Khomeini’S Warriors: Foundation of Iran’S Regime, Its Guardians, Allies Around the World, War Analysis, and Strategies

By Mehran Riazaty

This book analyzes Ayatollah Khomeinis ideology, Irans official and unofficial armed forces, and its allies throughout the world and provides photographs of the regimes predominant actors.

Since 1892, the Shia clergy has played a major role in Iran, such as the tobacco boycott, which led to the withdrawal of the concession given by the Shah to British citizens, Irans Constitutional Revolution of 1906, as well as organizing opposition to the Shahs policies in the 1979 revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini was a lecturer at Hawza Ilmiyya (Shia seminary of traditional Islamic school of higher learning) of Najaf and Qom for decades before he came on to the Iranian political scene. In 1977, Khomeini assumed the mantle of leadership within the Islamist opposition after the death of Ali Shariati, a leftist intellectual and one of the most influential Iranian Muslim thinkers of his generation. In 1930, Shariati contributed a new line of thinking in Iran, through his reinterpretation of jihad and shahadat (martyrdom), which was presented in his view of an authentic Islam. Shariatis new authentic Islam centered on a reinterpretation of the story of Karbala, where Imam Hussein was martyred in a battle, refusing to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph. Shariati borrowed the Christian concept of martyrdom from the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus as the basis of his new Islamic philosophy. Shariati wrote that when faced with the possibility of ones own death, one must adopt an attitude of freedom-toward-death and thereby experience authentic living. In 1978, Ayatollah Khomeinis reinterpretation of Shia rituals removed the borders between the audience and the actors, turning the entire country into a stage for his casting. He imbued the old passion of the story of Karbala with a new passionate hatred for the Shahs unjust rule in Iran, as well as Israels and the United Statess influences within the world.

Khomeinis memory of Dr. Mohammed Mosaddegh, whose government was toppled by the CIA in 1953, returning the Shah to Iran, resulted in the rise of various political groups such as nationalists, liberals, secularists, and Marxists. These groups were essential in assisting Khomeinis overthrow of the Shah, though they were soon stomped out by the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in May 1979 in order to protect Khomeinis unique brand of a Shia Islamic Revolution. The Iran-Iraq War initiated the rapid expansion of the IRGCs size and capabilities. In September 1980, the IRGC had only 30,000 men in lightly armed units. Prior to the war, the IRGC personnel were very young in age and had little to no military experience. By the summer of 1981, the IRGC had organized basic training centers with experienced commanders and a select group of regular officers. They also had 50,000 members, and its strength would jump to 100,000 in 1983 and 250,000 in 1985. In order to meet all its manpower needs on the Iraq war front, the IRGC then turned to its volunteer militia, the Basij. The Basij members provided more troops than the IRGC could arm. The average Basij member came from Irans rural areas and can be described as poor, uneducated, and ranged in age from twelve to thirty years old. Like the IRGC, the Basij members are motivated by both religion and ideology. After the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC focused on external threats as the Basij increased its involvement in domestic affairs. In past years, the Basij militia has been active in controlling public gatherings and disrupting demonstrations by civil or student activists.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: May 11, 2016
• ISBN: 9781514470312

Mehran Riazaty

Mehran Riazaty is a native of Iran. He completed his undergraduate work in political science concentrated in the fields of comparative politics and political philosophy in the United States. In 2003, Mehran was employed by Multi-National Forces Iraq as a Farsi linguist and Iran analyst. He works well beyond his required output every day to ensure that what was coming from the Iranian leadership in Farsi was presented to the U.S. leadership in English within hours of being reported in the Iranian media. His analysis of events, as they occur, was to the point and deadly accurate. He has the in-depth knowledge and understanding of present-day Iranian government and leadership required to compile meaningful biographies and various detailed written imagery of Iranian leaders. His work has been recognized by many different influential people in the United States.

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Copyright © 2016 by Mehran Riazaty.

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Preface

Persian Pride

Part 1 The Islamic Republic of Iran

Ayatollah Seyyed Mousavi Ruhollah Khomeini

Shia Leadership Ranking

Shia Holidays

Shia Leaderships and Hawza Ilmiyya

Ayatollah Khomeini and the Hawza Ilmiyya of Qom and Najaf

Shia Religious Places and Institutions

Ali Shariati (1933–1977)

Foundation of Iran’s Islamic Revolution

Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Republic

Khomeini and Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor

Khomeini’s Political Structure

Iran after Khomeini

Ayatollah Seyyed Jawad Hosseini Khamenei

Iran’s Foreign Policy and Khomeini’s Goals

Iranian Ayatollahs’ Future Regional Plan (Shia Empire)

Western Social Sciences vs. Shia Islamic Social Sciences

Exporting Iran’s Revolution through Iranian Films and TV Series

Who Is Ahmadinejad?

How and Why Ahmadinejad Became President in 2005 and 2009?

How Ahmadinejad Became Known throughout the World?

