupted, the means of communication cut off by the enemy (the American forces), the ports occupied by warships, etc.—such being the times, I stayed in Los Angeles and chose a wife. I got married, and after a couple of months became seriously ill with fever. During my convalescence, one night a squadron came whose arms I could hear clinking from one of the rooms. They knocked on the door. My wife opened it and two American officers asked for me. My wife was scared and said that I wasn’t there. On hearing this, he said not to deny it. I got out of bed and went to meet these men. I invited them in, and they very carefully explained to me the order to arrest me that they had received from military commander Gillespie. After having obtained permission from the officers, I changed my clothes.

[¶ 43; pp. 25–25a; September 11+, 1846] I left with them after they had searched my home. We went to Gillespie, who asked me questions about Ramon Carrillo, whom I had helped escape. I replied that I had not seen Carrillo since I had separated from Don Jose Castro. His response was for me to be thrown into the calaboose from which I would not be released until I informed them of Ramon Carrillo’s whereabouts. The officers shoved me out and took me to a lockup adjoining headquarters. They removed a drunk Indian to put me there. They took a blanket off the Indian and threw it over me so that I could cover myself with it; later on, they brought me a wooden table. They had me there a number of days (about thirty), despite the efforts of leading townsmen; but the officers who had arrested me pleaded with Gillespie and managed to get me out under their bond [fianza]; and then, after removing my shackles, allowed me to stay in their quarters.

[¶ 44; p. 25a–26; September 22+, 1846] That same night, Gillespie was attacked by some Californios; and the next day Andrés Pico, Pedro Romero, and Juan Bautista Moreno were imprisoned by the Americans. They told me of a force of countrymen who had risen against the Americans, and for that reason the authorities were arresting as many Californios as they could find. This bad policy caused a great deal of ill-feeling in the area such that even the same meek people who had decided to accept what had happened [i.e., the Yankee occupation] were forced to join with those who sparked the uprising. That’s how in the space of two or three days it had become a body of 300 or 400 men, determined to fight to regain the independence of their homeland, for which purpose they went one night to the home of Captain Jose Maria Flores, who was living with his family in the center of the city [ciudad] of Los Angeles. By a ruse, they smuggled him out: One of the Californios loaded him onto a horse’s hindquarters and carried him about one mile from Los Angeles to where the force had gathered on los Paredones Blancos. The Californios there informed him of their need for his leadership, which he finally accepted. After an emotional meeting, they all put themselves under his command.

[¶ 45; pp. 26–28; September 25+, 1846] On the following day, they began to form up [into military companies] to attack the enemy, wherever it might be. Ramon Carrillo had a division under his command; and he went straight to the Chino ranch owned by an American by the name of Isaac Williams, where up to thirty men—mostly American—had fortified themselves under the command of the American Benito Wilson (Benjamin D. Wilson). These individuals were married to Mexicans and were established men, and owners of ranches, cattle, etc. Ramon Carrillo showed up, asking them to surrender, which was answered with rifle shots. Carrillo at once charged the fortified house with his cavalry force, immediately losing one of his best men, Sgt. Carlos Ballesteros. But he managed to position himself against the walls of the house. The exits were blocked, and they set the roof on fire—it was made of tar and instantly caught. The scene that followed was horrific: In middle of the fire, you could hear screams, the cries of the injured, and pleas from the owner of the ranch, with his little girls in his arms, to spare his life and to take him prisoner, and to protect his daughters. The commander immediately, although with great difficulty, rescued them, and took these foreigners prisoners of war, leaving the house and all it contained to perish after a futile attempt was made to put out the fire.

[¶ 46; p. 28; September 27, 1846] The ranch owner’s little girls were picked up by their uncles, who were officers in Carrillo’s force: Don Jose del Carmen Lugo and Don Vicente Lugo. The prisoners, under the charge of Carrillo’s forces, were delivered to Commander General Flores at [the insurgents’ camp at] Paredon Blanco.

[¶ 47; p. 28; September 27, 1846] The military commander of Los Angeles, Gillespie, found out at once what had happened. Because the captured force was the main buttress of his defense, this was very alarming to his small garrison. The way in which the Chino house was taken he found disquieting because the house he occupied also had a roof of tar and was therefore exposed to the same danger. Naturally, he and his men immediately moved to a height from which he could keep an eye on the population, taking with him the Californio prisoners he had, including me but not Don Andrés Pico, because he had already been set free under bail and under parole.

