Parallelism in Revolution: The Cases of France, Germany, and Iran

By Matthew C. Wells Ph.D.

Read the book which predicted the rise of the radical Islamic right in Iran. Originally released in August 1999 under the title Democratic Transitions and the Weber/Freud Connection, the book noted that the government in Iran was in jeopardy of being usurped by radical right-wing forces. The predictions contained in this work were based on Dr. Matthew C. Wells theory of Political Parallelism. In light of recent political events (i.e., the triumph of the Abadgaran faction in 2004 parliamentary elections and the recent election of Iranian neo-con Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the presidency), this book has become all the more timely.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Oct 14, 2005
• ISBN: 9781462803040

Matthew C. Wells Ph.D.

Dr. Matthew C. Wells received his Ph.D. in political science in 1999. His major area of concentration is in comparative politics. Dr. Wells has taught courses on political philosophy, the Middle East, and Europe at both Kent State University and John Carroll University. He has also been an independent security consultant for the US Navy (Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic Iran, Iraq, Mid-East, etc.). Dr. Wells is also the director of The Center for the Study of Political Parallelism (www.parallelism.org), and is a founding member of the Society for the Policy Sciences at Yale University.

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Copyright © 2005 by Matthew C. Wells, Ph.D.

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Contents

PREFACE

CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 6

CHAPTER 7

CHAPTER 8

REFERENCES

PREFACE

"The concept of the ‘clash of civilizations’ is not right. We need to talk about

the parallelism and bonds of harmony that exist amongst the various religions

and civilizations, not their respective divergence."

Shirin Ebadi, 2003 Nobel Laureate

Frontline interview, November 22, 2003

The following treatise was originally a dissertation completed in April 1999, and released under the title Democratic Transitions and the Weber/Freud Connection: The Cases of the First French Republic (1789-1799), Weimar Germany (19181934), and Islamic Iran (1979-present). In many ways the dissertation was a prequel to the ground breaking book, Parallelism a Handbook of Social Analysis: The Study of Revolution and Hegemonic War (2002). In the original document the methodology and theoretical underpinnings of the theory of Parallelism were laid out, and the nature of revolution and revolutionary behavior were linked to the broader subject areas of democratic and political transitions.

In this work a detailed comparison of the case studies was presented and a number of conclusions concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran were drawn. It was argued that if Iran continued to follow the historical pattern that the so-called reform movement would falter and that the radical right would ultimately gain control over the political system. It was argued that Iran would succumb to some form of Bonapartism/Fascism, and that the situation was ripe for the rise of new paternalistic right-wing factions. The takeover was likely to occur through coup- de-etat (Bonapartism) or elections (Fascism). The following excerpt from the conclusion explains this more fully:

Of all of these possibilities, the last seems the most likely. From a theoretical perspective, Iranian voters have already shown their lack of confidence in fraternalism. Indeed, every faction associated with government since the death of Khomeini has been violently rejected in one election or another. It would seem that since the death of the Imam, the public has been searching for a new arch-father to deliver Iran from its woes. It is possible to interpret the masses electoral fickleness as a longing for the father, a longing which may soon result in the election/selection of new leaders to lead Iran into the next millennium. Indeed, demographic changes within the Iranian electorate (e.g., the growth of fatherless families, the youthfulness of the electorate) might facilitate the rise of such a father-surrogate, one who could conceivably be elected president or speaker of parliament on the platform of systemic reform. Not unlike Bonaparte, he could claim to be the fulfillment of the revolution and a true follower of the Imam (Khomeini).

Since the release of this treatise, Islamic Iran has seen the electoral defeat of the reform movement in local elections (2003), parliamentary elections (2004), and presidential elections (2005). Iran has likewise seen the emergence of a new radical right-wing faction known as Etelaf-e Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami (literally Developers of Islamic Iran). This group has been able to dominate parliament, nominate speaker Haddad Adel, and get its chosen candidate, former Revolutionary Guardsman Mahmud Ahmadinejad, elected to the presidency. As a result, this analysis has become all the more important as it shows the theoretical validity and predictive power of the theory of Parallelism.

The following treatise is being presented in its original, unaltered form, so that the reader can determine for themselves how effectively the theory works.

Best,

Matthew C. Wells, Ph.D.