Ahmadinejad and Imam Mahdi

Ahmadinejad and Jamkaran Mosque

Ahmadinejad’s Letter to Bush is a sign of the Return of

Imam Mahdi

Ahmadinejad’s Strategy: Attack Is Best Defense

Ahmadinejad’s View of Iran and the British

Ayatollah Khomeini and the Nuclear Bomb

Iranian Officials’ Comments on a Nuclear Bomb

Why Iran Is Persistent on Its Nuclear Program

Maslahat, Taklif, Taqiyah

Iran’s Publicly Known Nuclear Sites

Ahmadinejad Comments on Iran’s Nuclear Activities

Moderates’ View on Iran Nuclear Activities

Hardliner s’ View on Iran Nuclear Activities

The Root of Conflicts between Hardliners and Moderates

A. Conflict between Rafsanjani and his allies with Khamenei and hardliners on the concept of Velayat-e Faqih

B. Hardliners are imposing their views on Iranian People

C. IRGC Is Supporting Hardliners?

A Possible Political Game Played among Iranian Leaders

(Jang-e Zargari)

Hojatoleslam Hassan Rouhani

Why Rouhani Won the 2013 Presidency?

(Is He Old Wine in a 2013 Bottle?)

Rouhani and Foreign Policy

Part 2 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Hojatoleslam Ali Saeedi Shahroudi

Representative of Ayatollah Khamenei to IRGC

Abdollah Haj-Sadeghi

Deputy Representative of Ayatollah Khamenei to IRGC

IRGC’s Former and Current Commanders

Qods Force (Jerusalem Brigade)

IRGC and Qods Force Training Camps in Iran

Qods Force Commanders

Basij Organization

Basij Recruiting Form

Basij Domestic Operations

Representative of the Supreme Leader to the Basij Force,

Hojatoleslam Mohammad-Reza Tosarkani

The Basij Commander-in-Chief

Major General Mohammad Reza Naqadi

The Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Army The Artesh

The Artesh’s Commanders

Khatam al-Anbiya Air Base (Seal of the Prophets)

Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or

Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK)

Key MOIS Officials, Former and Present

Formation of Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan in Iran

Mostazafan Foundation’s Goals

The Organizational Chart of the Central Unit of Mostazafan Foundation

Bonyads’ Companies and Institutions

Products and Services

Bonyad-e-Shahid

Role of Maddah in the Islamic Republic of Iran

(Sufism and Shia Lyrics during Ashura)

The Martyrdom of the Global Islamic Movements in Iran

Martyrdom

Suicide Bombers Recruiter

Registration Form for Martyrdom-Seeking Operations

Influential Clerics in Iran’s Government

Iranian Officials Who Closely Cooperate with IRGC

Iran’s Friends in the Region and Worldwide

Part 3 Assumptions on War with Iran (Analysis and Strategies)

IRGC Assessment on Israel Attacking Iran

Factors of Starting a War and Winning

Assumptions about Attacking Iran by Iranian Strategists

Possible Conflicts between Iran, the United States, and Israel

Operation Praying Mantis (Iran-U.S. War in April 1988)

A View on the Confrontation between Washington and Tehran

Foundation of Iran’s Missile Program

War with Iran and Its Consequences

Appendix: Persian Language Source Information

The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the U.S. government. The author enjoys full academic freedom to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on Iran’s issues.

To the sons and daughters of Persia who lost their lives in the

pursuit of freedom against the theological tyranny of Velayat-e Faqih

(Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist)

Acknowledgements

First off, much thanks to Professor Edward J. Erler (California State University, San Bernardino) who opened my mind to the world of political philosophy and made me aware of its charms. A world of appreciation is due to the late professor Harry Neumann (Claremont Graduate University), who taught me the importance of statesmanship. To his penetrating thought, his breadth of vision, I shall always be indebted. To no lesser degree, I have the utmost respect for Major General USMC (ret) Kevin B. Kuklok who read the entire manuscript and made countless constructive comments which I incorporated herein. Finally, I want to thank two of my dearest friends; Amir T. for his support throughout this journey and for FS who diligently assisted maintaining the framework, relevance, and context of this book. Last but certainly not least, I thank my wife for having the patience and love for tolerating the many long hours spent researching and writing this work.

Note to Readers: In the Islamic Republic of Iran, political and military figures are not removed from the political scene due to administration changes (Rafsanjani to Khatami to Ahmadinejad to Rouhani), rather, their responsibilities change. By the time this book is published, it is possible that a number of individuals named herein could have new responsibilities within the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Preface

This book analyzes Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology, Iran’s official and unofficial armed forces and its allies throughout the world, and provides photographs of the regime’s predominant actors.

Since 1892, the Shia clergy has played a major role in Iran, such as the tobacco boycott that led to the withdrawal of the concession given by the Shah to a British citizens, Iran’s Constitutional Revolution of 1906, and opposition to the Shah’s policies in 1979 Iran’s Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini was a lecturer at Hawza Ilmiyya (Shia seminary of traditional Islamic school of higher learning) of Najaf and Qom for decades before he came on to Iran’s political scene. In 1977, Khomeini assumed the mantle of leadership within Islamist opposition after the death of Ali Shariati, a leftist intellectual and one of the most Iranian influential Muslim thinkers of his generation in 1970, who contributed a new line of thinking in Iran. Shariati’s reinterpretation of Jihad and Shahadat (Martyrdom) was presented in his view of an authentic Islam. Shariati’s new authentic Islam centered on a reinterpretation of the story of Karbala where Imam Hossein was martyred in a battle, refusing to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph (661–750 CE). Shariati borrowed the Christian concept of martyrdom from the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus as the basis of his new Islamic philosophy. Shariati wrote that when faced with the possibility of one’s own death, one must adopt an attitude of freedom-toward-death and thereby experience authentic living. In 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini’s reinterpretation of Shia rituals removed the borders between the audience and the actors, turning the entire country into a stage for his casting. He imbued the old passion the story of Karbala with a new passionate hatred of the Shah’s unjust rule in Iran, of Israel, and the United States role in the world.