[¶ 48; pp. 28–29; ca. September 28, 1846] Shortly after (if I remember correctly, the next day), some negotiations began between the two forces. Acting as commissioner was the well-known Spaniard Don Eulogio de Célis, who undertook the negotiations and the affairs for both sides. It was arranged that the prisoners be freed. I consequently was set free and went to join my countrymen, to whom in gratitude I offered the best services I could provide. Next, it was settled that Gillespie and his people would embark on Howard’s ship, which lay off San Pedro.

[¶ 49; pp. 29–30; September 29–ca. October 6, 1846] When Gillespie arrived in San Pedro, he did not keep his word, and dug in there. Flores then located at the plaza in Los Angeles, and put his prisoners under lock and key [en seguridad]. Because Mr. Gillespie broke his promises, Señor Flores ordered me to take him a statement telling him to embark immediately or he would be attacked without further notice. While Mr. Gillespie composed his answer, I enjoyed some time with those officers who had been my friends. Gillespie then got on board ship with this troops, and remained in the port, the ship remaining at anchor until a warship arrived, while I meantime returned with the response for Señor Flores.

[¶ 50; p. 30; October 5–8?, 1846] Flores ordered me to march forth with fifty men and recover the San Diego plaza, and to restore the nation’s authority, at the same time picking up all the deserters and people that we could find in order to strengthen the force. After three or four days of marching, I already could count 150 men under my command. While at Rancho Santa Margarita (belonging to Don Pio Pico), I received orders to return march, and did everything I could to arrive expeditiously and aid the small force that Flores had under his command, as well as to avoid the takeover of Los Angeles by Captains Mervine and Gillespie, who with thirty men were trying to retake it.

[¶ 51; pp. 30–31; October, 1846] I carried out the counter march as quickly as I could; but when I arrived at the Dominguez Ranch, I found that the battle had already taken place: [Jose Antonio] Carrillo with fifty men and one cannon attacked the Mervine force, causing many deaths and wounded and capturing the flag (this capture of the flag was accomplished by Pedro Romero, who killed the person who abandoned it), and forcing them to return to the port, embark, and put out to sea.

[¶ 52; p. 31; October, 1846] We started back to Los Angeles to gather our war materiel and more resources because we knew it wouldn’t be long before we were struck with further heavy blows. Before we arrived in Los Angeles, I was informed by all of the force’s officers of Comandante General Flores’s bad behavior vis-à-vis the campaign’s goals, as well as of certain malign plans he had to escape from the country, taking with him public funds. I complained of this to Señor Flores in front of everyone. His response was to call in a unit to arrest me. I made two or three thrusts with my lance, striking his head and midsection. General Jose Antonio Carrillo and others took me prisoner. We marched toward Los Angeles, with me as prisoner.

[¶ 53; pp. 31–32; October-December, 1846] Through the influence of several of my friends, I was set free in two or three days without giving up my quest to uncover the facts and confirm that Señor Flores intended to leave us and go to Sonora with money, horses, and many more resources he had in his possession. I called the officers into a secret meeting in which all the affairs of the country were discussed, Señor Flores’ plans included. We came to a definite resolution that I, as their leader, would take Señor Flores and his cronies prisoner, lodging a complaint with the department assembly—the only legitimate authority that existed in California—so that this department could provide the necessities to avoid mayor disruptions in the country, and to appoint a competent leader who would lead us.

[¶ 54; p. 32; December 2–3, 1846] The following night, around midnight, Comandante General Jose Maria Flores, his secretary, his clerks, and others were captured (all of them sons of Mexico, no Californios) along with all the correspondence they had with them—even correspondence addressed to the supreme government in regards to the state of California. But everything in that correspondence was distorted—a bunch of lies. These lies were his preparation for going to Mexico and obtaining an important position.

[¶ 55; p. 33; December 3–5, 1846] After the prisoners were secured, the order of the troops was established. Don Jose Antonio Carrillo was placed as leader of the departmental assembly, to make decisions on these issues. This position was Señor Carrillo’s by right, because he was Major General. One additional, larger, meeting of officials was set up to hear further evidence. It was additionally found that Señor Flores and his henchmen had decided to send the prisoners taken in Chino overland to Mexico, guarded by reputable elders, family fathers, and respectable citizens (the youngest one was twenty years old) whose children and grandchildren were part of this effort, with an eye towards talking up their merits to the supreme government. This incident, the embezzlement of the wealth of the locals, the bad way the war was going, the cowardice, the commandeering of valuable horses belonging to the citizens of California in order to flee with them to Mexico—all this was brought to the assembly’s attention, backed up with Señor Flores’s correspondence.