CHAPTER 1

TRANSITIONS AS CURRENTLY CONCEIVED

Transitions from authoritarian/totalitarian forms of rule to democratic ones have become the subject of renewed interest. This can be traced in large measure to the collapse of Communism and the growth of democracies world-wide. Some have seen it as a triumph for democracy. Others regard it as proof of the Western world’s superior economic practices, and still others as simply one more in a series of transitions and counter-transitions. All of this has resulted in a proliferation of explanations, speculations, hypothesis, and theories.

In this dissertation I am approaching transitions by making reference both to the psychological theories of Sigmund Freud and the sociological theories of Max Weber. Chapter 1 begins by reviewing some of the relevant literature dealing with transitions—namely, consensualist, economic, culturalist, and voluntarist approaches—and notes three problematic areas common to the various approaches. All of these shortcomings relate to the ongoing agent/structure debate now taking place within political science.1 Likewise, all relate to the various level of analysis (whether micro or macro), the ways in which values are addressed, and the inability of scholars to uncover one consistent pattern of transition. Chapter 2 addresses these three problem areas by suggesting an alternative conceptual framework which combines both Weber and Freud, while simultaneously integrating micro and macro processes and positing a consistent pattern of transition. It is argued that existing political systems are predominately those modeled after the patriarchal household, the two main types being paternalism and fraternalism, and that transitions involve a fundamental social transformation from one form to another; thus transitional political systems are ones which are an admixture of paternalism and fraternalism. The methodological approach is based on both Weber’s notion of the ideal-type as well as Lasswell’s notion of the developmental construct. Chapter 3 further explicates this approach and puts some meat on the bone by describing in greater detail the characteristics and values that define paternalism and fraternalism.

Chapters 6 and 7, change direction by applying this approach to the selected case studies outlined in Chapter 2 (France, 1789-1799; Germany, 1918-1934; Iran, 1979-present) by examining both the legal/political systems of the three cases as well as the behavior of their ruling elites. It is argued that these three political systems are examples of transitional political systems and, as such, are a combination of conflicting values and characteristics. As a result, they are also unstable. Analysis of the French First Republic and the German Weimar Republic is designed to aid in forecasting future outcomes in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Chapter 8 concludes by returning to theory for the purpose of forecasting potential outcomes for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Transitions to Democracy and Vice Versa

Remmer (1991) notes a number of ways in which scholars have reacted to the wave of democratic transitions that swept the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The first and perhaps most important reaction has been a return to older approaches, most notably those dealing with culture, economics and political consensuality. These approaches are largely deductive in character and seek to explain transitions by making reference to theory; however, some are structuralist and seek to explain transition by making reference to underlying and unobservable structural factors. An alternative reaction has been largely inductive, what Remmer refers as barefoot empiricism. Scholars pursuing this strategy have sought to develop relevant theories from the information obtained during the recent wave of transitions. A third reaction has been basically postmodern and/or voluntarist. The argument made by these scholars is that there is no consistent pattern for transitions and that each case must be regarded as unique.

What becomes clear from all of these approaches is that there are a variety of ways in which transitions have been studied, and in the pages that follow, some of these approaches will be examined in greater detail.

Political Consensuality and Cooperation

One way in which scholars have reacted to transitions has been to revive and revise elite theory. The main arguments have revolved around the ways in which consensus is established. This rebirth of elite theory is not surprising since it has always been concerned with making distinctions between authoritarian and democratic forms of elites. Pareto (1984), in particular, was interested in transitions, and while he argued that a state could never exist without some form of elite, he did differentiate between authoritarian and democratic elites. He referred to elites in democratic states as plutocratic. Plutocratic elites rule by virtue of the agreements and/or pacts which they form with one another. In modern societies this has led to the creation of representative democratic institutions. The plutocratic elite dominates the structures and institutions which it creates through deceit and manipulative dealings (Pareto 1984, p. 56).

Michels (1949) makes similar arguments. In his discussion of the «iron law of oligarchy,» he argues that elites will exist in any kind of organization, even so- called democratic ones. Unlike their authoritarian counterparts, democratic elites control organizations through laws and rules of succession. If rules of succession are successful in mitigating conflict, then they will ultimately lead to the establishment of a stable oligarchy.

It was these ideas, among others, that prompted scholars to reexamine elite approaches. Nonetheless, there were a number of problems that had to be confronted before elite theory could be effectively employed, most of which related to elite theory’s unsuccessful attempts to establish linkages between elites and civil society. While each approach deals differently with the problem of linkages, nearly all of these approaches accept the importance of political consensus.