Khomeini’s memory of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh whose government was toppled with the assistance of CIA in 1953 returning Mohammad Reza Shah to power in Iran, the rise of different political groups such as nationalists, liberals, secularists, and Marxists, who helped him overthrow the Shah, created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in May 1979 to protect his Islamic Revolution. The Iran-Iraq War initiated the rapid expansion of the IRGC’s size and capabilities. In September 1980, the IRGC had only thirty thousand men in lightly armed units. Prior to the war, the IRGC personnel were very young and had little or no military experience. By the summer of 1981, the IRGC had organized basic training centers with experienced commanders and a select group of regular officers. They also had fifty thousand members, and its strength would jump to one hundred thousand in 1983 and two hundred and fifty thousand in 1985. To meet all its manpower needs on the Iran-Iraq War fronts, the IRGC turned to its volunteer militia, the Basij. The Basij members provided more troops than the IRGC could arm. The average Basij member came from Iran’s rural areas and, as a result, was poor, uneducated, and ranged from twelve to thirty years old. Like the IRGC, the Basij members are motivated by religion and ideology. After the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC focused on external threats as the Basij increased its involvement in domestic affairs. In the past years, Basij has been active in controlling gatherings and disrupting demonstrations by civil or student activists.

To export his revolution, Khomeini established the Qods Force. The Qods Force is believed to have come into existence soon after Islamic revolutionary forces took control of Iran on January 16, 1979. The name Qods is a direct reference to the city of Jerusalem, which is one of the holiest sites in Islam that is now under Israeli control. The Qods Force is one of the IRGC’s armed branches and is mostly responsible for external operations, including terrorism. The largest branch of the Qods corps’ foreign operations consists of approximately 12,000 Arabic-speaking Iranians, Afghans, Iraqis, Lebanese Shias, and North Africans who trained in Iran or received training in Afghanistan during the Afghan war years. Presently these foreign operatives receive training in Iran, Sudan, Lebanon, and other parts of the world.¹

Iran also has a Regular National Army called the Artesh and consists of a diverse ethnic group of men drawn from across the country. Khomeini identified the armed forces as the key to his revolution’s success in early 1978. In February 1979, after Khomeini established his government, he issued orders for the Shah’s trained uniformed and civilian members of the armed forces to return to work and announced the Artesh as part of the revolution. The Artesh began to regain its honor and strength on the prospect of the Iran-Iraq War on September 1980.

Due to the lack of weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian officials used many Basij as human wave attacks to clear minefields or draw the enemy’s fire. After the war, Iranian officials realized the effectiveness of using human wave attacks and turned that to suicide bombing attacks by individuals who were ready to die for Khomeini’s ideological cause. On 5 November 2005, the former chief of the IRGC Yahya Safavi said, We do not rely only on defense technology. The IRGC has thousands of Martyrdom-Seekers, who have gained military experience during the eight years of war, and these martyrdom-seekers are prepared to carry out martyrdom operations on large scales. They operate professionally, and have undergone training. They have a strong spirit of martyrdom.²

Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is ranked by experts as one of the largest and most active intelligence agencies in the Middle East. The MOIS is also one of the most secretive agencies in the world, and its command structure is directly answerable to the Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

In 1988, after the Iran-Iraq War, right hand of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Rafsanjani’s postwar reconstruction plan turned the IRGC into an economic empire. Of particular importance was the growth of the engineering arm of IRGC known as the Khatam al-Anbiya (Seal of the Prophets). Khatam al-Anbiya is an economic branch of the guards and is ‎involved with in government projects in different fields of activity.³ Khatam al-Anbiya could be compared to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineering. After the revolution, all the banks and large industrial companies were expropriated, but Khomeini did not allow the state to take them over. Rather they were treated as property of Islamic law, and many were amalgamated into six independent foundations set up in the first years of the revolution. The largest of these, the Foundation of the Disinherited (Bonyad-e Mostazafan), absorbed the Pahlavi Foundation and, despite its name, was a conglomerate of 1,049 enterprises and 2,786 real estate units by 1982. These economic foundations, known singly as Bonyad (the Persian word for foundation), control an estimated 40 percent of the Iranian economy, and even though as much as 58 present of the state budget was reportedly allocated to them in 1994, their leadership are not responsible to the state but only to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.⁴

Currently, many clergy who studied at the Hawzas of Qom and Najaf and the IRGC members who fought for the survivor of Khomeini’s regime during Iran-Iraq War have key positions in government. These people are assisting Supreme Leader Khamenei to run the country’s internal and external affairs. In 2006, the former head of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezaei, said that during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s diplomacy was very weak. He added that they did not have many friends in the world, and that was one of the reasons they could not pass any resolutions on behalf of Iran in the United Nation. After the Iran-Iraq War, Iran became very active in international community to attract allies to compete with the United States. Currently, Iran has many friends in the region (Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria) and around the world (Cuba, Venezuela).