[¶ 56; pp. 33–34; December 5+, 1846] But unfortunately there was no more than one Californio voice in that body—Señor Francisco de la Guerra y Noriega, who could not thwart the predisposition of the others in favor of Señor Flores and his pretensions. The other members present were Don Agustin Olvera, Don Antonio Coronel, Don Narciso Botello, and Don Francisco Figueroa, all of them Mexicans of the opposing party; and so things went back to how they had been, with Señor Flores again the leader. To tell the truth, I must say that, after this, Mr. Flores abandoned all his intrigues and continued to provide good service—without ever showing much inclination to expose himself to bullets.

[¶ 57; p. 34; early October, 1846] I remember that, when I was sent towards San Diego, Lieutenant Don Manuel Garfias had meantime been dispatched with some fifty or a hundred men to attack the small American force that was in Santa Barbara, in which he was unsuccessful because the enemy escaped into the mountains. This was why Flores had only fifty men in Los Angeles when Commander Mervine came to attack him.

[¶ 58; p. 35; late October, 1846] After a period of calm in Los Angeles, everyone busied themselves making gunpowder and preparing ammunition, under the direction of Don Manuel Castro. I addressed Señor Flores, asking him for permission to go to certain Californio areas up north to make attacks and distract the enemy, keeping them from concentrating solely on the southern ports. Flores answered that he would call his council of officers to consider this idea, and that’s what happened the following evening. The council asked me to explain my plans, which I did. But they considered it a dangerous undertaking. Then I mentioned that Señor Castro was the Prefect of the Second District and had many relatives and friends in that area, and had influence in the rest of the town [presumably Monterey]. And if he wanted to help me in my projects with the little [los pocos; presumably the few resources] that remained with the Californios—both those who were free and those who were under the enemy’s control—if he accompanied me we could achieve some success, or at least provide a distraction. Señor Castro, though he considered the project difficult, agreed to its execution.

[¶ 59; pp. 35–36; early November, 1846] At once, with permission from Flores and the council of officers, we [left and] brought with us some fifteen or twenty soldiers, residents of that part of the North. Upon arriving at San Luis Obispo, we met our friend and comrade Jesus Pico, who had the same spirit of patriotism that he had shown earlier. Immediately, we set about gathering all the forces and resources possible. After collecting everything that we could, we went as quietly as possible so that the Americans would not get word of our movements.

[¶ 60; p. 36; mid-November, 1846] We arrived at Pilarcitos with 150 men in the dead of night [peso de la noche] with the intention of capturing a drove of horses [caballada] guarded by an American escort belonging to the force stationed in Monterey. At the time, we had sent some people to Carmel and other places to gather a large number of horses. We all got back together in Pilarcitos in order to capture the caballada that was there.

[¶ 61; pp. 36–37; mid-November, 1846] Next day, we got word that Don Thomas O. Larkin, accompanied by William Matthews, was traveling in the direction of San Juan [Bautista], where Mr. Frémont’s force was. It occurred to officer Don Jose Antonio Chavez to go and capture him [Larkin] on the road. Don Manuel Castro and I denied him permission because the attempt would be ticklish and put our plans at risk: The enemy would learn of our arrival and prevent us from joining up with the people of San Jose, who were developing a strategy. It would also deprive us of the element of surprise in taking the resources we needed from the enemy.

[¶ 62; p. 37; mid-November, 1846] But Chavez took a few soldiers and put his caprice into action, with the result that he captured Larkin; but his [Larkin’s] companion Matthews, a very lively [vivo] man, escaped, and told the [American] forces in San Juan what had happened. Larkin was brought to our company. Some idiots proposed that he be killed; but wiser heads prevented that from happening. We made our way to Santa Rita with our prisoner, being more careful this time, gaining nothing from it but danger.

[¶ 63; p. 38; mid-November, 1846] In Santa Rita, a squad of [our] scouts was going towards San Juan on the same road that we were taking. They reached the ranch house of Don Joaquin Gomez, and were invited to lunch; and when they had finished their lunch and were chatting, one of the young ladies of the ranch noticed six or eight men coming along the road, under the command of a certain [Captain] Thompson. The Californios jumped on their horses, and left with a lead of 200 yards [yardas], riding back to warn their leaders of what had happened. They were chased; but they managed to get into the mountains and escape.

[¶ 64; pp. 38–39; mid-November, 1846] Already on the march from Santa Rita to San Juan in travel formation, we came on the scouts bearing this news, which made us decide to divide the force into thirds. Don Manuel Castro took command of the vanguard first division, Jose Antonio Chavez took the center taking with him the prisoner Larkin, and the other portion (the rear) I commanded. A small force under the command of Sergeant Lazaro Soto guarded the horses, the war munitions, and a splendid cannon battery, so marvelous that it would cost you a thirty-year-old mule. Don Joaquin de la Torre was positioned a thousand yards in front, leading ten dragoons, knowing that, should they encounter the enemy, they were to fire on them and then fall back.