Elite settlement theory (Burton & Higley, 1987, 1989; Field & Higley, 1980; Higley, Burton & Field, 1990; Lachmann, 1990) represents a return to the idea of elite cooperation, consensus, and pact-making, but unlike older approaches seeks to link elite behavior to civil society. Elite settlement theory argues that there are basically three kinds of elites: consensually unified (democratic elites), ideologically unified (authoritarian/totalitarian), and disunified (mixed). Consensually unified elites are stable because they establish basic agreements governing interaction. They respect the rules of political etiquette and the norms of political interaction. Ideologically unified elites are stable as well. They mitigate conflict by having the same normative beliefs and/ or by toeing the party-line.

Opposed to unified elites are disunified elites. Because there is no overarching ideology or consensus, there is instability. This manifests itself in the form of arbitrary arrests, killing, imprisonment, or political expulsions. Stability can be achieved in basically two ways: 1) through the triumph of an ideologically unified faction, or 2) through the establishment of a pact whereby the major factions come to some kind of an agreement on the rules of political interaction. This is called an elite settlement. Elite settlement theory also seeks to rectify some of the problems associated with earlier approaches by linking elite attitudes to those of civil society. It basically argues that elite attitudes must correspond to those in civil society.

Another approach that accents the role of elites in the transition process is democratic-elite theory (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993). Like the aforementioned approaches, this model argues that elite cooperation insures political stability in times of economic or political crisis. This theory points to the importance of pacts and institutional checks on power. It differs slightly, however, from other elite approaches in that it assigns greater autonomy to elites and sub-elites in the creation of democratic systems. Since it is elites and/or former sub-elites that ultimately write constitutions, the systems they create are more likely to reflect their values than those of civil society. If elites value consensuality, they will divide up power equally among the various branches of government, and work together to preserve the system they create. This ultimately translates into cooperation among majority and minority elite factions over central key issues.

This theory also marks a return to Pareto‘s concept of elite relativity, in that it argues that elites will exist and have a disproportionate influence in any organization or group. If elites cooperate with one another, this will set an example for those in civil society to follow. Elites in this regard are „trend setters" for civil society. If they are effective in their dealings with one another this will mitigate conflict within civil society.

Another argument that deals with consensuality revolves around the concept of consociationalism (Ascher, 1994; Lipjhart, 1974, 1991; Lorwin, 1974). Consociational theory has much in common with elite settlement theory. Consociationalism basically means cooperation among elites with the deliberate aim of preserving the political system. This results in „policy-making arrangements that allow for non-majoritarian input and influence, and setting certain issues beyond debate and action" (Ascher, 1994, p. 7). Consociational theory tends to focus on small, yet highly bifurcated, societies. When majorities tyrannize smaller groups the system becomes unstable and may break down. This may result in civil strife and/or the triumph of authoritarian factions. If elites fail to recognize the dangers of fragmentation, or fail to forge viable solutions, the political system collapses. It is for these reasons that elites must be attentive to changes and disruptions within civil society.

A large number of case studies employ elite consensual and/or consociational approaches. In his discussion of elitism in Latin America, Farfan-Hernandez (1992) puts consociational theory to the test, refuting dependency explanations of transitions. He argues that consociational explanations are superior because they accent the role of rational cooperation among social actors and citizens. Lijphart (1991), in his discussion of Latin America, concurs, and notes a number of criteria that consociational states need in order to preserve democracy. First, there must be room for democratic engineering. Elites and those in civil society need to allow for democratic experimentation. Individuals must accept that mistakes will invariably be made and that this is unavoidable. Second, newly created democratic institutions need to be more accommodating and consensual. Minority rights need to be respected. Majorities should not be allowed to ride roughshod over their opposition. Third, for disunified societies, parliamentary systems, not presidential ones, are best. This is because parliamentary systems force factions to cooperate with one another in order to control government. Fourth, countries with large populations require federal institutions which allow for greater local participation. Autonomy in local regions serves to appease minority groups and helps to build a sense of belonging. And finally, institutions in general need to be stronger so that political actors and elites cannot circumvent or operate outside of them in patrimonial fashion.

Other approaches deal with the idea of building consensus not only among elites but within civil society. Oxhorn (1994) also refers to Pareto‘s concept of elite relativity. In his analysis of the role played by popular social movements in the transition process, he argues that consensus established between sub-elites at the local level plays just as significant a role in the transition process as agreements at the top. Consensus is something that has to be built and accepted not only by elites but by those in civil society. This alleviates instability by replacing populism with popular participation.