This book covers Iran’s regime in three parts: (A) The first part explains the Shia sect of Islam’s clerical hierarchy, which is not widely understood by the West, how Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, and his vision of establishing a Shia empire in the Middle East. It will also examine why Ahmadinejad was elected as a president and the role of twelfth Imam Mahdi in his government, Iran’s foreign policy, Iran’s nuclear program, the root of conflict between moderate and hard-line figures, and why Rouhani become Iran’s president in 2013; (B) The second part provides biographical information and photos of the regime’s predominant actors and allies, explains in detail the Islamic armed forces (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC], Basij, Iran’s regular army Artesh, the Qods Force, Ministry of Intelligence and Security [MOIS], and Khatam al-Anbiya Air Base), organizations within the regime (Bonyads [charitable foundations], the role of the Maddah (Eulogist) in the Islamic Republic, the martyrs of the Global Islamic Movement (Martyrdom Seekers), and influential clergies and officials in Iran’s government; (C) The third part predicts how Iran would possibly respond to an attack by Israel and/or the United States.

Persian Pride

I am Darius, the Great King, the King of Kings, the son of Vishtaspa, the Achaemenid, a Parsi, the son of a Parsi, an Arya of Aryan (the Noble One) lineage.⁵

Throughout recorded history, time and again, the Persian influence has been stated by Western philosophers and great minds. For example, Machiavelli said God was a friend of Cyrus, Hegel noted that history of the world began with Iran, and Nietzsche stated that the foundation of Western religious morality was formulated by the Persian prophet Zarathustra.

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469–1527), a well-known Italian philosopher, in his best known book The Prince, said that his teaching was based on his knowledge and the actions of great men who have acquired or founded new kingdoms or religions in the world. He claimed that the greatest examples of great men are new prophets and princes like Moses (founder of Judaism), Cyrus (founder of the Achaemenid Persian Empire), and Romulus (founder of the Roman Empire).⁶ Machiavelli called these men prophets and said God was with them. The life of Cyrus has been written by Xenophon and acknowledged Cyrus’s chastity, affability, humanity, and liberty.⁷

The Sassanid dynasty ruled the Persian Empire from 224 to 651 AD, and Zoroastrianism was its dominant religion. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), a well-known German philosopher, in his book The Philosophy of History, said Cyrus, the King of Persia’s empire, succeeded because he accepted the religion of the Persian prophet Zarathustra. The name Zarathustra originated from zaratha (golden) and the ushtra (light) from the root ush, to shine. Thus Zarathustra would mean He of the Golden Light, which is just the proper name to be given to one of the greatest light-bringers of the world.⁸

Hegel claimed that the principle of world development begins with the history of Persia, and this therefore constitutes strictly the beginning of world history. He stated that the Persians are the first historical people. Hegel argued that the Persian Empire under the religion of Zarathustra and leadership of Cyrus is the first empire in the world to rise with the light that not only shines on itself but also illuminates everything that is around it. For Zarathustra, the creator Ahura Mazda is the lord of the kingdom of light and good, and Ahriman is the lord of darkness and evil. For Zarathustra, light belongs to the world of consciousness and spirit. Light makes no distinctions. The sun shines on the righteous and unrighteous and confers on all the same benefit and prosperity. Light vitalizes when it is brought to bear on something distinct from itself, at which time it begins operating upon and transforming the distinction. Light holds a position against darkness, and this antithetical relation brings to surface for us the principle of activity and life. In traditional Persian thought, there was neither idol worshiping nor adoration of individual objects rather the universe as a whole. Light introduces the spirit in the form of good and true, the substance of all natural things. Light puts man in a position to exercise choice. But light also directly involves an opposite, namely darkness. Man could not appreciate light (good) if darkness (evil) did not exist.⁹

Zarathustra is also the self-idealization of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), another well-known German philosopher. In his book Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche says that Zarathustra’s uniqueness lies in his being the first thinker to see morality; thus the battle between good and evil which is the essence of everything. The great march of history is customarily thought to have originated with the prophets of the Old Testament. However, Nietzsche claimed that they originated from Zarathustra, whose works were taken over, as their own, by the Hebrew prophets. Nietzsche claimed that the revolutionary tradition of the West reformulates again and again the moral vision and religious mission of which Zarathustra is the founder. In the time of Zarathustra, there existed a pure and original faith among Persians that no longer exists. Islam put an end to the Persian faith and spiritual existence following the Arab invasion of the Persian Empire.¹⁰

In Iranian Shia Islam, aspects from the Old Persian religion of Zoroastrianism, specifically the perpetual fight between the forces of good (Ahura Mazda) and evil (Ahriman), found new meaning. The Shia theologians saw a reenactment of this fight between good and evil in a war that took place in 680 CE between two men, the saintly Imam Hossein (grandson of Prophet Mohammad) and the evil Yazid, the third caliph of the Umayyad Caliphate. On 26 October 1978, the father of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the late Ayatollah Khomeini castigated the Shah’s regime for granting civil liberties to Zoroastrians, declaring that his regime rule has resulted in the development and strengthening of fire worshippers (Zoroastrianism) and deepening the foundations of injustice, especially in Iran.¹¹

Part I

The Islamic Republic of Iran

The Shia clergy have no desire to govern in Iran

Imam Khomeini’s interview with France Press,

25 October 1978¹²

I do not want to be the leader of the Islamic Republic. I do not want to rule. I will only guide people

Imam Khomeini’s interview with The Guardian,

1 September 1978¹³

Politics? I don’t engage in politics. It disgusts me

Adolf Hitler, Joachim Clemens Fest,

Hitler, Interpolation III¹⁴

Politics is the belligerent drive to empower (legitimate) one’s God, one’s idea of the good, to ram it down the throats of one’s enemies, by having it legislated into law and enforced by the police and army

—Harry Neumann¹⁵

Ayatollah Seyyed Mousavi Ruhollah Khomeini

(1902–1989)