[¶ 65; p. 39; mid-November, 1846] We had not gone 500 yards when the shooting started between the enemy and De la Torre in the little oak grove called La Natividad. Having agreed that the vanguard would advance as much as it could from the other side, and that the troops would attack the enemy who had taken possession of the grove, four men were appointed, one officer—Rafael Linares—to attend to our prisoners and give them the best treatment. The shootout at the grove left several dead on both sides, and seriously injured Jose Antonio Chavez and Juan Ignacio Cantua, and several soldiers.

[¶ 66; p. 40; mid-November, 1846] Don Manuel Castro took the position that we had agreed upon. At the start of the fight, I noticed a large force trying to join up with another that was only an advance party. I sent an order for them to join the others as soon as possible and to keep an eye on our larger group. I accomplished this as quickly as possible; and upon my arrival I saw the need to go at it with all my might: We were losing spirit, the horses were tired, we had no gunpowder; and knives, sabers, bayonets, and swords were the only usable weapons we had for our defense. I took sole command, and gave it everything I had, putting all my men at the battlefront; and, when they would hear my voice commanding Ride and attack—which was our last resort—to give a brisk blow. Most of the troops had dismounted.

[¶ 67; pp. 40–41; mid-November, 1846] The enemy came at us; and, when we were separated by 50 or 60 yards, I gave my command. All of them mounted the horses except for one who had just stuffed himself to such a degree that he could not mount his horse; and there he died. Our attack was repulsed; and after an unequal battle in which we fought with knives and the enemy with rifles and pistols, they pushed us back about 200 or 300 yards until our people took heart and we began to make a stand, dealing out cuts, lancings, knife stabs, and blows with rods, and so driving the enemy back some distance from which they had to counter-attack; and, placing themselves in an oak thicket, they used their horses as a wall, and the advantage began to turn their way. Seeing that it was wiser to pull back the troops, I did so at once.

[¶ 68; pp. 41–42; mid-November, 1846] From what I saw, considering both us and the enemy during the two attacks, there were 8 or 9 [total casualties]. Later on I was informed that we had the greater loss with four dead and four wounded. The scene came to an end with nightfall, and we had to withdraw, taking no heed of the dead. But we undertook looking after our wounded—where they could get help. Juan Ignacio Cantua, we left him with the family of Don Santiago Moreno at the Rancho Sauzal; and Chavez was taken that same night to Gonzalez, and we left him in the care of the Alvarez family.

[¶ 69; p. 42; November–December, 1846] We went back south, sure that we had missed the fighting, a misfortune I can only attribute to the unwise step that Chavez took to capture Larkin. We took him with us and arrived at Mission San Antonio dead tired, hungry, and wounded. There, we drank three or four pipes of wine that Father Andrés had made with great effort. Once our needs were met, we officers got together to decide on what to do. I picked out Jose Antonio de la Guerra and some of the best horses, Capistrano Lopez, Esteban Espinosa alias el Chaparro [shorty], and someone named Chavez from New Mexico, to handle our prisoner and deliver him to our commander.

[¶ 70; pp. 42–43; December, 1846] Don Manuel Castro, with the remainder of the troops, decided to go via the coastal mountain range for their own protection, with me planning to return with supplies as soon as I could to assist them. I went as quickly as I could all that day; but since the capture I had noticed much familiarity between my prisoner and three of his guards: Lopez, Espinosa, and Chavez. Considering Noriega trustworthy, I explained my suspicions to him—namely, my thought that my prisoner and his guards had planned his escape.

[¶ 71; p. 43; December, 1846] We proceeded quite cautiously until we arrived at San Luis Obispo. There I came to a full understanding of the plan to murder me and Noriega for $1000 that was to be paid to each of the villains. Capistrano Lopez, Chavez the New Mexican, and Espinosa had conspired with Larkin to carry out a plan in which they would go back to Larkin’s home, returning him to Monterey with the idea that they and their families would be transported to the Sandwich Islands, to protect them from any threats. I found this out in a conversation that I heard between Espinosa and Lopez and others.

[¶ 72; p. 44; December, 1846] I made certain of this concerning Chavez, Espinosa, and others. There in San Luis, there were only women—I did not have a force available, and I had to depend on a man whom everyone called El Beato for him to make the conspirators get drunk. The plan was successful, and I escaped in the darkness, taking the prisoner with me. Next day, the guards caught up with me about twelve or fourteen leagues beyond San Luis. I had to give Larkin a horse because his was tired, and I continued on foot. That day they caught up with me, late at night I was able to