Desai and Habib (1995) take a similar position in their analysis of South African trade unions. Unlike other approaches dealing with strategic alliances and pact building, these authors link consensus to participation in other kinds of social grouping (e.g., cultural, professional, community, corporatist). In the case of South Africa, these common links facilitated a resurgence in trade unionism and an acceleration of the transition process. In this regard, consensus was first established at the sub-elite level (they were the trend setters), and it was elites who moved towards them.

A similar argument is made by Bozoki and Sukosd (1993). In their discussion of Eastern European transitions, they argue that consensus first occurred among counter-elites and within civil society, and that it was elites who were the latecomers. Because elites gravitated toward consensual trends among sub-elites and within civil society instead of resisting them, the transition process was less violent or revolutionary than it might have otherwise been. Linkages between elite attitudes and those of civil society are thus very important. If trends toward consensus are accepted and cultivated within civil society, then the stronger civil society will become, and the culture will consequently become more participatory and less populist; however, if consensus fails to take hold, civil society will grow weak and more prone to populist leaders. This argument mimics one made by Campeanu (1992) who argues that this tendency towards populism is exacerbated by the lack of a pre-existing political system through which conflict and disagreement can be peacefully negotiated. Consensus at both the elite and non-elite level restricts the ability of transitional systems to realize both stable democracy and economic restructuring.

Because elite and consociational theorists accent the importance of cooperation and consensuality, they also tend to focus on the institutions that regulate conflict (Burstein, 1996; Burton & Higley, 1987; Field & Higley, 1980; Stena, 1996). Stena (1996) argues that the institutions created in Slovakia after gaining independence from Serbia, while democratic in character, possess a number of flaws which contribute to the instability of the state. Most of these institutions promote nationalist, not democratic, ideals. In a similar vein, Field (1980) suggests that elites who are disunified create institutions which are compromises between authoritarian and democratic values, and as such are incompatible with one another. Division among elite factions thus leads to divisions within the new system. Burstein (1996) agrees and contends that much of elite divisiveness can be traced to newly created institutions. Part of the problem arises from the mythology surrounding democracy itself. Individuals within civil society believe that the creation of democratic institutions will displace elites and put power in the hands of the masses. This, however, does not occur because the iron law of oligarchy prohibits it. While the creation of democratic bodies does make government more responsive to the demands of the public, many of these demands are not met because of political favoritism. Interest groups and the wealthy have a disproportionate influence because of their own economic power, for example, while those in civil society become disillusioned with democratic structures and long for a return to authoritarianism. This, in turn, leads to disunity within the elite, and competition between authoritarian and democratic factions.

In all of these approaches there are a number of central themes. The real strength of consensual approaches lies in the argument that consensus and cooperation are central to the establishment and stability of democratic political systems. Another strength is the accentuation of pact-building which plays a critical role in the creation of political systems. Likewise, the new consensual approaches are much broader than their predecessors and there is a clear attempt to link elite behavior to civil society.

There are, however, a number of weaknesses in these approaches. The first is that they fail to explain the various values that underlie different elite formations. While there seems to be agreement on the values that link democratic elites (i.e., consensus, cooperation), there is disagreement over the values that underlie authoritarian and totalitarian elites. Some argue that it is ideology that unifies elites, but this remains problematic since many authoritarian elites have no common ideology. Others argue that it is submission and loyalty that are valued. Still others argue that authoritarian elites are linked not by values, but by force of arms.

Elite approaches likewise tend to downplay psychological and cultural factors in the transition process. This is to some degree understandable, especially in light of theoretical focus; however, the shortage of linkages to other approaches limits explanatory power. While it is agreed that pact-building and consensuality are central to the transition process, questions arise as to how the values of consensuality emerge within predominately authoritarian societies.

Economic and Structural Approaches

While consensual approaches tend to focus on micro-processes which shape political outcomes, economic and structural approaches tend to focus on macro-processes. Some economic approaches that have received attention are modernization and equilibrium theory (Apter, 1967; Cutright, 1963; Dix, 1994; Huntington, 1984; Lipset, 1959; Marsh, 1991; Pye, 1991). Both modernization and equilibrium theory argue that there is a positive relationship between a country’s socio-economic development and its political development. Preindustrial societies typically have some form of traditional authoritarian rule (e.g., monarchy, feudalism, patrimonialism, bureaucratic authoritarianism), whereas industrialized societies tend to have some form of democratic institutions (e.g., parliaments, legislatures). Both theories argue that societies which experience profound economic development will have accompanying political and social changes leading to democracy, the main reason being that greater wealth means a rise in the middle class and income equality. These groups in turn make greater demands on the political system. Modernization theory explains the statistical correlation between high economic levels and democracy by making reference to social disruptions at the grass roots level.