Ayatollah Khomeini’s family migrated from northeastern Iran to Oudh, India, in an effort to promote the Shia religion. After some time in India, Khomeini’s grandfather, Seyyed Ahmad Mousavi Hindi, left India to Najaf, Iraq, in 1830 to further his religious study. Ahmad Mousavi met Yusef Khan Kamareh’i, a landlord who lived in the rural community of Farahan in Najaf, not far from Khomein. Khan Kamareh’i persuaded Mousavi to travel to Iran with him. Mousavi returned to Iran in 1839 and bought a house in the city of Khomein. Khomeini’s father, Seyyed Mostafa, studied the Shia faith under Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi in Isfahan, Iran. To pursue his religious study, Seyyed Mostafa moved to live in Najaf between the years 1891 and 1894 with his wife. Then in 1902, Seyyed Mostafa was murdered before Khomeini was born.¹⁶

Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini was born on 24 September 1902 in the village of Khomein, a province of Isfahan, Iran. His surname Ruhollah translates to Spirit of God. Khomeini was raised by his mother Hajieh Agha Khanum. He began his religious study at the age of six. At the age of sixteen, Khomeini’s mother passed away. Three years after the death of his mother, Khomeini moved to the city of Arak to study under Haj Shaikh AbdolKarim Hairi Yazdi, a well-known cleric at the time. When Ayatollah Hairi decided to move to Qom, Iran, Khomeini followed his teacher to continue his religious studies. Khomeini’s studies in Qom included jurisprudence (Fiqh), logic, Islamic taxation (Kharaj), ethics (Akhlaq), and mystical philosophy (Irfan). In 1929, Khomeini married Khadija Thaqafi, and in 1936, he was granted the title of Mujtahid (one who can interpret Islamic Sharia law). As a young man, Khomeini faced two political choices: follow his teacher Ayatollah Hairi’s policy of quietism, accommodation, and consolidation or follow Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Modarres’s opposition against the monarchy. Khomeini admired Ayatollah Modarres for the strength and courage he displayed against Reza Shah. Modarres was a supporter of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution that took place circa 1905. Khomeini always had a keen interest in politics. He observed Reza Pahlavi establish the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran and put Iran on a course of modernization. Under Reza Shah’s son, the last king on Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah, Iran continued this path of rapid modernization, although with a Western flavor.¹⁷, ¹⁸, ¹⁹

Khomeini believed the Shah to be an agent of Western powers, particularly of the United States. He believed that the Shah had sold out the Iranian nation. The first punishment for challenging the Shah turned out to be exile from Iran. As it turned out, Khomeini was not welcome by his next hosts either. In November 1964, Khomeini first went to Turkey, then to Najaf in September 1965, and finally to Paris, France, where he lived for a brief period until returning to Iran in February 1979.²⁰

Religion has always played a prominent role in Iran. Before the Islamic Revolution, most of the Iranian middle class, including the intellectuals and religious authorities, had an unpleasant memory of the United States. This memory went back to June 1953 when the CIA’s covert action program, code named Operation Ajax, destabilized Iran and toppled the popular and nationalist government of Dr. Mohammad Mossaddeq and brought Mohammad Reza Shah back to power.²¹ After that incident, most Iranians believed that Reza Shah was the puppet of the United States in Iran. In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew Mohammad Reza Shah and came into power with the help of the Iranian people. Two of Khomeini’s key principles were his persistent anti-Americanism and unrelenting opposition to Israel. Khomeini’s view of the United States and Israel was that these two countries were the source of all evil in the world. It was based on this view that on 4 November 1979, militant Iranian students occupied the Den of Espionage (the name given by Iranians to the embassy of United States in Tehran), and the next day, Khomeini had voiced his support for the occupation and called the United States the Great Satan.²²

The followers of Ayatollah Khomeini who occupied the United States embassy in Tehran called themselves the Students Who Follow Imam Khomeini’s Path (Daneshjuyane Payroeh Khate Imam Khomeini) or the Individuals Who Faithfully Follow in the Path of Imam Khomeini (Peyrovane ba Eman, be Khate Imam Khomeini). Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the officials in charge of the regime have always said that they follow Khomeini’s path.²³ For example, on 29 September 2006, former Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki said the generation who were trained by Imam Khomeini had defused all the enemy plots against the revolution and had defeated the enemies of Islamic Iran.²⁴

Since the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, many scholars have analyzed his movement as Khomeinism. It is wrong to analyze Khomeini’s movement as Khomeinism. Why? According to Wiktionary, the English suffix -ism was first used to form a noun of action from a verb. It is taken from the Greek suffix -ismos that likewise forms abstract nouns from verbal stems. An example is baptism, from the Greek baptismos (immersion), derived from baptizein, a Greek verb meaning to immerse. Its usage was later extended to signify larger organized systems and concepts—in belief, ideology, doctrine, and ritual practice.²⁵ Khomeini’s students believe that Khomeini’s legacy is a path, not a doctrine. Khomeini’s path is the path of Anbiya (the Prophets). Khomeini’s path is a religious path based on Shia teaching and not a secular path such as those of Ba’athism, Communism, or Liberalism. Khomeini’s followers believe the foundation of Ba’athism, Communism, and Liberalism all were grounded on earth, and not in heaven like Khomeini’s regime.

Shia Leadership Ranking

After the Quran, the Prophets and the Twelve Shia Imams, Mujtahids, are the highest authority on religious laws in the Twelver Shia Islam. Twelver Shias believe in twelve divinely ordained leaders known as the Twelve Imams. They believe the Twelfth Imam is the Mahdi who will return from occultation bringing peace into the world. The twelve Shia imam’s names in order are as follows: (1) Ali ibn Abi Talib, (2) Hassan ibn Ali, (3) Hossein ibn Ali (4) Ali ibn Hossein, (5) Mohammad ibn Ali, (6) Ja’far ibn Mohammad, (7) Musa ibn Ja’far, (8) Ali ibn Musa, (9) Mohammad ibn Ali, (10) Ali ibn Mohammad, (11) Hassan ibn Ali, (12) Mohammad ibn al-Hassan (al-Mahdi).²⁶

A Mujtahid is a Shia scholar who is legally competent to interpret Islamic Sharia law. The Shia Mujtahids are the source of emulation and are followed by Shias without any question. In other words, Shia people will do what the Mujtahid’s expert opinion avers and refrain from what is spoken against. It is as though a Shia person will place the responsibility of his/her deeds utterly on a Mujtahid’s shoulders. Among the conditions that determine if a Mujtahid should be followed are that he must be the most educated (Alem) Mujtahid of his time and the most capable in deriving the religious laws from the appropriate sources.²⁷

To become a Mujtahid, it is necessary to complete a rigorous and lengthy course of religious studies in one of the prestigious Hawzas of Qom in Iran or Najaf in Iraq and to receive an authorization from a qualified Mujtahid. Of equal importance is either the explicit or the tacit recognition of a cleric as a Mujtahid by laymen and scholars in the Shia community. There is no set time for studying a particular subject, but serious preparation to become a Mujtahid normally requires fifteen years to master the religious subjects deemed essential. It is uncommon for any student to attain the status of Mujtahid before the age of thirty; more commonly students are between forty and fifty years old when they achieve this distinction.²⁸

There are generally several ranks among Shia clerics. The highest Shia cleric rank begins with Grand Ayatollah, which means great sign of God. All grand ayatollahs are considered Mujtahids. Under grand ayatollah is Ayatollah (Sign of God). Below ayatollah is the rank of Hojatoleslam, which is Arabic for Authority on Islam, and Hojatoleslam wal-Muslimin (Authority on Islam and Muslims) is given to middle ranking Shia clergy. Next is Mubellegh al Risala or Carrier of the Message. At the bottom of the ladder are Shia religious students, Talabeh. At the time of the revolution, there were slightly more than 11,000 Talabehs in Iran; approximately 60 percent of these were studying at the Hawza in the city of Qom; another 25 percent were enrolled in the important Hawzas of Mashhad and Esfahan, and the rest were at Hawzas in Tabriz, Yazd, Shiraz, Tehran, Zanjan, and other cities.²⁹

While Mujtahid often refers to clerics in general, it is also a specific rank, denoting one who has graduated from a religious seminary (Hawza Ilmiyya). Besides obvious factors such as graduation, which determine the potential for becoming a Mujtahid, promotion in the ranks is a rather a subjective matter. Two important factors that determine promotion are the number and quality of students following the candidate and his authorship of scholarly works on Islam.

Seyyed is a title given to a male descendant [bloodline] of Prophet Mohammad through his grandsons, Hassan ibn Ali and Husain ibn Ali, sons of the prophet’s daughter Fatima Zahra and his son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib.³⁰ The Shia clergy wear a white or black turban and an Aba, a loose, sleeveless brown cloak, open in front. Clerics with black turban are Seyyed. Haj or Haji is title given to one who has made a pilgrimage to Mecca.

Shia Holidays

Ashura is one of the Shia holidays. Ashura commemorate the death of the Third Imam, Hossein, the son of Ali and Fatima and the grandson of Mohammad. He was killed near Karbala in modern Iraq in 680 CE during a battle with troops supporting the Umayyad caliph. Hossein’s death is commemorated by Shias with passion plays and is an intensely religious time. The following days are of special significance to Shia Muslims.³¹

Arba’een: It is commemorated on the twentieth of Safar, forty days after Ashura Shias also remember the terrible treatment of the women of Imam Hossein’s household—they were dragged from Karbala (central Iraq) to Shaam (Damascus, Syria)—with many young children dying of thirst and exposure along the route.

Eidal-Ghadeer: A celebration held on the eighteenth of Dhil-Hijjah marking the event of Ghadeer Khumm in AH 10, Eid al-Ghadeer is the day on which God stated the completion of Islam. Laylatul Qadr is the biggest night, and Eid al-Ghadeer is the biggest day.

Eidal-Mubahila: A celebration held on the twenty-fourth of Dhil-Hijjah marking the event of al-Mubahila between the Household of the Prophet and a Christian deputation from Najran in AH 10.

Miladal-Nabi: It is a celebration to mark the Prophet Mohammad’s birth date, seventeenth Rabbi al-Awwal. Milad al-Nabi coincides with the birth date of the sixth Shia imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq. The Sunnis mark the occasion on twelfth Rabbi al-Awwal.