Unlike theories that focus on micro-processes, those studying transitions from this perspective tend to employ empirical forms of analysis. It was the collapse of the Soviet Union and states in Eastern Europe that prompted Pye (1991) to argue that modernization theory has been vindicated. While anomalies remain (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Portugal), for the most part, states with the highest GNP per capita do tend to have the most viable democracies.

Other economic theories like dependency, world systems, and structuralism contest these claims. A number of authors (Cardoso, 1986; Chase-Dunn, 1990; Evans, 1979; Ng, 1993; O‘Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Rueschemeyer & Evans, 1985; Skocpol, 1985) note that despite economic development, authoritarian regimes persist. This is particularly true in the case of Latin America throughout the 1960s and 1970s where there was a wave of dictatorships and a rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. While modernization theory can explain some aspects of the developed world, it cannot explain newly industrialized countries.

Dependency and world-system theorists contend that the patterns of the most wealthy states (i.e., the core states) is not being repeated in the developing world (semi-periphery, periphery); instead, the late developing states are most likely to generate economic inequalities and social disequilibria which advantage autocratic governments and pre-existing economic elites. States in the core are thus more likely to have stable democracies, whereas states in the semi-periphery are more likely to have transitional forms of government or dictatorships (Bollen, 1988; Korzeniewicz & Awbrey, 1992). Economic crisis thus plays a critical role in the transition process (Ng, 1994; Vilas & Pineyro, 1992). While economic crisis may bring down autocratic regimes, the governments that replace them are unlikely to be fully functioning democracies and are likely to be weak. While economic change may bring about change in government, economic inequality remains a problem, thus leaving open the door to a return to dictatorship and populist leaders.

Both dependency and world-system approaches derive many of their ideas from Marxian theory which argues that economic transformations lead to political transformations. As states become increasingly capitalist, government increasingly becomes the instrument of the new capitalist class, which establishes parliamentary procedures. Because economic inequality in civil society persists, the dominant class controls the system through its wealth. Economic crisis, however, can often cause the collapse of these fledgling democracies and a return to authoritarian rule, a phenomenon known as Bonapartism. Because the state has some degree of autonomy, there are instances in which democracies will succumb to dictatorship.

In this context, Mouzelis (1996) argues that the rise of military and/or autocratic regimes in Latin America are actually political crises within civil society itself and arise from long-term economic transformation. The flip-flop effect results not from short-term economic back-sliding, but rather is a manifestation of long-term consequences of capitalism and the inequalities in wealth it generates. Industrialization creates political crisis.

Both modernization-equilibrium and dependency-world systems theory have a number of strengths. The great strength of modernization approaches is that they can empirically show correlations between economic prosperity and democracy. There is in fact a tendency for economically viable states to be more democratic. The same is true of dependency approaches: They, too, can show correlations justifying their claim that industrialization does not solve problems overnight, i.e., that industrialization does not insure a smooth transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Authoritarian regimes have proven to be surprisingly resilient in their ability to adapt to economic changes. Even modernization theorists like Pye (1985) have admitted as much.

The weakness of both approaches is not in the empirical correlations which they have uncovered, but rather in their causal explanations. Both approaches show correlations, but have experienced limited success in making convincing causal linkages. Likewise, both tend to be economically reductionist. In both approaches there is a tendency to ignore the cyclical nature of democratic transition. Modernization theory tends to focus on long-term analysis, and thus the theory has limited applicablity in predicting short-term outcomes. On the one hand, it is clear that modernization and industrialization play some role in the development of democratic institutions, but on the other hand, democracy also occurs in the absence of industrialization (primitive and/or nomadic social structures, the polis, interest groups, fraternal/sororital associations). In a number of states (e.g., Britain, Norway, U.S.), democracy was established before the rise of modern capitalism. Modernization theory also tends to downplay the massive social disruptions that industrialized states experienced in the transition process. Most democratic states (the U.S. excepted) did not become stable overnight, and many experienced long periods of revolution, counter-revolution, and civil war.