MidofShaban: It is significant to all Muslims but specifically to Shias as it also marks the birth date of their twelfth and final imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi.³²

Shia Leaderships and Hawza Ilmiyya

Hawza literally means seminary of traditional Shia Islamic studies, and Ilmiyya means an academy for studying Islamic sciences. Several senior Grand Ayatollahs constitute the Hawza. The institutions in Najaf, Iraq, and Qom, Iran, are the preeminent Hawza centers for training Shia clergymen.³³

The Shia Mujtahids directly and indirectly rule Shia communities around the world. These Shia leaders receive their education from the Hawza Ilmiyya of either Najaf or Qom. The first Hawza was established in Najaf in the eleventh century AD. Shaykh al-Tusi established this Hawza Ilmiyya, which remained the main Shia learning center for approximately a millennium until its decline over the past century. Respectively, the Hawza of Qom remained small and un-influential until the Safavid dynasty made the Shia sect of Islam the official religion of Persia in the fifteenth century AD. With the decline of Najaf, the city of Qom rose to prominence and remains the primary center of traditional Shia learning today. With the shift of the primary Hawza from Najaf to Qom, the growth of Iran’s influence became inevitable. As a result, there are now at least as many Shia references produced in Iran’s Persian language as there are in Arabic. However, the original Islamic sources of Quran and Hadith (the statements and actions conducted by Prophet Mohammad) continue to be preserved and studied in Arabic.³⁴

The majority of the traditional themes taught at a Hawza are interrelated, and they appendage each other. For example, one who attempts to specialize in Jurisprudence (Fiqh) should also study other subjects in depth such as the principles of jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh), Arabic language and grammar, the sciences of the Quran (Ulum al-Quran), Hadith, Islamic history (Tarikh), theology (Aqied), Quran exegesis (Tafsir), logic (Mantiq), and so on. While some people may study at a Hawza for many years and dedicate their entire lives to the study and teaching of traditional Islamic subjects, others study for as little as three to five years at a Hawza and then return to their hometowns (sometimes as a full-time Islamic missionary [muballigh]) while continuing to study on their own.³⁵

Today, another common study at Hawzas in Iran for young men and women is to obtain one- to three-month crash courses especially over summer. In recent years, Hawzas leaders realized that people who are studying at the Hawza need to be well-rounded in all subjects. Therefore, Hawzas nowadays are also introducing secular subjects into their curriculum such as human psychology, sociology, current affairs, political science, English language studies, geography, comparative religions/world religions, Western philosophy, and so forth. However, the Hawza’s studies are mostly dedicated to traditional subjects since they are not taught in any other modern institutions. The traditional subjects taught at a Hawza are divided into the following:³⁶

Mantiq (Logic)

Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence)

Fiqh (Jurisprudence)

Tafsir al-Quran (Quran Exegesis)

Ulum al-Quran (Quran Sciences)

Ilm al-Hadith (The study of Traditions)

Ilm ar-Rijal (Science of Narrators)

Tarikh (History)

Aqaid / Kalam (Theology)

Lugha (Language Studies)

Falsafa (Islamic Philosophy)

Irfan (Islamic Mysticism)

Ayatollah Khomeini and the Hawza Ilmiyya of

Qom and Najaf

Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of Islamic Republic of Iran, was a lecturer at Najaf and Qom seminaries for decades before he burst onto the political scene in late 1970s. He spent more than fourteen years in exile, mostly in Najaf, where he taught political philosophy, Islamic history, and ethics. Khomeini’s Islamic studies included Islamic law (Sharia) and Jurisprudence (Fiqh). He held a moderate standpoint vis-à-vis Greek philosophy and regarded Aristotle as the founder of logic. Khomeini was also influenced by Plato’s philosophy, especially Plato’s concept of Philosopher King. Khomeini’s concept of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) as the foundation of his Islamic government is similar to Plato’s Philosopher King.³⁷ Plato’s teacher Socrates in book 6 of the Republic argued that a philosopher must become a king and rule the masses, because a philosopher truly knows human nature and what is good for them, very much akin to the Shia Mujtahid who thinks that he truly knows what is good for human beings.

Qom is considered to be a holy city in Shia Islam as it is the site of the shrine of Fatema Mæ’sume, sister of Imam Ali ibn Musa Reza, the seventh Shia imam. In the seventeenth century, Shah Abbas I, one of Iran’s prominent rulers at that time, built the shrine as we know it today. The shrine became the city’s chief attraction and the intellectual center of the city. Najaf played a major role in the political history of the Hawza, though the deterioration of the status of the Najaf Hawza, due to political events in Iraq, consolidated the position of the Qom Hawza. Throughout the history of modern Iraq, the Najaf Hawza was instrumental in shaping Shia public opinion and popular positions against different governments. At the formation of the Iraqi state, the Hawza issued a series of hostile Fatwas (Edicts) forbidding Shias to attend government-operated public schools or to assume careers in government offices. That was the beginning of the Political Shia movement in modern history.³⁸, ³⁹

Shia Religious Places and Institutions

There are different religious places in Shia communities in Iran. These consist of the following: 1) Mosque, 2) Hosseinieh, 3) Imamzadeh, 4) Jame-e-Modarressin Qom, 5) Haqqani School, and 6) Hojjatieh Society.