The same may be said of world systems theory, which in a quest to prove the dependency of the developing world, focuses too exclusively on short-term trends while ignoring similar flip-flops between authoritarianism and democracy in Europe (e.g., Britain, France, Germany, Italy). This focus ignores long-term trends, whether towards and/or away from democracy. Because world systems theorists have accepted Marxist (and/or modernization) claims that European democracy was purely an outgrowth of capitalist wealth, they argue that democracy in the developing world cannot be realized without a leveling in wealth among states. Thus democratization can only be achieved through the massive redistribution of wealth from core states to those in the periphery and semi-periphery. The problem with this argument is that democracies can and have existed in impoverished communities (e.g., the Kung San tribe in Botswana, the Semai people of Malaysia). In a similar vein, the institutional foundation for democracy in states like Britain and Sweden appeared during the mercantilist and not the industrial revolution. Initially these systems were somewhat oligarchic. It was only later that they developed into liberal democracies of the modern type.

Both modernization and dependency approaches, unlike their elite counterparts, also downplay the role of consensual values in the transition process. It is here that modernization and industrialization have had their greatest impact. Conflict management and resolution strategies are fundamentally different in authoritarian and democratic societies. Authoritarian societies tend to regard violence as a legitimate means of resolving dispute, whereas democratic societies tend to resolve conflict more peacefully through the acceptance of rules, regulations, and norms. Modernization not only alters the skills of the population but the way in which conflict is resolved as well. What is lacking and/or weak in both approaches is an explanation as to why economic transformation results in changes regarding conflict resolution. While it is clear that profound economic transformations do alter value structures among elites, counter-elites and the masses, neither modernization nor dependency approaches addresses this issue sufficiently. Economic analysis of transition thus needs better integration with value-oriented approaches. Because value change can and does occur in the absence of economic transformation, it cannot be said with certainty that modernization causes democracy, that it will, in deterministic fashion, bring with it political pluralism. In order for economic change to bring about such a transformation, the economic change must serve to alter the ways in which individuals regard conflict.

Culturalist and Historical Approaches

Almond and Verba’s (1963) seminal work, The Civic Culture, set a trend within political science. In their study, Almond and Verba conclude that states with different political systems have corresponding political cultures. The first type they identify, participatory culture, appears in stable democratic and/or modern totalitarian systems. These are systems in which the population has greater interest in the political process and is more aware of the inner workings of government. A second type, subject culture, is linked to authoritarian systems. These cultures are ones in which citizens largely think of themselves as subjects of government. They identify with the state, but do not feel the need to have a greater voice in the political process. Their knowledge of government is minimal. A third type, parochial culture, is identified with traditional political systems. This culture is one in which the citizens have little or no knowledge of their government. They tend to be isolated in their own communities and unconcerned with politics.

Political culture studies go hand in hand with modernization theories. Capitalist development is the engine of change. As states modernize, their cultures become increasingly participatory. Once again this is a long-term process.

Another cultural approach that set important trends was pluralism (Dahl, 1956; Lijphart, 1991; Lindblom, 1965). Pluralists, like elite theorists, address the problematic nature of existing definitions of democracy. Thus Dahl (1956) created the term polyarchy, a political system with a number of institutional arrangements that permit public participation. A polyarchy differs from an authoritarian form of rule because it allows the public to express its demands. Cultures which exist within polyarchies are defined as pluralist, because a plurality of interests is expressed. Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy entail fundamental changes within both popular culture and relevant political institutions and reflect the desires of the population to play a greater role in the political process. Thus pluralists refute elite claims that a minority of individuals always dominates transitions.

Other approaches accent the role of culture as well. A number of scholars studying culture have come to challenge claims made by elite theorists that democracy is purely and/or primarily a product of elite/counter-elite pact making (Barajas, 1992; Edles, 1995; Harrison, 1985; Inglehart, 1988; Kazancigil, 1991; Muni, 1991; Nzouankeu, 1991; Roniger, 1989; Wiarda, 1995). While most cultural approaches accept the importance of consensuality, they argue that it is often overstated, and that elite approaches ignore complexities and are overly simplistic. While there has been a move within elite theory towards integrating civil society, these have not gone far enough. Moves toward political consensuality must first appear in civil society before changes within the political system can be altered, and historical events often delegitimize violence as a means of resolving disputes.

A large number of case studies have employed culturalist and historical approaches. Huntington (1991), in