Mosque is a place of worship for followers of the Islamic faith, and there are over seventy thousand mosques throughout Iran. Sixty thousand of these mosques belong to Shias, and ten thousand belong to Sunnis.⁴⁰

Hosseinieh is a congregation hall for Shia ritual ceremonies, especially those associated with the Remembrance of Muharram. (The event marks the anniversary of the Battle of Karbala when Imam Hossein ibn Ali, the grandson of the Islamic Prophet Mohammad and the first Shia imam, was killed by the forces of the second Umayyad caliph Yazid I). In Hosseinieh, people are manipulated by religious scholars through religious rhetoric, both intellectually and emotionally. Most of the people who teach at the Hosseinieh have university and religious educational backgrounds. For example, Ali Shariati, a well-known and respected Iranian theologian and philosopher, started his teaching at the Hosseinieh Ershad in Tehran. Currently there are 118 Hosseiniehs throughout Iran.⁴¹

Imamzadeh literally means Born of an Imam and refers to an immediate descendant of a Shia Imam. Imamzadeh is also a word used to symbolize a Shrine-Tomb of the descendants of Shia Imams that are directly related to the Prophet Mohammad. These shrines are only for the descendants of Imams, and they are not for Imams themselves. These Shrine-Tombs are used as centers of Shia devotion and pilgrimages. These Shrine-Tombs are also believed to have incredible properties and the ability to cure a sick person. Many of these are located in Iraq, Medina, and Iran. Currently, there are approximately 10,500 Imamzadehs in Iran.⁴²,⁴³

On 27 October 2010, Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei in a meeting with the officials of different sections of Qom Province said, The holy city of Qom is the honor of the Islamic Republic of Iran because this city is the base of the Iranian Revolution, the clerics and the location of the largest seminary and prominent scientific and religious figures. He added that the enemy’s front has always had a special planning for Qom as the base of Islam’s grandeur. So it was planning to establish an anti-Islamic Revolution base in Qom.⁴⁴

Another very important seminary in Iran is the Jame-e-ModarressinQom (theQomSeminaryTeachersSociety). The Jame-e-Modarressin Qom was founded in 1961 by the leading Shia clerics of Qom to organize religious teachings in the seminaries and expand the religious teachings in Iran. Currently the Jame-e-Modarressin Qom heads the Supreme Council of Qom Hawzas and proposes judges to the judiciary system. In 1963, the society declared Ayatollah Khomeini as Mujtahid. In 1994, after the death of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Araki, the society nominated seven of the Ulema as his successors to be a Mujtahid, including Ayatollah Khamenei. The society has fifty-two members.⁴⁵

The clergies in charge of the Jame-e-Modarressin Qom who also control the Hawza of Qom determine who can become a Mujtahid. For example, on 3 January 2010, Iran’s state-run news agency, Press TV, reported that the Jame-e-Modarressin Qom declared that Grand Ayatollah Yousef Sanei no longer qualifies to be a Mujtahid. Sanei is known as a reformist cleric who strongly supported reformer Mir- Hossein Mousavi during the 2009 presidential elections. In June 2009, Ayatollah Sanei declared Ahmadinejad’s presidency illegitimate and that cooperating with his government was against Islam. The head of the Jame-e-Modarressin Qom is Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi. He is an ultraconservative Iranian cleric who strongly supported Ahmadinejad. On 17 May 2009, Mohammad Yazdi stated that the majority of the Jame-e-Modarressin Qom members have expressed support for Ahmadinejad in the presidential race.⁴⁶, ⁴⁷, ⁴⁸

5. Haqqani School

For centuries, young men have gathered at Islamic seminaries to escape Western influences and quietly study Islamic texts that have been handed down unchanged through the ages.

Ayatollah Ali Quddusi⁴⁹

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Ayatollah Ali Quddusi was born in 1927 to a cleric family in Nahavand, Hamadan. His father was a prominent clergy that was highly respected by Ayatollah Boroujerdi. In 1944 Quddusi entered a seminary school in Qom to be present among teachers such as Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi and Ayatollah Khomeini to achieve the level of Ijtihad. From an early age, he had a special interest in the study of ethics and spirituality, and so he began to pursue this further as it pertained to the Shia faith. Quddusi was also a pioneer in anti-Pahlavi struggles dating prior to 1963. His struggles culminated during the 1962–1963 period, simultaneous to Khomeini’s movement against the Shah. He actively participated in the movement that in 1966 and subsequent to detection of a struggle organization of a group of clergies inclusive of Ayatollahs Khamenei and Rafsanjani he was apprehended and transferred to Qezel Qaleh Prison. Quddusi attached a special importance to reviving the culture of Islam and, for the same reason, devoted most of his activities to an educational system to parallel political activities. He founded the Haqqani (Montazerieh) School and Maktab-e Towhid (Shia seminary for women), which were established in Qom. Accompanied by Ayatollah Beheshti, he made these two education institutions a model for other educational and cultural centers to follow. Once the Islamic Revolution was realized, Khomeini appointed Quddusi as attorney general of the revolution. Two years later on 5 September 1981, Quddusi was killed by a bomb explosion in his office. ⁵⁰, ⁵¹

From 1964 to the time of Iran’s 1978–1979 Islamic Revolution, the Haqqani school activities were focused more on cultural shift rather than on the revolution. In addition, they established links with institutions similarly inclined such as the Dar Rah-e Haq (the Right Path) center run by Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah and the Maktab-e Islam (School of Islam) center run by Ayatollah Naser Makarem-Shirazi. Makarem-Shirazi also founded the Imam Ali, Imam Hassan Mujtaba, and Imam Hossein schools. Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s Publicity Institutes (Moasesat-e Dar al-Tabliq) provided much of the funding for these centers. Their main activities consisted of writing articles and publishing magazines. Interestingly, the individuals associated with them did not engage in serious ant regime activities.⁵², ⁵³, ⁵⁴

The Haqqani School became more active after the 1978–1979 revolution. After the rise of Iran’s radical clergy to power in 1979, Haqqani